This Christmas, more people are considering giving second-hand (or ‘pre-loved’) goods as presents. This allows them to afford better-quality presents and to save money at a time when a large proportion of the population are finding that their finances are stretched. This continues a trend towards buying second-hand products – a trend driven by the rise of various online retailers, such as Vinted and Preloved, and a growing online presence of charity shops, as well as extensive use of established platforms, such as Facebook Marketplace, eBay, Depop, Gumtree and Nextdoor.
Clearly, people gain from buying and selling second-hand items – part of the ‘circular economy’. But what are the implications for gross domestic product (GDP)? After all, GDP is one of the main indicators of the size of an economy, and growth in GDP is probably the most widely-used measure of economic progress. Are second-hand transactions captured in GDP?
If you directly sell your own second-hand items, this does not count towards GDP. There is no new product being made. The items are only counted when they are first produced. Any service you provide to the purchaser (and to yourself) is in a similar category to housework, childcare, DIY and other services that people provide to themselves, household members and friends. But like such services, there is a strong argument that they should be.
Likewise, the environmental benefits (positive externalities) of recycling products, rather than throwing them away or hoarding them, are not counted. In fact, if reusing products causes fewer new products to be made, this would be counted as subtracting from GDP.
If, however, you set up a business by buying and selling second-hand items, the service you provide would contribute towards GDP. What would be counted would the value added to the product – captured through the difference in the purchase and selling prices. In fact, HMRC has warned people that buying and selling second-hand items is taxable, as it counts as self-employment for tax purposes. But it is only this value added that counts. If you buy an item on Vinted, only the value added by Vinted counts towards GDP.
As no production takes place, the purchase of second-hand items adds either nothing to GDP or just the service of a retailer. It is effectively just a transfer of goods and money. If buying second-hand items means that you buy fewer new ones, then that would cause GDP to fall if the response of firms is to produce fewer newer items. However, the person selling the second-hand items will gain revenue, which could be used to buy new items. If that increased production, that would boost GDP. The net effect on GDP of this transfer of goods and money in the second-hand market will be pretty small.
Yet, clearly, the second-hand market provides a welfare gain to both sellers and purchasers – a gain that is likely to grow as the use of second-hand markets increases. At Christmas time, it provides a timely warning of the limitations of using GDP to measure wellbeing.
Articles
- Giving toys another life with another child
Westmorland & Furness Council, News (18/11/25)
- ‘I make £1,000 a week with charity shop side hustle – I couldn’t afford Christmas without it’
Manchester Evening News, Lee Grimsditch and Hannah Cottrell (3/12/25)
- HMRC issues warning to anyone with money-making ‘side hustle’ ahead of Christmas
Manchester Evening News , Ryan Price (12/11/25)
- 12 tips for a low cost Christmas
Rest Less, Melanie Wright (14/11/25)
- I’ve saved over £100 on my girl’s Christmas gifts & got everything on her list including Disney dolls & Hey Dugee toys
The Sun, Becky Pemberton (25/11/25)
- Circular trade is growing, but will second-hand shopping be visible during the Christmas season?
Finnish Commerce Federation, Press Release (27/11/25)
- Shop secondhand, shred your veg and try ‘furoshiki’ wrapping: 14 easy ways to cut Christmas waste
The Guardian, Hannah Rochell (8/12/25)
- 13 Ways to Have a Sustainable Christmas This Year
Circular&Co., Adam Millett (1/12/23)
- The Role of Circular Economy in Driving Economic Growth: Evidence from EU Countries
Sage Open, Vladimir Radivojević, Tamara Rađenović and Jelena Dimovski (14/11/24)
- How to Have a Circular Economy Christmas: Deck the Halls, Sustainably
50 Shades Greener, Kiri Spanowicz (10/12/24)
- Twelve Economic Impacts of Christmas
City-REDI Blog, Birmingham University, Charlotte Hoole (22/12/16)
- Christmas 2025: Christmas Economics Explained
Plus500 (23/11/25)
Questions
- What other items or activities affecting human wellbeing are not counted in GDP?
- Name some goods and services that are produced, and hence are included in GDP, but which can be classed as ‘bads’.
