After promises made back in July 2012 that the ECB will ‘do whatever it takes’ to protect the eurozone economy, the ECB has at last done just that. It has launched a large-scale quantitative easing programme. It will create new money to buy €60 billion of assets every month in the secondary market.
Around €10 billion will be private-sector securities that are currently being purchased under the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), which were both launched late last year. The remaining €50 billion will be public-sector assets, mainly bonds of governments in the eurozone. This extended programme of asset purchases will begin in March this year and continue until at least September 2016, bringing the total of asset purchased by that time to over €1.1 trillion.
The ECB has taken several steps towards full QE over the past few months, including €400 billion of targeted long-term lending to banks, cutting interest rates to virtually zero (and below zero for the deposit rate) and the outright purchase of private-sector assets. But all these previous moves failed to convince markets that they would be enough to stimulate recovery and stave off deflation. Hence the calls for full quantitative easing became louder and it was widely anticipated that the ECB would finally embark on the purchase of government bonds – in other words, would finally adopt a programme of QE similar to those adopted in the USA (from 2008), the UK (from 2009) and Japan (from 2010).
Rather than the ECB buying the government bonds centrally, each of the 19 national central banks (NCBs), which together with the ECB constitute the Eurosystem, will buy their own nation’s bonds. 
The amount they will buy will depend on their capital subscriptions the eurozone. For example, the German central bank will buy German bonds amounting to 25.6% of the total bonds purchased by national central banks. France’s share will be 20.1% (i.e. French bonds constituting 20.1% of the total), Spain’s share will be 12.6% and Malta’s just 0.09%.
Central banks of countries that are still in bail-out programmes will not be eligible to purchase their countries’ assets while their compliance with the terms of the bailout is under review (as is the case currently with Greece).
The risk of government default on their bonds will be largely (80%) covered by the individual countries’ central banks, not by the central banks collectively. Only 20% of bond purchases will be subject to risk sharing between member states according to their capital subscription percentages: the ECB will directly purchase 8% of government bonds and 12% will be bonds issued by European institutions rather than countries. As the ECB explains it:
With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.
As with the QE programmes in the USA, the UK and Japan, the transmission mechanism is indirect. The assets purchased will be from financial institutions, who will thus receive the new money. The bond purchases and the purchases of assets by financial institutions with the acquired new money will drive up asset prices and hence drive down long-term interest rates. This, hopefully, will stimulate borrowing and increase aggregate demand and hence output, employment and prices.
The ECB will buy bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and European institutions in the secondary market against central bank money, which the institutions that sold the securities can use to buy other assets and extend credit to the real economy. In both cases, this contributes to an easing of financial conditions.
In addition, there is an exchange rate transmission mechanism. To the extent that the extra money is used to purchase non-eurozone assets, so this will drive down the euro exchange rate. This, in turn, will boost the demand for eurozone exports and reduce the demand for imports to the eurozone. This, again, represents an increase in aggregate demand.
The extent to which people will borrow more depends, of course, on confidence that the eurozone economy will expand. So far, the response of markets suggests that such confidence will be there. But we shall have to wait to see if the confidence is sustained.
But even if QE does succeed in stimulating aggregate demand, there remains the question of the competitiveness of eurozone economies. Some people are worried, especially in Germany, that the boost given by QE will reduce the pressure on countries to engage in structural reforms – reforms that some people feel are vital for long-term growth in the eurozone
The articles consider the responses to QE and assess its likely impact.
Articles
- The ECB makes its mind up: The launch of euro-style QE
- ECB unveils massive QE boost for eurozone
- Eurozone boost of €1.1tn in ‘shock and awe’ plan by Central Bank
- European Central Bank unleashes quantitative easing
- 11 questions you are too embarrassed to ask about Quantitative Easing
- What the experts say about the ECB’s latest round of QE
- Mario Draghi’s QE blitz may save southern Europe, but at the risk of losing Germany
- The sad consequences of the fear of QE
- Will euro QE work?
