In the following article, Joseph Stiglitz argues that power rather than competition is a better starting point for analysing the working of capitalism. People’s rewards depend less on their marginal product than on their power over labour or capital (or lack of it).
As inequality has widened and concerns about it have grown, the competitive school, viewing individual returns in terms of marginal product, has become increasingly unable to explain how the economy works.
Thus the huge bonuses, often of millions of pounds per year, paid to many CEOs and other senior executives, are more a reflection of their power to set their bonuses, rather than of their contribution to their firms’ profitability. And these excessive rewards are not competed away.
Stiglitz examines how changes in technology and economic structure have led to the increase in power. Firms are more able to erect barriers to entry; network economies give advantages to incumbents; many firms, such as banks, are able to lobby governments to protect their market position; and many governments allow powerful vested interests to remain unchecked in the mistaken belief that market forces will provide the brakes on the accumulation and abuse of power. Monopoly profits persist and there is too little competition to erode them. Inequality deepens.
According to Stiglitz, the rationale for laissez-faire disappears if markets are based on entrenched power and exploitation.
Article
Monopoly’s New Era Chazen Global Insights, Columbia Business School, Joseph Stiglitz (13/5/16)
Questions
- What are the barriers to entry that allow rewards for senior executives to grow more rapidly than median wages?
- What part have changes in technology played in the increase in inequality?
- How are the rewards to senior executives determined?
- Provide a critique of Stiglitz’ analysis from the perspective of a proponent of laissez-faire.
- If Stiglitz analysis is correct, what policy implications follow from it?
- How might markets which are currently dominated by big business be made more competitive?
- T0 what extent have the developments outlined by Stiglitz been helped or hindered by globalisation?
In our recent blog constructing growth without production: The UK growth paradox we saw that the provisional estimate of economic growth in the UK in the final quarter of 2015 was 0.5 per cent. This was buoyed by service sector growth of 0.7 per cent. Meanwhile, construction sector output was estimated to have fallen by 0.1 per cent and production in the production industries by 0.2 per cent. The ONS Index of Production released on 11 February suggests the decline in production activity in the final quarter might have been has much as 0.5 per cent further pointing to unbalanced industrial growth.
The production industries today account for about 15 per cent of UK output which is small in comparison to the roughly 79 per cent from service-sector industries. Chart 1 shows the quarterly rate of growth in UK industrial production since the 1980s. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the average quarterly rate of growth in industrial output has been a mere 0.1 per cent compared with 0.5 per cent for total economic output and 0.7 per cent for the service sector. As a result, the importance of the production industries as a driver of economic output has declined.
Across 2015 industrial production rose by 1 per cent while the total output of the economy grew by 2.2 per cent. Industrial output comprises four main components. Of these, output from mining and quarrying grew in 2015 by 6.6 per cent, water, sewerage and waste management by 3.1 per cent, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning by 0.3 per cent, while manufacturing output contracted by 0.2 per cent.
Chart 2 shows the path of industrial output since 2006. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). In particular, it allows us to analyse the effect of the financial crisis and the global economic downturn. Whereas the total output of the economy surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, driven by the service sector, total industrial output in 2015 Q4 remains 9.9 per cent below its 2008 Q1 level. Among its component parts, output in mining and quarrying is 31 per cent lower, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning output is 12.2 per cent lower and manufacturing 6.5 per cent lower. Only the output of water, sewerage and waste management is greater – some 7.4 per cent higher.
The data point to the industrial composition of UK remaining heavily skewed towards the service sector and, hence, to service-sector industries driving economic growth. A key talking point is the extent to which this matters. On one hand we might point to the deindustrialisation captured by the data. This has had profound implications for certain regions of the United Kingdom and in particular for living standards in certain communities. Industrial change poses challenges for the UK labour force and for policymakers trying to affect the skills of workers needed in a changing economy. It has had a profound impact on the country’s balance of trade in goods: we consistently run a balance of trade deficit in goods. On the other hand we might argue that the UK does services well. We might be said to have a comparative advantage in this area. Whatever, your view point the latest industrial production data show the fragility of UK industrial output.
Data
Index of Production Dataset December 2015 Office for National StatisticsIndex of Production, December 2015 Office for National Statistics
Articles
UK industrial production shrank in 2015 Guardian, Phillip Inman (10/2/16)
December UK industrial output falls sharply BBC News, (10/2/16)
Manufacturing output fall dents UK growth hope Sky News, (10/2/16)
Industrial production’s worst monthly fall since 2012 Belfast Trelegraph, Holly Williams (11/2/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)
Questions
- What is meant by industrial production? How does it differ from the economy’s total output?