- For what reasons might a country have a high GDP per capita but a poor average level of wellbeing?
- How might GDP figures be adjusted for international comparison purposes?
- Would it be possible to adjust GDP figures to take account of externalities in production (negative and positive)? If so, how?
- Production involves human costs. To what extent does GDP take this into account?
- What is meant by the circular economy? How might you have a ‘circular’ Christmas?
In my previous blog post on this site, I examined how AI-powered pricing tools can act as a ‘double-edged sword’: offering efficiency gains, while also creating opportunities for collusion. I referred to one of the early examples of this, which was the case involving Trod Ltd and GB Eye, where two online poster and frame sellers on Amazon used pricing algorithms to monitor and adjust their prices. However, in this instance there was also an explicit agreement between the firms. As some commentators put it, it was ‘old wine in new bottles‘, meaning a fairly conventional cartel that was simply facilitated through digital tools.
Since then, algorithms have increasingly become part of everyday life and are now embedded in routine business practice.
Some of the effects may have a positive effect on competition. For example, algorithms can help to lower barriers to entry. In some markets, incumbents benefit from long-standing experience, while new firms face significant learning costs and are at a disadvantage. By reducing these learning costs and supporting entry, algorithms could contribute to making collusion harder to sustain.
On the other hand, algorithms could increase the likelihood of collusion. For example, individual algorithms used by competing firms may respond to market conditions in predictable ways, making it easier for firms to collude tacitly over time.
Algorithms can also improve the ability of firms to monitor each other’s prices. This is particularly relevant for multi-product firms. Traditionally, we might expect these markets to be less prone to collusion because co-ordinating across many products is complex. AI can overcome this complexity. In the Sainsbury’s/Asda merger case, for example, the Competition and Markets Authority suggested that the main barrier to reaching and monitoring a pricing agreement was the complexity of pricing across such a wide range of products. However, the CMA also suggested that technological advances could increase its ability to do so in the future.
The ‘hub-and-spoke’ model
One of the other growing concerns is the ability of AI pricing algorithms to facilitate collusion by acting as a ‘hub’ in a ‘hub-and-spoke’ arrangement. In this type of collusion, competing firms (the ‘spokes’) need not communicate directly with one another. Instead, the ‘hub’ helps them to co-ordinate their actions.
While there have been only limited examples of an AI pricing algorithm acting as a hub in practice, what once seemed to be a largely theoretical concern has now become a live enforcement issue.
A very recent example is the RealPage case in the United States. The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage Inc. in August 2024, alleging that RealPage, acting as the ‘hub’, facilitated collusion between landlords (the ‘spokes’).
RealPage provided pricing software to numerous landlords, including the largest landlord in the USA, which manages around 950 000 rental units across the country. These landlords would normally compete independently in setting rental prices, discounts and lease terms to win consumers. However, by feeding competitively sensitive information that would not usually be shared between rivals into RealPage’s system, the software generated pricing recommendations that, according to the DOJ, led to co-ordinated rent increases across competing apartment complexes.
I
n the RealPage case, the authorities reported that they had access to internal documents and statements from the parties involved, which helped support their allegations. These included references within RealPage to helping landlords ‘avoid the race to the bottom’ and comments from a landlord describing the software as ‘classic price fixing’.
Evidence in these cases really matters because the standard of proof required to establish a hub-and-spoke arrangement is much higher than for traditional cases of explicit collusion. This is because it can be difficult to distinguish between legitimate and anti-competitive communication between retailers and suppliers. Also, proving ‘anti-competitive intent’ is inherently challenging.
Other competition authorities around the world are also turning their attention to these issues. For example, the European Commission recently announced that a number of investigations into algorithmic pricing are underway, signalling a clear shift toward more active scrutiny. As technology continues to advance, it is clear that algorithmic pricing will remain an area where both firms and authorities must move and adapt quickly.
Articles
Questions
- In what ways does the RealPage case differ from the earlier Trod Ltd and GB Eye Ltd case? Consider the roles played by the firms, the nature of the alleged co-ordination, and the extent to which pricing algorithms were used to facilitate the conduct.
- How might the use of pricing algorithms affect the likelihood of firms colluding, either explicitly or tacitly? Consider ways that algorithms may make collusion easier to sustain but also ways in which they may reduce its likelihood.
