Category: Podcasts and Videos

Tickets for Beyonce’s 2023 UK Renaissance tour went on general sale via Ticketmaster’s website at 10am on Tuesday 7 February. Throughout the day, social media were full of messages from fans complaining about technical issues, long online queues and rising prices. This is not the first time this has happened. Similar complaints were made in 2022 when tickets went on sale for tours by Bruce Springsteen, Harry Styles and Taylor Swift.

With the general sale of tickets for Beyonce’s tour, many fans complained they were waiting in online queues of over 500 000 people. Others reported their frustration with continually receiving ‘403 error’ messages.

Market dominance

In November 2022, Ticketmaster’s website in the USA constantly crashed during the pre-sale of tickets for Taylor Swift’s tour. This led to the general sale of tickets being cancelled.

In response to the public anger that followed this decision, the Senate’s antitrust subcommittee organised a hearing with the title – ‘That’s The Ticket: Promoting Competition and Protecting Competition and Protecting Consumers in Live Entertainment.’

Senator Amy Klobuchar, the Chair of this committee, stated that

The issues within America’s ticketing industry were made painfully obvious when Ticketmaster’s website failed hundreds of thousands of fans hoping to purchase tickets for Taylor Swift’s new tour, but these problems are not new. For too long, consumers have faced long waits and website failures, and Ticketmaster’s dominant market position means the company faces inadequate pressure to innovate and improve.

Ticketmaster merged with Live Nation in 2010 to become the largest business in the primary ticket market for live music events. Some people have accused the firm of abusing its dominant market position by failing to invest enough money in its website, so leading to poor customer service.

Dynamic pricing

Fans have also been complaining about the system of dynamic pricing that Ticketmaster now uses for big live events. What exactly is dynamic pricing?

Firms with market power often adjust their prices in response to changing market conditions. For example, if a business experiences significant increases in demand for its products in one quarter/year it may respond by raising prices in the following quarter/year.

With dynamic pricing, these price changes take place over much shorter time periods: i.e. within minutes. For example, in one media report, a Harry Styles fan placed £155 tickets in their basket for a concert at Wembley stadium. When the same fan then tried to purchase the tickets, Ticketmaster’s website sent a message stating that they were no longer available. However, in reality they were still available but for £386 – the price had instantly jumped because of high demand. Continually monitoring market conditions and responding to changes so quickly requires the use of specialist software and sophisticated algorithms.

Arguments for dynamic pricing

With ticket sales taking place months/years in advance of most live events, it is difficult for artists/promotors to predict future levels of demand. Given this uncertainty and the importance for the artist of playing in front of a full venue, event organisers may err on the side of caution when pricing tickets.

If the demand for tickets proves to be much stronger than initially forecast, then resellers in the secondary market can take advantage of the situation and make significant amounts of money. Dynamic pricing enables sellers in the primary market, such as Ticketmaster, to adjust to market conditions and so limits the opportunities of resale for a profit.

Ticketmaster argues that without dynamic pricing, artists will miss out on large amounts of revenue that will go to re-sellers instead. A spokesperson for the company stated that

Over the past few years, artists have lost money to resellers who have no investment in the event going well. As such event organisers have looked to market-based pricing to recapture that lost revenue.

Critics have claimed that Ticketmaster’s use of dynamic pricing is simply an example of price gouging.

No doubt the controversy over the sale of tickets for live music events will continue in the future.

Articles

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between the primary and secondary market for ticket sales for live events.
  2. Draw a demand and supply diagram to illustrate the primary market for tickets. Using this diagram explain how below market clearing prices in the primary market enable re-sellers to make money in the secondary market.
  3. What are the limitations of using demand and supply diagrams to analyse the primary market for tickets?
  4. Who has the greater market power – Ticketmaster or artists such as Taylor Swift and Beyonce?
  5. Try to provide a precise definition of the term ‘price gouging’.
  6. What other sectors commonly use dynamic pricing?

In its latest World Economic Outlook update, the IMF forecasts that the UK in 2023 will be the worst performing economy in the G7. Unlike all the other countries and regions in the report, only the UK economy is set to shrink. UK real GDP is forecast to fall by 0.6% in 2023 (see Figure 1: click here for a PowerPoint). In the USA it is forecast to rise by 1.4%, in Germany by 0.1%, in France by 0.7% and in Japan by 1.8%. GDP in advanced countries as a whole is forecast to grow by 1.2%, while world output is forecast to grow by 2.9%. Developing countries are forecast to grow by 4.0%, with China and India forecast to grow by 5.2% and 6.1%, respectively. And things are not forecast to be a lot better for the UK in 2024, with growth of 0.9% – bottom equal with Japan and Italy.

