Rising costs of cloth and a rise in VAT could mean that clothes prices are set to rise. Does this spell the end of cheap fashion from the likes of Primark and H&M? Or can they absorb the cost increases?
The following articles look at the causes of the rise in costs of clothing and what the cheap fashion chains can do about it.
Articles
Primark follows fashion rivals as it warns of rising costs Guardian, David Teather and Zoe Wood (13/9/10)
Primark warns on costs as growth slows Telegraph, James Hall (14/9/10)
Is this the end of cheap clothes era? Price of cotton has rocketed because of floods, Primark warns Mail Online, Sean Poulter (14/9/10)
Fashion chains far from cheerful about future of cheap chic Observer, Zoe Wood, David Teather and Julia Finch (19/9/10)
Data
Commodity prices (including cotton) Index Mundi
Cotton futures BBC Business: Commodities
Questions
- Why have cotton prices been rising? Illustrate your arguments with a demand and supply diagram.
- Would you expect a rise in the price of cotton of 45% to lead to a rise in the price of cotton clothes of 45%, or of more than 45% or of less than 45%? Explain.
- For what other reasons are the prices of clothing rising?
- How did the process of globalisation keep the price of clothing down?
- Next’s chief executive, Lord (Simon) Wolfson said that if prices of Next’s clothes go up 8% then the number of units sold will fall by 10%. What is the value of the price elasticity of demand that he is assuming?
- Why is the ‘Fairtrade system so important’?
- “Some retailers have already increased prices but there is more to come. The products most under threat are T-shirts, underwear and socks. More complicated garments such as heavy jeans will be less affected.” Why are the prices of more complicated garments likely to rise by a smaller percentage than those of simple garments?
- What has been happening to the demand for cheap fashion clothing and why? Combine this effect with those of costs on a demand and supply diagram.
- What type of market structure is the market for fashion clothing? What are the implications of this for the profits of retailers?
The market for food in the UK is highly competitive. From dining in style to a simple take-away, one of the key words when it comes to dining seems to be choice. Competitive prices and high quality are on offer, which is largely due to the sheer number of restaurants available to consumers. However, consolidation seems to be on the menu.
Nando’s is a well known restaurant and a popular eating destination on UK and Irish high streets, with more than 230 restaurants. This chicken restaurant group has made a £30 million bid for Clapham House, the company behind the Gourmet Burger Kitchen chain with 53 branches. Clapham’s shareholders were advised to accept the deal and on the 17th September 2010, it is reported that a deal was reached with Nando’s Group Holdings and its private equity owner Capricorn Ventures International. The 74 pence per share deal was met with disappointment by some analysts, who felt that the company was under-valued, despite failed attempts by Clapham House’s Board to persuade Capricorn to raise the offer price or find an alternative bidder.
The restaurant industry has suffered from the recession and especially by the weak economic recovery, so perhaps lower valuations are to be expected. Nando’s said:
‘As macroeconomic weakness has persisted in the UK, the trading environment for restaurant businesses in the UK has been difficult. This is evidenced by Clapham House’s vaolatile weekly trading performance.’
Nando’s intend to invest significantly in Clapham Houses’ businesses to reinvigorate their previous competitor. This may be essential, given the expectation that conditions in the UK will remain fragile, with consumer confidence staying low, as well as a somewhat untimely rise in VAT in January next year, which is almost certain to have an adverse effect on the restaurant business.
This take-over deal is not the first in the restaurant industry and nor is it likely to be the last, as the UK economy remains in a vulnerable state. The following articles look at this and over takeovers.
Nando’s to buy Gourmet Burger Kitchen for £30m BBC News (17/9/10)
UK restaurants serve up £50m in takeover deals Management Today, Emma Haslett (17/9/10)
Nando’s swallows Gourmet Burger Daily Mirror News, Clinton Manning (18/9/10)
GBK team plots next move after Nandos deal Telegraph, Jonathan Sibun (18/9/10)
Nando’s to buy Real Greek chain for £30m Independent, Alistair Dawber (18/9/10)
Mithcells & Butlers and Nando’s to feast on rival restaurant chains Mail Online, Ben Laurance (17/9/10)
GBK owner Clapham agrees to Nando’s offer Reuters (17/9/10)
Questions
- What type of takeover is Nando’s purchase of Clapham House?
- Why has the weak macroeconomic environment adversely affected the restaurant industry? What might be the impact of next January’s rise in VAT?
- Will Nando’s takeover (or indeed any other takeover in the restaurant industry) allow the company to prosper from the weak economic climate?
- In which type of market structure would you place the restaurant industry in the UK? Explain the characteristics of the market structure you choose and why you have placed the restaurant industry in it.
- How was the finance for the deal raised by Nando’s Holdings Group? What other sources of finance are available to firms for this purpose? What are the (a) advantages and (b) disadvantages of each?
- What other takeovers have occurred recently in the restaurant industry? What types of takeovers are they?
Later this afternoon I’ll be going down to watch my beloved Leicester City. Our first home match drew a crowd of just over 21,500. This was perhaps a little disappointing for the first home match of the season. Normally, supporters’ spirits are high are the start of the season, we all go down to the ground with renewed optimism, and so ‘first match’ crowds are high. But, this year a number had not come along and the problem was not confined to my club. Just down the road in Coventry, their first match against fellow Midlanders Derby County drew a crowd of only a little over 13,000. While this match was televised by SKY, the attendance is likely to have disappointed many at this historic club. Up by the River Tees, Midllesbrough’s first home match drew a record low league crowd of 14,633 and led manager Gordon Strachan to blame poor crowds on the recession. But, while some clubs are struggling to get supporters through the turnstiles, others seemed rather more immune from the affects of the economic climate. Manchester United’s first home match drew a near-capacity 75,221, despite being a televised match on a Monday night, while Arsenal’s first home match against newly promoted Blackpool drew a capacity crowd of 60,032.
