Tag: fraud

Following the controversary over the sale of tickets for popular live events such as Taylor Swift’s Eras tour and the Oasis Live ’25 Tour, the government launched a consultation exercise in January 2025 on the resale of tickets. Titled, ‘putting fans first’, the exercise sought the views of individuals and organisations on a range of policy proposals. One of these was the implementation of a cap on the resale price of tickets.

The government is not only considering whether to implement a cap but also the level at which it might be set. The following question was included in the consultation exercise.

What is the maximum uplift that you think should be applied if ticket resales were to be subject to a price cap? Please state the reason for your selection.
 • no uplift at all
 • 10% or less
 • between 10 and 20%
 • between 20 and 30%
 • other – please state

Some platforms such as Twickets and Ticketswap already cap resale prices on their platforms at between 5 and 10 per cent above the face value of the ticket. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by any new price regulation unless the ‘no uplift at all’ option is chosen. On other platforms, such as Viagogo and Stubhub, resellers are free to list tickets at whatever price they choose. This is often referred to as the uncapped market, and tickets for the Oasis tour with a face value of £150 were listed on these websites for £14 000. The implementation of a price cap is likely to have a big impact on this part of the resale market. The chief executive of StubHub stated in June 2025 that the business would probably have to exit the UK if a cap was introduced.

Although many fans dislike the uncapped secondary ticketing market, most economists take a more positive view. They see them as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial trade and helping to reallocate tickets to those with the highest willingness to pay. This reduces levels of allocative inefficiency/deadweight welfare loss in the market.

Economists also tend to argue against the use of price controls in competitive markets because of their negative impact on supply. If price controls reduce the available returns to sellers, they have an incentive to do something else with their time/resources i.e. switch to supplying other goods and services in markets not subject to price controls. This reduces supply in the regulated market and so could have a negative impact on consumer surplus.

What are the issues with the secondary market?

Given the benefits outlined by economists of having an uncapped secondary ticketing, why is the government considering the implementation of a price cap? One potential issue of having an uncapped secondary ticketing market is that developments in technology make it easier for professional resellers to buy very large quantities of tickets. This makes it increasingly difficult for fans who want to attend the event from being able to purchase a ticket.

Reports also suggest that professional resellers use illegal methods to both mass purchase and resell tickets. For example, to overcome any limits on sales imposed by the sellers in the primary market, some use automated software, fake IDs and multiple credit cards. Two people convicted of fraudulent trading in 2024 were found to have bought 47 000 tickets over a 212-year period, using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.

Some resellers have also acted in ways that do not comply with consumer law when advertising tickets for sale. For example, not providing information such as the ticket number and other details about where the seat is located i.e. the block/area and row.

These rent seeking activities by professional resellers could outweigh the positive impact of uncapped secondary market on allocative efficiency.

Implementing a resale price cap would reduce the incentives for professional resellers to purchase large quantities of tickets and engage in these rent-seeking activities. However, in the consultation document the government recognises that the implementation of a resale price cap would be a ‘significant and complex intervention’.

An important implementation issue

To calculate the resale price cap for any live event, the original price of the ticket in the primary market needs to be known. This raises an interesting question – should the cap apply to the initial face value of the ticket or the total price the customer pays?

The face value of the ticket may only represent a proportion of the actual cost of buying a ticket because of the widespread use of drip pricing. This is the practice of applying additional fees as the consumer proceeds through the online purchasing process. These fees can sometimes add around 25 per cent and more to the price of a ticket. In the consultation document, the government suggested that the cap should apply to the face value of the ticket plus all compulsory fees.

One issue raised in the response to the consultation by the Competition and Markets Authority is that these fees are not always made clear by sellers in the primary market in a clear and transparent way. Therefore, for the policy to be effective, primary market sellers would have to make information on both ticket prices and any fees clearly and easily available. Recent changes to the law that prohibit drip pricing might help to address this issue.

The potential impact of a resale price cap on fraud

To avoid the price cap, there is a danger that increasing numbers of buyers and sellers stop using capped secondary ticket platforms, where activity is easier to observe/regulate, and switch to other non-specialist platforms where detection of illegal behaviour and enforcement of consumer law is more difficult. Examples of non-specialist platforms where sales might increasingly take place include Facebook Marketplace, Instagram Shop, X (formerly Twitter) and internet forums. With lower levels of consumer protection and the greater difficulty of detecting illegal behaviour, sales via these non-specialist platforms are more vulnerable to scams and fraud.

When referring to the impact of a resale price cap, the chief executive of StubHub argued that:

It will have a massive negative impact on consumers. It’s not like the demand is going to go away, it’s just going to move somewhere else, and that somewhere else is going to be the black market [where] consumers aren’t protected.

To test the hypothesis that price controls lead to greater incidences of fraud, one study used polling data to compare ticket fraud rates in the UK with Victoria, Australia and Ireland. In 2009, the state government of Victoria made it illegal for tickets to be resold for more than 10 per cent of their face, while the Irish government introduced the Sale of Ticket Act in 2021 that prohibited the resale of tickets above their original price. The study found that the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of ticket fraud over the previous two years was around four times higher in Victoria and Ireland than the UK. The most common sales channel where consumers experienced ticket fraud in all three countries were social media platforms.

