Nearly two years ago, France lost its triple A credit-rating and the news has only got worse. Unemployment has risen and economic growth in France has remained low and this is one of the reasons why France’s credit rating has been downgraded further from AA+ to AA. A high credit rating doesn’t guarantee market confidence, but it does help to keep the cost of borrowing for the government low. Thus, this downgrading could spell trouble for French borrowing costs.
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), who downgraded the French credit rating, is expecting government debt to rise to 86% of gross domestic product and believes that unemployment will remain above 10% until 2016. While the French government has put various reforms in place to boost the struggling economy, S&P don’t believe they are sufficient and have been very public in criticising the government’s effort. They were quoted as saying:
We believe the French government’s reforms to taxation, as well as to product, services and labour markets, will not substantially raise France’s medium-term growth prospects and that on-going high unemployment is weakening support for further significant fiscal and structural policy measures.
Following the downgrading, the return for those investors purchasing French debt did begin to rise, echoing the theory that the cost of borrowing would rise. 
The yield on French government 10-year bonds increased from 2.158% to 2.389%. The outlook given to France by S&P was ‘stable’, implying that there is a relatively low chance that S&P would change France’s credit-rating again in the next two years.
Many were surprised at the downgrading of France’s credit rating, but this may be the nudge that President Hollande needs to push through extensive labour market reforms with the aim of reducing unemployment and generating growth in the economy. Despite this latest move by S&P, the other credit rating agencies have yet to take similar action. Perhaps they are more convinced by the Finance Minister, Pierre Moscovici who claims that France’s debt is ‘one of the safest and most liquid in the world.’ He commented that:
They are underestimating France’s ability to reform, to pull itself up … During the last 18 months the government has implemented major reforms aimed at improving the French economic situation, restoring its public finances and its competitiveness.
It will take some time for the full impact of this development in France’s economy to become apparent. The cost of borrowing has already risen only time will tell what will happen to market confidence over the coming weeks. However, what is certain is that pressure is already mounting on Francois Hollande. The following articles consider the French economy.
France told to reform labour market after second credit rating downgrade The Guardian, Phillip Inman (8/13/13)
France’s credit rating cut by S&P to AA BBC News (8/11/13)
S&P lowers France rating on reform doubts, markets unfazed Reuters, Nicholas Vinocur (8/11/13)
Hollande approval rating slumps as France downgraded The Telegraph, James Titcomb (8/11/13)
S&P cuts France’s credit rating by one notch to double-A Wall Street Journal, William Horobin (8/11/13)
Five charts that show the state of the French economy The Telegraph (8/11/13)
France rating downgrade heaps pressure on Francois Hollande Financial Times, Michael Stothard (8/11/13)
Questions
- What does a double A rating mean for the French economy?
- Which factors will be considered when a ratings agency decides to change a country’s credit rating?
- France’s unemployment rate is one of the key factors that S&P has considered. Why is France’s unemployment rate so high? Which type(s) of unemployment are increasing?
- Use a diagram to illustrate the unemployment that France is facing.
- If a country does see its credit rating downgraded, what might this mean for government borrowing costs? Explain why this might cause further problems for a country?
- Markets have been ‘unfazed’ by the downgrade. How do you think markets will react to over the coming weeks? Explain your answer.
- What action could the French government take to ensure that S&P is the only ratings agency that downgrades their credit rating?
UK house prices are incredibly volatile. This helps to explain the fascination that many of us have with the British housing market. According to the latest ONS house Price Index, the average UK house price in August 2013 was 3.8 per cent higher than 12 months earlier. The rates varied across the home nations: 4.1 per cent in England, 1.1 per cent in Northern Ireland, 1 per cent in Wales and -0.7 per cent in Scotland. Here we take a look at international house price inflation rates. Is the British housing market as unique as we think it is?
Let’s begin at home (excuse the pun). If we take the period from 1970 Q1 to 2013 Q2, the average annual rate of house price inflation across the UK is 9.7 per cent. The average rate in England is 9.8 per cent, as it is in Wales too, while in Scotland it is 9.0 per cent and in Northern Ireland it is 8.8 per cent. While the long-term averages of the UK nations are rather more similar than perhaps we might expect, what is quite interesting is the differences that emerge in more recent times. If we take the period from July 2008 to August 2013, the average annual rate of house price inflation in the UK is -0.2 per cent, in England it is 0.1 per cent, in both Wales and Scotland it is -1.0 per cent, while in Northern Ireland it is -11 per cent.
