Author: Jon Guest

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Ticket resales – is it time to introduce a price cap?

Following the controversary over the sale of tickets for popular live events such as Taylor Swift’s Eras tour and the Oasis Live ’25 Tour, the government launched a consultation exercise in January 2025 on the resale of tickets. Titled, ‘putting fans first’, the exercise sought the views of individuals and organisations on a range of policy proposals. One of these was the implementation of a cap on the resale price of tickets.

The government is not only considering whether to implement a cap but also the level at which it might be set. The following question was included in the consultation exercise.

What is the maximum uplift that you think should be applied if ticket resales were to be subject to a price cap? Please state the reason for your selection.
 • no uplift at all
 • 10% or less
 • between 10 and 20%
 • between 20 and 30%
 • other – please state

Some platforms such as Twickets and Ticketswap already cap resale prices on their platforms at between 5 and 10 per cent above the face value of the ticket. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by any new price regulation unless the ‘no uplift at all’ option is chosen. On other platforms, such as Viagogo and Stubhub, resellers are free to list tickets at whatever price they choose. This is often referred to as the uncapped market, and tickets for the Oasis tour with a face value of £150 were listed on these websites for £14 000. The implementation of a price cap is likely to have a big impact on this part of the resale market. The chief executive of StubHub stated in June 2025 that the business would probably have to exit the UK if a cap was introduced.

Although many fans dislike the uncapped secondary ticketing market, most economists take a more positive view. They see them as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial trade and helping to reallocate tickets to those with the highest willingness to pay. This reduces levels of allocative inefficiency/deadweight welfare loss in the market.

Economists also tend to argue against the use of price controls in competitive markets because of their negative impact on supply. If price controls reduce the available returns to sellers, they have an incentive to do something else with their time/resources i.e. switch to supplying other goods and services in markets not subject to price controls. This reduces supply in the regulated market and so could have a negative impact on consumer surplus.

What are the issues with the secondary market?

Given the benefits outlined by economists of having an uncapped secondary ticketing, why is the government considering the implementation of a price cap? One potential issue of having an uncapped secondary ticketing market is that developments in technology make it easier for professional resellers to buy very large quantities of tickets. This makes it increasingly difficult for fans who want to attend the event from being able to purchase a ticket.

Reports also suggest that professional resellers use illegal methods to both mass purchase and resell tickets. For example, to overcome any limits on sales imposed by the sellers in the primary market, some use automated software, fake IDs and multiple credit cards. Two people convicted of fraudulent trading in 2024 were found to have bought 47 000 tickets over a 212-year period, using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.

Some resellers have also acted in ways that do not comply with consumer law when advertising tickets for sale. For example, not providing information such as the ticket number and other details about where the seat is located i.e. the block/area and row.

These rent seeking activities by professional resellers could outweigh the positive impact of uncapped secondary market on allocative efficiency.

Implementing a resale price cap would reduce the incentives for professional resellers to purchase large quantities of tickets and engage in these rent-seeking activities. However, in the consultation document the government recognises that the implementation of a resale price cap would be a ‘significant and complex intervention’.

An important implementation issue

To calculate the resale price cap for any live event, the original price of the ticket in the primary market needs to be known. This raises an interesting question – should the cap apply to the initial face value of the ticket or the total price the customer pays?

The face value of the ticket may only represent a proportion of the actual cost of buying a ticket because of the widespread use of drip pricing. This is the practice of applying additional fees as the consumer proceeds through the online purchasing process. These fees can sometimes add around 25 per cent and more to the price of a ticket. In the consultation document, the government suggested that the cap should apply to the face value of the ticket plus all compulsory fees.

One issue raised in the response to the consultation by the Competition and Markets Authority is that these fees are not always made clear by sellers in the primary market in a clear and transparent way. Therefore, for the policy to be effective, primary market sellers would have to make information on both ticket prices and any fees clearly and easily available. Recent changes to the law that prohibit drip pricing might help to address this issue.

