Tag: depreciation

There has been an interesting debate recently about whether the austerity policies being pursued in the UK are the correct ones. What would have happened if the government had pursued a more expansionary policy? Would the increase in borrowing, at least in the short term, have triggered a financial crisis?

Without austerity policies, would the eurozone crisis have led to a collapse in investor confidence in the UK, especially if Greece had been forced out of the euro?

On the one side, Kenneth Rogoff argues that increasing the UK’s budget deficit would have been dangerous and could have led to a flight from the pound. Generally, but with some reservations, he supports the fiscal policies that have been pursued by the Coalition.

I am certainly not arguing that the UK or other advanced countries handled the post-crisis period perfectly. There should have been more infrastructure spending, even more aggressive monetary policy and probably more ruthless bank restructuring. But there has to be a balance between stimulus and stability. To assume we always knew things would calm down, and to retrospectively calibrate policy advice accordingly, is absurd

Paul Krugman and Simon Wren-Lewis challenge Rogoff’s arguments. Paul Krugman uses a version of the IS-LM model to analyse the effect of a loss of international confidence in the UK following problems in the eurozone and worries about excessive UK borrowing.

In the model, the LM curve (labelled MP in Krugman’s diagrams) illustrates the effect of an increase in real GDP on interest rates with a particular monetary policy (e.g. an inflation target or a Taylor rule, which involves a mix of two policy objectives: an inflation target and real GDP). As GDP rises, putting upward pressure on inflation, so the central bank will raise interest rates. Hence, like the traditional LM curve, the monetary-policy related LM curve will slope upwards, as shown in the diagram.

Initial equilibrium GDP is Y0. The rate of interest is at the minimum level, r0 (i.e. the rate of 0.5% that the Monetary Policy Committee has set since January 2009). This, in the model, is the liquidity trap, where any increase in money supply (a rightward shift in the LM curve) will have no effect on interest rates or GDP.

In Rogoff’s analysis of a crisis triggered by excessive borrowing and problems in the eurozone, the IS curve will shift to the left (as illustrated by curve IS1) as capital flows from the UK and confidence collapses. Real GDP will fall to Y1. This will be the outcome of fiscal expansion in the world of the early 2010s.

Krugman argues that the opposite will occur. The outflow of capital will drive down the exchange rate. This will lead to an increase in exports and a decrease in imports. Aggregate demand thus rises and the IS curve will shift to the right (e.g. to IS2 in the diagram. Real GDP will rise (e.g. to Y2 in the diagram). If the rise in aggregate demand is sufficient, the economy will rise out of the liquidity trap and interest rates will rise (e.g. to r2 in the diagram).

Not surprisingly, Rogoff challenges this analysis, as you will see if you read his second paper below. He doesn’t criticise the model per se, but challenges Krugman’s assumptions. For example, a depreciation of sterling by some 20% since 2008 doesn’t seem to have had a major effect in stimulating exports (see the chart in the news item, A balancing act). And exports could well have declined if the eurozone economy had collapsed, given that exports to the eurozone account for around 44% of total UK exports.

Rogoff’s assumptions in turn can be challenged. Simon Wren-Lewis argues that, provided a credible long-term plan for deficit reduction is in place, maintaining a fiscal stimulus in the short run, to keep the recovery going that was beginning to emerge in 2010, would help to increase investor confidence, not undermine it. And, with a policy of quantitative easing, which involves the Bank of England buying central government debt, there is no problem of a lack of demand for UK gilts by the private sector.

What is clear from this debate is the willingness of both sides to accept points made by the other. It is an extremely civilised debate. In fact, it could be seen as a model of how academic debate should be conducted. There is none of the ‘shouting’ that has charaterised much of the pro- and anti-austerity lobbying since the financial crisis burst onto the world stage.

Britain should not take its credit status for granted Scholars at Harvard from Financial Times, Kenneth Rogoff (3/10/13)
Ken Rogoff on UK austerity mainly macro, Simon Wren-Lewis (3/10/13)
Phantom Crises (Wonkish) The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman (3/10/13)
Three Wrongs do not make a Right Scholars at Harvard from Financial Times, Kenneth Rogoff (7/10/13)
Is George Osborne really a hero of global finance? The Guardian, Robert Skidelsky (24/10/13)

Questions

  1. Explain how the policy-dependent LM curve illustrated in the diagram is derived.
  2. What would cause the policy-dependent LM curve to shift?
  3. Explain what is meant by the ‘liquidity trap’. Why does being in a liquidity trap make monetary policy ineffective?
  4. How would you determine whether or not the UK is currently in a liquidity trap?
  5. How is the level of (a) public-sector debt and (b) private sector debt owed overseas likely to affect the confidence of investors concerning the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy?
  6. Compare the UK’s total external debt with that of other countries (see the following tables from Principal Global Indicators, hosted by the IMF: External debt and Short-term external debt).
  7. What insurance policy (if any) does the UK have to protect against market panic about the viability of UK debt?
  8. What areas of agreement are there between Rogoff on the one side and Krugman and Wren-Lewis on the other?

The rate of growth in India has fallen to its lowest level since the first three months of 2009 – the period when many countries were plunging into recession. Although the annual rate was still 4.4% in Q2 2013 (a rate most Western governments would love to achieve!), it had averaged 8.2% from 2003 to 2007 and 9.5% from 2010 to 2011 (see).

And the rupee has been falling in value (see chart below). The exchange rate of the rupee to the dollar has depreciated by 21% since the start of the year and by 14% since the beginning of August (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). This has pushed up the price of imports and raised fears that inflation, already approaching 10%, will rise.

