The debate about a minimum price for alcohol continues to be prompted by concerns over high levels of drinking, its effect on public health and public order, and a widespread belief that most of the alcohol that contributes to drunken behaviour is irresponsibly priced and sold. Minimum pricing for alcohol, although considered a radical intervention, is not a new policy. A minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland in 2018, in Wales in 2020, in the Republic of Ireland in 2022 and looks likely to be introduced in Northern Ireland.
Despite more countries following Scotland’s lead, there are no current plans to consider an application of an MUP in England. However, with recent increases in the MUP in Scotland and the findings of a five-year review in Wales, it would suggest that this policy will continue to be at the forefront of discussions of how to tackle impacts of alcohol consumption.
Reasons and options for intervention
The main goal of introducing a minimum unit price for alcohol is to tackle unwanted consequences from the consumption of alcohol. While many people consume alcoholic drinks safely without any problems, some patterns of alcohol use are associated with significant physical, mental and social harm.
It costs UK society more than £27 billion a year through a combination of health, crime, workplace and social welfare costs. Therefore, some governments in the British Isles have deemed it necessary to intervene in this market to reduce alcohol-related harm and protect the health of those regularly drinking more than the recommended 14 units per week.
Research has shown that making alcohol less affordable can reduce consumption and hence related harms. The World Health Organization considers minimum pricing one of its ‘best buys’ for tackling harmful alcohol use.
There are three main policy options that aim to reduce the consumption of alcohol by making alcohol less affordable. One is to tax alcoholic drinks; the second is to set a minimum price per unit of alcohol; the third is to ban the sale of alcohol drinks below cost price (the level of alcohol duty plus VAT).
The policy option of an MUP has been adopted by Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland; England has opted to use a ban on selling alcohol below the level of alcohol duty plus VAT (since 28 May 2014).
What is a minimum price?
The introduction by the government of a minimum price for a product means that it cannot legally be sold below that price. It can be set in order to achieve certain economic or social objectives that are not currently being achieved at equilibrium in the market. In order for the policy to have an effect, the minimum price must be set above the equilibrium price. This price floor then prevents prices from falling too low and settling back at equilibrium below the MUP.
A common misconception is that introducing a minimum price for alcohol is a form of taxation. However, this is not the case. Implementing an MUP means that any extra money from higher prices goes to the retailers and producers, not to the government.
Why choose a minimum price floor?
The policy has two main objectives. The first is to protect the interests of drinkers who may make poor decisions on their own behalf. This may be from lack of information, social pressures or a disregard for their own long-term health or welfare.
The second objective is to reduce the external costs placed on health services, the police, the criminal justice system, on fellow citizens or employers. There are also longer-term external costs when alcohol abuse impacts on productivity or leads to repeated absences from work.
It is argued that MUP intervention can encourage positive changes in behaviour of both consumers and producers. It can target harmful excessive drinking, while leaving the more moderate drinker relatively unaffected.
A positive impact on consumers is the possible changes in demand. People who previously consumed cheap, and often strong, drinks, such as cheap cider, will find that their marginal private cost of consuming alcohol has increased. Depending on the price elasticity of demand, their consumption will decrease and there will be a reduction in alcohol-related violence and other external costs. A positive impact on producers is that it can encourage drinks manufacturers themselves to reduce the alcohol content of their products and, therefore, limit any increase in price passed on to the consumer.
How it differs in the different parts of the British Isles
While minimum alcohol pricing is in place in several countries, policies differ. In terms of the British Isles, in 2018 Scotland became the first country to introduce a national minimum price for all types of alcohol. Two years later, Wales followed suit. The Republic of Ireland introduced minimum pricing in January 2022, while Northern Ireland has been engaged in consultation on the policy for several years. The following table shows when MUP was introduced and at what rates.
Has the MUP been effective?
Wales has reached the five-year review point since the MUP was introduced. Many of the findings within the Welsh evaluation have strong resonance with those elsewhere, particularly those of the final Scottish evaluation. There have been five main findings:
- Implementation has been smooth. Retailers have largely complied with the law, and enforcement has been effective.
- Certain cheap alcohol products have disappeared. Large bottles of strong cider, for example, are now rare. There have also been shifts in promotions and product availability.