The potential impact of a resale price cap on fraud

To avoid the price cap, there is a danger that increasing numbers of buyers and sellers stop using capped secondary ticket platforms, where activity is easier to observe/regulate, and switch to other non-specialist platforms where detection of illegal behaviour and enforcement of consumer law is more difficult. Examples of non-specialist platforms where sales might increasingly take place include Facebook Marketplace, Instagram Shop, X (formerly Twitter) and internet forums. With lower levels of consumer protection and the greater difficulty of detecting illegal behaviour, sales via these non-specialist platforms are more vulnerable to scams and fraud.

When referring to the impact of a resale price cap, the chief executive of StubHub argued that:

It will have a massive negative impact on consumers. It’s not like the demand is going to go away, it’s just going to move somewhere else, and that somewhere else is going to be the black market [where] consumers aren’t protected.

To test the hypothesis that price controls lead to greater incidences of fraud, one study used polling data to compare ticket fraud rates in the UK with Victoria, Australia and Ireland. In 2009, the state government of Victoria made it illegal for tickets to be resold for more than 10 per cent of their face, while the Irish government introduced the Sale of Ticket Act in 2021 that prohibited the resale of tickets above their original price. The study found that the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of ticket fraud over the previous two years was around four times higher in Victoria and Ireland than the UK. The most common sales channel where consumers experienced ticket fraud in all three countries were social media platforms.

Another example of the potential impact of the price cap in Ireland on fraud relates to the first ever regular-season NFL game that is being played in Dublin on 28 September 2025 between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Minnesota Vikings. The online bank, Revolut, reported an 80 per cent increase in the number of ticket scams when tickets for this game went on sale.

In response to the consultation exercise, the Competition and Markets Authority backed the implementation of a resale price. It will be interesting to see if the government goes through with the measure in the next few months.

Consultation

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Questions

  1. Why might event organisers set ticket prices below the market clearing rate? Illustrate the impact of setting prices below market clearing rates on consumer, producer and total surplus in the primary market for tickets.
  2. Using a demand and supply diagram, explain how the uncapped secondary ticket market could reduce deadweight welfare loss. Discuss any assumptions you have made about the allocation of tickets among potential buyers in the primary market (i.e. sorting).
  3. Is it possible for professional resellers to continue making a profit if tickets are sold at market clearing rates in the primary market? Explain your answer.
  4. Under what circumstances would a maximum price set below the market clearing rate in a competitive market have a negative impact on consumer surplus? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
  5. Using examples, explain what is meant by ‘rent seeking’ in economic theory.
    Outline some of the recent updates to the law on pricing information that businesses must show customers.
  6. What policies, other than a resale price cap, could the government introduce to try to address some of the issues with the ticketing market for live events?
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The European Commission’s latest battle with Apple – The interoperability obligation of the Digital Markets Act

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) outlines a new regulatory approach that the European Commission (EC) is taking to address concerns over the lack of competition in digital platform markets. The DMA complements existing European Union competition law and officially came into force on 1st November 2022.

In the first stage of this new regulatory approach, the EC identified ten core platform services (CPS). Examples include search engines, online social networking services, video sharing services, cloud computing services, web browsers and operating systems. These services act as important gateways for large numbers of businesses and consumers to interact with one another. They also have some important economic characteristics, such as large economies of scale and very strong network effects.

The next stage of the regulatory process was to assess which of the large established businesses should be designated as ‘gatekeepers’ of these CPS. To be judged as a gatekeeper, a business had to meet three qualitative criteria. Using quantitative thresholds as a guide to see if these qualitative criteria had been met, the following six companies were designated as gatekeepers by the EC in September 2023: Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (owner of TikTok), Meta (owner of Facebook) and Microsoft. Individual companies can be gatekeeper for more than one CPS. For example, Apple was judged to be a gatekeeper for both web browsers (Safari) and operating systems (iOS and iPadOS).