The Economist (22/1/15)
BBC News (22/1/15)
The Guardian, Heather Stewart (22/1/15)
Financial Times, Claire Jones (22/1/15)
Independent, Russell Lynch (22/1/15)
The Guardian, Julia Kollewe (22/1/15)
The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (22/1/15)
The Economist, Paul De Grauwe (21/1/15)
BBC News, Robert Peston (20/1/15)
ECB publications
- ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme
- Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)
Webcast of ECB press conference
ECB Press Release (22/1/15)
ECB Press Conference, Mario Draghi, President of the ECB (22/1/15)
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB (22/1/15)
Previous blog posts
- The fate of the eurozone
- Eurozone deflation risk
- Edging closer to full QE
- The ECB: tackling the threat of deflation
(7/1/15)
(1/12/14)
(6/9/14)
(8/6/14)
Questions
- Why has the ECB been reluctant to engage in full QE before now?
- How has the ECB answered the objections of strong eurozone countries, such as Germany, to taking on the risks associated with weaker countries?
- What determines the amount by which aggregate demand will rise following a programme of asset purchases?
- In what ways and to what extent will non-eurozone countries benefit or lose from the ECB’s decision?
- Are there any long-term dangers to the eurozone economy of the ECB’s QE programme? If so, how might they be tackled?
- Why did the euro plummet on the ECB’s announcement? Why had it not plummeted before the announcement, given that the introduction of full QE was widely expected?
The eurozone is certainly in trouble and, despite the efforts of world leaders to create confidence, it appears that most announcements are having the opposite effect. The risk of deflation has now emerged to be very true; the powerhouse of Europe ‘needs to do more’ and the euro has fallen following Mario Draghi’s recent comments. So, just how bad are things in the eurozone?
Mario Draghi suggested that as a means of stimulating the eurozone economies, a process of quantitative easing may soon need to begin. However, rather than reassuring investors that action was being taken to improve the economic performance in the region, it appears to have had the opposite effect. Following his comments, the euro fell to its lowest level since the middle of 2010.
Quantitative easing has seen much use in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the aim in the eurozone would be to put a stop to the continuing price decreases. The eurozone has now entered deflation and, while the aim of this economic area has always been low prices, deflation is not good news. The downward pressure on prices has been largely driven by oil prices falling and prices in other areas remaining relatively stable.
Quantitative easing would inject money into the eurozone, thus creating growth (or at least that’s the idea) and pushing up prices. One of Mario Draghi’s comments was:
‘We are making technical preparations to alter the size, pace and composition of our measures in early 2015.’
So, while it’s not certain that the QE policy will be used, it seems pretty likely, especially as this policy has been floating around for almost a year.
A key question is, will it work? The quantity theory of money does suggest that an increase in the money supply will lead to inflationary pressures, unless its velocity of circulation falls. But will it actually stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth? If there is more money in the banking system and hence more money available for lending then it may well stimulate investment and consumption. However, if consumers and firms are not confident about the effectiveness of the policy or about the future of the economy, then will the fact that more money is available for lending actually encourage them to borrow? In this case will there merely be a fall in the velocity of circulation?
The comments by Mario Draghi have also caused the euro to fall to its lowest level since 2010. The graph included in the CNBC article provides an interesting view of the path of the euro. Marc Chandler, from Brown Brothers Harriman said:
‘I’d say there’s a good chance it [the euro] gets there [parity with the dollar] before the election next November (2016) … We know the Fed’s going to be raising rates sooner or later, and the ECB is going to be easing sooner or later. I just see a steady grind lower.’
The outlook of the euro therefore doesn’t look too good by all accounts. It is now a waiting game to see if the policy of quantitative easing is implemented and whether or not it has the desired effect. The following articles consider this topic.
Eurozone economy slows further BBC News (6/1/15)
Eurozone falls into deflation for first time since October 2009 Financial Times, Claire Jones (7/1/15)
Eurozone officially falls into deflation, piling pressure on ECB The Telegraph, Marion Dakers (7/1/15)
Eurozone consumer prices fall for first time in five years Nasdaq, Brian Blackstone and Paul Hannon (7/1/15)
Draghi comments send euro to lowest level since 2010 BBC News (2/1/15)
Oil slump drags Eurozone into deflation The Guardian, Graeme Wearden (7/1/15)
Eurozone prices fall more than expected in December Reuters (7/1/15)
Eurozone lurches into deflation after oil price crashes Independent, Russell Lynch (7/1/15)
German inflation hits five-year low as Eurozone prepares for QE The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (5/1/15)
Euro slide could take it to parity with dollar CNBC, Patti Domm (7/1/15)
Questions
- Why is deflation a cause for concern when normally the main problem is inflation that is too high?
