In our blog article IMF warns of the long-term need for fiscal consolidation we highlighted the concerns that the IMF had about the size of public debt-to-GDP ratios in those countries with weak fiscal credibility. Since 1997 the UK has undertaken a series of measures designed to enhance the credibility of fiscal policy and, in particular, to dispel the notion that fiscal policy is unduly sensitive to political needs. Firstly, we have seen the introduction of a Code for Fiscal Stability which outlines a series of principles which should underpin fiscal policy measures. Secondly, in response to the worsening state of the public finances, we have seen the introduction of a Fiscal Responsibility Act which requires governments to outline plans for delivering sound public finances and places a duty on them to deliver them.
The new UK coalition government is now introducing a new independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) which will have responsibility for assessing the public finances and the economy, including the generation of forecasts, and for assessing the public-sector balance sheets (i.e. the sector’s assets and liabilities). The OBR will begin its work immediately in readiness for an ‘emergency Budget’ on the 22nd June. According to the HM Treasury press release on 17 May the OBR will be headed by Sir Alan Budd, an economist who was a founder member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. Sir Alan will head a 3-member Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC) which will be supported by economists and public finance experts currently working in HM Treasury, but who in the longer-term will redeployed from the Treasury. Legislation will be drawn up in order to establish the OBR on a permanent statutory basis.
In arguing the case for the OBR, the government points out that all Budget forecasts since 2000 of public borrowing for more than ‘1 year ahead’ have underestimated borrowing. For instance, the average error for ‘2 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 is £29.5 billion, i.e. borrowing for the financial year after next has, on average, turned out to be £29.5 billion higher than predicted. Of course, we would expect shorter-term forecasts to be more accurate. The evidence presented shows the average error for ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 to be £6 billion, i.e. actual borrowing in the following financial year has, on average, been £6 billion higher than forecast. But, more than this, since 2000 four Budgets – those in 2000, 2006, 2007 and 2009 – have produced ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts that over-predicted levels of borrowing.
While it will certainly be fascinating in the years ahead to assess the accuracy of the OBR’s own crystal ball in forecasting, the creation of the OBR is undoubtedly an interesting development in the way in which fiscal policy is both designed and implemented in the UK.
HM Treasury Press Notice
Chancellor announces policies to enhance fiscal credibility HM Treasury (17/5/10)
Articles
Osborne braced for cuts Financial Times, Lionel Barber, George Parker and Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Chancellor launches audit of government spending Independent, Andrew Woodcock (17/5/10)
Osborne gives up power to forecast Financial Times, Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Why the Office for Budget Responsibility Matters BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (17/5/10)
Osborne confirms new U.K. budget watch dog MarketWatch, William L Watts (17/5/10)
Osborne warns of ‘disastrous consequences’ for economy BBC News, Ben Wright (17/5/10)
Chancellor announces new fiscal watchdog BBC News (17/5/10)
Robert Chote on new OBR BBC Daily Politics, Robert Chote (17/5/10)
George Osborne discovers the joys of kitchen-sinking Telegraph, Tracey Corrigan (17/5/10)
George Osborne tackles Labour’s toxic handover Guardian,
Larry Elliott (17/5/10)
Mixed reaction to Office for Budget Responsibility Public Finance, Jaimie Kaffash (17/5/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of fiscal credibility?
- How important do you think the new OBR will be in enhancing the UK’s fiscal credibility?
- In what other ways have UK governments attempted to enhance the UK’s fiscal credibility in recent years?
- What do you see as the potential economic benefits of enhancing fiscal credibility?
- One of the first things that the incoming Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, did in 1997 was to make the Bank of England independent and create a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to set interest rates. What parallels do you see between the MPC and the newly created Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC)?
Labour’s Chancellor, Alistair Darling, delivered his last budget on the 24th March 2010. However, with the new Coalition government planning to make more substantial cuts and with George Osborne and other ministers claiming to find ‘black holes’ in the budgets left by Labour, an emergency budget will take place on the 22nd June 2010. The Coalition government has agreed to make £6 billion of spending cuts in the current year in a bid to reduce the UK’s substantial budget deficit, which stands at nearly 12% of GDP. Vince Cable told the Times:
I fear that a lot of bad news about the public finances has been hidden and stored up for the new government. The skeletons are starting to fall out of the cupboard.