Rules and compliance

Once a business has been designated as a gatekeeper for one or more CPS, the DMA imposes a set of rules on its future conduct. Some of these rules refer to conduct that the business must follow, while others refer to types of behaviour that are prohibited. The EC sometimes refer to these rules as a list of “do’s” and “don’ts”.

One of the rules refers to interoperability. This is the degree to which different (a) software, (b) devices and (c) other applications can work seamlessly together (i.e. share functionality/data) without requiring any actions by the user (i.e. how compatible they are with one another).

For example, consider the degree of interoperability between the operating system of a gatekeeper, such as Apple, and other hardware/software services. One of the requirements of the DMA is for the gatekeeper to provide the same degree of interoperability for the hardware/software services provided by rival businesses as they do for similar hardware/software services they supply. This is sometimes referred to as the interoperability obligation.

Once a business is designated as a gatekeeper, it has 6 months to submit a compliance report to the EC that demonstrates how it is meeting the rules set out in the DMA. This should include descriptions of any changes the company has had to make to its conduct to meet the new requirements. Further compliance reports must then be submitted on an annual basis.

If, after assessing a compliance report, the EC suspects that a gatekeeper is still acting in ways that do not comply with the DMA, then it can launch either a non-compliance or specification procedure.

The case of Apple

Apple submitted its first compliance report on 7 March 2024. It was far less extensive than those completed by other designated gatekeepers and adopted a very different tone: it directly challenged the EC’s view that the DMA rules would have a positive impact on consumer welfare.

In September 2024, the EC launched its first two specification proceedings that focused on Apple’s compliance with the interoperability obligation.

The first of these proceedings opened a formal discussion with Apple over the interoperability between the iPhone operating system (iOS) and connected devices such as smartwatches and headphones. The proceeding identified nine features that gave the iOS greater functional compatibility with connected devices produced by Apple than with those made by other businesses. For example:

  • Only users of connected devices produced by Apple can (a) receive iOS notifications that contain images or other attachments and (b) select the iOS notifications they want to appear on the device.
  • Only users of Apple’s wireless headphones have intelligent audio switching functionality that allows them to switch automatically to the device playing the most relevant audio.
  • The Airdrop function, which enables users to share files wirelessly between devices, only works if they are both produced by Apple.
  • Only connected devices made by Apple have the functionality for high-bandwidth data transfer from an iPhone without having to rely on network or cellular connection. This is useful for gaming and AI services.

The second specification proceeding focused on the process developed by Apple to deal with requests from other businesses that wanted to develop hardware or software services that are compatible with the iOS.

On 18th December 2024, the EC informed Apple of its preliminary specification decisions and opened a consultation exercise with other interested parties about the suitability of its proposals. Once this process was completed, the EC informed Apple of its final specification decisions on 19 March 2025.

The EC’s decisions

The first decision included a set of measures that Apple must take to improve the interoperability of connected devices produced by other businesses with the iOS. The EC stated that:

The interoperability solutions for third parties will have to be equally effective to those available to Apple and must not require more cumbersome system setting or additional user friction.

The second decision outlined measures that Apple had to take to improve the process of dealing with requests for greater compatibility with the iOS. For example, it should provide outside businesses with more (a) access to technical documentation, (b) predictable timelines for the reviews and (c) timely updates.

Apple argued that being forced to introduce these measures will (a) create significant additional costs, (b) limit its ability to develop products that work seamlessly with one another and (c) lead to its having to share sensitive customer information with its rivals.

On 30th May 2025, Apple filed an appeal against the EC’s specification decisions to the General Court of the European Union. It will be interesting to see what judgment is made on this case by the General Court and the implications this has for the enforcement of the DMA.