- Should firms be held liable for anti-competitive outcomes produced by algorithms that ‘self-learn’, even if they did not intend those outcomes? Explain why or why not.
Every year, world leaders gather to find ways of limiting global warming. The latest of these ‘COP’ meetings, COP30, is in Belém, Brazil from 10 to 20 November 2025. COP stands for ‘Conference of the Parties’, the decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Perhaps the best-known of these meetings was in Paris in 2015. This resulted in the Paris Agreement. This is a legally-binding international treaty to limit global warming to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. This would involve reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or taking carbon absorbing measures. All UN countries except for Iran, Libya and Yemen are signatories to the agreement.
However, on coming to office in January 2025, President Trump announced that the USA will withdraw from the agreement in January 2026. Instead, he would prioritise fossil fuel production, under the mantra, ‘drill, baby, drill’. Previously he had claimed that global warming is a hoax concocted by China designed to undermine the competitive power of the USA.
Progress in reducing emissions and mitigating climate change
Since 2020, each country has been required to submit its own emissions-reduction targets, known as ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs), and the actions it will take to meet them. Every five years each country must submit a new NDC more ambitious than the last. New NDCs are due this year. As of 12 November, 112 of the 197 countries had submitted a new NDC (including the USA, China, the EU and the UK). These 112 countries account for around 71 per cent of global emissions.
Implementing all new NDCs would reduce global CO2 emissions by between 15 and 25 per cent from current levels by 2035. But this would merely reduce global warming to around 2.6°C above pre-industrial levels. Approximately 35 per cent emissions reductions by 2035 would be required to restrict global warming to 2°C and 55 per cent to restrict it to 1.5°C.
But implementing the Paris Agreement has still had a high degree of success. Without the action taken and being taken over the past 10 years, it is predicted that global temperatures by 2050 would rise by 3–3.5°C.
Rich countries are expected to provide finance to low-income countries. This is required to help such countries adopt green technologies and to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change (e.g. through irrigation schemes and flood defences). At COP29 in Azerbaijan, the ‘Baku Finance Goal’ was agreed. This is an agreement to provide climate finance of $1.3 trillion per year by 2035 to developing countries from all public and private sources.
The subsequent ‘Baku to Belém Roadmap’ provides a set of suggested actions for governments, financial institutions and the private sector to bridge the gap between current climate finance flows and the $1.3 trillion agreed to meet global climate goals. The roadmap is a central focus of the COP30 conference in Belém, with discussions between countries on how to translate the Baku finance goal into concrete, tangible actions and integrate it into formal decisions.
The role of Donald Trump
As well as announcing that the USA will withdraw from the Paris Agreement in January 2026, since coming to office in 2025, President Trump has given billions of dollars of tax cuts to fossil fuel firms and allowed drilling for oil and gas on federal lands. At the same time, he has described renewable energy as ‘a joke’ that will bankrupt countries and has slashed subsidies and tax breaks for solar and wind power, withdrawn permits for wind and solar farms, and cut funding for green energy research.
He wants the USA to be world leader in fossil fuel energy, calling on governments to buy US oil and gas, threatening some countries with tariffs if they do not. Already, Japan, South Korea and several European countries have agreed to buy huge quantities of US oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). A worry is that other similarly inclined governments, such as Argentina, may roll back on their commitments to a green transition and instead boost their fossil fuel industries.
This gives added urgency to the Belém talks. It is crucial for the rest of the world to stick together in pushing ahead to combat global warming and in adopting and sticking to tough NDCs. It is also crucial for rich countries to support dlow-income countries in adopting climate-friendly investment and in measures to mitigate the effects of global warming.
The economics of climate change
Climate change is directly caused by market failures. One of the most important of these is that the atmosphere is a common resource: it is not privately owned; it is a global ‘commons’. Individuals and firms use it at a zero price. If the price of any good or service to the user is zero, there is no incentive to economise on its use. Thus for the emitter there are no private costs of using the atmosphere in this way as a ‘dump’ for their emissions and, in a free market, no incentive to reduce the climate costs.
