Increasing traffic on the roads is observable by everyone and government policy is focused on reducing the demand for road space, rather than increasing its supply. One method has been to improve public transport and make it a viable substitute for car travel. Private costs of motoring have increased, but if there is no viable alternative, people will continue to demand car travel. Investment in buses and trains has improved their quality: they are more frequent, more reliable, arguably more comfortable and supposed to be part of an integrated transport policy. Local bus services provide a crucial link for local communities, but it is these services that are now facing problems.
In your economics lectures, you may have looked at local bus services, when you considered monopolies, oligopolies and possibly contestable markets. Oligopolies, whilst closer to the monopoly end of the market spectrum can be very competitive, but are also open to collusion and anti-competitive practices. The local bus sector has been referred to the Competition Commission by the Office of Fair Trading through complaints of ‘predatory tactics’ by companies. It is argued that local bus services, by limiting competition, are causing prices to rise and the quality of service to fall. One key issue is that those companies established in the market are alleged to be acting aggressively towards smaller bus companies and thus reducing competition in the industry. A low number of bids for supported service contracts in many areas, local bus routes dominated by a few large companies and predatory actions by incumbent firms are all complaints that this industry is facing.
This investigation is especially important, given the amount of public money that goes into the bus industry: £1.2bn. Investigations found that in areas of limited competition, prices were 9p higher. A number of take-overs have contributed to this situation. Two-thirds of bus services are controlled by only five operators. This limits competition in the market and hence is argued to be against public interest. Yet, industry representatives still argue that the market is competitive. Read the following articles and answer the questions about this issue. Was the OFT right to to initiate this investigation?
Local buses to be re-regulated BBC News (27/9/09)
OFT refers UK bus market to Competition Commission Dow Jones Newswires, Kaveri Nihthyananthan (7/1/10)
Office of Fair Trading prompts probe into bus services Guardian (7/1/10)
Trasport groups fear OFT competition probe over buses Telegraph, Alistair Osborne (4/1/10)
Bus industry competition queried BBC News (20/8/09)
OFT refers bus industry on poor service and prices Times Online, Francesca Steele (7/1/10)
Inquiry into local bus market ‘may delay investment’ Scotsman, Hamish Rutherford (5/1/10)
Questions
- Why are local bus services argued to be (a) a monopoly; (b) an oligopoly?
- What are the main aspects of UK competition policy?
- What is a concentration ratio and how does this apply to the bus industry?
- What predatory tactics are being used in the local bus industry and how do they affect competition, prices and quality?
- Why may limited competition be against the public interest?
- Traffic congestion is a major problem. Explain the economic theory behind government intervention in this area. Think about the effects of taxes; building more roads; investment in substitutes. Which is likely to be the most effective method?
“As snow sweeps the country, the UK has coped in the way it usually does – with surprise, confusion and chaos.” Not only have the transport authorities in many areas struggled to cope, but individuals too have been caught out. Many have rushed to stock up on things such as blankets, fires, de-icing equipment and warming foods.
But why does Britain cope worse than many other countries? Should more resources be diverted into keeping roads, airports and rail lines open? And how have individuals responded? How much have they stocked up on a range of cold-weather items and why? The linked article looks at these issues?
Why can’t the UK deal with snow? EU Infrastructure, Timon Singh (6/1/10)
Questions
- Does it make economic sense for the UK to invest relatively little in snowy-weather infrastructure?
- How should a local authority decide whether or not to (a) buy an additional gritting lorry; (b) increase its stock piles of grit? How would risk attitudes affect the decision?
- Why might a lower proportion of people get to work in the recent snowy weather than in equivalent weather 20 years ago?
- How might you define a ‘thermal elasticity of demand’ for a product, where the determinant of demand is the temperature?
- What factors determine the thermal elasticity of demand for a product? How is the short-term elasticity likely to be different from the longer-term elasticity and why?
- What would you need to include in measuring the full social costs to the economy of the cold spell?
The health of an economy is generally measured in terms of the growth rate in GDP. A healthy economy is portrayed as one that is growing. Declining GDP, by contrast, is seen as a sign of economic malaise; not surprisingly, people don’t want rising unemployment and falling consumption. The recession of 2008/9 has generally been seen as bad news.