There have also been concerns about the health of India’s banking sector, with worries over the possible rise in bad loans.

One result of all these factors is that the confidence of investors has been shaken. Bond prices have fallen and so too have share prices. The Mumbai Sensex index fell by 11.5% from 22 July to 27 August. Worried about possible capital flight, the Indian government imposed capital controls on Indian residents on 14 August. It has, however, since ruled out limiting the outflow of funds by foreign investors.

The following articles and videos look at the causes of the current economic problems and what can be done about them.

Webcasts

India’s sliding economy Aljazeera (24/8/13)
Economic woes grow for Indians as rupee continues to slide BBC News, Sanjoy Majumder (30/8/13)
What is behind the Indian economy’s fall from grace? BBC News, Yogita Limaye (30/8/13)
Indian rupee: How onions reflect health of economy BBC News, Nitin Srivastava (30/8/13)
The rise and fall of India’s economy NDTV (20/8/13)
Is the Indian economy heading for a doom? NDTV, Dr Arvind Virmani, Adi Godrej, P N Vijay, Sanjay Nirupam and Prakash Javadekar (20/7/13)
Can Rajan stabilise India’s economy? FT Video, Stuart Kirk and Julia Grindell (7/8/13)

Articles

India in trouble: The reckoning The Economist (24/8/13)
PM warns of short term shocks, attacks BJP for stalling Parliament The Economic Times of India (31/8/13)
External global factors led to rupee slide: Manmohan in Lok Sabha Hindustan Times (30/8/13)
India seeks allies to defend rupee as growth skids to four-year low Reuters, Manoj Kumar and Frank Jack Daniel (30/8/13)
Rupee charts in uncharted territory Reuters, Saikat Chatterjee and Subhadip Sircar (30/8/13)
Indian Prime Minister Says Rupee Crisis Will Only Make Country Stronger Time World, ilanjana Bhowmick (30/8/13)
Is India in danger of another crisis? BBC News, Linda Yueh (8/8/13)
India’s GDP shows continuing slowdown BBC News (30/8/13)
Slowest India Growth Since 2009 Pressures Singh to Support Rupee Bloomberg, Unni Krishnan (30/8/13)

Questions

  1. Why has the rupee fallen in value so dramatically? Is there likely to have been overshooting?
  2. What are the economic consequences of this large-scale depreciation? Who gain and who lose?
  3. What factors are likely to affect the rate of growth in India over the coming months?
  4. Why is the Indian economy more vulnerable than many other Asian economies?
  5. What economic policies are being pursued by the Indian government? How successful are they likely to be?

Japan has suffered from deflation on and off for more than 20 years. A problem with falling prices is that they discourage spending as people wait for prices to fall further. One of the three elements of the Japanese government’s macroeconomic policy (see Japan’s three arrows) has been expansionary monetary policy, including aggressive quantitative easing. A key aim of this is to achieve an inflation target of 2% and, hopefully, propel the economy out of its deflationary trap.

The latest news, therefore, from Japan would seem to be good: consumer prices rose 0.4% in June – the first rise for more than a year. But while some analysts see the rise in prices to be partly the result of a recovery in demand (i.e. demand-pull inflation), others claim that the inflation is largely of the cost-push variety as the weaker yen has increased the price of imported fuel and food.

If Japanese recovery is to be sustained and broadly based, a growth in real wages should be a core component. As it is, real wages are not growing. This could seriously constrain the recovery. For real wages to grow, employers need to be convinced that economic recovery will be sustained and that it would be profitable to take on more labour.

The success of the expansionary policy, therefore, depends in large part on its effect on expectations. Do people believe that prices will continue to rise? Do employers believe that the economy will continue to expand? And do people believe that their real wages will rise?

Articles

Japan prices turn higher, but BOJ’s goal remains tall order Reuters, Tetsushi Kajimoto and Leika Kihara (26/7/13)
How Japan Could Go from Deflation to Hyperinflation in a Heartbeat The Wall Street Journal, Michael J. Casey (24/7/13)
Japan Prices Rise Most Since ’08 in Boost for Abe Bloomberg, Toru Fujioka & Andy Sharp (26/7/13)
Japan central bank finds the pessimists come from within Reuters, Leika Kihara (26/7/13)
Japan’s Fiscal Crossroads: Will Abenomics Mean Tougher Changes? The Daily Beast, Daniel Gross (26/7/13)
Japan Economist Makes Rare Call to Tackle Debt The Wall Street Journal, Kosaku Narioka (25/7/13)
Japanese Consumer Prices Rise In Sign Of Some Success In Abe Economic Policy International Business Times, Nat Rudarakanchana (26/7/13)

Data

Bank of Japan Statistics Bank of Japan
Statistics Statistics Bureau of Japan
International sites for data Economics Network

Questions

  1. Distinguish between cost-push and demand-pull inflation? Do higher prices resulting from a depreciation of the currency always imply that the resulting inflation is of the cost-push variety?
  2. In the Japanese context, is inflation wholly desirable or are there any undesirable consequences?
  3. Consider whether a two-year time frame is realistic for the the Bank of Japan to achieve its 2% inflation target.
  4. What is meant by the output gap? Using sources such as the European Commission’s European Economy, AMECO database and the OECD’s Economic Outlook: Statistical Annex Tables (see sites 6 and 7 in the Economics Network’s links to Economic Data freely available online) trace the Japanese output gap over the past 10 years and comment on your findings.
  5. What supply-side constraints are likely to limit the rate and extent of recovery in Japan? What is the Japanese government doing about this (see the third arrow of Japan’s three arrows)?