And yet when firms emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere there are costs to other people. To the extent that they contribute to global warming, part of these costs will be borne by the residents of that country; but a large part will be borne by inhabitants of other countries.
These climate costs are external costs to the firm and are illustrated in the figure. It shows an industry that emits CO2. To keep the analysis simple, assume that it is a perfectly competitive industry with demand and supply given by curves D and S, which are equal to the marginal private benefits (MPB) and marginal private costs (MPC), respectively. There are no externalities on the demand side and hence MPB equals the marginal social cost (MSB). Market equilibrium is at point a, with output at Qpc and price at Ppc. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)
Assume that the emissions create a marginal cost to society equal to MECc. Assume that the MEC increases as output and total emissions increase. The MECc line is thus upward sloping. At the market price of Qpc, these external climate costs are equal to the purple vertical line. When these external climate costs are added to private costs, this gives a marginal social cost given by MSC = MPC + MECc. The gives a socially optimal level of output of the product of Q* at a price of P*, with the optimum point of c.
In other words, other things being equal, the free market overproduces products with climate externalities. If the output is to be reduced to the social optimum of Q*, then the government will need to take measures such as those advocated in the Paris Agreement. These could include imposing taxes on products, such as electricity generated by fossil fuels, or on the emissions themselves. Or green alternatives, such as wind power, could be subsidised.
Alternatively, regulations could be used to cap the production of products creating emissions, or caps on the emissions themselves could be imposed. Emissions permits could be issued or auctioned. Only firms in possession of the permits would be allowed to emit and the permits would cap emissions below free-market levels. These permits could be traded under a cap-and-trade scheme, such as the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Again, such schemes are advocated under the Paris Agreement.
COP30 and progress in tackling climate change
The USA is not attending COP30 in Brazil. Nor is the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. However, there are growing opportunities for translating aims into practical policies for specific sectors, such as energy, transport and carbon-intensive industries. These policies may require some degree of government action – taxes, subsidies or regulation – to internalise climate externalities. But increasingly, green alternatives are becoming economically viable without subsidies or with just initial government funding to ‘crowd in’ private investment, which will then attract further private capital as external economies of scale kick in. Increasingly investors will find profitable opportunities in climate-friendly projects.
At the same time, while the USA is moving away from climate-friendly investment (as least for the term of the Trump Presidency), China is moving in the opposite direction, with massive investment in solar panels, wind turbines, EVs and batteries – investment that is bringing down their cost and thereby encouraging their adoption around the world. Such technologies create huge opportunities for low-income countries to provide affordable energy and to create local jobs, both skilled and unskilled. It also helps them achieve much greater energy security by reducing their reliance on fossil fuel imports
Chinese advances in green technology are also providing a stimulus to other countries to invest in renewable industries to prevent Chinese dominance. The danger, however, of Chinese dominance in the renewable sector in high-income countries is that it may encourage them to impose tariffs on Chinese imports of EVs, solar panels, etc. to protect their own industries.
But despite the growing opportunities for profitable adoption of green technologies without government support, there is still much that governments need to do to encourage the process. COP meetings are an important forum for discussing such policies and holding governments to account for meeting or not meeting their targets.
The agreement
The agreement reached at the end of the conference marked relatively small progress. There was agreement to increase finance from developed to developing countries to help them adapt to climate change. This would triple to $120bn per year, up from the previously agreed doubling, but the target date was pushed back to 2035 from the previously agreed 2030.
By the end of the conference, 122 of the 197 countries had submitted a new NDC – still 75 countries short, although others are expected.
The conference also agreed to establish a ‘just transition mechanism (JTM)’ to ‘enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing, and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions’. However, this is voluntary and no funding was attached, but it could act as the basis for future funding.
The biggest failure of the conference was probably the lack of agreement on phasing out of fossil fuels. This is not surprising given the opposition of the major oil producers. The hope is that the reduction in costs of renewable energy will drive the process anyway – a process that China is keen to accelerate with its investment in solar power and other renewable energy. One hopeful development, however, was the pledging of more than $9bn to halt deforestation, a major source of global warming. (See the Travers Smith article at the end of the Articles list below for a very useful summary of the outcome.)
Articles
- What is COP30 and why does it matter for the climate?
