For the past three years the Japanese yen has been appreciating against the US dollar and many other currencies. From the end of June 2007 to 14 September 2010, the yen appreciated from ¥100 = $0.81 to ¥100 = $1.20 (a 48% appreciation). Over the same period the yen exchange rate index rose from 113.3 to 172.4 (a 52% appreciation). The rising yen has been impeding Japan’s recovery as it has made its exports more expensive, while, at the same time, making imports cheaper and thus making it harder for domestic firms to compete.
Until 14 September 2010, the yen was freely floating. But on 15 September, the Japanese central bank decided to intervene by selling yen and buying dollars and other currencies.
But why had the yen risen so strongly? There are four main reasons.
The first is the persistent Japanese trade surpluses, partly stimulated by falling costs of production in Japan.
The second is the unwinding of the carry trade. Before the banking crisis of 2007/8, many banks and other financial institutions borrowed yen, given the low interest rates in Japan, and used the yen to purchase dollars and pounds, given the much higher interest rates in the USA and the UK. The effect of this ‘carry trade’, as it was known, was to drive up the exchange rates of the dollar and sterling and drive down the value of the yen. This encouraged further speculation as people sold yen in anticipation of further depreciation and purchased dollars and sterling in anticipation of further appreciation. With the banking crisis, however, short-term financial flows decreased and the current account became more important in determining exchange rates. The carry trade began to unwind and people began selling dollars and sterling and buying yen. What is more, towards the end of 2008, interest rates were reduced substantially in the USA and the UK in order to stimulate aggregate demand. The interest rate differential between Japan and the USA and UK virtually disappeared. This further encouraged the purchase of yen and the sale of dollars and sterling as carry trade investors began paying back their loans to Japan.The third reason for the appreciation of the yen is the actions of the Chinese who have used their surpluses to buy other currencies: originally mainly dollars, but increasingly yen.
The fourth reason is speculation. As the yen has risen, so increasingly people have bought yen in anticipation of further appreciation. But, of course, this speculation has brought about the very effect the speculators anticipated. Such speculation can be very powerful, given that some $4 trillion goes across the foreign exchange markets every day (see The inexorable growth of FOREX).
So will the intervention by the Bank of Japan be successful in causing the yen to depreciate? Or will the forces that drove up the yen prove impossible to resist? The following articles consider this question and also look at the factors that caused the yen to appreciate and its effects on the Japanese economy.
Articles
Japan’s $21b move to weaken yen may be futile Sydney Morning Herald (16/9/10)
Japan acts to weaken surging yen Guardian, Larry Elliott and Graeme Wearden (15/9/10)
Q+A: How is Japan judging success in yen intervention? Reuters, Hideyuki Sano and Charlotte Cooper (17/9/10)
Tokyo action puts brake on yen Financial Times, Peter Garnham (17/9/10)
It’s hard to keep a strong yen down CTV, Canada, Brian Milner (16/9/10)
Firm stance on yen stressed / Govt, BOJ strike decisive pose, but drastic action still required Daily Yomiuri, Japan, Tadashi Isozumi and Yomiuri Shimbun (16/9/10)
Bernanke Shadow of Easing Limits BOJ Success With Yen Weakness Bloomberg, Ron Harui and Joshua Zumbrun (17/9/10)
The Bank Of Japan Is Spitting In The Wind Wall Street Journal blogs: The Source, Nicholas Hastings (16/9/10)
Japan intervenes in markets to combat rising yen BBC News, Mariko Oi (15/9/10)
Q&A: What’s moving the Japanese yen? BBC News (15/9/10)
Currency intervention’s mixed record of success BBC News, Russell Hotten (16/9/10)
Yen intervention: Because I Kan The Economist (16/9/10)
Beggar, then sneakily enrich, thy neighbour The Economist (15/9/10)
The yen and gold The Economist, Buttonwood (15/9/10)
Data
Dollar/yen exchange rate X-rates.com
Statistical Interactive Database – interest and exchange rates data Bank of England
Currencies BBC News
Currency converter Yahoo Finance
Questions
- Why has the Japanese yen appreciated so much over the past three years?