But is GDP a good indicator of human well-being? The problem is that GDP measures the production of goods and services for exchange. True, such goods and services are a vital ingredient in determining human well-being. But they are not the only one. Our lives are not just about consumption. What is more, many of our objectives may go beyond human well-being. For example, the state of the environment – the flora and fauna and the planet itself.
Then there is the question of the capital required to produce goods and maintain a healthy and sustainable environment. Capital production is included in GDP and the depreciation of capital is deducted from GDP to arrive at a net measure. But again, things are left out of these calculations. We include manufactured capital, such as factories and machinery, but ignore natural capital, such as rain forests, coral reefs and sustainable ecosystems generally. But the state of the natural environment has a crucial impact on the well-being, not only of the current generation, but of future generations too.
In the video podcast below, Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta, from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Cambridge and also from the University of Manchester, argues that the well-being of future generations requires an increase in the stock of capital per head, and that, in measuring this capital stock, we must take into account natural capital. In the paper to which the podcast refers, he argues “that a country’s comprehensive wealth per capita can decline even while gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increases and the UN Human Development Index records an improvement.”
Nature’s role in sustaining economic development (video podcast) The Royal Society, Partha Dasgupta
Nature’s role in sustaining economic development Philisophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, vol 365, no. 1537, pp 5–11, Partha Dasgupta (12/1/10)
GDP is misleading measure of wealth, says top economist University of Manchester news item (21/12/09)
Economics and the environment: Down to earth index Guardian (28/12/09)
Questions
- Why might a rise in GDP result in a decline in human well-being?
- In what sense is nature ‘over exploited’?
- What is meant by ‘comprehensive wealth’ and why might comprehensive wealth per capita decline even though the stocks of both manufactured capital and human capital are increasing?
- What is meant by ‘shadow prices’ in the context of natural capital?
- How might economists go about measuring the shadow prices of capital?
- What factors should determine the rate of discount chosen for projects that impact on the future state of the environment?
At the end of two weeks of often acrimonious wrangling between representatives from 193 countries, an agreement – of sorts – was reached at the climate change summit in Copenhagen. What was this agreement? It was an ‘accord’ brokered by the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa.
This Copenhagen Accord contains three elements. The first is a recognition of the need to prevent global temperatures rising by more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The second is a commitment by developed countries to give $30bn of aid between 2010 and 2012 to developing countries for investment in green technology and to mitigate the effects of climate change. In addition, a goal was set of providing $100bn a year by 2020. The third is for rich countries to give pledges on emissions reductions and for developing countries to give pledges on reducing emissions increases. Developed countries’ pledges will be scrutinised by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, while developing countries will merely be required to submit reports on their progress in meeting their pledges.
But this is only an accord. It has no legal status and was merely ‘recognised’ by the countries at the conference. What is more, the target of limiting temperature rises to 2C does not contain a date by which temperature rises should peak. Also, as countries are not required to submit targets for emissions until February 2010, it is not clear how these targets will be kept low enough to meet the temperature target and there is no identification of penalites that would apply to countries not meeting their pledges.