Chatham House, Anna Åberg (5/9/25)
- COP30 in Brazil: What is at stake for global collaboration on climate and nature?
World Economic Forum, Pim Valdre (5/11/25)
- What is COP30 and why does it matter?
CNN, Laura Paddison (11/11/25)
- Why COP 30 in Brazil Matters for a Thriving Economy and a Safe, Livable Planet
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS),Rachel Cleetus (7/11/25)
- Nationally Determined Contributions: The Action Plans Behind Global Efforts To Fight the Climate Crisis
Center for American Progress (CAP, Kalina Gibson and Courtney Federico (22/9/25)
- New climate pledges only slightly lower dangerous global warming projections
UN Environment Programme, Press Release (4/11/25)
- COP30: Trump and many leaders are skipping it, so does the summit still have a point?
BBC News, Justin Rowlatt (10/11/25)
- Trump dismisses clean energy as ‘a joke.’ But Americans deserve facts, not fear
USA Today, Mark McNees (23/9/25)
- The surprising countries pulling off stunningly fast clean energy transitions
CNN, Ella Nilsen and Samuel Hart (7/11/25)
Could the world’s biggest polluter be its savior against climate change?CNN, Simone McCarthy (17/11/25)
- COP 2025: Outlook and Implications for Investors
RankiaPro, Joanna Piwko, Allegra Ianiri, Marie Lassegnore and Jean-Philippe Desmartin (10/11/25)
Post-agreement
- Belém: yet another cop out
Zero Hour, Allan Gray (25/11/25)
- Cop30’s watered-down agreements will do little for an ecosystem at tipping point
The Guardian, Fiona Harvey, Jonathan Watts, Damien Gayle and Damian Carrington (22/11/25)
- COP30: Five key takeaways from a deeply divisive climate summit
BBC News, Justin Rowlatt and Matt McGrath, (25/11/25)
- COP30: What were the key outcomes?
Travers Smith (1/12/25)
Information and Data
Questions
- Summarise the Paris Agreement.
- Summarise the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.
- What incentives are there for countries to stick to their NCDs?
- Using a diagram similar to that above, illustrate how the free market will produce a sub-optimal amount of solar power because the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal private benefit. How might the calculation be changing?
- How might game theory be used to analyse possible international decision making at COP conferences? How might this be affected by the attitudes of the Trump administration?
- Is it in America’s interests to cease investing in green energy and green production methods?
Examples of rent seeking in economic theory
In March 2024, two people were convicted of running a business that used dishonest and illegal methods to buy and sell tickets for popular live events such as Ed Sheeran, Lady Gaga and Little Mix concerts. Between June 2015 and December 2017, this business purchased 47 000 tickets using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.
Economists refer to these actions as examples of rent seeking. However, many rent-seeking activities are not illegal.
What is rent seeking?
Rent seeking in economic theory refers to costly actions taken by people (i.e. they involve effort and expertise) to try to gain a greater share of a given level of profit /surplus. These actions do not generate any extra surplus or value for society and typically involve people trying to game or manipulate a situation or system for their own personal gain.
In many cases, the opportunity cost of these actions can be considerable. In this case, the opportunity cost is the surplus for society that could have been gained if this effort/expertise had been used to carry out more productive tasks.
A widely cited example of rent seeking is where firms exert time and effort to try to influence government policy through lobbying. Most lobbying activities in the UK are not illegal.
Non-price allocation
When prices are set below the market-clearing rate, by either the government or a private organisation, the quantity demanded of the good/service will exceed the quantity supplied. Therefore, non-price allocation must play a role. In other words, some method other than willingness to pay the price, must be used to determine which consumers receive the goods.
In some instances, such as visits to the GP or places at state schools, the good or service has a zero monetary price. In these cases. non-price allocation methods completely replace the role of the price in determining which consumers obtain the goods/services.
In other examples, a positive monetary price is set, but below the market-clearing rate. In these cases, the price partly determines who get the good/service (i.e. people must be willing to pay the non-market-clearing price), but non-price allocation also plays a role. The further below the market-clearing level the price is set, the greater the potential role for non-price methods.
Some common methods of non-price allocation include:
- First-come first served. This typically results in some type of queueing, either in person or online (a virtual queue).