- What will be the effect of the Bank of Japan’s exchange market intervention on Japanese money supply? What will determine the size of this effect?
- Why might the Bank of Japan’s actions have been influenced by the anticipation of further quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve Bank?
- What factors determine the likely success of foreign exchange market intervention by central banks?
- What will determine how speculators will react to the Bank of Japan’s actions?
- Discuss the following quote from the second The Economist article above: “A bit of inflation in Japan wouldn’t just be a good thing. It would be a really, really great thing. And if other countries react to Japan’s intervention by attempting to print and sell their own currencies in order to toss the deflationary potato to someone else, well then so much the better.”
- If all countries seek to achieve export-led growth, is this a zero-sum game?
- Why has the price of gold been rising?
According to GDP figures released on 15 August, China overtook Japan in the second quarter of 2010 to become the world’s second largest economy. This raises two questions: just what do the GDP figures mean and why has this happened?
The GDP figures are total figures measured in US dollars at current exchange rates. According to these nominal figures, Japan’s GDP was $1.286 trillion in the second quarter of 2010; China’s was $1.335 trillion. This follows several years when Chinese growth rates have massively exceeded Japanese ones.
As far as explanations are concerned, economists look to a number of different factors, including investment policies, relative exchange rates, confidence, deflation in Japan and the scope for catching up in China.
The following podcasts and webcasts look at these questions, as do the articles.
Podcasts and webcasts
China eyes Japan’s slowing GDP growth BBC News, Roland Buerk (16/8/10)
Japan’s economic strategy ‘not happening’ BBC Today Programme Interview with Dr Seijiro Takeshita of Mizuho International banks (16/8/10)
China’s growth rate slows to 10.3% as lending tightens BBC News, Chris Hogg (15/7/10)
China exports jump in May BBC News, Chris Hogg (10/6/10)
China Overtakes Japan in 2Q As No. 2 Economy Associated Press on YouTube (16/8/10)
China’s economy takes over Japan’s AsianCorrespondent on YouTube (16/8/10)
Articles
China overtakes Japan to become world’s second-biggest economy Telegraph, Roland Gribben (17/8/10)
Chinese economy eclipses Japan’s Financial Times, Lindsay Whipp and Jamil Anderlini (16/8/10)
Decoding China’s modesty Financial Times blogs, Jamil Anderlini (17/8/10)
China ‘overtakes Japan in economic prowess’ asiaone news (17/8/10)
China overtakes Japan to become second largest economy in world Irish Times, Clifford Coonan (17/8/10)
China Passes Japan As Second-Largest Economy Huffington Post, Joe McDonald (16/8/10)
Data
World Economic Outlook July 2010 Update IMF (7/7/10)
China Economic Statistics and Indicators EconomyWatch
Japan Economic Statistics and Indicators EconomyWatch
Questions
- Why may simple GDP figures be a poor indicator of the relative size of the Chinese and Japanese economies?
- If purchasing-power parity figures were used, how would this affect the relative sizes of the two economies? Explain why purchasing-power parity exchange rates are so different from nominal exchange rates in the two countries.
- What impact have the relative exchange rates of the two countries had on economic growth?
- Why are simple GDP figures a poor indicator of living standards?
- What factors will determine whether income inequality is likely to widen or narrow in China over the coming years?
- What factors explain Japan’s low rate of economic growth since the early 1990s? How likely is it that these factors will apply in China in the future?
The link below is to a podcast by Martin Wolf of the Financial Times. It considers a new book, Fault Lines by Raghu Rajan of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Rajan argues that the global economy is severely unbalanced:
There is a fair amount of consensus that the world economy is in need of rebalancing. Countries like Iceland, Greece, Spain, and the United States overspent prior to the crisis, financing the spending with government or private borrowing, while countries like Germany, Japan, and China supplied those countries goods even while financing their spending habits. Simply put, the consensus now requires U.S. households to save more and Chinese households to spend more in order to achieve the necessary rebalancing.
Martin Wolf identifies these imbalances and discusses various possible solutions. The problem is that what may seem sensible economically is not always feasible politically.