- What is the quantity theory of money and how does it suggest an increase in the money supply will affect prices?
- If quantitative easing is implemented, is it likely to have the desired effect? Explain why or why not.
- Why has the euro been affected by Mario Draghi’s comments? Use a diagram to help your explanation.
- How will quantitative easing help to stimulate economic growth across the Eurozone? Are there any other policies that would be effective?
- Oil prices have had a big influence on the deflationary pressures in the Eurozone. If oil prices increased again, would this be sufficient to create inflation?
The spectre of debt has awoken many of us in the night. Indebtedness is a key economic issue in the 2010s. Economists are devoting ever increasing amounts of research time trying to understand its impact on economic behaviour. This will not surprise you when you learn that the debt owed by the UK non-bank private sector to banks stood at £2.17 trillion at the end of September. This is the equivalent to 150% of annual GDP.
Chart 1 shows the stock of outstanding lending by Monetary Financial Institutions (banks and building societies) to the non-bank private sector bank since 1979. Back then the non-bank private sector had bank debt to the tune of around £70 billion or 10 per cent of GDP. Today’s figure is nearly 3000 per cent higher! Of this debt, around about 55 per cent is currently held by the household sector, 27 per cent by Other Financial Corporations (such as insurance companies and pension funds) and 18 per cent by private non-financial corporations. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
Chart 2 shows the stocks of debt as percentages of annual GDP. We can infer from it that there are waves of growth in bank debt. Two notable periods are during the 1980s and again from the late 1990s up to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. During the early and mid 1990s the relative size of debt stocks tended to stabilise while in the early 2010s the actual stocks of debt, as well as relative to GDP, declined. A credit binge seems to be followed by a period of consolidation. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
It is important that we understand the drivers of the growth of debt. The impact of debt on the balance sheets of the non-bank private sector and on banks themselves has implications for economic behaviour. In the early 2010s this has been to markedly slow the pace of growth through its impact on aggregate demand. Economic agents have, in general, looked to consolidate. There is no doubt that this partly reflects a precautionary motive. An important means by which debt and the balance sheets on which it is recorded affect behaviour is through a precautionary mechanism. This is difficult to accurately quantify because it represents a psychological influence on spending. Furthermore, it is affected by the prevailing circumstances of the time.
In looking to understand the factors that affect the growth of debt we may, as a result, learn more about the framework within which we may want banks and their customers to operate. Consequently, we may be in a better position to ensure sustainable longer-term growth and development. If there are cycles in credit it is important that we understand why they arise and whether, as some have suggested, they are an inherent part of the financialised economy in which we live. If they are, can we mitigate their potentially destabilising effects?
Articles
Retail shares facing nightmare before Christmas The Telegraph, John Ficenec (9/11/14)
Growing wealth inequality in the UK is a ticking timebomb The Guardian, Danny Dorling (15/10/14)
Richest 10% of Britons now control more than half the country’s wealth: Nation is only member of G7 where inequality between rich and poor has increased this century Mail Online, Mark Duell and Corey Charlton, (15/11/14)
Household debt is growing as families struggle Yorkshire Evening Post (31/10/14)
Consumer spending forecast to be the highest for four years The Telegraph, Ashley Armstrong (10/11/14)
Data
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England
Quarterly National Accounts, Q2 2014 Dataset Office for National Statistics
Questions
- What is the non-bank private sector?
- What factors might affect the rate at which non-bank private sector debt stocks grow?
- How might we go about assessing whether the aggregate level of lending by financial institutions to the non-bank private sector is sustainable?
- How might we go about assessing whether the level of lending by individual financial institutions to the non-bank private sector is sustainable?
- What information is conveyed in the balance sheets of economic agents, such as households and private non-financial corporations
- What is meant by precautionary saving?
- Can precautionary saving occur when the economy is growing strongly?