- A random selection process. For example, some goods/services are allocated via a lottery, with names of consumers being randomly drawn.
- The government or other public bodies in charge of allocating the good develop a set of rules to determine which consumers/people get the good. For example, when allocating places at popular state schools, priority is often given to children who live close to the school (i.e. in the catchment area) or who live in families with certain religious beliefs.
Examples of rent seeking
When non-price methods of allocation are implemented, can consumers engage in activities that increase their chances of getting hold of the good/service? Can they manipulate the system for their own advantage and gain a greater share of any surplus? This is rent seeking.
A survey carried out in January 2025 provides some interesting evidence of rent-seeking actions taken by parents to try to secure a place for their child at a popular school. Twenty-seven per cent of the respondents admitted they had tried to manipulate the system to get their child into their preferred school. Out of those who admitted attempting to manipulate the system:
- 30 per cent registered a child at either another family member’s or friend’s address that was closer to a popular school.
- 25 per cent exaggerated religious beliefs and attended church services to try to secure a school place.
- 9 per cent temporarily rented a second home inside the catchment area for the school.
- 7 per cent moved into the catchment area for the application, only to move out once their child’s place was secured.
Some of these actions may be dishonest but are not illegal.
Rent-seeking activities in the ticketing market for live events
In the primary market for tickets, prices for popular live events are often set below market-clearing levels. Therefore, non-price methods, such as first come, first served, are used to allocate the tickets. This typically results in some type of queueing. Rent-seeking activities include actions taken by consumers to increases their chances of getting nearer to the front of the queue.
If the tickets are being sold from a physical outlet (i.e. a sales kiosk), then some consumers may start queueing many hours before the kiosk opens – in some cases camping overnight. An example is the ‘The Queue’ for Wimbledon tennis matches. Rather than queueing themselves, some people might pay others to queue on their behalf.
People who are paid to queue are sometimes referred to as a ‘line stander’, ‘queue stander’, ‘line sitter’ or ‘queue professional’. Line standers offer their services via market platforms, such as TaskRabbit.
When tickets are sold online, non-market allocation includes both queuing and random selection. Typically, people have to create an account with the primary market ticketing website (Ticketmaster, See Tickets, Eventbrite or AXS) before the sale begins. Then, using this account, they can enter an online waiting room around 15 minutes before the tickets are available to purchase. There is thus an element of first come, first served. When the sale starts, people in the waiting room are randomly allocated a place in the online queue. Once they reach the front of the online queue, the event organiser normally places limits on the number of tickets they can purchase.
What can people do to manipulate this system and so increase their chances of purchasing tickets? In other words, what are the possible rent-seeking activities? One possibility is to create multiple accounts using the details of friends/family and then join the waiting room with each of these accounts using separate devices. Professional resellers often try to use specialist software, called bots, that can create thousands of fake accounts and so significantly increase the chances of getting to the front of the queue. Once they get to the front of the queue, an account created by a bot can proceed through the purchasing process much faster than a person can. The tickets can then be sold for a profit in the uncapped secondary market via websites such as Stubhub and Viagogo.
The UK government passed a law in 2017 that made the use of bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits an illegal activity. The use of ticket bots in the EU became illegal in 2022. Primary market ticketing websites have also invested in technology that tries to detect and block the use of this type of software.
Government policy in the resale of tickets
Should the government prohibit the resale of tickets or implement a resale price cap to try to deter this rent-seeking activity?
Many economists would oppose this policy because of the benefits of the secondary market. For example, resale helps to reallocate tickets to those consumers with the highest willingness to pay. Therefore, the secondary-ticketing market can have a positive impact on allocative efficiency, but it comes at a cost – rent-seeking activities.
Research by economists published more than ten years ago found that the positive impact of the resale market on allocative efficiency outweighed the rent-seeking costs. However, developments in technology have increased the level of rent seeking in recent years, making it easier and less costly for professional resellers to purchase large amounts of tickets in the primary market. Therefore, it is possible that the rent-seeking cost of the secondary market now exceeds its positive impact on allocative efficiency. A case can thus be made for greater intervention by the government.
Recent accusations have also been made about possible rent-seeking activities by sellers in the primary ticketing market too, adding to concerns.