- Would you expect the index of production to be less or more volatile than total output? Explain your answer.
- What factors might explain the volatility of industrial production?
- Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
- Discuss the economic issues that might arise as the industrial composition of a country changes.
- Why is the distinction between nominal and real important when analysing economic growth?
Many UK coal mines closed in the 1970s and 80s. Coal extraction was too expensive in the UK to compete with cheap imported coal and many consumers were switching away from coal to cleaner fuels. Today many shale oil producers in the USA are finding that extraction has become unprofitable with oil prices having fallen by some 50% since mid-2014 (see A crude indicator of the economy (Part 2) and The price of oil in 2015 and beyond). So is it a bad idea to invest in fossil fuel production? Could such assets become unusable – what is known as ‘stranded assets‘?
In a speech on 3 March 2015, Confronting the challenges of tomorrow’s world, delivered at an insurance conference, Paul Fisher, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, warned that a switch to both renewable sources of energy and actions to save energy could hit investors in fossil fuel companies.
‘One live risk right now is of insurers investing in assets that could be left ‘stranded’ by policy changes which limit the use of fossil fuels. As the world increasingly limits carbon emissions, and moves to alternative energy sources, investments in fossil fuels and related technologies – a growing financial market in recent decades – may take a huge hit. There are already a few specific examples of this having happened.
… As the world increasingly limits carbon emissions, and moves to alternative energy sources, investments in fossil fuels and related technologies – a growing financial market in recent decades – may take a huge hit. There are already a few specific examples of this having happened.’
Much of the known reserves of fossil fuels could not be used if climate change targets are to be met. And investment in the search for new reserves would be of little value unless they were very cheap to extract. But will climate change targets be met? 
That is hard to predict and depends on international political agreements and implementation, combined with technological developments in fields such as clean-burn technologies, carbon capture and renewable energy. The scale of these developments is uncertain. As Paul Fisher said in his speech:
‘Tomorrow’s world inevitably brings change. Some changes can be forecast, or guessed by extrapolating from what we know today. But there are, inevitably, the unknown unknowns which will help shape the future. … As an ex-forecaster I can tell you confidently that the only thing we can be certain of is that there will be changes that no one will predict.’
The following articles look at the speech and at the financial risks of fossil fuel investment. The Guardian article also provides links to some useful resources.
Articles
Bank of England warns of huge financial risk from fossil fuel investments The Guardian, Damian Carrington (3/3/15)
PRA warns insurers on fossil fuel assets Insurance Asset Risk (3/3/15)
Energy trends changing investment dynamics UPI, Daniel J. Graeber (3/3/15)
Speech
Confronting the challenges of tomorrow’s world Bank of England, Paul Fisher (3/3/15)
Questions
- What factors are taken into account by investors in fossil fuel assets?
- Why might a power station become a ‘stranded asset’?
- How is game theory relevant in understanding the process of climate change negotiations and the outcomes of such negotiations?
- What social functions are filled by insurance?
- Why does climate change impact on insurers on both sides of their balance sheets?
- What is the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)? What is its purpose?
- Explain what is meant by ‘unknown unknowns’. How do they differ from ‘known unknowns’?
- How do the arguments in the article and the speech relate to the controversy about investing in fracking in the UK?
- Explain and comment on the statement by World Bank President, Jim Yong Kim, that sooner rather than later, financial regulators must address the systemic risk associated with carbon-intensive activities in their economies.
In the UK, we take it for granted that if you need to see a doctor, you go and give little, if any thought, to the cost. It may be petrol costs, time off work or the cost of a prescription, but beyond that, receiving treatment is free at the point of use. Funded through a progressive tax system, the NHS is seen as being one of the more equitable health care systems.
When a mother gives birth, the main thing she will have to worry about is the labour – and not whether to have certain painkillers or stay an extra night, because of the cost.
The International Federation of Health Plans (IFHP) looked at data on the cost of giving birth, based on insurance company payments. For someone living in the UK, the figures make for quite astonishing reading. In the USA, a normal delivery will cost $10,000, while a caesarean totals $15,000, meaning that giving birth in the USA is the most expensive place in the world. The article linked below takes the case of Mari Roberts, whose total delivery bill came to over $100,000. The insurance did cover it, but that’s not always the case. Medical bills in the United States are one of the leading reasons for bankruptcy and with these types of figures, perhaps it’s hardly surprising.