Video

Articles

Questions

  1. Identifying core platform services is similar to defining relevant markets in standard competition policy but takes a more legalistic approach. Discuss some of the problems of defining a relevant market for a digital platform.
  2. Outline the three qualitative criteria and the quantitative thresholds that are used by the EC to designate a digital platform as a gatekeeper of a core platform service.
  3. Find an example of a digital platform that met the quantitative thresholds but did not meet the qualitative criteria and so was not designated as a gatekeeper.
  4. Find an example of a digital platform that did not meet the quantitative thresholds but did meet the qualitative criteria and so was designated as a gatekeeper.
  5. Interoperability is a type of conduct that is sometimes referred to as self-preferencing: i.e. behaviour by a digital platform that gives its own products/services preferential treatment over those provided by other firms that use the same platform. What other types of conduct are possible examples of self-preferencing?
  6. What is the difference between a non-compliance procedure and a specification procedure? Find some recent examples of non-compliance procedures that have been undertaken by the EC to enforce the DMA.
  7. What are the potential advantages and disadvantages for consumer welfare of the specification decisions made by the EC?
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Competition policy – the evolving approach towards firms that misuse market power

The enforcement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the European Commission (EC) tends to focus on exclusionary abuses by firms with significant market power. Exclusionary abuses are actions that limit or prevent competition, as opposed to exploitative abuses that directly harm the consumer, such as charging high prices.

The treatment of exclusionary abuses has evolved over time. Initially, the approach towards enforcement was form-based (i.e. the nature of the abuses), but this changed when the EC produced new guidelines in 2009 which signalled a move to a more effects-based approach.

The EC plans to produce a new set of guidelines in 2025 and published a draft version in August 2024 as part of the consultation process with businesses and other stakeholders. These draft guidelines indicate a partial shift back to a form-based approach. Any moves in this direction made by the EC are likely to influence both national-level competition authorities and the courts.

The form-based approach to policy enforcement

A form-based approach to the enforcement of Article 102 assumes that certain types of business conduct are inherently anti-competitive except in very exceptional circumstances. In other words, there is a presumption that the characteristics or form of the behaviour mean that it must have a negative impact on competition and consumer welfare in virtually all real-world cases.

With a form-based approach to enforcement there is no requirement for the authorities to carry out detailed case-specific analyses of business conduct as part of an investigation. This had been the approach adopted by the EC before 2009. It is possible, however, that the same form of business conduct could have anti-competitive effects in some market situations but pro-competitive effects in others. The EC was criticised for not making enough allowance for the chances of this happening.

The effects-based approach to policy enforcement

In response to this criticism the European Union published a new set of guidelines in 2009 which signalled that the enforcement of Article 102 was moving to a more effects-based approach. The effects-based approach uses economic analysis to assess the impact of a dominant firm’s conduct on a case-by-case basis. Context-specific evidence is examined by the competition authorities to see if the behaviour effectively excludes rival businesses from the market that are just as efficient as the dominant firm.

The use of economics in this effects-based approach gradually increased over time. Initially, the analysis was predominately based on theoretical arguments, but increasingly cases included sophisticated analysis of market-specific evidence using econometric models and market simulations. This, however, led to the following issues.

  • The increasing use of complex economic analysis makes it more difficult to meet the evidentiary standards of the courts and prove a case. As the effects-based approach places a greater burden on the competition authorities to meet these evidentiary standards (i.e. provide evidence of case-specific anti-competitive effects of the conduct) it disproportionality affects their ability to prove cases.
  • Businesses with significant market power are more likely to make large profits and so have access to greater resources than government-funded competition authorities. Therefore, they will be able to employ more economic consultants with the relevant technical expertise to (a) carry out the analysis and (b) communicate the findings effectively in a court case

This led to concerns that the competition authorities were losing cases where there was strong evidence of exclusionary conduct by the dominant firm.

In response to these concerns, the EC announced in 2023 that it would be revising its 2009 guidelines to improve enforcement of Article 102.

The draft guidelines

The draft guidelines published in August 2024 split different types of potentially anti-competitive conduct by dominant firms into three categories.