Low projected growth in the UK in part reflects the tighter fiscal and monetary policies being implemented to curb inflation, which is slow to fall thanks to tight labour markets and persistently higher energy prices. The UK is particularly exposed to high wholesale gas prices, with a larger share of its energy coming from natural gas than most countries.

But the UK’s lower forecast growth relative to other countries reflects a longer-term problem in the UK and that is the slow rate of productivity growth. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows output (GDP) per hour worked in major economies, indexed at 100 in 2008 (click here for a PowerPoint). As you can see, the growth in productivity in the UK has lagged behind that of the other economies. The average annual percentage growth in productivity is shown next to each country. The UK’s growth in productivity since 2008 has been a mere 0.3% per annum.

Causes of low productivity/low productivity growth

A major cause of low productivity growth is low levels of investment in physical capital. Figure 3 shows investment (gross capital formation) as a percentage of GDP for the G7 countries from the 2007–8 financial crisis to the year before the pandemic (click here for a PowerPoint). As you can see, the UK performs the worst of the seven countries.

Part of the reason for the low level of private investment is uncertainty. Firms have been discouraged from investing because of a lack of economic growth and fears that this was likely to remain subdued. The problem was compounded by Brexit, with many firms uncertain about their future markets, especially in the EU. COVID affected investment, as it did in all countries, but supply chain problems in the aftermath of COVID have been worse for the UK than many countries. Also, the UK has been particularly exposed to the effects of higher gas prices following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as a large proportion of electricity is generated from natural gas and natural gas is the major fuel for home heating.

Part of the reason is an environment that is unconducive for investment. Access to finance for investment is more difficult in the UK and more costly than in many countries. The financial system tends to have a short-term focus, with an emphasises on dividends and short-term returns rather than on the long-term gains from investment. This is compounded by physical infrastructure problems with a lack of investment in energy, road and rail and a slow roll out of advances in telecoms.


To help fund investment and drive economic growth, in 2021 the UK government established a government-owned UK Infrastructure Bank. This has access to £22 billion of funds. However, as The Conversation article below points out:

According to a January 2023 report from Westminster’s Public Accounts Committee, 18 months after its launch the bank had only deployed ‘£1 billion of its £22 billion capital to 10 deals’, and had employed just 16 permanent staff ‘against a target of 320’. The committee also said it was ‘not convinced the bank has a strategic view of where it best needs to target its investments’.

Short-termism is dominant in politics, with ministers keen on short-term results in time for the next election, rather than focusing on the long term when they may no longer be in office. When the government is keen to cut taxes and find ways of cutting government expenditure, it is often easier politically to cut capital expenditure rather than current expenditure. The Treasury oversees fiscal policy and its focus tends to be short term. What is needed is a government department where the focus is on the long term.

One problem that has impacted on productivity is the relatively large number of people working for minimum wages or a little above. Low wages discourage firms from making labour-saving investment and thereby increasing labour productivity. It will be interesting to see whether the labour shortages in the UK, resulting from people retiring early post-COVID and EU workers leaving, will encourage firms to make labour-saving investment.

Another issue is company taxation. Until recently, countries have tended to compete corporate taxes down in order to attract inward investment. This was stemmed somewhat by the international agreement at the OECD that Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) will be subject to a minimum 15% corporate tax rate from 2023. The UK is increasing corporation tax from 19% to 25% from April 2023. It remains to be seen what disincentive effect this will have on inward investment. Although the new rate is similar to, or slightly lower, than other major economies, there are some exceptions. Ireland will have a rate of just 15% and is seen as a major alternative to the UK for inward investment, especially with its focus on cheaper green energy. AstraZeneca has just announced that instead of building its new ‘state-of-the-art’ manufacturing plant in England close to its two existing plats in NW England, it will build it in Ireland instead, quoting the UK’s ‘discouraging’ tax rates and price capping for drugs by the NHS.

And it is not just physical investment that affects productivity, it is the quality of labour. Although a higher proportion of young people go to university (close to 50%) than in many other countries, the nature of the skills sets acquired may not be particularly relevant to employers.