Other countries also see high costs for delivery, where expectant mothers really do need to give consideration to the length of their stay in hospital and perhaps even whether they are willing to forgo a pain-relieving drug and save some money. There is often said to be an efficiency–equity trade-off in the area of healthcare, with countries offering a free at the point of use service delivering an equitable system, but with a lack of responsiveness to the demands of the patients. In the UK, you don’t pay to see a doctor but, with a ‘free’ service, demand is understandably very high, thus creating a shortage and waiting lists. In countries, such as the USA, a higher price for treatment does limit demand, creating more inequity but a responsive system.
There are certainly lessons that can be learned from all health care systems and living in a developed country, we should certainly consider ourselves lucky. There are many countries where access to even the most basic health care is a luxury that most cannot afford. So, where does have the best health care system? I’ll leave that to you.
Video and article
How much do women around the world pay to give birth? BBC News, Mariko Oi (13/2/15)
Report
Research for Universal Health Coverage, World Health Report 2013 World Health Organisation August 2013
Health Systems Financing: The Path to Universal Coverage, World Health Report 2010 World Health Organisation August 2010
Questions
- Using a demand and supply diagram, explain why there may be a trade-off between efficiency and equity.
- If there is over-consumption of a service such as health care, does this suggest that the market fails?
- What are the main market failures that exist in health care?
- Is the concept of opportunity cost relevant to mothers in labour? Think about the country in question.
- How would you go about ranking health care systems if you worked for an organisation such as the OECD or WHO?
- Pick a country whose health care system you are familiar with. What changes have occurred to the way in which health care is organised and financed in this country? How has it affected the key objectives that formed part of your answer to question 5?
The New Year is a time for reflection and prediction. What will the New Year bring? What does the longer-term future hold? Here are two articles from The Guardian that look into the future.
The first, by Larry Elliott, considers a number of scenarios and policy options. Although not totally doom laden, the article is not exactly cheery in its predictions. Perhaps ‘life will go on’ and the global economy will muddle through. But perhaps a new recession is around the corner or, even worse, the world is at a tipping point when things are fundamentally changing. Unless policy-makers are careful, clever and co-ordinated, perhaps a new dark age may be looming. But who knows?
Which brings us to the second article, by Gaby Hinsliff. This argues that people are pretty hopeless at predicting. “History is littered with supposed dead certs that didn’t happen – Greece leaving the euro, the premature collapse of the coalition – and wholly unimagined events that came to pass.” And economists and financial experts are little better.
Two years ago, The Observer challenged a panel of City investors to pick a portfolio of stocks and rated their performance against that of Orlando, a ginger cat who selected his portfolio by tossing a toy mouse at a sheet of paper. Inevitably, the cat triumphed.
But is this fair? If capital markets are relatively efficient, stock prices today already reflect knowable information about the future, but clearly not unknowable information.
It’s the same with economies. When information is already to hand, such as a pre-announced tax change, then its effects, ceteris paribus, can be estimated – at least roughly.
But it’s the ‘ceteris paribus‘ assumption that’s the problem. Other things are not equal. The world is constantly changing and there are all sorts of unpredictable events that will influence the outcomes of economic policy and of economic decisions more generally. And central to the problem are people’s attitudes and confidence. Mood can swing quite dramatically, from irrational exuberance to deep pessimism. And such mood changes – often triggered by some exogenous factor, such as an international dispute, an election or unexpected economic news – can rapidly gather momentum and have significant effects.
Predicting the long-term future is both easier and more difficult: easier, in that short-term cyclical effects are less relevant; more difficult in that changes that have not yet happened, such as technological changes or changes in working practices, may themselves be key determinants of the future global economy.
One of the most salutary lessons is to look at predictions made in the past about the world today and at just how wrong they have proved to be. Perhaps we need to call on Orlando more frequently.
Why ‘life will go on’ thesis about global economy might not pass muster in 2015 The Guardian, Larry Elliott (28/12/14)
Who knows what the new year holds? Certainly none of us The Guardian, Gaby Hinsliff (26/12/14)
Questions
- Give some examples of factors that could have a major influence on the global economy, but which are unpredictable.
- Is economic forecasting still worthwhile? Explain.
- Look at some macroeconomic forecasts made in the past about the world today. You might want to look at forecasts of agencies such as the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and the European Commission. You can find links in the Economics Network’s Economic Data freely available online. Explain why such forecasts have differed from the actual outcome.
- Why, if capital markets were perfect, might Orlando be just as good as a top investment manager at predicting the future course of share prices?
- In what ways is economic forecasting similar to and different from weather forecasting in its methods, its use of data and its reliability?
In the following article, Joseph Stiglitz argues that power rather than competition is a better starting point for analysing the working of capitalism. People’s rewards depend less on their marginal product than on their power over labour or capital (or lack of it).