There are plans to reform capital gains tax, possibly increase VAT to 20% and remove tax credits from some middle-income families. In Alistair Darling’s budget, it was middle-income families who were among the ‘losers’, with tax rises of around £19 billion, and it looks as though middle-income families may be hit again. Throughout the election all parties pledged to continue to help the poorest families, but there appears to be a lot of uncertainty ahead for middle-income families. They are likely to face reduced benefits and higher taxes as the Coalition government tackles the £163 billion deficit.
Despite critics of spending cuts arguing that it could cause a double-dip recession, the government is confident that cutting spending now is the right thing to do. As Osborne told GMTV:
I am pretty clear that the advice from the Governor of the Bank of England was that [cutting spending now] was a sensible thing to do, and if there is waste in Government that people at home are paying for with their taxes, let’s start tackling that now.
Chancellor launches audit of government spending Independent, Andrew Woodcock (17/5/10)
Osborne to give details of £6bn spending cuts next week (including video) BBC News (17/5/10)
Savings cuts to ‘hit middle class families’ BBC News (15/5/10)
Osborne to deliver emergency budget on June 22nd Times Online, Susan Thompson (17/5/10)
David Cameron declares war on public sector pay Telegraph, Rosa Prince (16/5/10)
All eyes on the emergency Budget Financial Times, Matthew Vincent (14/5/10)
Tax rises likely under Coaliation government, says Institute of Fiscal Studies Telegraph, Edmund Conway (13/5/10)
Questions
- What will be the likely impact on middle-income families if proposed spending cuts go ahead? How might this affect the recovery?
- What are the arguments for a) cutting spending now and b) cutting spending later?
- In the future, the Coalition government plans to limit bonus payments. How might this policy affect jobs and recruitment?
- What is the likely impact of the future increase in personal tax allowance? Who will it benefit the most?
- How are the proposals for corporation tax and capital gains tax likely to affect the economic recovery?
- Is a rise in VAT a good policy? Who will it affect the most? Will it reduce consumption and hence aggregate demand or is it likely simply to raise tax revenue? (Hint: Think about the type of tax that VAT is.)
On the 14th May the IMF published its latest Fiscal Monitor. The key message coming out of this was the need for countries to reduce their public debt ratios, i.e. public debt relative to GDP. Specifically, the IMF is arguing that public debt ratios should be reduced to their ‘post-crisis levels’. In effect, this means countries need to undertake fiscal consolidation. The IMF recognises that the pace of fiscal consolidation should reflect underlying fiscal and macroeconomic conditions, but warns of the dangers of not doing so especially in those countries where the credibility of the current and medium-term fiscal position is weakest.
Underpinning the IMF’s argument for fiscal consolidation is their concern that higher public debt ratios necessitate higher interest rates in order to entice investors to purchase government debt. In those countries with weak fiscal credibility, a sizeable interest rate premium may be needed to entice investors to hold government debt over other types of investments. For instance, we have seen how the markets reacted to the perceived lack of fiscal credibility in Greece and how a series of measures, as discussed in Fixing the Euro: a long term solution or mere sticking plaster were needed to both restore normality to debt markets and to prevent contagion in markets for other country’s public debt.
The IMF argues that the impact of higher interest rates from high public debt-to-GDP ratios would be to reduce an economy’s potential growth. The mechanism by which this would happen would primarily be a reduction of labour productivity growth resulting from lower levels of investment and, hence, from slower growth in the country’s capital stock.
In short, the IMF is arguing that without credible fiscal consolidation plans, countries – particularly advanced economies – run a real risk of restricting their rate of economic growth over the longer-term. Of course, the challenge is to implement fiscal consolidation plans that protect short-term growth by cementing the current economic recovery but do not hinder longer-term growth. Now that is a real challenge!
Report
Fiscal Monitor, May 14 2010 IMF
Articles
IMF Says Rising Public Debt Risk ‘Cannot Be Ignored’ Bloomberg Businessweek, Sandrine Rastello (14/5/10)
US faces one of the biggest crunches in the world – IMF Telegraph, Edmund Conway (14/5/10)
IMF says that developed countries must curb their deficits BBC News (14/5/10)
Outlook for rich economies worsening – IMF Eurasia Review (14/5/10)
Britain’s public debt falls under IMF focus Financial Times, Alan Beattie (15/5/10)
Advanced Economies Face Tougher, Not Impossible, Fiscal Adjustment MarketNews.com, Heather Scott (14/5/10)
A good squeeze The Economist (31/3/10)
Data
IMF Data and Statistic Portal IMF
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- Evaluate the argument put forward by the IMF that fiscal consolidation is necessary to prevent harming long-term economic growth.