What is more, relatively few participate in vocational education and training. Only 32% of 18-year olds have had any vocational training. This compares with other countries, such as Austria, Denmark and Switzerland where the figure is over 65%. Also a greater percentage of firms in other countries, such as Germany, employ people on vocational training schemes.

Another aspect of labour quality is the quality of management. Poor management practices in the UK and inadequate management training and incentives have resulted in a productivity gap with other countries. According to research by Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen (see linked article below, in particular Figure A5) the UK has an especially large productivity gap with the USA compared with other countries and the highest percentage of this gap of any country accounted for by poor management.

Solutions

Increasing productivity requires a long-term approach by both business and government. Policy should be consistent, with no ‘chopping and changing’. The more that policy is changed, the less certain will business be and the more cautious about investing.

As far a government investment is concerned, capital investment needs to be maintained at a high level if significant improvements are to be made in the infrastructure necessary to support increased growth rates. As far as private investment is concerned, there needs to be a focus on incentives and finance. If education and training are to drive productivity improvements, then there needs to be a focus on the acquisition of transferable skills.

Such policies are not difficult to identify. Carrying them out in a political environment focused on the short term is much more difficult.

Podcasts

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. What features of the UK economic and political environment help to explain its poor productivity growth record?
  2. What are the arguments for and against making higher education more vocational?
  3. Find out what policies have been adopted in a country of your choice to improve productivity. Are there any lessons that the UK could learn from this experience?
  4. How could the UK attract more inward foreign direct investment? Would the outcome be wholly desirable?
  5. What is the relationship between inequality and labour productivity?
  6. What are the arguments for and against encouraging more immigration in the current economic environment?
  7. Could smarter taxes ease the UK’s productivity crisis?

Over the decades, economies have become increasingly interdependent. This process of globalisation has involved a growth in international trade, the spread of technology, integrated financial markets and international migration.

When the global economy is growing, globalisation spreads the benefits around the world. However, when there are economic problems in one part of the world, this can spread like a contagion to other parts. This was clearly illustrated by the credit crunch of 2007–8. A crisis that started in the sub-prime market in the USA soon snowballed into a worldwide recession. More recently, the impact of Covid-19 on international supply chains has highlighted the dangers of relying on a highly globalised system of production and distribution. And more recently still, the war in Ukraine has shown the dangers of food and fuel dependency, with rapid rises in prices of basic essentials having a disproportionate effect on low-income countries and people on low incomes in richer countries.

Moves towards autarky

So is the answer for countries to become more self-sufficient – to adopt a policy of greater autarky? Several countries have moved in this direction. The USA under President Trump pursued a much more protectionist agenda than his predecessors. The UK, although seeking new post-Brexit trade relationships, has seen a reduction in trade as new barriers with the EU have reduced UK exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s November 2022 Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Brexit will result in the UK’s trade intensity being 15 per cent lower in the long run than if it had remained in the EU.

Many European countries are seeking to achieve greater energy self-sufficiency, both as a means of reducing reliance on Russian oil and gas, but also in pursuit of a green agenda, where a greater proportion of energy is generated from renewables. More generally, countries and companies are considering how to reduce the risks of relying on complex international supply chains.

Limits to the gains from trade

The gains from international trade stem partly from the law of comparative advantage, which states that greater levels of production can be achieved by countries specialising in and exporting those goods that can be produced at a lower opportunity cost and importing those in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Trade can also lead to the transfer of technology and a downward pressure on costs and prices through greater competition.

But trade can increase dependence on unreliable supply sources. For example, at present, some companies are seeking to reduce their reliance on Taiwanese parts, given worries about possible Chinese actions against Taiwan.

Also, governments have been increasingly willing to support domestic industries with various non-tariff barriers to imports, especially since the 2007–8 financial crisis. Such measures include subsidies, favouring domestic firms in awarding government contracts and using regulations to restrict imports. These protectionist measures are often justified in terms of achieving security of supply. The arguments apply particularly starkly in the case of food. In the light of large price increases in the wake of the Ukraine war, many countries are considering how to increase food self-sufficiency, despite it being more costly.

Also, trade in goods involves negative environmental externalities, as freight transport, whether by sea, air or land, involves emissions and can add to global warming. In 2021, shipping emitted over 830m tonnes of CO2, which represents some 3% of world total CO2 emissions. In 2019 (pre-pandemic), the figure was 800m tonnes. The closer geographically the trading partner, the lower these environmental costs are likely to be.