Some of the problems of implementing a resale price cap were discussed in a previous post: Ticket resales – is it time to introduce a price cap?
Articles
- Admission Impossible: Over a quarter of parents admit to ‘lying or bending’ rules to get their children into preferred schools
Zoopla (23/1/25)
- Diss ticket touts convicted in £6.5m reselling scheme
BBC News, Norfolk, Orla Moore & PA Media (13/3/24)
- These touts made millions – and claimed staff at big ticketing firms helped
BBC News, Chi Chi Izundu and James Stewart (12/6/25)
- Touts employ overseas workers to bulk-buy gig tickets
BBC News, Steffan Powell, Sian Vivian & Ben Summer (26/6/25)
- Online ticket touts jailed for fraud
National Trading Standards, News (17/5/24)
- Resale and Rent-Seeking: An Application to Ticket Markets
Review of Economic Studies, Phillip Leslie and Alan Sorensen (2014, 81, pp. 266–300)
- Ticketmaster, Live Nation face US suit over resale tactics
BBC News, Danielle Kaye (18/9/25)
Information
Questions
- Compare and contrast the meaning of the word ‘rent’ in everyday language with its use in economic theory.
- Give examples of some policies that a business might lobby the government to implement. What arguments might the business make to justify each of these policies?
- Outline some of the non-price methods that are used to allocate health care in the UK.
- Draw a demand and supply diagram to illustrate the incentives for rent-seeking activities when prices are set below market-clearing levels.
- Outline some potential rent-seeking activities by sellers in the primary ticketing market.
- Discuss some of the opportunity costs of rent-seeking activity in the market for tickets.
- Explain why the growing use of paid line standers might increase the demand for a good/service.
- Explain why the percentage of tickets for popular live events purchased by professional resellers has increased in the past 10 years.
Following the controversary over the sale of tickets for popular live events such as Taylor Swift’s Eras tour and the Oasis Live ’25 Tour, the government launched a consultation exercise in January 2025 on the resale of tickets. Titled, ‘putting fans first’, the exercise sought the views of individuals and organisations on a range of policy proposals. One of these was the implementation of a cap on the resale price of tickets.
The government is not only considering whether to implement a cap but also the level at which it might be set. The following question was included in the consultation exercise.
What is the maximum uplift that you think should be applied if ticket resales were to be subject to a price cap? Please state the reason for your selection.
• no uplift at all
• 10% or less
• between 10 and 20%
• between 20 and 30%
• other – please state
Some platforms such as Twickets and Ticketswap already cap resale prices on their platforms at between 5 and 10 per cent above the face value of the ticket. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by any new price regulation unless the ‘no uplift at all’ option is chosen. On other platforms, such as Viagogo and Stubhub, resellers are free to list tickets at whatever price they choose. This is often referred to as the uncapped market, and tickets for the Oasis tour with a face value of £150 were listed on these websites for £14 000. The implementation of a price cap is likely to have a big impact on this part of the resale market. The chief executive of StubHub stated in June 2025 that the business would probably have to exit the UK if a cap was introduced.
Although many fans dislike the uncapped secondary ticketing market, most economists take a more positive view. They see them as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial trade and helping to reallocate tickets to those with the highest willingness to pay. This reduces levels of allocative inefficiency/deadweight welfare loss in the market.
Economists also tend to argue against the use of price controls in competitive markets because of their negative impact on supply. If price controls reduce the available returns to sellers, they have an incentive to do something else with their time/resources i.e. switch to supplying other goods and services in markets not subject to price controls. This reduces supply in the regulated market and so could have a negative impact on consumer surplus.
What are the issues with the secondary market?
Given the benefits outlined by economists of having an uncapped secondary ticketing, why is the government considering the implementation of a price cap? One potential issue of having an uncapped secondary ticketing market is that developments in technology make it easier for professional resellers to buy very large quantities of tickets. This makes it increasingly difficult for fans who want to attend the event from being able to purchase a ticket.
Reports also suggest that professional resellers use illegal methods to both mass purchase and resell tickets. For example, to overcome any limits on sales imposed by the sellers in the primary market, some use automated software, fake IDs and multiple credit cards. Two people convicted of fraudulent trading in 2024 were found to have bought 47 000 tickets over a 212-year period, using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.