Not surprisingly, reactions around the world have been mixed. The following podcasts and articles look at these reactions and at the economic mechanisms that will be required to meet the 2C limit
Podcasts and videos
Recriminations after Copenhagen summit (video) BBC News, David Loyn (21/12/09)
Copenhagen special: Climate change talks end in failure Guardian podcast (19/12/09)
Where do we go after Copenhagen? BBC Today Programme (21/12/09)
Articles
What was agreed and left unfinished in U.N. climate deal Reuters of India Factbox (20/12/09)
Copenhagen deal: Key points BBC News (19/12/09)
Copenhagen deal reaction in quotes BBC News (19/12/09)
Copenhagen climate summit fails green investors BBC News, Damian Kahya (22/12/09)
Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal? BBC News (22/12/09)
Copenhagen climate accord: Key issues BBC News (19/12/09)
Harrabin’s Notes: After Copenhagen BBC News, Roger Harrabin (19/12/09)
Copenhagen climate conference: Who is going to save the planet now? Telegraph, Louise Gray (21/12/09)
Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money Flowing New York Times, James Kanter (20/12/09)
Copenhagen climate summit: plan for EU to police countries’ emissions (including video) Telegraph, James Kirkup, and Louise Gray (19/12/09)
The road from Copenhagen Guardian, Ed Miliband (UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change) (20/12/09)
Carbon Prices Tumble After ‘Modest’ Climate Deal Bloomberg, Mathew Carr and Ewa Krukowska (21/12/09)
Copenhagen deal causes EU carbon price fall BBC News (21/12/09)
Have the hopes of environmentalists been dashed? Financial Times, Clive Cookson (21/12/09)
EU reflects on climate ‘disaster’ Financial Times, Joshua Chaffinin (22/12/09)
China not to blame on climate China Daily, Zhang Jin (23/12/09)
Selling a low-carbon life just got harder Times Online, Jonathon Porritt (21/12/09)
Better than nothing The Economist (19/12/09)
Copenhagen has given us the chance to face climate change with honesty Observer, James Hansen (27/12/09)
Questions
- What incentives exist for countries to agree to tough pledges to reduce emissions?
- Was the very limited nature of the Copenhagen Accord a Nash equilibrium? Explain.
- Is the carbon price a good indicator of the effectiveness of measures to curb emissions?
- Must any agreement have verifiable targets for each country of the world if it is to be successful in curbing carbon emissions?
- Is a cap-and-trade system the best means of achieving emissions reductions? Explain.
When we examine industries and markets in economics, one of the key things we look for is how competitive the market is. A question that we ask is, under what type of market structure is this firm operating? To answer this, we will need information on the number of competitors, the products, prices, advertising, profits, efficiency and how the firms are likely to behave in both the short and long run.
A lot of the time firms are independent: their behaviour doesn’t affect the actions of rivals. This is usually because each firm within the industry only has a relatively small market share. If one firm changes the price, or how much it spends on advertising/product development, this won’t have an impact on the market equilibrium.
However, it’s not as easy for an oligopolist, as interdependence is a key characteristic of this market structure. As such, it’s not surprising that firms have a decision to make: should they compete with the other firms and try to maximise our own profits, or should they collude and try to maximise industry profits? Whilst collusion is illegal in many countries, activities such as price fixing do go ahead and it can be difficult to prove, as the ACCC is finding with a petrol price-fixing case in Melbourne. In 49 of the 53 weeks studied, when one of the big petrol stations changed their price, the industry followed these movements exactly.
As competition in a market decreases, it could be a sign that an oligopoly is developing. A few firms are beginning to dominate the market and this could spell trouble for customers. Indeed, in the Australian banking sector, there are concerns that an oligopoly will develop if more competition is not introduced. The Deputy Chairman of the Australian Bankers’ Association said: “We’ve got four major banks that are repricing all their commercial and small business customers’ margins upwards”. Customers may therefore lose out with higher prices and less choice, while the dominant firms see their profits growing.
The market structure under which a firm is operating will have a major impact on its decisions and the outcomes in the market, as shown in the articles below.
ACCC on safe political ground in targeting the Mobil takeover The Australian Business, John Durie and Martin Collins (3/12/09)
Nippon Steel Chairman warns of Australian oligopolies Market Watch, Stephen Bell (10/11/09)
Government’s bank guarantee hurting BOQ: Libby Business Day (2/12/09)
Regulators to scrutinise BHP and Rio’s Australian joint venture Financial Times, William McNamara and Elizabeth Fry (7/12/09)
Crackdown on price fixing draws mixed reaction The Korea Herald (7/12/09)
Questions
- What are the main characteristics of an oligopoly?
- Illustrate a cartel that fixes prices and show how a member of this cartel must sell at that price and at a given quantity.
- Some factors make collusion more likely to occur and more likely to succeed. In the Australian banking sector, which factors do you think are allowing price fixing to occur?
- Is the example of petrol price fixing barometric price leadership or dominant firm price leadership? Explain both of these terms and use a diagram, where possible, to illustrate the effects.
- The articles suggest that oligopolies are bad for competition. Explain why this is the case.
- To what extent are oligopolies against the public interest? Use examples from the articles to back up your argument.