Podcast
Three years and new fault lines threaten Financial Times podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/8/10)
Article
Three years and new fault lines threaten (transcript of podcast) Financial Times podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/8/10)
Questions
- What are the fault lines that Martin Wolf identifies?
- Have they become more acute since the credit crunch and subsequent recession?
- What risks do these fault lines pose to the future health of the global economy?
- How do political relationships make integrating the world economy more difficult? What insights does game theory provide for understanding the tensions in these relationships?
- Is a policy of export-led growth a wise one for the UK to pursue?
- Explain why global demand may be structurally deficient.
The east African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been operating with a common external tariff for some time. The East African Community (EAC), as it is known, came into force in 2000. Initially it had just three members, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; the other two countries joined in 2007. As the Community’s site says:
The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this extent the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and are working towards the establishment of a Common Market in 2010, subsequently a Monetary Union by 2012 and ultimately a Political Federation of the East African States.
This Common Market came into force on 1 July 2010, with free movement of labour being instituted between the five countries. The plan is also to do away with all internal barriers to trade, although it may take up to five years before this is completed.
The following articles and videos look at this significant opening up of trade in east Africa and at people’s reactions to it. Will all five countries gain equally? Or will some gain at the others’ expense?
Articles
East African Countries Form a Common Market New York Times, Josh Kron (1/7/10)
Dawn of an era for East Africans The Standard, John Oyuke (1/7/10)
5 East African countries create common market The Associated Press, Tom Maliti (1/7/10)
FACTBOX-East African common market begins Reuters (1/7/10)
Bold plan to have single EAC currency by 2012 Daily Nation, Lucas Barasa (1/7/10)
East Africa’s common market begins BBC News, Tim Bowler (30/6/10)
East Africa: Poor Road, Railway Network Holding Back Integration allAfrica.com, Zephania Ubwani (1/7/10)
Challenges for one East Africa Common Market The Sunday Citizen, James Shikwati (4/7/10)
Videos
Common market barriers NTVKenya (on YouTube) (2/7/10)
The fruits of E.A.C. NTVKenya (on YouTube) (2/7/10)
The East African Community (EAC)
Official site
Wikipedia entry
Questions
- Distinguish between a free trade area, a customs union, a common market and a monetary union.
- How is it possible that all five countries will gain from the establishment of a common market?
- Distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion. Under what circumstances is the establishment of a common market more likely to lead to (a) trade creation; (b) trade diversion?
- Why do some people worry about the consequences of free movement of labour with the EAC? How would you answer their concerns?
- What factors would need to be taken into account in deciding whether or not the five countries would benefit from forming a monetary union?
Keynes referred to the ‘paradox of thrift’ (see, for example, Box 17.5 on page 492 of Sloman and Wride, Economics, 7th edition). The paradox goes something like this: if individuals save more, they will increase their consumption possibilities in the future. If society saves more, however, this may reduce its future income and consumption. Why should this be so? Well, as people in general save more, they will spend less. Firms will thus produce less. What is more, the lower consumption will discourage firms from investing. Thus, through both the multiplier and the accelerator, GDP will fall.
What we have in the paradox of thrift is an example of the ‘fallacy of composition’ (see Sloman and Wride, Box 3.7 on page 84). What applies at the individual level will not necessarily apply at the aggregate level. The paradox of thrift applied in the Great Depression of the 1930s. People cutting back on consumption drove the world economy further into depression.
Turn the clock forward some 80 years. On 26/27 June 2010, leaders of the G20 countries met in Canada to consider, amongst other things, how to protect the global economic recovery while tackling the large public-sector deficits. These deficits have soared as a result of two things: (a) the recession of 2008/9, which reduced tax revenues and resulted in more people claiming benefits, (b) the expansionary fiscal policies adopted to bring countries out of recession.
But the leaders were divided on how much to cut now. Some, such as the new Coalition government in the UK, want to cut the deficit quickly in order to appease markets and avert a Greek-style crisis and a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to service the debt. Others, such as the Obama Administration in the USA, want to cut more slowly so as not to put the recovery in jeopardy. Nevertheless, cuts were generally agreed, although agreement about the timing was more vague.
