Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 13

Oil prices have been falling in recent months. By early June they had reached a 17-month low. The benchmark US crude price (the West Texas Intermediate price) fell to $83.2 at the beginning of the month, and Brent Crude (the North Sea reference price for refining into petrol) fell to $97.7 (see chart). (For a PowerPoint of the chart below, click here.)

At the same time various commodity prices have also been falling. The IMF all commodities price index has fallen by 7.2% over the past 12 months and by 6.2% in May alone. Some commodities have fallen much faster. In the 12 months to May 2012, natural gas fell by 44%, wheat by 25%, lamb by 37%, Arabica coffee by 36%, coconut oil by 45%, cotton by 47%, iron ore by 23% and tin by 29%.

Although part of the reason for the fall in the price of some commodities is increased supply, the main reason is weak world demand. And with continuing problems in the eurozone and a slowdown in China and the USA, commodity price weakness is likely to continue.

So is this good news? To the extent that commodity prices feed through into consumer prices and impact on the rate of inflation, then this is good news. As inflation falls, so central banks will be encouraged to make further cuts in interest rates (in the cases where they are not already at a minimum). For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia cut its cash rate last week from 3.75% to 3.5%. This follows on from a cut from 4.25% on 1 May. In cases where there is no further scope for interest rate cuts (e.g. the US Federal Reserve Bank, whose interest rate is between 0% and 0.25%), then the fall in inflation may encourage a further round of quantitative easing.

But falling commodity prices are also a reflection of bad news, namely the low economic growth of the world economy and fears of turmoil from a possible Greek exit from the euro.

Update
A day after this was written (9/6/12), a deal was agreed between eurozone ministers to provide support of up to €100 billion for Spanish banks. This helped to reduce pessimism about the world economy, at least temporarily. Stock markets rose and so too did oil prices, by around 1%. But if pessimism increases again, then the fall is likely to resume.

Articles

Oil prices hit a 17-month low on China slowdown fears BBC News (8/6/12)
Oil gives up gains without signs of Fed move BloombergBusinessweek, Sandy Shore (7/6/12)
Oil Heads for Longest Run of Weekly Losses in More Than 13 Years BloombergBusinessweek, (8/6/12)
Gold plunges as Bernanke gives no hint of stimulus Live5News(7/6/12)
Oil Price Tumbles Below $83 on Weak Economy Money News(8/6/12)
World food price index expected to fall for May Reuters(6/6/12)
Oil price losing streak continues Guardian, Julia Kollewe (8/6/12)

Data

Spot fuel prices US Energy Information Administration
Commodity Prices Index Mundi
Crude Oil Price Index Index Mundi

Questions

  1. Why have crude oil prices fallen to their lowest level for 17 months?
  2. How can the concepts of income elasticity of demand, price elasticity of supply and price elasticity of demand help to explain the magnitude of the fall in crude oil prices?
  3. Would a fall in inflation linked to a fall in commodity prices be a fall in cost-push or demand-pull inflation? Explain.
  4. What are the macroeconomic implications of the fall in crude oil prices?
  5. What factors are likely to have significant impact on crude oil prices in the coming months
  6. Why is it difficult to predict crude oil prices over the coming months?

Paul Volcker was Chair of the US Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987. He was also Chair of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama from February 2009 to January 2011. In the webcast and articles below, he reflects on the current state of the world financial system – from regulation, to the euro crisis, to world imbalances, to the system of floating exchange rates.

He argues that global financial systems are vulnerable to breakdowns. What is needed is reform to the system, and for that there needs to be consensus by politicians, regulators and central banks.

But, in the absence of international consensus on some key points, reform will be greatly weakened, if not aborted. The freedom of money, financial markets and people to move – and thus to escape regulation and taxation – might be an acceptable, even constructive, brake on excessive official intervention, but not if a deregulatory race to the bottom prevents adoption of needed ethical and prudential standards.

Perhaps most important is a coherent, consistent approach to dealing with the imminent failure of “systemically important” institutions. Taxpayers and governments alike are tired of bailing out creditors for fear of the destructive contagious effects of failure – even as bailouts encourage excessive risk-taking.

According to Volcker, countries must be prepared to surrender some sovereignty. Policies must be co-ordinated internationally and there must be stronger regulation by international bodies, such as the IMF and stronger concerted action by global organisations, such as the G20.

Left to their own devices, in an era of floating exchange rates, countries may pursue policies that exacerbate global imbalances.

Not so long ago, we were comforted by theorising that floating exchange rates would mediate international adjustments in a timely and orderly way. But, in the real world, many countries, particularly but not limited to small, open economies, simply find it impractical or undesirable to permit their currency to float.

We are left with the certainty, however awkward, that active participation in an open world economy requires some surrender of economic sovereignty. Or, to put the point more positively, it requires a willingness to co-ordinate policies more effectively.