The first category includes types of conduct where there is a strong presumption of anti-competitive effects: i.e. the sole purpose of the business behaviour is to restrict competition. These types of conduct are referred to as a ‘naked restriction’ and the documentation provides the following three examples:

  • making payments to customers (typically other businesses) on the condition that they cancel or postpone the launch of a product that uses inputs produced by the dominant firm’s rivals;
  • threatening to withdraw discounts offered to suppliers unless they agree to supply the dominant firm’s product in place of a similar product produced by a rival firm;
  • actively dismantling infrastructure used by a rival firm.

The guidelines indicate a form-based approach will be taken when investigating these types of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any case-specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. A business under investigation can challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects with appropriate evidence, but the guidelines make it clear that this would only succeed in exceptional circumstances. In other words, it is highly unlikely that the conduct could ever be justified on pro-competitive grounds.

The second category of anti-competitive conduct includes actions that are also presumed to have a negative impact on competition. The presumption, however, is not as strong as with naked restrictions, so firms have a better chance of proving pro-competitive effects.

There is a form-based element towards this second category of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any initial case specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. But, if a business under investigation does submit evidence to challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects, the EC must demonstrate that (a) it has fully assessed this evidence and (b) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the conduct does have pro-competitive effects. As part of this process, the EC can provide its own case-specific evidence. Therefore, for this second category of conduct, the initial burden of proof effectively shifts from the competition authority to the firm under investigation, making it more of a form-based approach. However, if the firm uses relevant evidence to appeal its case, the burden shifts back to the competition authority and becomes a more effects-based approach.

The third category includes types of conduct where the EC must initially provide case-specific evidence that it reduces competition. For this category of conduct, the approach towards enforcement remains the same as in the 2009 guidelines and an effects-based approach is adopted.

It will be interesting to see the extent to which the final guidelines (a) follow the approach outlined in the draft guidance and (b) influence the enforcement of Article 102 by the EC and other national-level competition authorities.

Articles

Questions

  1. What exactly does it mean if a firm has ‘significant’ market power?
  2. What methods do competitions authorities use to assess whether a firm has a dominant market position?
  3. Explain the difference between conduct by dominant firm that is (a) an exploitative abuse of its market power and (b) an exclusionary abuse of its market power.
  4. Explain why a form-based approach towards the enforcement of competition policy is more likely to lead to Type 1 errors (false positives), whereas an effects-based approach is more likely to lead to Type 2 errors (false negatives).
  5. Provide some examples of exclusionary abuses that are not considered to be naked restrictions.
  6. Competition policy guidance documents commonly refer to ‘competition on the merits’. What is the precise meaning of this term?
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The UK’s national fixed broadband network – wasteful duplication or effective competition?

You may have recently noticed construction workers from different businesses digging up the roads/pavements near where you live. You may also have noticed them laying fibre optic cables. Why has this been happening? Does it make economic sense for different companies to dig up the same stretch of pavement and lay similar cables next to one another?

For many years the UK had one national fixed communication network that was owned by British Telecom (BT) – the traditional phone landline made from copper wire. This is now operated by OpenReach – part of the BT group but a legally separate division. In addition to this national infrastructure, Virgin Media (formed in 2007 from the merged cable operators, Telewest and NTL) has gradually built up a rival fixed broadband network that now covers just over 50 per cent of the country.

Although customers have only had very limited choice over which fixed communication network to use, they have had far greater choice over which Internet service provider (ISP) to sign up for. This has been possible as the industry regulator, Ofcom, forces OpenReach to provide rival ISPs such as Sky Broadband, TalkTalk and Zen with access to its network.

Expansion of the fibre optic network

Recent government policy has tried to encourage and incentivise the replacement of the copper wire network with one that is fully fibre. This is often referred to as Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) or Fibre to the Home (FTTH). A fixed network of fully fibre broadband enables much faster download speeds and many argue that it is vital for the future competitiveness of the UK economy.

