Category: Economics for Business: Ch 14

Oil prices will remain below $60 per barrel for the foreseeable future. At least this is what is being assumed by most oil producing companies. In the more distant future, prices may rise as investment in fracking, tar sands and new wells dries up. In meantime, however, marginal costs are sufficiently low as to make it economically viable to continue extracting oil from most sources at current prices.

The low prices are partly the result of increases in supply from large-scale investment in new sources of oil over the past few years and increased output by OPEC. They are also partly the result of falling demand from China.

But are low prices all bad news for the oil industry? It depends on the sector of the industry. Extraction and exploration may be having a hard time; but downstream, the refining, petrochemicals, distribution and retail sectors are benefiting from the lower costs of crude oil. For the big integrated oil companies, such as BP, the overall effect may not be as detrimental as the profits from oil production suggest.

Articles

BP – low oil price isn’t all bad new BBC News, Kamal Ahmed (27/10/15)
Want to See Who’s Happy About Low Oil Prices? Look at Refiners Bloomberg, Dan Murtaugh (31/10/15)
Low prices are crushing Canada’s oil sands industry. Shell’s the latest casualty. Vox, Brad Plumer (28/10/15)

Data

Brent spot crude oil prices US Energy Information Administration
BP Quarterly results and webcast BP

Questions

  1. Why have oil prices fallen?
  2. What is likely to happen to the supply of oil (a) over the next three years; (b) in the longer term?
  3. Draw a diagram with average and marginal costs and revenue to show why it may be profitable to continue producing oil in the short run at $50 per barrel. Why may it not be profitable to invest in new sources of supply if the price remains at current levels?
  4. Find out in what downstream sectors BP is involved and what has happened to its profits in these sectors.
  5. Draw a diagram with average and marginal costs and revenue to show why profits may be increasing from the wholesaling of petrol and diesel to filling stations.
  6. How is price elasticity of demand relevant to the profitablity of downstream sectors in the context of falling costs?

In a blog post on 1 May this year, What’s really on offer?, we looked at the ‘super-complaint‘ by Which? to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) about supermarket special offers. The complaint referred to bogus price reductions, ‘cheaper’ multi-buys which weren’t cheaper, smaller pack sizes and confusing special offers. Under the rules of super-complaints, the CMA had 90 days from the receipt of the complaint on 21 April 2015 to publish a response. It has now done so.

Here is an extract from its press release:

In its investigation the CMA found examples of pricing and promotional practices that have the potential to confuse or mislead consumers and which could be in breach of consumer law. Where there is evidence of breaches of consumer law this could lead to enforcement action.

However, it has concluded that these problems are not occurring in large numbers across the whole sector and that generally retailers are taking compliance seriously to avoid such problems occurring. The CMA also found that more could be done to reduce the complexity in unit pricing to make it a more useful comparison tool for consumers. …Nisha Arora, CMA Senior Director, Consumer, said:

‘We have found that, whilst supermarkets want to comply with the law and shoppers enjoy a wide range of choices, with an estimated 40% of grocery spending being on items on promotion, there are still areas of poor practice that could confuse or mislead shoppers. So we are recommending further action to improve compliance and ensure that shoppers have clear, accurate information.

Although the CMA believes that misleading pricing is not as widespread as consumer groups have claimed, in some cases the supermarkets could be fined. The CMA also says that it will work with the supermarkets to eliminate misleading information in promotions.

In addition it recommends that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) publishes guidelines for supermarkets on displaying unit prices in a consistent way. It also recommends that legislation should be simplified on how items should be unit-priced.

The following articles look at the implications of the CMS’ findings.

Articles

Some UK supermarket promotions are misleading, watchdog says Financial Times, Andrea Felsted (16/7/15)
Shoppers beware: Grocers ‘confusing’ consumers with special offers, unit pricing, says government investigation International Business Times, Graham Lanktree (16/7/15)
Supermarket pricing: CMA finds ‘misleading tactics BBC News, Brian Milligan (16/7/15)
How special are special offers? BBC News, Kamal Ahmed (16/7/15)

CMA publications
Response to super-complaint: link to elements of report CMA (16/7/15)

Questions

  1. Give some examples of the types of promotion used by supermarkets?
  2. In what ways might such promotions be misleading?
  3. How is competition from Aldi and Lidl affecting pricing and promotions in the ‘big four’ supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons)?
  4. What cost and other advantages do Aldi and Lidl have over the big four? How might the big four reduce costs?
  5. Are misleading promotions systemic across the industry?
  6. How can behavioural economics help to explain consumers’ response to promotions in supermarkets?
  7. What is meant by ‘heuristics’? How might supermarkets exploit consumers’ use of heuristics in their promotions?