- What are the mechanisms by which non-bank private sector debt could impact on economic behaviour?
Following the recession of 2008/9, the UK has engaged in four rounds of quantitative easing (QE) – the process whereby the central bank increases the money supply by purchasing government bonds, and possibly other assets, on the open market from various institutions. The final round was announced in July 2012, bringing the total assets purchased to £375bn. As yet, however, there are no plans for quantitative tightening – the process of the Bank of England selling some of these assets, thereby reducing money supply.
The aim of QE has been to stimulate aggregate demand. Critics claim, however, that the effect on spending has been limited, since the money has not gone directly to consumers but rather to the institutions selling the assets, who have used much of the money to buy shares, bonds and other assets. Nevertheless, with banks having to strengthen their capital base following the financial crisis, QE has helped then to achieve this without having to make even bigger reductions in lending.
The Bank of England now reckons that the recovery is sufficiently established and there is, therefore, no need for further QE.
This is also the judgement of the Federal Reserve about the US economy, which experienced annual growth of 3.5% in the third quarter of 2014. The IMF predicts that US growth will be around 3% for the next three years.
The Fed has had three rounds of QE since the financial crisis, but in October 2014 called an end to the process. Since the start of this year, it has been gradually reducing the amount it injects each month from $85bn to $15bn. The total bond purchases over the past five years have been some $3.6tn, bringing the Fed’s balance sheet to nearly $4.5tn.
But as QE comes to an end in the USA, Japan is expanding its programme. On 31 October, the Bank of Japan announced that it would increase its asset purchases from ¥60-70tn per year to ¥80tn (£440bn). The Japanese government and central bank are determined to boost economic growth in Japan and escape the two decades of deflation and stagnation. The Tokyo stock market rose by some 8% in the week following the announcement and the yen fell by more than 5% against the dollar.
And the European Central Bank, which has not used full QE up to now, looks as if it is moving in that direction. In October, it began a programme of buying asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs). These are both private-sector securities: ABSs are claims against non-financial companies in the eurozone and CBs are issued by eurozone banks and other financial institutions.
It now looks as if the ECB might take the final step of purchasing government bonds. This is probably what is implied by ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement after the 6 November meeting of the ECB that the ground was being prepared for “further measures to be implemented, if needed”.
But has QE been as successful as its proponents would claim? Is it the solution now to a languishing eurozone economy? The following articles look at these questions.
Fed calls time on QE in the US – charts and analysis The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (29/10/14)
Quantitative easing: giving cash to the public would have been more effective The Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/10/14)
End of QE is whimper not bang BBC News, Robert Peston (29/10/14)
Federal Reserve ends QE The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (29/10/14)
Bank of Japan to inject 80 trillion yen into its economy The Guardian, Angela Monaghan and Graeme Wearden (31/10/14)
Every man for himself The Economist, Buttonwood column (8/11/14)
Why Japan Surprised the World with its Quantitative Easing Announcement Townhall, Nicholas Vardy (7/11/14)
Bank of Japan QE “Treat” Is a Massive Global Trick Money Morning, Shah Gilani (31/10/14)
ECB stimulus may lack desired scale, QE an option – sources Reuters, Paul Carrel and John O’Donnell (27/10/14)
ECB door remains open to quantitative easing despite doubts over impact Reuters, Eva Taylor and Paul Taylor (9/11/14)
ECB could pump €1tn into eurozone in fresh round of quantitative easing The Guardian,
Angela Monaghan and Phillip Inman (6/11/14)
Ben Bernanke: Quantitative easing will be difficult for the ECB CNBC, Jeff Cox (5/11/14)
Not All QE Is Created Equal as U.S. Outpunches ECB-BOJ Bloomberg, Simon Kennedy (6/11/14)
A QE proposal for Europe’s crisis The Economist, Yanis Varoufakis (7/11/14)
UK, Japan and 1% inflation BBC News, Linda Yueh (12/11/14)
Greenspan Sees Turmoil Ahead As QE Market Boost Unwinds Bloomberg TV, Gillian Tett interviews Alan Greenspan (29/10/14)
Questions
- What is the transmission mechanism between central bank purchases of assets and aggregate demand?