- There are indications that overall alcohol consumption in Wales has declined. While it is difficult to measure directly, purchasing data suggests a reduction.
- Concerns about unintended consequences have not materialised significantly. Predictions of a rise in home brewing, substance switching, shoplifting and cross-border purchasing have not been widely observed.
- Some drinkers have changed their purchasing habits. A minority have switched from cider to wine or spirits as price differences narrowed. Others, particularly those on low incomes, experienced further struggles in financially maintaining their drinking habits.
There was also a study published last year (2024) in the journal Economic Inquiry, looking at the impacts of the policy during lockdown restrictions. The study showed that the introduction of MUP in Wales resulted in a 15% increase in transaction prices and a sharp reduction in the amount of alcohol bought, around 20%, with an overall drop in expenditure per customer compared to England over the same period.
However, it should be noted that the COVID pandemic disrupted drinking habits and the availability of alcohol. In addition, evaluating the overall effects of the policy has been complex with other economic factors, including the cost-of-living crisis, also influencing affordability.
Is it a fair policy?
A counter argument to applying a price intervention on alcohol is that it may have unintended private and external costs. One argument claims that young people could decide to switch to cheaper non-alcoholic drugs instead. Alternatively, they may seek to purchase alcohol on illegal shadow markets.
Critics of the policy argue that it negatively impacts those who consume alcohol responsibly, especially families on average or below-average incomes. The wine and spirits industry tried to lobby against the Scottish government, arguing that it is inconsistent with the operation of the free market and that the intervention creates a barrier to trade. They claim that lower sales of alcoholic drinks will cost jobs in the UK, both in manufacturing and from reduced revenues of corner shops, pubs and other retailers.
There is also an argument that relying solely on an MUP targets the affordability of drinking rather than addressing all aspects of alcohol harm. Therefore, this policy is not necessarily effective in achieving all the government’s goals. Critics argue that this policy should be one component of a more comprehensive strategy delivery, which might include education, restricting the availability of alcohol, banning advertising, increasing alcohol duty, etc.
Conclusion
Although there are currently no plans to implement an MUP in England, there is ongoing pressure for the Government to consider adopting one. In the Autumn of 2024, Lord Darzi carried out an independent investigation of the NHS in England. This investigation into the NHS highlighted the ‘alarming’ death toll in England caused by cheap drink (see link below). This led public health leaders to call for action to increase the price of cheap alcohol in supermarkets and off-licences.
However, the policy itself is not without its critics, especially those citing continued trends in actual numbers of alcohol-related deaths. Therefore, it is suggested that the policy needs to be accompanied by well-funded treatment and support services for people experiencing alcohol-related difficulties. If combined with other policy measures and social support, it has the potential to contribute significantly to reductions in alcohol-related harm.
Despite reservations, overall a minimum price per unit of alcohol is viewed by many as a justified intervention and is well supported by evidence. It has been accepted that a minimum price is required to reduce consumption closer towards the social optimum and in order to bring about change in consumer and producer behaviour. Given the evidence provided from current MUP countries and ongoing discussions of alcohol-related deaths in England, health officials believe a review is almost certain, even though the current government reportedly ruled out minimum unit pricing shortly after winning power.
Articles
Reports
Questions
- Using a supply and demand diagram, discuss the effect of introducing a minimum price per unit of alcohol.
- How is the price elasticity of demand for alcoholic drinks relevant to determining the success of minimum pricing?
- Compare the effects on alcohol consumption of imposing a minimum unit price of alcohol with a ban the sale of alcohol below cost price. What are the revenue implications of the two policies for the government?
- What negative externalities occur as a result in the over consumption of alcohol? How could a socially efficient price for alcohol be determined?
- Could alcohol consumption be described as a ‘de-merit good’? Explain.
- Rather than targeting the price of alcohol, what other policies could the government introduce to tackle over consumption of alcohol?
- What will determine the number of people travelling across borders within the UK (i.e. from Scotland or Wales to England) to buy cheaper alcoholic drinks?
Africa’s energy transition is at a pivotal moment. While the continent boasts abundant renewable energy resources, its electricity generation and distribution remain fragmented. Cross-border electricity trade has emerged as a potential game-changer, fostering energy security, reducing costs, and accelerating the adoption of renewables. However, is Africa fully leveraging this opportunity?