Replacing the existing fixed communication network with fibre optic cables is expensive. It can involve major civil works: i.e. the digging up of roads and pavements to install new ducts to lay the fibre optic cables inside.

Over a hundred companies, that are not part of either OpenReach or Virgin Media O2 (the parent company of Virgin Media), have recently been digging up pavements/roads and laying new fibre optic cables. Known as alternative network providers (altnets) or independent networks, these businesses vary in size, with many of them securing large loans from banks and private investors. By the middle of 2023, 2.5 million premises in the UK had access to at least two or more of these independent networks.

After a slow initial response to the altnets, OpenReach has recently responded by rapidly installing FTTP. The business is currently building 62 000 connections every week and plans to have 25 million premises connected by the end of 2026. In July 2022, Virgin Media O2 announced that it was establishing a new joint venture with InfraVia Capital Partners. Called Nexfibre, this business aims to connect 5 million premises to FTTP by 2026.

Is the fibre optic network a natural monopoly?

Some people argue that the fixed communication network is an example of a natural monopoly – an industry where a single firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms. To what extent is this true?

An industry is a natural monopoly where the minimum efficient scale of production (MES) is larger than the market demand for the good/service. This is more likely to occur where there are significant economies of scale. Digging up roads/pavements, installing new ducts and laying fibre optic cable are clear examples of fixed costs. Once the network is built, the marginal cost of supplying customers is relatively small. Therefore, this industry has significant economies of scale and a relatively large MES. This has led many people to argue that building rival fixed communication networks is wasteful duplication and will lead to higher costs and prices.

However, when judging if a sector is a natural monopoly, it is always important to remember that a comparison needs to be made between the MES and the size of the market. An industry could have significant economies of scale, but not be an example of a natural monopoly if the market demand is significantly larger than the MES.

In the case of the fixed communication network, the size of the market will vary significantly between different regions of the country. In densely populated urban areas, such as large towns and cities, the demand for services provided via these networks is likely to be relatively large. Therefore, the MES could be smaller than the size of the market, making competition between network suppliers both possible and desirable. For example, competition may incentivise firms to innovate, become more efficient and reduce costs.

Research undertaken for the government by the consultancy business, Frontier Economics, found that at least a third of UK households live in areas where competition between three or more different networks is economically desirable.

By contrast, in more sparsely populated rural areas, demand for the services provided by these networks will be smaller. The fixed costs per household of installing the network over longer distances will also be larger. Therefore, the MES is more likely to be greater than the size of the market.

The same research undertaken by Frontier Economics found that around 10 per cent of households live in areas where the fixed communication network is a natural monopoly. The demand and cost conditions for another 10 per cent of households meant it is not commercially viable to have any suppliers.

Therefore, policies towards the promotion of competition, regulation, and government support for the fixed communication network might have to be adjusted depending on the specific demand and cost conditions in a particular region.

Articles

Review

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between fixed and wireless communication networks.
  2. Draw a diagram to illustrate a profit-maximising natural monopoly. Outline some of the implications for allocative efficiency.
  3. Discuss some of the issues with regulating natural monopolies, paying particular attention to price regulation.
  4. The term ‘overbuild’ is often used to describe a situation where more than one fibre broadband network is being constructed in the same place. Some people argue that incumbent network suppliers deliberately choose to use this term to imply that the outcome is harmful for society. Discuss this argument.
  5. An important part of government policy in this sector has been the Duct and Pole Access Strategy (DPA). Illustrate the impact of this strategy on the average cost curve and the minimum efficient scale of production for fibre broadband networks.
  6. Draw a diagram to illustrate a region where (a) it is economically viable to have two or more fibre optic broadband network suppliers and (b) where it is commercially unviable to have any broadband network suppliers without government support.
  7. Some people argue that network competition provides strong incentives for firms to innovate, to become more efficient and reduce costs. Draw a diagram to illustrate this argument.
  8. Explain why many ‘altnets’ are so opposed to OpenReach’s new ‘Equinox 2’ pricing scheme for its fibre network.
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The increasing use of dynamic pricing strategies

In September 2023, the Stonegate Group, the largest pub company in the UK with around 4,500 premises, announced that it was going to start increasing the pint of beer by 20p during busy periods. There was an immediate backlash on social media with many customers calling on people to boycott Stonegate’s pubs such as the Slug & Lettuce and Yates.