New Look was founded in 1969 and is an iconic budget retailer found on most British high streets. In its history, it has been a family business; it has been listed on the London stock exchange; returned to a private company and then had the potential to be re-listed. Now, it is moving into South African ownership for £780 million.

90% of New Look will now be owned by Christo Wiese who controls Brait and who has been linked with other take-overs of British retailers in recent years. The remaining 10% will remain in the hands of the founding family. The company has been struggling for some time and in 2010 did have plans to relist the company on the London Stock Exchange. However, volatile market conditions meant that this never occurred and the two private equity firms, Apax and Permira, appeared very eager to sell. New Look’s Chairman, Paul Mason, said:

“This is an ideal outcome for New Look. The Brait team demonstrated to us that they have the long-term vision to help Anders and the team grow this brand.”

It is not yet clear what this move will mean for the retailer, New Look, but with an estimated £1 billion debt, it is expected that changes will have to be made. It is certainly an attractive investment opportunity and New Look does have a history of high rates of growth, despite its current debt. Furthermore, the debt levels are likely to have helped Mr. Wiese obtain a deal for New Look. Fashion retailing is a highly competitive market, but demand always appears to be growing. It is still relatively ‘new’ news, so we will have to wait to see what this means for the number of stores we see on the high streets and the number of jobs lost or created. The following articles consider this new New Look.

South African tycoon buys New Look fashion retailer BBC News (15/5/15)
South African tycoon enters UK retail fray with New Look purchase Financial Times, Andrea Felsted, Clare Barrett and Joseph Cotterill (15/5/15)
New Look snapped up by South African tycoon The Guardian, Sean Farrell (15/5/15)
New Look sold to South African billionaire for £780m The Telegraph, Elizabeth Anderson and Andrew Trotman (15/5/15)

Questions

  1. Why might a company become listed on the London stock exchange?
  2. How would volatile economic circumstances affect a company’s decision to become listed on the stock market?
  3. What do you think this purchase will mean for the number of New Look stores on British high streets? Do you think there will be job losses or jobs created by this purchase?
  4. How do you think the level of New Look’s debt affected Christo Wiese’s decision to purchase New Look?
  5. Which factors are likely to affect a firm’s decision to take-over or purchase another firm?

Virtually all manual toothbrushes sold in the UK are made by Oral B (Procter & Gamble), Colgate (Colgate-Palmolive) or Listerene Reach (Johnson & Johnson). This is a powerful oligopoly.

The manufacturers distribute toothbrushes primarily through large powerful retailers, such as supermarkets and Boots. It is difficult for new entrants to persuade these retailers to stock their product. What is more, with large advertising and marketing budgets, existing toothbrush manufacturers make it difficult for new brands to attract customers.

But one company has successfully entered the children’s section of the market when Boots agreed to stock its product. The Rockabilly Kids toothbrush has a feature likely to appeal to both children and their parents. It wobbles! With a weight in the bottom, the brush rights itself, with a wobble, when dropped or simply placed on the basin or shelf.

This clearly appeals to small kids. It also appeals to their parents who can do away with unhygienic toothbrush holders. What is more, the self-righting wobbly toothbrush, by making the whole process of teeth cleaning fun for young kids, can help them gain good habits of oral hygiene.

So just how did the manufacturer overcome the barriers to entry into this well-established oligopoly? The following article examines how.

Can ‘wobbly’ kids toothbrushes shake the Oral B/Colgate oligopoly? The Telegraph, Rebecca Burn-Callander (10/1/15)

Questions

  1. What barriers to entry exist in the manual toothbrush market?
  2. How did Hamish Khayat overcome these barriers?
  3. Why did he decide against a toothbrush subscription service?
  4. How would you decide whether £6.99 is the right price?
  5. Is it a good idea for him to diversify into electric kids toothbrushes?
  6. How are the big toothbrush manufacturers likely to respond to the expansion of Rockabilly Kids?