In a forthcoming paper in the Energy & Environment journal, I join forces with my colleagues Mercy Adaji and Bereket Kebede to argue that the answer to this question is no. Our study examines the impact of cross-border electricity trade in renewable electricity generation across 21 African countries over a 24-year period (1996–2020). Our findings indicate that a 1% increase in electricity trade significantly raises the share of renewables in total electricity output by approximately 0.05%. This underscores the crucial role of regional integration in advancing Africa’s clean energy goals, aligning with previous studies (e.g., Boz et al., 2021; Song et al., 2022, linked below) that highlight how electricity market integration promotes renewable energy investments by stabilising supply and mitigating intermittency risks.
Despite these advantages, cross-border electricity trade remains significantly underutilised due to regulatory barriers, inadequate infrastructure, and governance challenges.
Net electricity-importing countries tend to benefit more from trade, while net-exporting nations, particularly those reliant on fossil fuels, exhibit weaker positive impacts. Without targeted policies (such as carbon pricing and green subsidies) trade disparities may persist, slowing the transition to clean energy.
Moreover, our results highlight the pivotal role of governance in fostering a robust electricity market. This is neither surprising nor new – quality of governance matters over the long term in all aspects of economic activity. Agostini et al. (2019), for instance, show that well-structured regulations and strategic investments in interconnections enhance the effectiveness of cross-border electricity trade. Transparent regulatory frameworks, expanded grid interconnections, and harmonised energy policies can significantly boost the impact of regional electricity trade.
By strengthening collaboration, African nations can mitigate energy poverty, enhance supply reliability, and accelerate the shift toward a greener future.
To capitalise fully on cross-border electricity trade, African policymakers must prioritise regional energy integration, invest in infrastructure and implement incentives to spur renewable energy expansion. With the right policies and co-operative strategies, Africa can harness its vast renewable potential and achieve a more sustainable, energy-secure future.
Articles
- Powering Africa’s sustainable future: The role of cross-border electricity trade on renewable electricity generation
Energy & Environment, Mercy Adaji, Nicholas Vasilakos and Bereket Kebede (17/2/25)
- A surplus based framework for cross-border electricity trade in South America
Energy Policy, Claudio A Agostini, Andrés M Guzmán, Shahriyar Nasirov and Carlos Silva (1/2/19)
- The effects of cross-border electricity trade on power production from different energy sources
The Electricity Journal, Deniz Ege Boz, Baris Sanli and M Hakan Berument (20/4/21)
- Energy market integration and renewable energy development: Evidence from the European Union countries
Journal of Environmental Management, Malin Song, Haitao Xu, Zhiyang Shen and Xiongfeng Pan (5/6/22)
Questions
- How does electricity trade help mitigate the intermittency challenges of renewable energy, and what mechanisms could further enhance its effectiveness?
- The study highlights governance quality as a crucial factor in the success of cross-border electricity trade. What governance-related challenges do African countries face in implementing a unified electricity market, and how can policymakers address them to maximize trade benefits?
- Our results show that net electricity-importing countries tend to gain more from trade than net-exporting ones, particularly those relying on fossil fuels. What policy measures can be introduced to ensure that net-exporting countries also benefit from electricity trade while advancing renewable energy integration?
- What are the most critical infrastructure and policy gaps that hinder the growth of cross-border electricity trade in Africa, and how can these be overcome to facilitate a more sustainable energy transition?
On the day he came to office, President Trump signed a series of executive orders. One of these was to set in motion the process of withdrawing from the UN Paris climate agreement. Section 3(a) of the order reads:
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations shall immediately submit formal written notification of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Paris Agreement is an international treaty on climate change. It was adopted on 12 December 2015 and came into force on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the point was reached when at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of global emissions had ratified the treaty.
Currently, all UN countries are signatories to the agreement and only Iran, Libya and Yemen are yet to ratify it. The agreement commits countries to limiting global warming to well under 2°C above pre-industrial levels and preferably to no more than 1.5°C. This would involve reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or taking carbon absorbing measures.
Since 2020, each country has been required to submit its own emission-reduction targets, known as ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs), and the actions it will take to meet them. Every five years each country must submit a new NDC more ambitious than the last.
Rich countries are expected to provide finance to low-income countries. This is required to help poor countries adopt green technologies and to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change (e.g. through irrigation schemes and flood defences).