- Under what circumstances might the effect of a given amount of QE on aggregate demand be relatively small?
- What dangers are associated with QE?
- What determines the likely effect on inflation of QE?
- What has been the effect of QE in developed countries on the economies of developing countries? Has this been desirable for the global economy?
- Have businesses benefited from QE? If so, how? If not, why not?
- What has been the effect of QE on the housing market (a) in the USA; (b) in the UK?
- Why has QE not been ‘proper’ money creation?
- What effect has QE had on credit creation? How and why has it differed between the USA and UK?
- Why did the announcement of further QE by the Bank of Japan lead to a depreciation of the yen? What effect is this depreciation likely to have?
Following the financial crisis, all sectors of the economy continue to repair their balance sheets. As well as households, non-financial corporations and government, this is true of the banking sector. In part, the repairing and rebalancing of their balance sheets is being brought about by regulatory pressures. The objective is to make banks more resilient to shocks and less susceptible to financial distress.
The need for banks to repair and rebalance their balance sheets is significant because of their systemic importance to the modern-day economy. Financial institutions that are systemically important to national economies are know as SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) while those of systemic importance to the global economy are know as G-SIFIs or G-SIBs (global systemically important banks). The increasing importance of financial institutions to economic activity is known as financialisation.
One way of measuring the degree of financialisation here in the UK is to consider the aggregate size of the balance sheet of resident UK banks and building societies (including foreign subsidiaries operating here). The chart shows that the balance sheet grew from £2.6 trillion in 1998 Q1 to £8.5 trillion in 2010 Q1. Another way of looking at this is to consider this growth relative to GDP. This reveals that the aggregate balance sheet of banks and building societies grew over this period from 3 times annual GDP to a staggering 5.6 times GDP. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
But, now consider the aggregate banking balance sheet in the 2010s. This reveals a shrinking balance sheet. At the end of the second quarter of this year (2014 Q2) it had fallen back to £7.1 trillion or 4 times GDP. As a share of GDP, this was the smallest the aggregate balance sheet had been since 2005 Q1.
Does a shrinking balance sheet matter? This is where the analysis becomes tricky and open to debate. If the smaller size is consistent with a more stable financial system then undoubtedly that is a good thing. But, size is not that all matters. The composition of the balance sheet matters too. This requires an analysis of, among other things, the liquidity of assets (i.e. assets that can be readily turned in a given amount of cash), the reliability of the income flow from assets and the resources available to withstand periods of slow economic growth, including recessions, or periods of financial difficulty.
As we have identified before (see Financialisation: Banks and the economy after the crisis), the financial crisis could herald new norms for the banking system with important implications for the economy. If so, we may need to become accustomed to consistently lower flows of credit and not to the levels that we saw prior to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. However, an alternative view is that we are merely experiencing a pause before the next expansionary phase of the credit cycle. This is consistent with the financial instability hypothesis (see Keeping a Minsky-eye on credit) which argues that credit cycles are an integral part of modern financialised economies. Only time will tell which view will turn out to be right.
Articles
‘Cleaning up bank balance sheets is key’ Irish Examiner, John Walsh (10/10/14)
More action needed at European banks: Fitch Courier Mail, (17/10/14)
Bank lending to small businesses falls by £400m The Telegraph, Rebecca Burn-Callander (20/10/14)
Bank lending to SMEs falls by £400m SME insider, Lindsey Kennedy (21/10/14)
Record world debt could trigger new financial crisis, Geneva report warns The Guardian, Phillip Inman (29/10/14)
RBS shares jump as bank’s bad debts improve The Guardian, Jill Treanor (30/10/14)
Data
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England
Questions
- Using examples, demonstrate your understanding of financialisation.
- Draw up a list of the alternative ways in which we might measure financialisation.
- What factors are likely to explain the recent reduction in the aggregate balance sheet of resident banks and building societies in the UK?
- How might we go about assessing whether the aggregate level of lending by financial institutions is sustainable?
- How might we go about assessing whether the level of lending by individual financial institutions is sustainable?
- How would reduced flows of credit be expected to impact on the economy both in the short term and in the longer term?
- Are credit cycles inevitable?
- Of what significance are credit cycles in explaining the business cycle?