The problems with a globally interdependent world have led to world trade growing more slowly than world GDP in recent years after decades of trade growth considerably outstripping GDP growth. Trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP peaked at just over 60% in 2008. In 2019 and 2021 it was just over 56%. This is illustrated in the chart (click here for a PowerPoint). Although trade as a percentage of GDP rose slightly from 2020 to 2021 as economies recovered from the pandemic, it is expected to have fallen back again in 2022 and possibly further in 2023.

But despite this reduction in trade as a percentage of GDP, with de-globalisation likely to continue for some time, the world remains much more interdependent than in the more distant past (as the chart shows). Greater autarky may be seen as desirable by many countries as a response to the greater economic and political risks of the current world, but greater autarky is a long way from complete self-sufficiency. The world is likely to remain highly interdependent for the foreseeable future. Reports of the ‘death of globalisation’ are premature!

Podcasts

Articles

Report

Questions

  1. Explain the law of comparative advantage and demonstrate how trade between two countries can lead to both countries gaining.
  2. What are the main economic problems arising from globalisation?
  3. Is the answer to the problems of globalisation to move towards greater autarky?
  4. Would the expansion/further integration of trading blocs be a means of exploiting the benefits of globalisation while reducing the risks?
  5. Is the role of the US dollar likely to decline over time and, if so, why?
  6. Summarise Karl Polanyi’s arguments in The Great Transformation (see the Daniel W. Drezner article linked below). How well do they apply to the current world situation?

At the time of the 2016 referendum, the clear consensus among economists was that Brexit would impose net economic costs on the UK economy. The size of these costs would depend on the nature of post-Brexit trading relations with the EU. The fewer the new barriers to trade and the closer the alignment with the EU single market, the lower these costs would be.

The Brexit deal in the form of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (see also) applied provisionally from January 2021, after the end of the transition period, and came into force in May 2021. Although this is a free-trade deal in the sense that goods made largely in the UK or EU can be traded tariff-free between the two, the deal does not apply to services (e.g. financial services) or to goods where components made outside the UK or EU account for more than a certain percentage (the ‘rules of origin‘ condition). Also there has been a huge increase in documentation that must be completed to export to or import from the EU.

Even though the nature of the Brexit deal has been clear since it was signed in December 2020, assessing the impact of the extra barriers to trade it has created has been hard given the various shocks that have had a severe impact on the UK (and global) economy. First COVID-19 and the associated lockdowns had a direct effect on output and trade; second the longer-term international supply-chain disruptions have extended the COVID costs beyond the initial lockdowns and acted as a brake on recovery and growth; third the Russian invasion of Ukraine imposed a severe shock to energy and food markets; fourth these factors have created not just a supply shock but also an inflationary shock, which has resulted in central banks seeking to dampen demand by significantly raising interest rates. One worry among analysts was that the negative effects of such shocks might be greater on the UK economy than on other countries.

However, the negative effects of Brexit are now becoming clearer and various institutions have attempted to quantify the costs. These costs are largely in terms of lower GDP than otherwise. This results from:

  • reduced levels of trade with the EU, thereby reducing the gains from exploiting comparative advantage;
  • increased costs of trade with the EU;
  • disruptions to supply chains;
  • reduced competition from European firms, with many no longer exporting to the UK because of the costs;
  • reduced inward investment;
  • labour market shortages, particularly in certain areas such a hospitality, construction, social care and agriculture as many European workers have left the UK and fewer come;
  • a reduction in productivity.

Here is a summary of the findings of different organisations.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)

The OBR has argued that Brexit as negotiated in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement:

will reduce long-run productivity by 4 per cent relative to remaining in the EU. This largely reflects our view that the increase in non-tariff barriers on UK-EU trade acts as an additional impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage.21

In addition the OBR estimates that:

Both exports and imports will be around 15 per cent lower in the long run than if the UK had remained in the EU.21

Recent evidence supports this. According to the OBR:

UK and aggregate advanced economy goods export volumes fell by around 20 per cent during the initial wave of the pandemic in 2020. But by the fourth quarter of 2021 total advanced economy trade volumes had rebounded to 3 per cent above their pre-pandemic levels while UK exports remain around 12 per cent below.22

This assumption was repeated in the November 2022 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (p.26) 23. What is more, new trade deals will make little difference, either because they are a roll-over from previous EU trade deals with the respective country or have only a very small effect (e.g. the trade deal with Australia).