Countries set target dates by which emissions would be fully offset by carbon absorption measures (‘net zero’). The UN’s goal is to reach global net zero by 2050. According to the UN Climate Action site:
As of June 2024, 107 countries, responsible for approximately 82 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, had adopted net-zero pledges either in law, in a policy document such as an national climate action plan or a long-term strategy, or in an announcement by a high-level government official. More than 9000 companies, over 1000 cities, more than 1000 educational institutions, and over 600 financial institutions have joined the Race to Zero, pledging to take rigorous, immediate action to halve global emissions by 2030.
The Paris Agreement has helped to cut emissions or slow their rate of growth in most countries. Although net zero by 2050 may be unlikely, warming will be less than without the agreement.
The USA and the Paris Agreement
In April 2016 the USA signed the Paris Agreement. As stated above, the Paris Agreement came into effect on 4 November 2016.
President Trump came to office for the first time in January 2017. In June 2017, he signed an executive order in which he announced that the USA would withdraw from the agreement, arguing that it undermined the US economy and put it at a competitive disadvantage. He claimed that global warming is a hoax concocted by China designed to undermine the competitive power of the USA.
However, despite Trump’s intention to withdraw from the agreement, its terms did not allow a country to begin a withdrawal procedure for at least three years after the agreement was ratified (i.e. not before 4 November 2019) and then a year’s notice has to be given. This notice was given on 4 November 2019. In the meantime, the USA had to abide by the terms of the treaty. During this period, US representatives at COP meetings used the opportunity to promote fossil fuels. Withdrawal took place on 1 November 2020, just one day after the presidential election and just over two months before the end of Trump’s first term of office.
On 20 January 2021, his first day in office, President Biden signed an executive order to rejoin the agreement, which took place on 19 February 2021. He committed to cutting total greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% by 2030. To achieve this, his administration adopted a number of emissions-reducing measures, for example requiring all new passenger vehicles sold after 2035 to be emissions free, giving tax credits for clean electricity generation, providing federal funds for smart agriculture and setting greener appliance and equipment standards.
But, as we have seen, newly elected President Trump for the second time announced that the USA would withdraw from the Paris agreement and would prioritise fossil fuel production, under the mantra, ‘drill, baby, drill’.
The economics of climate change
Climate change is directly caused by market failures. One of the most important of these is that the atmosphere is a common resource: it is not privately owned; it is a global ‘commons’. Individuals and firms use it at a zero price. If the price of any good or service to the user is zero, there is no incentive to economise on its use. Thus for the emitter there are no private costs of using the atmosphere in this way as a ‘dump’ for their emissions and, in a free market, no incentive to reduce the climate costs.
And yet when firms emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere there are costs to other people. To the extent that they contribute to global warming, part of these costs will be borne by the residents of that country; but a large part will be borne by inhabitants of other countries.
These climate costs are external costs to the firm and are illustrated in the figure. It shows an industry that emits CO2. To keep the analysis simple, assume that it is a perfectly competitive industry with demand and supply given by curves D and S, which are equal to the marginal private benefits (MPB) and marginal private costs (MPC), respectively. There are no externalities on the demand side and hence MPB equals the marginal social cost (MSB). Market equilibrium is at point a, with output at Qpc and price at Ppc. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)
Assume that the emissions create a marginal cost to society equal to MECc. Assume that the MEC increases as output and total emissions increase. The MECc line is thus upward sloping. At the market price of Qpc, these external climate costs are equal to the purple vertical line. When these external climate costs are added to private costs, this gives a marginal social cost given by MSC = MPC + MECc. The gives a socially optimal level of output of the product of Q* at a price of P*, with the optimum point of c.
In other words, other things being equal, the free market overproduces products with climate externalities. If the output is to be reduced to the social optimum of Q*, then the government will need to take measures such as those advocated in the Paris Agreement. These could include imposing taxes on products, such as electricity generated by fossil fuels, or on the emissions themselves. Or green alternatives, such as wind power, could be subsidised.
Alternatively, regulations could be used to cap the production of products creating emissions, or caps on the emissions themselves could be imposed. Emissions permits could be issued or auctioned. Only firms in possession of the permits would be allowed to emit and the permits would cap emissions below free-market levels. These permits could be traded under a cap-and-trade scheme, such as the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Again, such schemes are advocated under the Paris Agreement.