Some resellers have also acted in ways that do not comply with consumer law when advertising tickets for sale. For example, not providing information such as the ticket number and other details about where the seat is located i.e. the block/area and row.
These rent seeking activities by professional resellers could outweigh the positive impact of uncapped secondary market on allocative efficiency.
Implementing a resale price cap would reduce the incentives for professional resellers to purchase large quantities of tickets and engage in these rent-seeking activities. However, in the consultation document the government recognises that the implementation of a resale price cap would be a ‘significant and complex intervention’.
An important implementation issue
To calculate the resale price cap for any live event, the original price of the ticket in the primary market needs to be known. This raises an interesting question – should the cap apply to the initial face value of the ticket or the total price the customer pays?
The face value of the ticket may only represent a proportion of the actual cost of buying a ticket because of the widespread use of drip pricing. This is the practice of applying additional fees as the consumer proceeds through the online purchasing process. These fees can sometimes add around 25 per cent and more to the price of a ticket. In the consultation document, the government suggested that the cap should apply to the face value of the ticket plus all compulsory fees.
One issue raised in the response to the consultation by the Competition and Markets Authority is that these fees are not always made clear by sellers in the primary market in a clear and transparent way. Therefore, for the policy to be effective, primary market sellers would have to make information on both ticket prices and any fees clearly and easily available. Recent changes to the law that prohibit drip pricing might help to address this issue.
The potential impact of a resale price cap on fraud
To avoid the price cap, there is a danger that increasing numbers of buyers and sellers stop using capped secondary ticket platforms, where activity is easier to observe/regulate, and switch to other non-specialist platforms where detection of illegal behaviour and enforcement of consumer law is more difficult. Examples of non-specialist platforms where sales might increasingly take place include Facebook Marketplace, Instagram Shop, X (formerly Twitter) and internet forums. With lower levels of consumer protection and the greater difficulty of detecting illegal behaviour, sales via these non-specialist platforms are more vulnerable to scams and fraud.
When referring to the impact of a resale price cap, the chief executive of StubHub argued that:
It will have a massive negative impact on consumers. It’s not like the demand is going to go away, it’s just going to move somewhere else, and that somewhere else is going to be the black market [where] consumers aren’t protected.
To test the hypothesis that price controls lead to greater incidences of fraud, one study used polling data to compare ticket fraud rates in the UK with Victoria, Australia and Ireland. In 2009, the state government of Victoria made it illegal for tickets to be resold for more than 10 per cent of their face, while the Irish government introduced the Sale of Ticket Act in 2021 that prohibited the resale of tickets above their original price. The study found that the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of ticket fraud over the previous two years was around four times higher in Victoria and Ireland than the UK. The most common sales channel where consumers experienced ticket fraud in all three countries were social media platforms.
Another example of the potential impact of the price cap in Ireland on fraud relates to the first ever regular-season NFL game that is being played in Dublin on 28 September 2025 between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Minnesota Vikings. The online bank, Revolut, reported an 80 per cent increase in the number of ticket scams when tickets for this game went on sale.
In response to the consultation exercise, the Competition and Markets Authority backed the implementation of a resale price. It will be interesting to see if the government goes through with the measure in the next few months.
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Questions
- Why might event organisers set ticket prices below the market clearing rate? Illustrate the impact of setting prices below market clearing rates on consumer, producer and total surplus in the primary market for tickets.
- Using a demand and supply diagram, explain how the uncapped secondary ticket market could reduce deadweight welfare loss. Discuss any assumptions you have made about the allocation of tickets among potential buyers in the primary market (i.e. sorting).
- Is it possible for professional resellers to continue making a profit if tickets are sold at market clearing rates in the primary market? Explain your answer.
- Under what circumstances would a maximum price set below the market clearing rate in a competitive market have a negative impact on consumer surplus? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
- Using examples, explain what is meant by ‘rent seeking’ in economic theory.
Outline some of the recent updates to the law on pricing information that businesses must show customers.
- What policies, other than a resale price cap, could the government introduce to try to address some of the issues with the ticketing market for live events?