The Bank of England

The Bank of England, ever since the referendum in 2016, has forecast that Brexit would damage trade, productivity and GDP growth. In recent evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee5, Andrew Bailey, the Governor, stated that previous work by the Bank concluded that Brexit would reduce productivity by a bit over 3% and that this was still the Bank’s view.

His colleague, Dr Swati Dhingra, stated that, because of Brexit, there was a ‘much bigger slowdown in trade in the UK compared to the rest of the world’. She continued:

The simple way of thinking about what Brexit has done to the economy is that in the period after the referendum, the biggest depreciation that any of the world’s four major economies have seen overnight contributed to increasing prices [and] reduced wages. …We think that number is about 2.6% below the trend that real wages would have been on. Soon afterwards and before the TCA happened came the effects of the uncertainty that was unleashed, which basically translates into reduced business investment and less certainty of the FDI effects. Those tend to be very long-pay things.

She continued that now we are seeing significantly reduced trade directly as a result of the Brexit trade agreement (TCA).

Her colleague, Dr Catherine Mann, argued that ‘the small firms are the ones that are the most damaged, because the cost of the paperwork and so forth is a barrier’. This does not only affect UK firms exporting to the EU but also EU firms exporting to the UK. Reduced imports from EU firms reduces competition in the UK, which tends to lead to higher prices.

The Institute for Fiscal Studies

The IFS has consistently argued that Brexit, because of increased trade barriers with the EU, has reduced UK trade, productivity and GDP. In a recent interview6, its Director, Paul Johnson, stated that ‘Brexit, without doubt, has made us poorer than we would otherwise have been’. That, plus other convulsions, such as the mini-Budget of October 2022, have reduced foreigners’ confidence in the UK, with the result that investment in the UK and trade with the rest of the world have fallen.

Resolution Foundation

In a major Resolution Foundation report24, the authors argued that the effects of Brexit will take time to materialise fully and will occur in three distinct phases. First, in anticipation of permanent effects, the referendum caused sterling to depreciate and this adversely affected household incomes. What is more, the uncertainty about the future caused business investment to fall (but not inward FDI). Second, the Trade and Cooperation Act, by introducing trade barriers, reduced UK trade with the EU. But trade with the rest of the world also fell suggesting that Brexit is impacting UK trade openness and competitiveness more broadly. Third, there will be structural changes to the UK economy over the long-term which will adversely affect economic growth:

A less-open UK will mean a poorer and less productive one by the end of the decade, with real wages expected to fall by 1.8 per cent, a loss of £470 per worker a year, and labour productivity by 1.3 per cent, as a result of the long-run changes to trade under the TCA. This would be equivalent to losing more than a quarter of the last decade’s productivity growth.

Nuffield Trust

One of the key effects of Brexit has been on the labour market and especially on sectors, such as hospitality, agriculture, construction, health and social care. These sectors are experiencing labour shortages, in part due to EU nationals leaving the UK. In 2021, the Nuffield Trust looked at the supply of workers in health and social care25 and found that, as a result of increased bureaucratic hurdles, the number of EU/EFTA-trained nurses had declined since 2016. In social care, new immigration rules have made it virtually impossible to recruit from the EU. A more recent report looked at the recruitment of doctors in four specific specialties.26 In each case, although the number recruited from the EU/EFTA was still increasing, the rate of increase had slowed significantly. The reason appeared to be Brexit not COVID-19.

Ivalua

Research by Coleman Parkes for Ivalua18 shows that 80% of firms found Brexit to have been the biggest cause of supply-chain disruptions in the 12 months to August 2022, with 83% fearing the biggest disruptions from Brexit are yet to come. Brexit was found to have had a bigger effect on supply chains than the war in Ukraine, rising energy costs and COVID-19.

Centre for European Reform

Modelling conducted by John Springford27 used a ‘doppelgängers’ method to show the effects of Brexit on the UK economy. Each doppelgänger is ‘a basket of countries whose economic performance closely matches the UK’s before the Brexit referendum and the end of the transition period’. Comparing the UK’s performance with the doppelgänger can show the difference between leaving and not leaving the UK. Doppelgängers were estimated for GDP, investment (gross fixed capital formation), total services trade (exports plus imports) and total goods trade (ditto).