Webcast

Volcker Urges Global Monetary System Overhaul BloombergBusinessweek (31/5/12)

Articles

Is global financial reform possible? Guardian, Paul Volcker (6/6/12)
Volcker Urges Global Financial System Overhaul After Crisis BloombergBusinessweek, Robyn Meredith and Shamim Adam (31/5/12)

Questions

  1. What reforms, according to Volcker, need to be implemented in order for the euro to function effectively without crises?
  2. What can the USA do to ease the euro crisis?
  3. What are Volcker’s views on the regulation of the US banking system?
  4. How are incentive structures in banks related to speculative activities?
  5. Should banks be allowed to fail?
  6. What financial imbalances exist between countries?
  7. What international monetary reforms are required?
  8. What light can game theory shed on the difficulty of achieving global policy co-ordination?
  9. Is an international system of floating exchange rates appropriate given the size of international financial flows?

In the third and final part of this blog, we look at the G8 summit at Camp David on 18 and 19 May 2012. Ways of averting the deepening global economic crisis were top of the agenda.

In terms of the global economy, the leaders agreed on three main things. The first was that they supported Greece remaining in the euro. According to the communiqué:

We agree on the importance of a strong and cohesive eurozone for global stability and recovery, and we affirm our interest in Greece remaining in the eurozone while respecting its commitments. We all have an interest in the success of specific measures to strengthen the resilience of the eurozone and growth in Europe

The second was a commitment to ‘fiscal responsibility’ and the clawing down of public-sector deficits.

We commit to fiscal responsibility and, in this context, we support sound and sustainable fiscal consolidation policies that take into account countries’ evolving economic conditions and underpin confidence and economic recovery.

The third was commitment to boosting economic growth. (Click on chart for a larger image.) On the supply side this would be through measures to stimulate productivity. On the demand side this would be through policies to stimulate investment.
(For a PowerPoint of the chart, click on the following link: Quarterly Growth.)

To raise productivity and growth potential in our economies, we support structural reforms, and investments in education and in modern infrastructure, as appropriate. Investment initiatives can be financed using a range of mechanisms, including leveraging the private sector. Sound financial measures, to which we are committed, should build stronger systems over time while not choking off near-term credit growth. We commit to promote investment to underpin demand, including support for small businesses and public-private partnerships.

But the communiqué was short on details. How will fiscal consolidation be achieved? Does this mean a continuation of austerity measures? And if so, what will be the impact on aggregate demand? Or if fiscal consolidation is slowed down, what will be the impact on financial markets?

If a growth in investment is central to the policy, what will be the precise mechanisms to encourage it? Will they be enough to combat the deflationary effect on demand of the fiscal measures?

And how will productivity increases be achieved? What supply-side measures will be introduced? And will productivity increases be encouraged or discouraged by continuing austerity measures?

Lots of questions – questions raised by the articles below.

Articles

Capitalism at a crossroads Independent (19/5/12)
Barack Obama warns eurozone to focus on jobs and growth The Telegraph (20/5/12)
G8 Summit: World leaders push for Greece to stay in the eurozone The Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (19/5/12)
Obama sees ’emerging consensus’ on crisis Sydney Morning Herald, Ben Feller and Jim Kuhnhenn (20/5/12)
G8 leaders tout economic growth, fiscal responsibility CNN (20/5/12)
G8 focuses on Eurozone Gulf News (20/5/12)
G8 leaders back Greece amid tensions France 24 (20/5/12)
G8 splits over stimulus versus austerity Financial TimesRichard McGregor and Kiran Stacey (19/5/12)
Cameron is consigning the UK to stagnation Financial Times, Martin Wolf (17/5/12)
Time to end ‘Camerkozy’ economics Financial Times, Ed Miliband (18/5/12)
Obama: Eurozone ‘must focus on jobs and growth’ BBC News (20/5/12)
World leaders back Greece, vow to combat financial turmoil Reuters, Jeff Mason and Laura MacInnis (19/5/12)
Germany isolated over euro crisis plan at G8 meeting in Camp David Guardian, Patrick Wintour (19/5/12)
G8 leaders end summit with pledge to keep Greece in eurozone Guardian, Ewen MacAskill (19/5/12)
G8 summit ends with few tangible results Xinhua, Sun Hao (20/5/12)

Final communiqué
Camp David DeclarationG8 (19/5/12)

Questions

  1. To what extent are economic growth and fiscal consolidation (a) compatible; (b) incompatible objectives? How might a Keynesian and a new classical economist respond to these questions?
  2. What supply-side measures could be introduced by the EU?
  3. Why might dangers of protectionism increase in the coming months?
  4. What would be the impact of a Greek default and exit from the eurozone on other eurozone economies?
  5. What monetary policy changes could be introduced by the eurozone governments and the ECB in order to ease the sovereign debt crisis of countries such as Grecce, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland?