- What are the economic dangers of consolidating a country’s fiscal position too quickly?
- What do you understand by short-run and long-term economic growth?
- What do you understand by potential growth?
- What could a government do to increase the perceived credibility of its fiscal position?
The incoming coalition government in the UK has been spelling out its fiscal policy. It is sticking to the Conservative pledge of cutting £6bn from government spending this fiscal year (6 April 2010 to 5 April 2011). It hopes to make most of these by ‘efficiency savings’ – in other words, providing the same level of service for less money. It has, however, said that it will take advice from the Treasury and the Bank of England as to whether the cuts need to be delayed if the economy weakens substantially.
But the Bank of England is forecasting a continuation of the recovery (see its latest Inflation Report below), even assuming no further quantitative easing beyond the £200bn of assets purchased by the Bank. The Governor, Mervyn King, feels that the economy can indeed bear the proposed £6bn cut in government spending and that this will also send an important signal to the market that the government is committed to reducing the deficit.
The new government has also said that it will honour the Liberal Democrat pledge to raise the personal tax free allowance on income tax to £10,000. It has also backtracked somewhat on the Conservative pledge not to raise national insurance. Only employers will be spared the rise; employees will have to pay it.
So has there been a major change in fiscal policy? Has the focus moved from one of maintaining aggregate demand in order to avoid falling back into recession to one of making a start on tackling the deficit straight away? Or is the change in emphasis more one of presentation than substance? The following webcasts looks at the new fiscal policy emerging from number 11 and at the latest forecasts for growth and inflation.
Webcasts
What kind of medicine is the economy going to be fed? BBC Newsnight, Paul Mason (13/5/10)
Policy breakdown for Lib Dem-Conservative coalition BBC News, James Landale (12/5/10)
Savings cuts to ‘hit middle class families’ BBC News, Keith Doyle (15/5/10)
Inflation Report, May 2010 Bank of England (click on Watch Webcast) (12/5/10)
Documents and data
Coalition Agreement published (see here for text of agreement) Conservative Party (11/5/10)
Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition negotiations agreements Liberal Democrats (11/5/10)
Inflation Report, May 2010 (portal) Bank of England, see in particular:
Articles
Department by department, what the new Government plans to do Independent (13/5/10)
VAT rise looms as coalition deal adds estimated £10bn to debt Guardian, Katie Allen and Julia Kollewe (13/5/10)
Some initial reaction to the Tory / Lib Dem coalition agreement Institute for Fiscal Studies Press Release, Robert Chote and Mike Brewery (12/5/10)
Tax rises likely under coalition government, says Institute for Fiscal Studies Telegraph, Edmund Conway (13/5/10)
Give and take BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (12/5/10)
Questions
- What ground has been given by (a) the Conservatives; (b) the Liberal Democrats in terms of their proposed economic policies (see Looking at the manifestos for details of their proposed policies).
- What will be the implications of a £6bn cut in government spending on aggregate demand? What other determinants of aggregate demand need to be taken into account in order to assess the likely growth in GDP over the coming months?
- What are the distributional consequences of (a) a rise in the personal income tax allowance to £10,000; (b) a rise in VAT?
- Has there been a major change in fiscal policy?
In the past few days, the euro has been under immense speculative pressure. The trigger for this has been the growing concern about whether Greece would be able to force through austerity measures and cut its huge deficit and debt. Also there has been the concern that much of Greece’s debt is in the form of relatively short-term bonds, many of which are coming up for maturity and thus have to be replaced by new bonds. For example, on 19 May, Greece needs to repay €8.5 billion of maturing bonds. But with Greek bonds having been given a ‘junk’ status by one of the three global rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Greece would find it difficult to raise the finance and would have to pay very high interest on bonds it did manage to sell – all of which would compound the problem of the deficit.
