There are seven Indian airlines: state-owned Air India and six private carriers. Since the onset of recession they have all been making losses and were considering a one-day ‘strike’ when services would be removed. The aim was to force the Indian government to reduce fuel and airport taxes.
Do the losses suggest that there is overcapacity in the Indian airline market? Does it matter if, during the current recession, some airlines go out of business? Are bankruptcies necessary if the surviving carriers are to be stimulated to make cost savings and are to achieve sufficient economies of scale? Or should governments offer support to struggling airlines? Is oligopoly the best market structure for such an industry and, if so, how can collusion be avoided? The following articles consider these questions.
How many airlines do we need? Business Line (The Hindu) (4/8/09)
Indian airlines call off Aug 18 strike Forbes (3/8/09)
When corporations capture the state Rediff Business (7/8/09) (see middle part of article)
Blaming everyone else Indian Express (3/8/09)
India’s air carriers spin loss riddle Asia Times Online (8/8/09)
A strategic vision for Indian aviation The Economic Times (8/8/09)
Flight to value The Economist (6/8/09)
Federation of Indian Airlines
Questions
- Describe the features of the market structure in which Indian airlines operate.
- Is the Federation of Indian Airlines a cartel?
- Should (a) any; (b) all Indian airlines be given government support, and, if so, what form should the support take? Should Air India be treated differently from the other Indian airlines? Explain your answer.
- Is it in Air India’s long-term interests to embark on a price war with the other Indian airlines?
- Is oligopoly necessarily the optimal market structure for a capital-intensive industry?
The large bonuses received by bankers, often amounting to more than a million pounds, have been contentious for many years. With the banking crisis and subsequent recession, and with both public and government outrage at the size of the bonuses, many thought that the days of such bonuses were over. But such is not the case. “There has been public disquiet that leading banks – which have been seen as a major cause of the financial crisis – have been receiving taxpayer funds, but are not prepared to change their traditional culture of awarding big bonuses to key staff.”
The following articles look at what has been happening to senior bankers’ remuneration in recent months. But what are the market conditions that allow such rewards to continue? Are they a reflection of the marginal productivity of bankers or of their market power, or what?
RBS to keep paying bonuses despite 1bn first-half loss Telegraph (7/8/09)
Lloyds chief plans bonuses for ‘spectacular job’ in making £4bn loss Telegraph (6/8/09)
CS toxic bonuses are up 17%, but gains can’t be realised for four years eFinancial Careers (7/8/09)
Banks: Look, don’t touch Guardian (8/8/09)
Analysis: The plan’s the thing Times Online (7/8/09)
Cutting our bonuses would hit the taxpayer, says RBS Citywire (7/8/09)
France targets bankers’ bonuses BBC News (7/8/09)
Sarkozy weighs into debate over banker bonuses after BNP Paribas compensation sparks anger Los Angeles Times (7/8/09)
Knotting the purse-strings The Economist (6/8/09)
Pay and politics The Economist (6/8/09)
Questions
- Explain why many senior bankers have continued to receive huge bonuses. To what extent is oligopoly theory relevant to your explanation?
- To what extent do the size of the bonuses reflect senior bankers’ contributions to (a) the productivity and (b) the profits of their bank?
- If bankers are to be paid bonuses, what is the best form for these bonuses to take? Consider the incentive effects in your answer.
- Should bankers’ bonuses be regulated and, if so, what criteria should regulators use for determining the acceptable size of bonuses?
On July 8 the UK government published its long-awaited White Paper on reform of the system of banking regulation. Several commentators had called for the abolition of the ‘tripartite’ system of regulation, whereby responsibility for ensuring the stability and security of the banking system is shared between the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England and the Treasury. Some have advocated a considerable strengthening of the role of the Bank of England and even abolishing the FSA. What is generally agreed is that there needs to be ‘macro-prudential’ regulation that looks at the whole banking system and at questions of systemic risk and not just at individual banks. Several of the articles below debate this issue.
The government’s White Paper proposes keeping the tripartite system but also strengthening various aspects of regulation. Amongst other things, it proposes giving the FSA powers to ‘penalise banks if their pay policies create unnecessary risks and are not focused on the long-term strength of their institutions’. It also proposes setting up a ‘new Council for Financial Stability – made up of the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury – to meet regularly and report on the systemic risks to financial stability’. Banks would also be required to increase their capital adequacy ratios. The first two articles below give an outline of the proposals. The detailed proposals are contained in the third link, to the Treasury site.
Chancellor moves to rein in ‘risky’ banks Independent (9/7/09)
Banks to face tougher regulation BBC News (8/7/09)
Reforming financial markets HM Treasury (8/7/09)
Treasury sees devil in the detail Financial Times (7/7/09)
How to police the banking system Independent (8/7/09)
City regulation: a quick guide Telegraph (8/7/09)
Treasury White Paper: what it means for the financial services industry Telegraph (8/7/09)
Key issues: Financial regulation BBC News (8/7/09)
Alistair Darling accuses banks of ‘kamikaze’ attitude to loans Telegraph (5/7/09)
HSBC boss on banking reform BBC News video (3/7/09)
Bankers ‘want to be proud of what they do’ BBC Today Programme, Radio 4 (7/7/09)
Divisions on display at Mansion House BBC Newsnight video (18/6/09)
Who should supervise the banks? BBC Newsnight video (18/6/09)
Governor wants more bank powers BBC News video (17/6/09)
King puts spotlight on banks too big to fail Times Online (21/6/09)
Mervyn King: Banks cannot be too big to fail Edmund Conway blog, Telegraph (17/6/09)
The City doesn’t need any more rules Telegraph (6/7/09)
Treasury admits ‘intellectual failure’ behind credit crisis Telegraph (8/7/09)
Bankers to face draconian pay veto Times Online (8/7/09)
Questions
- What do you understand by macro-prudential regulation? What would be the difficulties of applying regulation at this level?