Another example of the potential impact of the price cap in Ireland on fraud relates to the first ever regular-season NFL game that is being played in Dublin on 28 September 2025 between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Minnesota Vikings. The online bank, Revolut, reported an 80 per cent increase in the number of ticket scams when tickets for this game went on sale.

In response to the consultation exercise, the Competition and Markets Authority backed the implementation of a resale price. It will be interesting to see if the government goes through with the measure in the next few months.

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Questions

  1. Why might event organisers set ticket prices below the market clearing rate? Illustrate the impact of setting prices below market clearing rates on consumer, producer and total surplus in the primary market for tickets.
  2. Using a demand and supply diagram, explain how the uncapped secondary ticket market could reduce deadweight welfare loss. Discuss any assumptions you have made about the allocation of tickets among potential buyers in the primary market (i.e. sorting).
  3. Is it possible for professional resellers to continue making a profit if tickets are sold at market clearing rates in the primary market? Explain your answer.
  4. Under what circumstances would a maximum price set below the market clearing rate in a competitive market have a negative impact on consumer surplus? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
  5. Using examples, explain what is meant by ‘rent seeking’ in economic theory.
    Outline some of the recent updates to the law on pricing information that businesses must show customers.
  6. What policies, other than a resale price cap, could the government introduce to try to address some of the issues with the ticketing market for live events?

The news in many European countries has been dominated in February by the ‘horse meat scandal’. Small traces of horse meat may be the result of faulty quality control. But the significant amount of horse found in several processed meat products suggest fraud at one or more points in the supply chain from farm to supermarket or other outlet. Indeed several specific suppliers, from abattoirs to processors are facing criminal investigation.

The scandal has put the supply chain under intense scrutiny. Part of the problem is that the supply chain is often very long and complex. As the Guardian article states:

The food and retail industries have become highly concentrated and globalised in recent decades. A handful of key players dominate the beef processing and supermarket sectors across Europe. They have developed very long supply chains, particularly for their economy lines, which enable them to buy the ingredients for processed foods from wherever they are cheapest at any point, depending on exchange rates and prices on the global commodity markets. Networks of brokers, cold stores operators and subcontracted meat cutting plants have emerged to supply rapidly fluctuating orders “just in time”. Management consultants KPMG estimate there are around 450 points at which the integrity of the chain can break down.

Then there is the huge pressure on all parts of the supply chain to reduce costs.

Supermarkets use their market power to drive down the prices of the products they buy from their suppliers and this has a knock-on effect backwards down the supply chain. This pressure has intensified as real wages have fallen and consumers have found their budgets squeezed.

At the same time, beef and other meat prices have been rising as the costs of animal feed have soared. This all puts tremendous pressure on suppliers to add cheaper ingredients. Again to quote the Guardian article:

Manufacturers add other cheap ingredients including water and fat, and use concentrated proteins to bind the water and fat in. They may appear on labels as ‘seasoning’. One of the cheapest sources of these protein additives is pork rind. It is possible that horse hide is now also being used. The widespread adulteration of cheap chicken breast with pig and beef proteins and water has been uncovered in previous scandals. The beef proteins were derived from hydrolysed cattle hides. It is not illegal to use these protein concentrates so long as they are identified correctly to the manufacturer.

It is not surprising that if cheap horse meat becomes available to suppliers, such as from old horses towards the end of their working lives, some processing companies may be tempted to add it fraudulently, stating that it is beef.

The articles look at the issues of long and complex supply chains in the processed food industry and assess why they have evolved into their current form and the difficulties in regulating them.

Horsegate: heed economics of the cold chain The Grocer, Andrew Godley (16/2/13)
Horsemeat scandal: the essential guide The Guardian, Felicity Lawrence (15/2/13)
After the horse has been bolted The Economist (16/2/13)
Slavery, not horse meat, is the real scandal on our doorstep The Telegraph, Fraser Nelson (14/2/13)
Industry must take the reins on food safety Globe and Mail (Canada)Sylvain Charlebois (15/2/13)
Supply chains changed the growth model The Economist, Richard Baldwin (15/8/12)
Supply-chain management The Economist (6/4/09)
Tesco pledges to open up supply chain after horse meat scandal The Telegraph (16/2/13)
Horse meat scandal: Shoppers who buy ‘cheapest food’ at risk The Telegraph, James Quinn, Jason Lewis and Patrick Sawer (16/2/13)
Let Them Eat Horse Bloomberg, Marc Champion (15/2/13)
Scandal shows meat supply chain must be policed heraldscotland (14/2/13)
MPs push for new powers for FSA as officials seize yet more suspect meat Independent, Martin Hickman (13/2/13)

Questions

  1. Why do supermarkets and their suppliers use long supply chains?
  2. Explain the concepts of ‘countervailing power’ and ‘monopsony or oligopsony power’? How do they apply in the processed meat supply chain?
  3. Identify the types of transactions costs in the processed meat industry.
  4. In what ways do consumers (a) gain and (b) lose from such supply chains?
  5. Why is the problem of fraud in processed food supply chains likely to have intensified in recent years?
  6. How have supermarkets reacted to the horse meat scandal? Why has it taken the scandal to make them react in this way?
  7. To what extent is the problem simply one of inaccurate labelling?
  8. To what extent is there a principal–agent problem in the processed meat supply chain?