The recent English average is heavily distorted by London and to a lesser extent the rest of the South East. In London and the South East the average annual house price inflation rates since July 2008 have been 2.6 per cent and 0.2 per cent respectively. In all the other English regions the average rate has been negative. In my own region of the East Midlands the average rate has been -1.2 per cent – this is exactly the UK average if both London and the South East are removed from the figures.
Now let’s go international. Chart 1 shows annual house price inflation rates for the UK and six other countries since 1997. Interestingly, it shows that house price volatility is a common feature of housing markets. It is not a uniquely British thing. It also shows that the USA is notable for its relatively robust house price inflation rates of late. In the first half of 2013 annual house price inflation has been running at 7 per cent in America, compared with 2 to 3 per cent here in the UK. In contrast, the Netherlands has seen near-double digit rates of house price deflation over the past year, albeit with a rebound in the third quarter of this year. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)
The chart captures very nicely the effect of the financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn on global house prices. Ireland saw annual rates of house price deflation touch 23 per cent in 2009 compared with rates of deflation of 12 per cent in the UK. Denmark too suffered significant house price deflation with prices falling at an annual rate of 15 per cent in 2009.
House price volatility appears to be an inherent characteristic of housing markets worldwide. Let’s now consider the extent to which house prices rise over the longer term. In doing so, we consider real house price growth after having stripped out the effect of consumer price inflation. Real house price growth measures the growth of house prices relative to consumer prices.
Chart 2 shows real house prices since 1996 Q1. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.) It shows that up to 2013 Q2, real house prices in the UK have risen by a factor of 2.24, i.e. they are two and a quarter times higher. This is a little less than in Sweden where prices are 2.5 times higher.
Chart 2 shows that the increase in real house prices in the UK and Sweden is significantly higher than in the other countries in the sample. In particular, in the USA real house prices in 2013 Q2 are only 1.16 times higher than in 1996 Q1. In the US actual house prices, when viewed over the past 17 years or so, have grown only a little more quickly than consumer prices.
The latest data on house prices suggest that house price volatility is not unique to the UK. However the rate of growth over the longer term relative to consumer prices is markedly quicker than in many other countries. It is this which helps to explain the amount of attention paid to the UK housing market – and not least by policy-makers.
Data
House Price Indices: Data Tables Office for National Statistics
Articles
First time buyers in race to beat house price rises Telegraph, Nicole Blackmore (8/11/13)
House prices soar by £13,000: Values rise at fastest rate for 3 years Express, Sarah O’Grady (7/11/13)
House prices: ‘south-east set to outpace London’ for first time in a decade Guardian, Jennifer Rankin (6/11/13)
UK house prices hit record level, says ONS BBC News, (15/10/13)
UK house prices rise at fastest pace in three years in October – Nationwide Reuter (31/11/13)
Jonathan Portes: UK house prices a ‘force of evil’ BBC News, (5/11/13)
Questions
- What is meant by the annual rate of house price inflation? What about the annual rate of house price deflation?
- What factors are likely to affect housing demand?
- What factors are likely to affect housing supply?
- Explain the difference between nominal and real house prices. What does a real increase in house prices mean?
- How might we explain the recent differences between house price inflation rates in London and the South East relative to the rest of the UK?
- What might explain the very different long-term growth rates in real house prices in the USA and the UK?
- Why were house prices so affected by the financial crisis?
- What factors help explain the volatility in house prices?
As we saw in the news item The difficult exit from cheap money, central banks around the world have been operating an extremely loose monetary policy since the beginning of 2009. Their interest rates have been close to zero and trillions of dollars of extra money has been injected into the world economy through various programmes of quantitative easing.
For the past few months the Federal Reserve has been purchasing bonds under its most recent programme dubbed QE3, and thereby increasing narrow money, by $85 billion per month. Since the start of its QE programme in 2009, it has pumped around $2.8 trillion of extra money into the US and world economies. This huge increase in money supply has boosted the demand for assets worldwide and world stock markets have risen. Much of the money has flowed into developing countries, such as India, and has acted as a boost to their economies.
Once the US economy is growing strongly again, the aim is to taper off, and ultimately end or even reverse, the QE programme. It was expected that the Fed would decide to start this tapering off process at its meeting on 18 September – perhaps reducing bond purchases initially by some $10 billion. (Note that this would still be an increase in money supply, just a slightly smaller one.) Over the past few days, US bond prices have been falling (and yields increasing) in anticipation of such a move.