- Why may liquidity ratios and capital adequacy ratios that are deemed appropriate by individual banks be inappropriate for the banking system as a whole?
- If banks are too big to fail, why does this create a moral hazard?
- Examine the case for splitting universal banks into retail banks and investment banks.
- Examine the arguments for and against regulating the level and nature of remuneration of senior bank executives.
The east coast mainline from London to Edinburgh is a ‘premium route’. This means that it is one of the lines in the UK that is profitable. When the franchises come up for renewal on such lines, potential operators bid to pay the government for the franchise. National Express won the eight-year franchise in 2007 for a total of £1.4 billion, paid in annual rising instalments.
Although the east coast mainline is still profitable, the recession has meant that passenger numbers have been insufficient for National Express to make its annual payments to the Department for Transport and still be left with a profit. As a result, the government will take the franchise into public ownership later this year. This specially created nationalised company will then operate trains on the route until a new franchise is awarded to a private company at the end of 2010.
So why has this proved necessary? Is it all down do the depth of the recession? Or was the £1.4 billion cost of the franchise unrealistically expensive? Would the answer be for National Express to merge with another operator, such as the First Group? Or should the government be prepared to waive, or at least reduce, the franchise payments until passenger numbers are growing fast enough? Or is it time to rethink the whole UK model of rail privatisation and perhaps return to a nationalised rail system? The articles below consider the issues.
National Express loses East Coast line Independent (2/7/09)
National Express goes off the rails on east coast line Times Online (4/7/09)
Q&A: the future of National Express and the east coast mainline rail service Guardian (1/7/09)
East Coast main line: Q&A Telegraph (2/7/09)
Runaway train: The crisis in the rail sector Scotsman (5/7/09)
First Group sets sights on East Coast Business7 (3/7/09)
National Express’s decision to quit East Coast franchise is a lose-lose for nearly everyone Telegraph (4/7/09)
Focus turns to rail franchise system Financial Times (2/7/09)
Rail network: red signals ahead Guardian (2/7/09)
Have we reached the end of the line for privatisation? Observer (5/7/09)
Privatisation has been a train wreck: Ken Livingstone Guardian (2/7/09)
New Capitalism: Old Capitalism except taxpayer money is at risk: Iain Macwhirter Sunday Herald (5/7/09)
Questions
- Consider the relative merits of temporary nationalisation of the east coast mainline services with providing temporary support for National Express.
- Should profitable rail franchises be awarded to the highest bidder? Similarly, should loss-making franchises be awarded to companies bidding for the lowest subsidy?
- Discuss the arguments for and against a complete re-nationalisation of the railways.
- With reference to the final article above, explain what is meant by a Special Purpose Vehicle and whether it was an appropriate means for National Express to fund its £1.4 billion franchise. What dangers are associated with this and other new forms of ‘no-risk capitalism’? Is there a ‘moral hazard’ in this form of capitalism?
Setanta is a sports broadcaster that emerged from an Irish dance hall in West London in the 1990s. Since 2004 it has grown rapidly, acquiring major sporting rights and acting as something of a rival to Sky. However, Setanta has now gone into administration following the collapse of talks with a US investor, its failure to pay a number of sporting organisations and the loss of its English Premier League games. Having less than 60% of the annual subscribers needed, and competing against Sky, it is hardly surprising that this broadcaster has now exited the industry. But, what are the reasons behind this collapse? Marketing, advertising, pricing, the recession or dominance by its competitors? What will be the impact of this bankruptcy on its employees, the Pay TV market, sporting organisations and its customers?
Offer made for stake in Setanta BBC News (12/6/09)
Troubled sports channel stops broadcasting CBBC Newsround (24/6/09)
Setanta goes off air with loss of more than 200 jobs Guardian, James Robinson, Leigh Holmwood (23/6/09)
Blavatnik offers Setanta lifeline BBC News, Robert Peston (12/6/09)
Last-ditch effort to save Setanta BBC News (9/6/09)
Football’s minnows braced to take full force of Setanta collapse Guardian, Owen Gibson (24/6/09)
UFC: After Setanta divorce where now: Bravo, Viring, Channel 5 or Sky? Telegraph, Gareth Davies (23/6/09)
Setanta sports taken off air in Britain Times Online, Dan Sabbagh (23/6/09)
Questions
- How was Setanta able to expand so quickly? Is this part of the reason for its failure?
- Premium content, such as Premier League matches, is already dominated by BSkyB. What does the collapse of Setanta mean for the structure of the Pay TV market?
- What reasons could explain Setanta’s inability to attract sufficient subscribers? Is its collapse a consequence of the recession, or are there other factors? What are they?
- Who will lose out from Setanta’s bankruptcy? Think about all those connected with Setanta. What will happen to the Scottish Premier League, which has paid the SPL clubs out of its own pocket? Will it get this money back?
- Do you think there were any other options open in a bid to rescue Setanta? If Ofcom had stepped in to regulate the industry, would it have made a difference?