Effect of the USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and promoting fossil fuels will increase US emissions. Scientific consensus is that this will have a negative effect on climate change. Only part of these climate costs will be borne by the USA, although the severity of recent fires in California, fanned by strong Santa Ana winds, and more violent hurricanes are two examples of costs of climate change to the USA itself.
A bigger worry is whether the USA’s withdrawal will encourage other countries, such as Argentina, to do likewise. Then the climate costs of US withdrawal will be greater.
But all is not bad news. The transition to green energy is well advanced and the costs of solar and wind power are decreasing. Global investment in clean energy has increased by 60% since 2015. China is investing heavily in renewable energy technology, which is giving it a significant trade advantage. The EU has taken significant actions to promote green energy and technology. Similarly, industrial processes that economise on emissions are developing apace and it is becoming increasingly profitable for private companies to make climate-friendly investments without subsidies. In the USA itself, many Democratic states and local governments, and even some Republican ones, will continue to adopt climate-friendly policies.
In this environment, the Trump administration does not want to fall behind in the development of new technologies and markets. And with Elon Musk having a significant influence on Donald Trump, the USA’s investment in EVs and battery technology is likely to continue. This will help to reduce the price of green energy and transport.
Videos
Articles
- Trump vows to leave Paris climate agreement and ‘drill, baby, drill’
BBC News, Matt McGrath (20/1/25)
- What is the Paris climate agreement and why has Trump withdrawn?
BBC News, Esme Stallard and Mark Poynting (21/1/25)
- Six Trump executive orders to watch
BBC News (21/1/25)
- The real message behind Trump’s withdrawal of US from the Paris climate agreement
Sky News, Tom Clarke (21/1/25)
- Trump signs order to withdraw US from Paris climate agreement for second time
The Guardian, Dharna Noor (20/1/25)
- Explained: how Trump’s day one orders reveal a White House for big oi
The Guardian, Oliver Milman and Dharna Noor (22/1/25)
- Donald Trump can’t stop global climate action. If we stick together, it’s the US that will lose out
The Guardian, Bill Hare (6/11/24)
Trump to pull US from Paris climate agreement: What could this mean for the environment?ITV News, Martin Stew (21/1/25)
- 10 reasons why US president-elect Donald Trump can’t derail global climate action
The Conversation, Wesley Morgan and Ben Newell (8/11/24)
- Trump has rejected the Paris agreement again, but game theory shows how other countries can still lead by example
The Conversation, Renaud Foucart (27/1/25)
Information
Questions
- Summarise the Paris Agreement.
- Using a diagram similar to that above, illustrate how the free market will produce a sub-optimal amount of solar power because the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal private benefit.
- How might game theory be used to analyse possible international decision making in the context of US climate policy?
- Is it in America’s interests to cease investing in green energy and green production methods?
- Go through each of the reasons (not specific to Australia) given in The Conversation article linked above why ‘Donald Trump can’t derail global climate action’. To what extent do you agree with each one?
In September 2023, UK mobile phone network operators Vodafone and Three (owned by CK Hutchinson) announced their intention to merge. At the time, in terms of total revenue from the supply of mobile phone services to consumers, Vodafone and Three had market shares of 23% and 12%, respectively.
In addition to Vodaphone and Three, there are two other major network operators – the BT Group (BT & EE) and Virgin-media 02, with market shares of around 31% and 23%, respectively, with other operators having a combined market share of 12%. As we shall see below, these other operators use one of the four major networks. Therefore, the merged entity of Vodafone-Three would become the market leader with a share of around 35% and there would only be three major network operators competing in the UK.
Not surprisingly, the UK competition agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), decided to conduct a detailed investigation into whether the merger would harm competition. However, in early December 2024 the CMA announced its decision to allow the merger to go ahead, subject to several important commitments by the merging parties.
CMA’s phase 1 findings
The CMAs phase 1 investigation raised several concerns with the merger (see fifth CMA link below).
First, it was worried that retail and business customers would have to pay higher prices for mobile services after the merger.