The results are sobering. In the final quarter of 2021, UK GDP is 5.2 per cent smaller than the modelled, doppelgänger UK; investment is 13.7 per cent lower; and goods trade, 13.6 per cent lower.

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) (Ireland)

Similar results for UK trade have been obtained by Janez Kren and Martina Lawless in research conducted for the ESRI.28 They used product-level trade flows between the EU and all other countries in the world as a comparison group. This showed a 16% reduction in UK exports to the EU and a 20% reduction in UK imports from the EU relative to the scenario in which Brexit had not occurred.

British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) survey

According to a BCC survey of 1168 businesses33, 92% of which are SMEs, more than three quarters (77%) for which the Brexit deal is applicable say it is not helping them increase sales or grow their business and 56% say they have difficulties in adapting to the new rules for trading goods. The survey shows that UK firms are facing significant challenges in trying to trade with EU countries under the terms of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. What is more, 80% of firms had seen the cost of importing increase; 53% had seen their sales margins decrease; and almost 70% of manufacturers had experienced shortages of goods and services from the EU.

Academic studies

Research at the Centre for Business Prosperity, Aston University, by Jun Du, Emine Beyza Satoglu and Oleksandr Shepotylo20, 29 found that UK exports to the EU ‘fell by an average of 22.9% in the first 15 months after the introduction of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement’. The negative effect on UK exports persisted and deepened from January 2021 to March 2022. The research involved comparing actual trade with an ‘alternative UK economy’ model based on the UK having remained in the EU. What is more, the researchers found that there had been a reduction of 42% in the number of product varieties exported to the EU, with a large number of exporters simply ceasing to export to the EU and with many of the remaining exporters streamlining their product ranges.

Research at the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance by Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Richard Davies and Josh De Lyon31 found that leaving the EU added an average of £210 to UK household food bills over the two years to the end of 2021. This amounted to a total cost to consumers of £5.8 billion. This confirmed the findings of previous research30 that the increase in UK-EU trade barriers led to food prices in the UK being 6% higher than they would have been.

Finally, a report from the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford32 examined the effects of the ending of the free movement of labour from the EU to the UK. Visas are now required, but ‘low-wage occupations that used to rely heavily on EU workers are now ineligible for work visas, with some limited exceptions for social care and seasonal workers’. Many industries are facing labour shortages. Reasons include other factors, such as low pay and unattractive working conditions, and workers leaving the workforce during the pandemic and afterwards. But the end of free movement appears to have exacerbated these existing problems.

References

    Videos

  1. The Brexit effect: how leaving the EU hit the UK
  2. Financial Times film (18/10/22)

  3. What impact is Brexit having on the UK economy?
  4. Brexit and the UK economy, Ros Atkins (29/10/22)

  5. Why Brexit is damaging the UK economy both now and in the future
  6. Economics Help on YouTube, Tejvan Pettinger (5/12/22)

  7. Why the Costs of Brexit keep growing for the UK economy
  8. Economics Help on YouTube, Tejvan Pettinger (17/10/22)

  9. Treasury Committee (see also)
  10. Parliament TV (25/11/22) (see 15:03:00 to 15:08:12) (Click here for a transcript: see Q637 to Q641)

  11. UK economy made worse by ‘own goals’ like Brexit and Truss mini-budget, IFS economist says
  12. Sky News, Paul Johnson (IFS) (18/11/22)

    Articles

  13. Brexit and the economy: the hit has been ‘substantially negative’
  14. Financial Times, Chris Giles (30/11/22)

  15. ‘What have we done?’: six years on, UK counts the cost of Brexit
  16. The Observer, Toby Helm, Robin McKie, James Tapper & Phillip Inman (25/6/22)

  17. Brexit did hurt the City’s exports – the numbers don’t lie
  18. Financial News, David Wighton (9/11/22)

  19. Brits are starting to think again about Brexit as the economy slides into recession
  20. CNBC, Elliot Smith (23/11/22)