Also there have been deep concerns about a possible domino effect. If Greece’s debt is perceived to be unsustainable at 13.5% of GDP (in 2009), then speculators are likely to turn their attention to other countries in the eurozone with large deficits: countries such as Portugal (9.4%), Ireland (14.3%) and Spain (11.2%). With such worries, people were asking whether the euro would survive without massive international support, both from within and outside the eurozone. At the beginning of 2010, the euro was trading at $1.444. By 7 May, it was trading at $1.265, a depreciation of 12.4% (see the Bank of England’s Statistical Interactive Database – interest & exchange rates data
If the euro were in trouble, then shock waves would go around the world. Worries about such contagion have already been seen in plummeting stock markets. Between 16 April and 7 May, the FTSE100 index in London fell from 5834 to 5045 (a fall of 13.5%). In New York, the Dow Jones index fell by 8.6% over the same period and in Tokyo, the Nikkei fell by 7.6%. By 5 May, these declines were gathering pace as worries mounted.
Crisis talks took place over the weekend of the 8/9 May between European finance ministers and, to the surprise of many, a major package of measures was announced. This involves setting aside €750bn to support the eurozone. The package had two major elements: (a) €60bn from EU funds (to which all 27 EU countries contribute) to be used for loans to eurozone countries in trouble; (b) a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’), which would be funded partly by eurozone countries which would provide €440bn and partly by the IMF which would provide a further €250bn. The SPV would be used to give loans or loan guarantees to eurozone countries, such as Greece, which were having difficulty in raising finance because of worries by investors. The effect would also be to support the euro through a return of confidence in the single currency.
In addition to these measures, the European Central Bank announced that it would embark on a ‘Securities Markets Programme’ involving the purchase of government bonds issued by eurozone countries in difficulties. According to the ECB, it would be used to:
.. conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which are dysfunctional. The objective of this programme is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Does this amount to quantitative easing, as conducted by the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England? The intention is that it would not do so, as the ECB would remove liquidity from other areas of the market to balance the increased liquidity provided to countries in difficulties. This would be achived by selling securities of stronger eurozone countries, such as Germany and France.
In order to sterilise the impact of the above interventions, specific operations will be conducted to re-absorb the liquidity injected through the Securities Markets Programme. This will ensure that the monetary policy stance will not be affected.
So will the measures solve the problems? Or are they merely a means of buying time while the much tougher problem is addressed: that of getting deficits down?
Webcasts and podcasts
Rescue plan bolsters the euro BBC News, Gavin Hewitt (10/5/10)
The EU rescue plan explained Financial Times, Chris Giles, Emily Cadman, Helen Warrell and Steve Bernard (10/5/10)
Peston: ‘Crisis is not over’ BBC Today Programme (10/5/10)
Greece ‘will get into even more deep water’ BBC Today Programme (11/5/10)
Articles
EU ministers offer 750bn-euro plan to support currency (including video) BBC News (10/5/10)
EU sets up crisis fund to protect euro from market ‘wolves’ Independent, Vanessa Mock (10/5/10)
Euro strikes back with biggest gamble in its 11-year history Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
Debt crisis: £645bn rescue package for euro reassures markets … for now Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
The E.U.’s $950 Billion Rescue: Just the Beginning Time, Leo Cendrowicz (10/5/10)
Eurozone bail-out (portal) Financial Times
Bailout does not address Europe’s deep-rooted woes: Experts moneycontrol.com (11/5/10)
An ever-closer Union? BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (10/5/10)
Eurozone crisis is ‘postponed’ BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (10/5/10)
Multi-billion euro rescue buys time but no solution BBC News, Lucy Hooker (11/5/10)
No going back The Economist (13/5/10)
It is not Greece that worries EURO: It is China that teeters on a collapse Investing Contrarian, Shaily (11/5/10)
Data and official sources
For deficit and debt data see sections 16.3 and 18.1 in:
Ameco Online European Commision, Economic and Financial Affairs DG
For the ECB statement see:
10 May 2010 – ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets ECB Press Release
Questions
- Why should the measures announced by the European finance ministers help to support the euro in the short term?
- Why should the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme not result in quantitative easing?
- Explain what is meant by sterlisation in the context of open market operations.
- What will determine whether the measures are a long-term success?
- Explain why there may be a moral hazard in coming to the rescue of ailing economies in the eurozone. How might such a moral hazard be minimised?
- Why should concerns about Greece lead to stock market declines around the world?
- What is the significance of China in the current context?