Second, in addition to the four mobile network operators, the UK market is served by a number of mobile ‘virtual’ network operators (MVNOs), for example Sky Mobile and Lyca Mobile. As we saw above, these suppliers account for around 12% of the consumer retail market. The MVNOs do not own their own networks and instead agree wholesale terms with one of the network operators to access their network and supply their own retail mobile services. The CMA was concerned that since the merger would reduce the number of networks competing to host these MVNOs from four to three, it would result in MVNOs paying higher wholesale access prices.
Vodafone and Three did not offer any remedies to the CMA to address these competition concerns. Consequently, the CMA referred the case to phase 2 for a more thorough investigation.
CMA’s phase 2 findings
The CMA’s analysis in phase 2 confirmed its earlier concerns (see linked report below). It was still worried that because the merged entity would become the largest network operator, retail customers would face higher prices or get a poorer service – for example, a reduced data allowance in their contract. In addition, the CMA remained concerned that the MVNOs would be negatively impacted and that this would lessen their ability to offer the best deals to retail customers.
However, during the phase 2 investigation, the merging parties put forward various efficiency justifications for the merger. They argued that the merger would provide them with much needed scale and investment capacity to improve their network and roll-out 5G technology. The CMA recognised these claims but questioned the merging parties’ incentives to go through with the investment once the merger was approved. Furthermore, it was concerned that if they did invest, this would be funded by raising the prices charged to consumers.
As a result, the CMA only agreed to allow the merger once Vodafone and Three accepted remedies that would address these concerns.
The remedies necessary for the merger to proceed
First, the merged entity must cap a range of tariffs and data plans it offers in the retail market for three years.
Second, again for three years, it must commit to maintain the wholesale contract terms it offers to MNVOs.
Finally, over the next eight years, the merged entity must deliver the network upgrade plans that it claimed the merger would allow. The CMA believes that in the long run this network development would significantly boost competition between the three remaining mobile network operators.
The acceptance of remedies of this nature was unusual for the CMA. Typically, like other competition agencies, the CMA has favoured divestment remedies in which the merging parties are required to sell-off some of the assets or capacity acquired. In contrast, the remedies in the Vodafone-Three deal impact on the merging parties’ behaviour.
One clear disadvantage of such remedies is that they require the merged firm’s actions to be monitored, in this case for eight years, to make sure it adheres to the agreed behaviour. One reason why the CMA may have been willing to accept this is that the communications industries regulator, OFCOM, will be able to assist with this monitoring.
It was also surprising that the CMA was willing to allow the number of network operators to decrease to three. Previously, there had been a perception that it was important to maintain four networks. This was certainly the view in 2016 when Three’s attempted merger with O2 was prohibited. This decision was made by the European Commission (EC). However, the CMA raised serious concerns to the EC and when the merging parties offered behavioural remedies argued that these were:
materially deficient as they will not lead to the creation of a fourth Mobile Network Operator (MNO) capable of competing effectively and in the long-term with the remaining three MNOs such that it would stem the loss of competition caused by the merger.
Why has the authorities’ attitude towards the merger changed?
So why has there been a change of stance in this latest attempted merger in the mobile phone sector?
One explanation is that the market has fundamentally changed over time. The margins for network operators have declined, network usage has grown and there has been a lack of investment in expensive 5G technology. This would certainly fit with the CMA’s desire to use the remedies to facilitate network investment.
A second possible explanation is that the CMA has recently faced criticism from UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer (see third Guardian article below). In a speech at the International Investment Summit in London in October 2024, he said that
We will rip out the bureaucracy that blocks investment and we will make sure that every regulator in this country take growth as seriously as this room does.
In response to this, the CMA has indicated that in 2025 it will review its approach to mergers, ensuring that only truly problematic mergers don’t proceed, and reconsider when behavioural remedies may be appropriate (see final CMA link below).
The CMA’s decision in the Vodafone-Three case certainly demonstrates that it is now willing to accept behavioural remedies when there is a regulator in place to support the subsequent monitoring.
It will be interesting to see how this merger affects competition in the mobile phone market and, more generally, whether the CMA starts to implement behavioural remedies more widely, especially in markets where it would have to do all the subsequent monitoring.
Articles
CMA reports, etc
Questions
- Why is it beneficial to have MVNOs in the market for mobile phone services?
- Why is it important that MVNOs have a choice of mobile networks to supply their retail mobile services?