So where is the fallacy of composition? If one country cuts, then it is possible that increased demand from other countries could drive recovery. If all countries cut, however, the world may go back into recession. What applies to one country, therefore, may not apply to the world as a whole.
Let’s look at this in a bit more detail and consider the individual elements of aggregate demand. If there are to be cuts in government expenditure, then there has to be a corresponding increase in aggregate demand elsewhere, if growth is to be maintained. This could come from increased consumption. But, with higher taxes and many people saving more (or reducing their borrowing) for fear of being made redundant or, at least, of having a cut in their incomes, there seems to be little sign that consumption will be the driver of growth.
Then there is investment. But, fearing a ‘double-dip recession’, business confidence is plummeting (see) and firms are likely to be increasingly reluctant to invest. Indeed, after the G20 summit, stock markets around the world fell. On 29 June, the FTSE 100 fell by 3.10% and the main German and French stock market indices, the Dax and the Cac 40, fell by 3.33% and 4.01% respectively. This was partly because of worries about re-financing the debts of various European countries, but it was partly because of fears about recovery stalling.
The problem is that cuts in government expenditure and rises in taxes directly affect the private sector. If government capital expenditure is cut, this will directly affect the construction industry. Even if the government makes simple efficiency savings, such as reducing the consumption of paper clips or paper, this will directly affect the private stationery industry. If taxes are raised, consumers are likely to buy less. Under these circumstances, no wonder many industries are reluctant to invest.
This leaves net exports (exports minus imports). Countries generally are hoping for a rise in exports as a way of maintaining aggregate demand. But here we have the fallacy of composition in its starkest form. If one country exports more, then this can boost its aggregate demand. But if all countries in total are to export more, this can only be achieved if there is an equivalent increase in global imports: after all, someone has to buy the exports! And again, with growth faltering, the global demand for imports is likely to fall, or at best slow down.
The following articles consider the compatibility of cuts and growth. Is there a ‘paradox of cuts’ equivalent to the paradox of thrift?
Articles
Osborne’s first Budget? It’s wrong, wrong, wrong! Independent on Sunday, Joseph Stiglitz (27/6/10)
Strategy: Focus switches from exit to growth Financial Times, Chris Giles (25/6/10)
Once again we must ask: ‘Who governs?’ Financial Times, Robert Skidelsky (16/6/10)
Europe’s next top bailout… MoneyWeb, Guy Monson and Subitha Subramaniam (9/6/10)
Hawks hovering over G20 summit Financial Times (25/6/10)
G20 applauds fiscal austerity but allows for national discretion Independent, Andrew Grice and David Usborne (28/6/10)
To stimulate or not to stimulate? That is the question Independent, Stephen King (28/6/10)
Now even the US catches the deficit reduction habit Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (28/6/10)
George Osborne claims G20 success Guardian, Larry Elliott and Patrick Wintour (28/6/10)
G20 accord: you go your way, I’ll go mine Guardian, Larry Elliott (28/6/10)
G20 summit agrees on deficit cuts by 2013 BBC News (28/6/10)
IMF says G20 could do better BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (27/6/10)
Are G20 summits worth having? What should the G20’s top priority be? (Economics by invitation): see in particular The G20 is heading for a “public sector paradox of thrift”, John Makin The Economist (25/6/10)
Why it is right for central banks to keep printing Financial Times, Martin Wolf (22/6/10)
In graphics: Eurozone in crisis: Recovery Measures BBC News (24/6/10)
A prophet in his own house The Economist (1/7/10)
The long and the short of fiscal policy Financial Times, Clive Crook (4/7/10)
G20 Communiqué
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration (27/6/10) (see particularly paragraph 10)
Questions
- Consider the arguments that economic growth and cutting deficits are (a) complementary aims (b) contradictory aims.
- Is there necessarily a ‘paradox of cuts’? Explain.
- How is game theory relevant in explaining the outcome of international negotiations, such as those at the G20 summit?
- Would it be wise for further quantitative easing to accompany fiscal tightening?
- What is the best way for governments to avoid a ‘double-dip recession’?