In the second part of this blog, we look at an interview with the Guardian given by Robert Chote, Chair of the UK’s Office of Budget Responsibility. Like Mervyn King’s, that we looked at in Part 1, Robert Chote’s predictions are also gloomy.

In particular, he argues that if Greece leaves the euro, the effects on the UK economy could be significant, not just in the short term, but in the long term too.

The concern is that you end up with an outcome in the eurozone that creates the same sort of structural difficulties in the financial system and in the economy that we saw in the past recession, and that that has consequences both for hitting economic activity in the economy, but also its underlying potential. And it’s the latter which has particular difficulties for the fiscal position, because it means not just that the economy weakens and then strengthens again – ie, it goes into a hole and comes out – but that you go down and you never quite get back up to where you started. And that has more lingering, long-term consequences for the public finances.

The interview looked not just at the effects of the current crisis in the eurozone on the eurozone, British and world economies, but also at a number of other issues, including: the reliability of forecasts and those of the OBR in particular; relations between the OBR and the Treasury; allowing the OBR to cost opposition policies; the economic effect of cutting the 50p top rate of income tax; the sustainability of public-sector pensions; and tax increases or spending cuts in the long term.

In Part 3 we look at attempts by the G8 countries to find a solution to the mounting crisis.

Articles
Robert Chote interview: ‘I would not say in the past there’s been rigging’ Guardian, Andrew Sparrow (18/5/12)
UK ‘may never fully recover’ if Greece exits euro Guardian, Andrew Sparrow, Helena Smith and Larry Elliott (18/5/12)
British economy may ‘never quite recover’ from a severe Euro collapse The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (18/5/12)

OBR report
Economic and fiscal outlook Office for Budget Responsibility (March 2012)

Questions

  1. Why is it very difficult to forecast the effects of a Greek withdrawal from the euro?
  2. Why may Greek withdrawal have an effect on long-term potential output in the UK and the rest of Europe?
  3. Why are economic forecasts in general so unreliable? Does this mean that we should abandon economic forecasting?
  4. Why are public finances “likely to come under pressure over the longer term”?
  5. Why might the cut in the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45% have little impact on economic growth? Distinguish between income and substitution effects of the tax cut.

The press is buzzing with talk of Greece leaving the euro. And if Greece leaves, what next? The press is also buzzing with talk of a possible, if not probable, breakup of the euro altogether – a Eurodämmerung as Paul Krugman calls it.

So is Greece likely to leave the euro, or will the Greek electorate vote next time for the parties supporting the austerity package they negotiated with the EU?

If Greece does leave the euro, what would be the implications for the Greek economy? And what would be the implications for the rest of the eurozone? Would it fall apart: would there a be a domino effect to Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland and then the whole eurozone? Or would Germany and the ECB do whatever was necessary to prevent any more countries leaving?

The following articles ponder these weighty questions. In the meantime, stock markets around the world have plunged on fears of the damage a disorderly Greek exit could do to the eurozone and to the global economy.

Greece, euro exit and the drummer in the band Reuters, Luke Baker (14/5/12)
Greek fire could singe rest of euro Financial Times, Richard Milne and Patrick Jenkins (14/5/12)
Eurozone: If Greece goes … Financial Times, Chris Giles, Peter Spiegel and Kerin Hope (13/5/12)
How would Greece leave the euro? BBC News, Kabir Chibber (10/5/12)
CBI: Greece eurozone exit ‘would be like an earthquake happening’ The Telegraph, John Cridland (14/5/12)
Forget what you’re hearing: Greece won’t quit euro soon Globe and Mail (Canada), Brian Milner (14/5/12)
Could the euro survive a Greek exit? BBC News, Robert Peston (14/5/12)
Greekonomics (see also) BBC News, Paul Mason (9/5/12)
This is how the euro ends – not with a whimper but a bang The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (15/5/12)
EC and ECB working on emergency plans for Greek euro exit, says trade commissioner Karel De Gucht The Telegraph (18/5/12)
Fiddling while Athens burns The Economist (19/5/12)
Exodus, chapter 1 The Economist (19/5/12)
The Greek run The Economist (19/5/12)
Greece will leave the euro. But what then? Independent on Sunday, Hamish McRae (20/5/12)
No quick fix for Euro – maybe a slow one? BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (24/5/12)

Questions

  1. If Greece left the euro, what would happen to bank deposits in Greek banks?
  2. What would be the costs and benefits to the Greek economy of a reintroduction of the drachma?
  3. Why might individuals and companies, if they were able, move their euro deposits out of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy into accounts based in other eurozone countries? What would be the implications of such financial flows?
  4. What can the ECB do to support the banking systems in vulnerable eurozone countries? Is there any theoretical limit to the amount that the ECB can offer?
  5. What is the role of the central banks of individual eurozone countries in a transfer of large-scale funds from one eurozone country to another? How does this impact on the receiving country (e.g. Germany)?