  21. Brexit has cracked Britain’s economic foundations
  22. CNN, Hanna Ziady (24/12/22)

  23. Mark Carney: ‘Doubling down on inequality was a surprising choice’
  24. Financial Times, Edward Luce (14/10/22)

  25. Brexit: Progress on trade deals slower than promised
  26. BBC News, Ione Wells & Brian Wheeler (2/12/22)

  27. How Brexit costs this retailer £1m a month in sales
  28. BusinessLive, Tom Pegden (22/11/22)

  29. Brexit Is Hurting The UK Economy, Bank Of England Official Says
  30. HuffPost, Graeme Demianyk (16/11/22)

  31. Brexit and drop in workforce harming economic recovery, says Bank governor
  32. The Guardian, Richard Partington (16/11/22)

  33. Brexit a major cause of UK’s return to austerity, says senior economist
  34. The Guardian, Anna Isaac (14/11/22)

  35. 80% of UK businesses say Brexit caused the biggest supply chain disruption in the last 12 months
  36. Ivalua (28/11/22)

  37. Brexit added £210 to household food bills, new research finds
  38. Sky News, Faye Brown (1/12/22)

  39. Brexit changes caused 22.9% slump in UK-EU exports into Q1 2022 – research
  40. Expertfile (8/12/22)

    Research and analysis

  41. Brexit analysis
  42. OBR (26/5/22)

  43. The latest evidence on the impact of Brexit on UK trade
  44. OBR (March 2022)

  45. Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2022 (PDF)
  46. OBR (17/11/22)

  47. The Big Brexit (PDF)
  48. Resolution Foundation, Swati Dhingra, Emily Fry, Sophie Hale & Ningyuan Jia (June 2022)

  49. Going it alone: health and Brexit in the UK
  50. Nuffield Trust, Mark Dayan, Martha McCarey, Tamara Hervey, Nick Fahy, Scott L Greer, Holly Jarman, Ellen Stewart and Dan Bristow (20/12/21)

  51. Has Brexit affected the UK’s medical workforce?
  52. Nuffield Trust, Martha McCarey and Mark Dayan (27/11/22)

  53. What can we know about the cost of Brexit so far?
  54. Centre for European Reform, John Springford (9/6/22)

  55. Brexit reduced overall EU-UK goods trade flows by almost one-fifth
  56. Economic and Social Research Institute (Ireland), Janez Kren and Martina Lawless (19/10/22)

  57. Post-Brexit UK Trade – An Update (PDF)
  58. Centre for Business Prosperity, Aston University, Jun Du, Emine Beyza Satoglu and Oleksandr Shepotylo (November 2022)

  59. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices (PDF)
  60. UK in a Changing Europe, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz and Dilan Yang (25/4/22)

  61. Non-tariff barriers and consumer prices: evidence from Brexit
  62. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Richard Davies and Josh De Lyon (December 2022)

  63. How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-wage Labour Force in the UK?
  64. Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, Madeleine Sumption, Chris Forde, Gabriella Alberti and Peter William Walsh (15/8/22)

  65. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Two Years On – Proposals For Reform by UK Business
  66. British Chambers of Commerce (21/12/22)

  67. The Detriments of Brexit
  68. Yorkshire Bylines (June 2022) (see also)

Questions

  1. Summarise the negative effects of Brexit on the UK economy.
  2. Why is it difficult to quantify these effects?
  3. Explain the ‘doppelgängers’ method of estimating the costs of Brexit? How reliable is this method likely to be?
  4. How have UK firms attempted to reduce the costs of exporting to the EU?
  5. Is Brexit the sole cause of a shortage of labour in many sectors in the UK?

When building supply and demand models, the assumption is usually made that both producers and consumers act in a ‘rational’ way to achieve the best possible outcomes. As far as producers are concerned, this would mean attempting to maximise profit. As far as consumers are concerned, it would mean attempting to achieve the highest satisfaction (utility) from their limited budget. This involves a cost–benefit calculation, where people weigh up the costs and benefits of allocating their money between different goods and services.

For consumers to act rationally, the following assumptions are made:

  • Consumer choices are made independently. Their individual choices and preferences are not influenced by other people’s, nor do their choices and preferences impact on other people’s choices.
  • The consumer’s preferences are consistent and fixed.
  • Consumers have full information about the products available and alternatives to them.
  • Given the information they have and the preferences they hold, consumers will then make an optimal choice.

Black Friday can be seen as a perfect occasion for consumers to get their hands on a bargain. It is an opportunity to fulfil a rational need, for example if you were needing to replace a household appliance but were waiting until there was a good deal before committing to a purchase.