This announcement is an example of dynamic pricing, where firms with market power adjust prices relatively quickly in response to changing market conditions: i.e. to changes in demand and supply.

Traditionally, prices set by firms in most retail markets have been less flexible. They may eventually adjust to changing market conditions, but this could take weeks or even months. If a product proves to be popular on a particular day or time, firms have typically left the price unchanged with the item selling out and customers facing empty shelves. If the product is unpopular, then the firm is left with unsold stock.

One business that makes extensive use of dynamic pricing is Amazon. Prices for popular items on Amazon Marketplace change every 10 minutes and can fluctuate by more than 20 per cent in just one hour.

Conditions for dynamic pricing to operate

The Amazon example helps to illustrate the conditions that must be in place for a firm to implement dynamic pricing successfully. These include:

  • The capacity to collect and process large amounts of accurate real-time data on the demand for and supply of particular items i.e. the number of sales or the interest in the product.
  • The ability to adjust prices in a timely manner in response to changing market conditions indicated by the data.
  • Effectively communicating the potential advantages of the pricing strategy to consumers.

Consumer attitudes

The last point is an interesting one. As the Stonegate example illustrates, consumers tend to dislike dynamic pricing, especially when price rises reflect increases in demand. A previous article on this website discussed the unpopularity of dynamic pricing amongst fans in the ticket market for live musical events.

The precise reason for the increase in demand, can also have an impact on consumer attitudes. For example, following a mass shooting at a subway station in New York in April 2022, the authorities shut down the underground system. This led to a surge in demand for taxis and this was picked up by the algorithm/software used by Uber’s dynamic pricing system. Fares for Uber cars began to rise rapidly, and people started to post complaints on social media. Uber responded by disabling the dynamic pricing system and capping prices across the city. It also announced that it would refund customers who were charged higher prices after the subway system shut down.

There is a danger for businesses that if they fail to communicate the policy effectively, annoyed customers may respond by shopping elsewhere. However, if it is implemented successfully then it can help businesses to increase their revenue and may also have some advantages for consumers.

The growing popularity of dynamic pricing

It has been widely used in airline and hotel industries for many years. Robert Cross, who chairs a revenue management company predicts that ‘It will eventually be everywhere’.

More businesses in the UK appear to be using dynamic pricing. In a consumer confidence survey undertaken for Barclays in September 2023, 47 per cent of the respondents had noticed more examples of companies raising prices for goods/services in response to higher demand at peak times.

It has traditionally been more difficult for bricks-and-mortar retailers to implement dynamic pricing because of the costs of continually changing prices (so-called ‘menu costs’). However, this might change with the increasing use of electronic shelf labels.

It will be interesting to see if dynamic pricing becomes more widespread in the future or whether opposition from consumers limits its use.

Articles

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between surge and dynamic pricing.
  2. Using a diagram, explain how dynamic pricing can increase a firm’s revenue.
  3. Discuss both the advantages and disadvantages for consumers of firms using dynamic pricing.
  4. How might dynamic pricing influence consumer behaviour if it alters their expectations about future price changes.
  5. There is some evidence that the use of dynamic pricing is less unpopular amongst 18–24-year-olds than other age groups. Suggest some possible reasons why this might be the case.
  6. Using the concept of loss aversion, consider some different ways that a business could present a new dynamic pricing policy to its customers.