In an earlier post, Elizabeth looked at oligopolistic competition between supermarkets. Although supermarkets have been accused of tacit price collusion on many occasions in the past, price competition has been growing. And recent developments show that it is likely to get a lot fiercer as the ‘big four’ try to take on the ‘deep discounters’, Aldi and Lidl.

Part of the reason for the growth in price competition has been a change in shopping behaviour. Rather than doing one big shop per week in Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda or Morrisons, many consumers are doing smaller shops as they seek to get more for their money. A pattern is emerging for many consumers who are getting their essentials in Aldi or Lidl, their ‘special’ items in more upmarket shops, such as Waitrose, Marks & Spencer or small high street shops (such as bakers and ethnic food shops) and getting much fewer products from the big four. Other consumers, on limited incomes, who have seen their real incomes fall as prices have risen faster than wages, are doing virtually all their shopping in the deep discounters. As the Guardian article below states:

A steely focus on price and simplicity, against a backdrop of falling living standards that has sharpened customers’ eye for a bargain, has seen the discounter grab market share from competitors and transform what we expect from our weekly shop.

The result is that the big four are seeing their market share falling, as the chart shows. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) In the past year, Tesco’s market share has fallen from 29.9% to 28.1%, Asda’s from 17.8% to 16.3%, Sainsbury’s from 16.9% to 16.2% and Morrisons’ from 11.7% to 11.0%. By contrast, Aldi’s has risen from 3.9% to 5.4% and Lidl’s from 3.1% to 4.0%, while Waitrose’s has also risen, from 4.7% to 4.9%. And it’s not just market share that has been falling for the big four. Profits have also fallen, as have share prices. Sales revenues in the four weeks to 13 September are down 1.6% on the same period a year ago; sales volumes are down 1.9%.

But can the big four take on the discounters at their own game? Morrison’s has just announced a form of price match scheme called ‘Match & More’. If a shopper finds that a comparable grocery shop is cheaper in not only Tesco, Sainsbury’s or Asda, but also in Aldi or Lidl, then ‘Match & More users will automatically get the difference back in points on their card. Shoppers also will be able to collect extra points on hundreds of featured products and fuel’. When the difference has risen to a total £5 (5000 points), the shopper will get a £5 voucher at the till. The idea is to encourage customers to stay loyal to Morrisons.

But what if Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury’s do the same? What will be the impact on their prices and profits. Will there be a race to the bottom in prices, or will they be able to keep prices higher than the deep discounters, hoping that many customers will not cash in their vouchers?

But if effectively the big four felt forced to cut their prices to match Aldi and Lidl, could they afford to do so? This depends on their comparative average costs. At first sight, it might be thought that the big four could succeed in profitably matching the discounters, thereby clawing back market share. After all, they are much bigger and it might be thought that they would benefit from greater economies of scale and hence lower costs.

But it is not as simple as this. The discounters have lower costs than the big four. Their shops are typically in areas where rents or land prices are lower; their shops are smaller; they carry many fewer lines and thus gain economies of scale on each line; they have a much higher proportion of own-brand products; products are displayed in the boxes they come in, thus saving on the staff costs of unpacking them and placing them on shelves; they buy what is cheapest and thus do not always display the same brands.

So is Morrison’s a wise strategy? Will other supermarkets be forced to follow? Is there a prisoners’ dilemma here and, if so, is there any form of collusion in which the big four can engage which is not illegal? Can the big four differentiate themselves from the discounters and the up-market supermarkets in ways that will attract back customers?

It is worrying times for the big four.

Articles

Questions

  1. Would it be possible for the big four to price match the deep discounters?
  2. What is meant by the prisoners’ dilemma? In what ways are the big four in a prisoners’ dilemma situation?
  3. Assume that you had to advise Tesco on it strategy? What advise would you give it and why?
  4. Assume that two firms, M and A, are playing the following ‘game’: firm M pledges to match firm A’s prices; and firm A pledges to sell at 2% below M’s price. What will be the outcome of this game?
  5. Is Morrisons wise to adopt its ‘Match & More’ strategy?
  6. Why is it difficult for Morrisons to make a like-for-like comparison with Aldi and Lidl in its ‘Match & More’ strategy?
  7. Why may Aldi and Lidl benefit from Morrisons’ strategy?