These contrasting experiences amongst football clubs raise some important questions about the nature of demand for attending football matches. Perhaps a good place to start for any chief executive thinking about the demand for their club’s matches is to actually step back and consider about how supporters derive satisfaction from attending matches. This satisfaction from consuming something is also known by economists as ‘utility’. In understanding how supporters derive utility clubs may gain some really useful information when pricing season tickets or match-day tickets.
Well, let’s start with me! I am a fox (a Leicester supporter) through and through and so it’s about an emotional attachment. I was first taken down to Filbert Street by Grandfather in the early 1980s. We were soundly beaten on the day by Notts County on the day. But, while I was gutted, I was supporting my team! I derive a lot of my satisfaction from supporting my home-town team. I guess that makes me what we might term a ‘core supporter’. It’s important for clubs to have a sense of their core support because these are likely to be supporters who are least sensitive to pricing. In other words, this group of supporters is more likely to exhibit a price inelastic demand.
So, a happy chief executive of a football club is likely to be one with a sizeable core support. Another way of looking at this, which is not always popular amongst football traditionalists, is to think of a football club as a brand. A popular, sought-after brand gives the supplier a greater degree of power over pricing. The greater the attachment to the brand the greater the power to set price. While for me the attachment comes from the geography of my birth, for others the attachment comes from being associated with success. This helps to explain the attachment of so many supporters to what we refer to as ‘the big clubs’. Therefore, success can help generate supporter-attachment which can therefore be ‘priced-in’ by clubs when determining the pricing structure for matches and season tickets.
But, not everybody is attached to a team out of loyalty to their town or city or because of its success. For others, the utility from attending matches could come from a variety of sources. A ‘floating supporter’ is therefore likely to be more choosey and pricing needs to try and take this into account. For these supporters it might be a question of who the two teams on show are on a particular day. This helps, in part, to understand why local derbies are generally well attended – but why they are also relatively expensive to attend. It might also be the case that particular matches allow supporters to see a ‘superstar’. If a certain player or club is in town then prices at the turnstiles are likely to reflect this.
What we have suggested here is that in beginning to understand the demand for attending football matches, clubs need to build up a profile of their supporters and their potential supporters. We have focused on how supporters derive satisfaction from watching football and how this affects what they are willing to pay. Yet they need to do more than this, including building up a profile of the economic, social and geographic demographics of supporters. As Gordon Strachan points out, supporters are not immune to economic conditions and football clubs can’t be either. Therefore, clubs will also need to have a sense of how income-sensitive is the demand for attending their matches. The economic climate means that many in football, especially those at clubs involved in setting prices, may need to give considerable thought to the demand function for attending live football matches. May be an economist really could help in the board rooms of many football clubs. While I may not make the board room at the Walkers Stadium later, I will be in the crowd!
Articles
Boro boss Strachan blames recession for poor crowds BBC News (22/8/10)
Premier League fun for all – at a cost BBC Sport, Matt Slater’s Blog (27/8/10)
Inside football with Rob Tanner: Where have all the fans gone Leicester Mercury, Rob Tanner (27/8/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by term ‘utility’? Think of any two products or services and draw up a list of how you derive utility from them?
- What do you understand by the terms ‘price elasticity of demand’ and ‘income elasticity of demand’? Try applying these concepts to the demand to attend matches at any two football clubs that you might be aware of.
- Are football clubs price-takers or price-makers when determining match prices? Is this true of all clubs?
- Imagine that a club is promoted to the top league in its country for the first ever time. How will this affect the position and slope of its demand curve for season tickets?
The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:
The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.
“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.
Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)
European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)
Questions
- Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
- Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
- Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
- Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?
Whilst a new version of Windows may make the headlines, it’s not Windows that is the main source of profit for Microsoft: it’s Office, with it’s suite of appplications – Word for word processing, Excel for spreadsheets, PowerPoint for presentations, Access for databases, FrontPage for web pages and Outlook for e-mail. But Office is under threat from two sources.
First, despite that fact that Microsoft’s share of the office applications market has remained fairly constant at around 94%, it is facing increased competition from free alternatives, such as Google docs and Google Apps, and OpenOffice from Oracle (see also).
Second, the demands of users are changing. With the growing use of social networking and file sharing, and with a more mobile and dispersed workforce, Microsoft Office needs to adapt to this new environment.
With the launch of Office 2010, these issues are being addressed. The following articles examine what Microsoft has done and whether it is a good business model
Microsoft Office 2010 takes aim at Google Docs BBC News (11/5/10)
Office 2010: banking on Apps Sydney Morning Herald, David Flynn (11/5/10)
Microsoft’s two-pronged strategy for Office 2010 BBC News, Tim Weber (12/5/10)
Revamped Microsoft Office Will Be Free on the Web New York Times, Ashlee Vance (11/5/10)
Microsoft Predicts Fastest-Ever Adoption of New Office Software Bloomberg Businessweek, Dina Bass (12/5/10)
Questions
- Discuss the business logic of giving away products free.
- Discuss the likely success of Microsoft’s response to the changing market conditions for office applications software.
- Explain what is meant by ‘cloud computing’. What opportunities does this provide to Microsoft and what are the threats?
- What is meant by ‘network economies’? How do these benefit Microsoft? How is Sharepoint relevant here?
- Are network economies likely to increase or decrease for Microsoft in the future?