The assumption that people act rationally has been at the forefront of economic theory for decades. However, this has been questioned by the rise in behavioural economics. Rather than assuming that all individuals are ‘rational maximisers’ and conduct a cost–benefit analysis for every decision, behavioural economists mix psychology with economics by focusing on the human. As humans, we do not always behave rationally but, instead, we act under bounded rationality.

As economic agents, we make different decisions depending on our emotional state that differ from the ‘rational choice’ assumption. We are also influenced by our social networks and often make choices that provide us with immediate gratification. Given this, Black Friday can also be viewed as a great opportunity to fall prey to irrational and emotional shopping behaviours.

Black Friday originated in the USA and is the day after Thanksgiving. During this annual shopping holiday, retailers typically offer steep discounts to kick off the holiday season. The Black Friday shopping phenomenon is less than a decade old in the UK but it’s now an established part of the pre-Christmas retail calendar. Between 2010 and 2013, Black Friday gradually built up momentum in the UK. In 2014, Black Friday became the peak pre-Christmas online sales day and many online retailers haven’t looked back.

Arguably, from a behavioural economist’s perspective, the big problem with Black Friday is that all the reasons consumers possibly have to partake can be largely illusory. Consumers are bombarded with the promise of one-off deals, large discounts, scarce products, and an opportunity to get their holiday shopping done all at once. However, on Black Friday, our rational decision-making faculties are tested, just as stores are trying their hardest to maximise consumers’ mistakes.

There are many ‘behavioural traps’ that consumers often fall into. The following two are most likely to occur on Black Friday:

  • Scarcity and loss aversion. Shoppers may fear that they will miss out on the best sales deals available if they don’t buy it now. Retailers commonly spark consumers’ interest by highlighting limited stocks available for a limited time only, which raises the perceived value of these goods. This sense of scarcity can further trigger the need to buy now, increasing the ‘Fear of Missing Out’. Consumers therefore need to ask themselves if they are really missing out if they don’t buy it now? And is the discount worth spending the money today, or is there something else I should be spending it on or saving for?
  • Sunk cost fallacy. Once consumers have started to invest, they often struggle to close out investments that prove unprofitable. On Black Friday, customers have already made the initial investment of getting up early, driving to the shops, finding parking and waiting in a queue, before they have purchased anything. Therefore, they will be inclined to buy more than they initially went for. It is important therefore to think about each purchase in isolation.

This year, however, there is also the added complication of the rising cost of living. Whilst this may deter some consumers from unnecessary, impulse purchases, some consumers are using Black Friday as an opportunity to stock up on expected future purchases, hedging against likely price rises over the coming months.

It is thought that more consumers will be looking for a combination of high quality but low price to make sure their purchases are affordable and can last for a long time. According to PwC, many consumers have closely monitored their favourite brands in anticipation that big-ticket electronics, more pricey winter wear or Christmas stocking fillers will be discounted. Consumers are also in search of bargains more than ever given rising inflation. This would suggest a shift in attitude, meaning consumers will be more aware of what they cannot afford rather than giving in to emotional temptation brought on by Black Friday.

Retailers are fully aware of the cognitive biases that surround Black Friday and take full advantage of them. ‘Cyber Monday’ follows right after Black Friday, giving retailers an extra opportunity for them to keep those ‘urgent’ or ‘unmissable’ sales going and increase their revenues.

Black Friday is one of the biggest shopping days of the year. However, the way retailers approach it is growing increasingly mixed. Stores such as Amazon, Argos, Currys and John Lewis have started offering Black Friday deals much earlier in the month, leading some to refer to the event as ‘Black November’. Other stores, such as M&S and Next, didn’t take part at all this year.

Ultimately, Consumers can use insights from behavioural economics to empower them to make more rational decisions in such circumstances: ones that better align with their individual budgets. Nevertheless, the Black Friday sales mania can trigger our deepest emotional and cognitive responses that lead to unnecessary spending.

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Questions

  1. Discuss what is meant by the term ‘rational consumer’. Is it a useful generalisation about the way consumers behave?
  2. Discuss what is meant by the term ‘rational producer’. Is it a useful generalisation about the way firms behave?
  3. What is cost–benefit analysis? What is the procedure used in conducting a cost–benefit analysis?
  4. In addition to scarcity and loss aversion and the sunk cost fallacy, are there any other reasons why consumers may not always act rationally?
  5. Are people likely to be more ‘rational’ about online Black Friday purchases than in-store ones? Explain.