As it turned out, the Fed decided to delay tapering off. It will continue with its assets purchase programme of $85 billion per month for the time being. The reason given was that the US economy was still too fragile and needed the monthly injections of money to stay at the current level.
Normally it might be expected that the announcement of a more fragile recovery would cause the US stock market, and others worldwide, to fall. In fact the opposite occurred, with investors relieved that the extra money, which allows extra asset purchases, would continue at the same rate.
But this then raises the question of just what will be the effect when tapering off does actually occur. Will stock markets then go into a tailspin? Or will they merely stop rising so fast. That depends very much on the role of speculation.
Webcasts
Bernanke’s Own Words on Asset Purchases, Economy Bloomberg (18/9/13)
Bernanke: Fed to delay bond tapering PBS Newshour on YouTube (full speech plus questions) (18/9/13)
No tapering announced by Fed CNBC on Yahoo Finance (18/9/113)
The impact of US stimulus moves at home and abroad BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (18/9/13)
Is the upturn reaching Americans? BBC World, Stephanie Flanders (17/9/13)
Shares hit high as Federal Reserve maintains stimulus BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (18/9/13)
US Fed decision to delay tapering was a relief ET Now (India), Bimal Jalan (19/9/13)
Articles
Federal Reserve surprises markets by delaying QE tapering The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (18/9/13)
Federal Reserve delays QE tapering: the full statement The Telegraph (18/9/13)
Q&A: What is tapering? BBC News (18/9/13)
Fed delay is no reason to celebrate The Guardian, Larry Elliott (19/9/13)
Federal Reserve tapering decision has baffled the markets The Guardian, Larry Elliott (19/9/13)
Taper tiger The Economist (21/9/13)
Everything You Need to Know About the Fed’s Decision Not to Taper QE3 The Atlantic, Matthew O’Brien (18/9/13)
Fed’s dovish turn leaves Wall Street economists mulling taper timing: poll Reuters, Chris Reese (18/9/13)
Good news and bad news from the Fed BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (19/9/13)
Is the Fed frightened of its shadow? BBC News, Robert Peston (19/9/13)
The Federal Reserve and Janet Yellen face a tough task with insufficient tools The Guardian, Mohamed A. El-Erian (14/10/13)
Questions
- Why might a slowing down in the increase in US money supply cause asset prices to fall, rather than merely to rise less quickly?
- Why has the US QE programme led to a rise in asset prices overseas?
- Distinguish between stabilising and destabilising speculation. Which type of speculation has been occurring as a result of the US QE programme?
- How has QE affected unemployment in the UK and USA? How is the participation rate and the flexibility of labour markets relevant to the answer?
- Explain the following two statements by Stephanie Flanders and Robert Peston respectively. “The market conditions argument has a circularity to it: talk of tapering leads to higher market rates, which in turn puts the taper itself on hold.” “The Fed simply hinting that less money would be created, means that there will be no reduction in the amount of money created (for now at least).”
- Why have US long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, risen since May of this year?
- What impact have higher US long-term interest rates had on economies in the developing world? Explain.
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the USA, filed for bankruptcy. Although the credit crisis had been building since mid 2007, the demise of Lehmans was a pivotal event in the unfolding of the financial crisis and the subsequent severe recession in most developed economies. Banks were no longer seen as safe and huge amounts of government money had to be poured into banks to shore up their capital and prevent further bankruptcies. Partial nationalisation seemed the only way of rescuing several banks and with it the global financial system.
A deep and prolonged recession followed (see Chart 1: click here for a PowerPoint). In response, governments pursued expansionary fiscal policies – at least until worries about rising government deficits and debt caused a lurch to austerity policies. And central banks pursued policies of near zero interest rates and subsequently of quantitative easing. But all the time debate was taking place about how to reform banking to prevent similar crises occurring in the future.
Solutions have included reform of the Basel banking regulations to ensure greater capital adequacy. 
The Basel III regulations (see Chart 2) demand considerably higher capital ratios than the previous Basel II regulations.
Other solutions have included proposals to break up banks. Indeed, just this week, the Lloyds Banking Group has hived off 631 of its branches (one sixth of the total) into a newly reformed TSB. Another proposal is to ring-fence the retail side of banks from their riskier investment divisions. In both cases the aim has been to avoid the scenario where banks are seen as too big to fail and can thus rely on governments to bail them out if they run into difficulties. Such reliance can make banks much more willing to take excessive risks. Further details of the new systems now in place are given in the Robert Peston article below.