- How do you think the other mobile network operators will react to the Vodafone-Three merger?
- Compare the relative benefits of blocking a merger with requiring merging companies to adopt certain remedies.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the way we live and work, with many of us knowingly or unknowingly using some form of AI daily. Businesses are also adopting AI in increasingly innovative ways. One example of this is the use of pricing algorithms, which use large datasets on market conditions to set prices.
While these tools can drive innovation and efficiency, they can also raise significant competition concerns. Subsequently, competition authorities around the world are dedicating efforts to understanding how businesses are using AI and, importantly, the potential risks its use may pose to competition.
How AI pricing tools can enhance competition
The use of AI pricing tools offers some clear potential efficiencies for firms, with the potential to reduce costs that can potentially translate into lower prices for consumers.
Take, for instance, industries with highly fluctuating demand, such as airlines or hotels. Algorithms can enable businesses to monitor demand and supply in real time and respond more quickly, which could help firms to respond more effectively to changing consumer preferences. Similarly, in industries which have extensive product ranges, like supermarkets, algorithms can significantly reduce costs and save resources that are usually required to manage pricing strategies across a large range of products.
Furthermore, as pricing algorithms can monitor competitors’ prices, firms can more quickly respond to their rivals. This could promote competition by helping prices to reach the competitive level more quickly, to the benefit of consumers.
How AI pricing tools can undermine competition
However, some of the very features that make algorithms effective can also facilitate anti-competitive behaviour that can harm consumers. In economic terms, collusion occurs when firms co-ordinate their actions to reduce competition, often leading to higher prices. This can happen both explicitly or implicitly. Explicit collusion, commonly referred to as illegal cartels, involves firms agreeing to co-ordinate their prices instead of competing. On the other hand, tacit collusion occurs when firms’ pricing strategies are aligned without a formal agreement.
The ability for these algorithms to monitor competitors’ prices and react to changes quickly could work to facilitate collusion, by learning to avoid price wars to maximise long-term profits. This could result in harm to consumers through sustained higher prices.
Furthermore, there may be additional risks if competitors use the same algorithmic software to set prices. This can facilitate the sharing of confidential information (such as pricing strategies) and, as the algorithms may be able to predict the response of their competitors, can facilitate co-ordination to achieve higher prices to the detriment of consumers.
This situation may resemble what is known as a ‘hub and spoke’ cartel, in which competing firms (the ‘spokes’) use the assistance of another firm at a different level of the supply chain (e.g. a buyer or supplier that acts as a ‘hub’) to help them co-ordinate their actions. In this case, a shared artificial pricing tool can act as the ‘hub’ to enable co-ordination amongst the firms, even without any direct communication between the firms.
In 2015 the CMA investigated a cartel involving two companies, Trod Limited and GB Eye Limited, which were selling posters and frames through Amazon (see linked CMA Press release below). These firms used pricing algorithms, similar to those described above, to monitor and adjust their prices, ensuring that neither undercut the other. In this case, there was also an explicit agreement between the two firms to carry out this strategy.
What does this mean for competition policy?
Detecting collusion has always been a significant challenge for the competition authorities, especially when no formal agreement exists between firms. The adoption of algorithmic pricing adds another layer of complexity to detection of cartels and could raise questions about accountability when algorithms inadvertently facilitate collusion.
In the posters and frames case, the CMA was able to act because one of the firms involved reported the cartel itself. Authorities like the CMA depend heavily on the firms involved to ‘whistle blow’ and report cartel involvement. They incentivise firms to do this through leniency policies that can offer firms reduced penalties or even complete immunity if they provide evidence and co-operate with the investigation. For example, GB eye reported the cartel to the CMA and therefore, under the CMA’s leniency policy, was not fined.
But it’s not all doom and gloom for competition authorities. Developments in Artificial Intelligence could also open doors to improved detection tools, which may have come a long way since the discussion in a blog on this topic several years ago. Competition Authorities around the world are working diligently to expand their understanding of AI and develop effective regulations for these rapidly evolving markets.
Articles
Questions
- In what types of markets might it be more likely that artificial intelligence can facilitate collusion?
- How could AI pricing tools impact the factors that make collusion more or less sustainable in a market?
- What can competition authorities do to prevent AI-assisted collusion taking place?