But many critics maintain that not nearly enough has been done. Claims include:
• The Basel III rules are not tough enough and banks are still being required to hold too little capital.
• Rewards to senior bankers and traders are still excessive.
• The culture of banking, as a result, is still too risk loving in banks’ trading arms, even though they are now much more cautious about lending to firms and individuals.
• This caution has meant a continuing of the credit crunch for many small businesses.
• Higher capital adequacy ratios have reduced bank lending and have thus had a dampening effect on the real economy.
• The so-called ring-fences may not be sufficient to insulate retail banking from problems in banks’ investment divisions.
• Banks are not being required to hold sufficient liquidity to allow them to meet customers’ demands for cash in all scenarios.
• Banks’ reliance on each other still leaves a systemic risk for the banking system as a whole.
• Fading memories of the crisis are causing urgency to tackle its underlying problems to diminish.
• Problems may be brewing in less regulated parts of the banking world, such as the growing banking sector in China.
The following articles look at the lessons of the banking crisis – those that have been learned and those that have not. They look at the measures put in place and assess whether they are sufficient.
Lehman Brothers collapse, five years on: ‘We had almost no control’ The Guardian, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (13/9/13)
Lehman Brothers collapse: five years on, we’re still feeling the shockwaves The Guardian, Larry Elliott (13/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, could a collapse happen all over again? The Observer, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (15/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, all tickety-boo? BBC News, Robert Peston (9/9/13)
What have we learned from the bank crash? Independent, Yalman Onaran, Michael J Moore and Max Abelson (14/9/13)
We’ve let a good financial crisis go to waste since Lehman Brothers collapsed The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (12/9/13)
The Lehman legacy: Lessons learned? The Economist (9/9/13)
The dangers of debt: Lending weight The Economist (14/9/13)
The Lehman anniversary: Five years in charts The Economist (14/9/13)
Questions
- Why did Lehman Brothers collapse?
- Explain the role of the US sub-prime mortgage market in the global financial crisis of 2007/8.
- In the context of banking, what is meant by (a) capital adequacy; (b) risk-based capital adequacy ratios; (c) leverage; (d) leverage ratios?
- Explain the Basel III rules on (a) risk-based capital adequacy (see the textbook and the chart above); (b) non-risk-based leverage (introduced in 2013: see here for details).
- Explain and comment on the following statement by Adair Turner: ‘We created an over-leveraged financial system and an over-leveraged real economy. We created a system such that even if the direct cost of bank rescue was zero, the impact of their near-failure on the economy was vast.’
- Under what circumstances might the global financial system face a similar crisis to that of 2007/8 at some point in the future?
- Why is there an underlying conflict between increasing banks’ required capital adequacy and ensuring a sufficient supply of credit to consumers and business? What multiplier effects are likely to occur from an increase in the capital adequacy ratio?
House prices in the UK are rising and the rise seems to be accelerating – at least until the latest month (August). They are now growing at an annualised rate of nearly 4%. This is the fastest rate for three years (see chart below: click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).
This may be worrying for Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, who is committed to avoiding a new house price bubble. 
The problem is that, under the recently issued forward guidance, the Bank of England is set to retain the current historically low Bank rate of 0.5% until unemployment has fallen to 7%. But that could be some time – probably around two years.
So what can the Bank do in the meantime and what will be the consequences?
The following article from The Guardian looks at the options.
Article
How can the Bank of England prick the house price bubble? The Guardian, Patrick Collinson and Heather Stewart (30/8/13)
Data
Links to house price data The Economics Network, John Sloman
Questions
- What constitutes a housing price boom? Is the UK currently experiencing such a boom?
- What factors have led to the recent house price rises? Have these factors affected the demand or supply of houses (or both)?
- Who gains and who loses from rising house prices?
- Explain the policy adopted in New Zealand to curb house price inflation.
- Consider the merits of this option?
- Could borrowers find ways around this measure?
- Are there any other options open to the Bank of England?
Nearly two years ago, France lost its triple A credit-rating and the news has only got worse. Unemployment has risen and economic growth in France has remained low and this is one of the reasons why France’s credit rating has been downgraded further from AA+ to AA. A high credit rating doesn’t guarantee market confidence, but it does help to keep the cost of borrowing for the government low. Thus, this downgrading could spell trouble for French borrowing costs.
The yield on French government 10-year bonds increased from 2.158% to 2.389%. The outlook given to France by S&P was ‘stable’, implying that there is a relatively low chance that S&P would change France’s credit-rating again in the next two years.
