Will we soon live in a world without cash? More and more payments are being made electronically: whether by credit card or debit card, or by direct debit or bank transfer, or by cash loaded cards. For many people cash is now largely used only for small transactions.
But even here, things are changing. Direct transfers via mobile phone apps are increasingly being used for small transactions. Mobile phone companies, banks and others are busy developing such apps and more and more are being released onto the market.
And it’s not just in developed countries. Many developing countries are finding that mobile phones are an ideal way of transferring money for a whole range of transactions. For example, in Kenya, under 20% have a formal bank account, only 1% have a landline and yet more than 70% have a mobile phone, and this percentage is still rising. In 2007, a system known as M-Pesa (see also) was launched:
The user can create a free account and deposit money into it for free with registered agents at retail outlets. They may be gas stations, supermarkets, banks or micro-finance providers or small and medium-sized businesses. No minimum account balance is required.
The user can then transfer up to $440 from the account to someone else — including someone who doesn’t have a cellphone. The recipient provides identification and picks up the cash from another registered agent.
Users can deposit and withdraw cash, pay water and electricity bills, pay their children’s school fees, get paid by their employers or buy extra airtime for their phone.
Other developing countries are introducing similar systems. The second webcast link below gives an example from South Africa.
So how long will it be before cash disappears as a medium of exchange? Or will people continue to prefer to carry cash around with them – especially given the convenience of having cash machines readily available which do not charge for use.
Webcasts
Life in a cashless society BBC News Magazine, David Wolman (14/6/12)
FNB Introduces Cashless Payment App ABNDigital on YouTube (14/5/12) (see also FNB launches new geo-payment system IT News, Africa
PayPal leads mobile payments push Reuters (4/6/12)
Are We Moving Towards a Cashless Society? TheAlyonaShow on YouTube (14/3/12)
Articles
More than 70 per cent of Canadians ready to go “cashless” CNW (13/6/12)
Is a cashless society on the way? Westfair Online, Janice Kirkel (18/5/12)
Mobile money misery BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (16/5/12)
Cellphones transform Kenyan commerce CBC News (27/10/10)
Chart
For a PowerPoint of the above chart, click here.
Questions
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of using cash?
- To what extent can mobile phone technology replace cash? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such technology?
- To what extent can mobile phone technology fulfil the various functions of money?
- Private-sector holdings of cash have been rising as a proportion of (nominal) GDP – see above chart. Is this consistent with a decreased use of cash? Explain.
- Why may mobile phone transactions be particularly useful in developing countries?
- What proportion of your own expenditure is conducted by cash? Has this changed over the past couple of years? If so, explain why.
With falling GDP and house prices, Spanish banks have been running the risk of failure. Indeed, the Spanish government has already had to agree to bail out Spain’s fourth biggest bank, Bankia.
On Saturday 9 June, at a crisis conference call, eurozone finance ministers agreed to lend the Spanish government up to €100 billion to provide credit to Spanish banks. The Spanish government is commissioning independent audits of the banks and, in the light of that, will specify just how much it needs to borrow.
Details of the nature of the loans will be made clear over the coming days, but they will funded either from the temporary rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), or from the new permanent fund that will replace it, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
But whilst the loans will remove the immediate pressure on Spanish banks, the underlying problems of the Spanish economy remain. Easy credit fuelled a property bubble which then burst. House prices have fallen by over 20% since the peak, and many Spanish people are in negative equity. Many construction companies have gone out of business.
What is more, the Spanish government is committed to reducing the budget deficit from 8.9% of GDP in 2011 to 5.3% in 2012 and 3% in 2013. To achieve this it has instituted tough austerity policies of government expenditure cuts and tax rises. (Click here for a link to a graph from the BBC of budget deficits in 18 EU countries.)
This has only aggravated the decline in GDP – at least in the short term. Spanish GDP is set to fall by around 2% this year and unemployment, at nearly 25% and rising, is the highest in Europe. Indeed the unemployment rate for those aged 15 to 25 is over 51%! This clearly has profound social and political consequences, with many young people seeing no prospect of gaining employment and thus feeling socially alienated. (For a PowerPoint of the above chart, click here.)
Markets on the Monday after the bailout was announced initially reacted positively. By the end of the day, however, the gains had been wiped out. Although no conditions were imposed on the Spanish government – the loan, although to the Spanish government, was to bail out the banks, not the government itself – worries remain that the Spanish economy is not set to recover for some time.
What is more, worries about other eurozone countries in difficulty have not gone away. Indeed, with the Spanish government being seen as having been dealt with more leniently than the Greek, Portuguese and Irish governments, investors are now worried that these countries may demand to renegotiate the terms of their bailout. And in the case of Greece, the Spanish bailout may make people more willing to vote in this coming Saturday’s election for parties that reject the Greek bailout terms. This may make it more likely that Greece will be forced to leave the euro, with all the chaos that is likely to ensue.
Webcasts and Podcasts
Spain: Simmering anger in Seville BBC News, Paul Mason (7/6/12)
Will Spain’s Bailout save Europe? CNBC Video, Martin Wolf (11/6/12)
Bailout boost evaporates Financial Times video, James Macintosh (11/6/12)
Spain’s bailout may not be enough Financial Times video, Nikki Tait (11/6/12)
Eurozone: ‘Italy will be next’ BBC Today Programme, Robert Peston (11/6/12)
Articles
Eurozone agrees to lend Spain up to 100 billion euros MSN Money, Jan Strupczewski and Julien Toyer (12/6/12)
Hurried Spanish banking bailout fails to calm market nerves Guardian, Giles Tremlett (11/6/12)
Fears that Spain’s bailout relief may be short-live Independent, Alasdair Fotheringham and Tom Bawden (11/6/12)
Spanish banks deal: Market concerns remain BBC News (11/6/12)
Q&A: Spanish bank deal BBC News (11/6/12)
Debt crisis: Market euphoria evaporates over Spain’s €100bn bank bailout The Telegraph, Emma Rowley and Bruno Waterfield (11/6/12)
Why bondholders are scared about Spain MarketWatch, Deborah Levine (11/6/12)
Krugman on another bank bailout Press-Telegram Paul Krugman (11/6/12)
Messy Spanish rescue BBC News, Robert Peston (10/6/12)
This latest euro fix will come apart in less than a month The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (11/6/12)
The consequences of Spain’s bank rescue Financial Times, Gavyn Davies (10/6/12)
Buy on the summit, sell on the communiqué Financial Times, Alan Beattie (11/6/12)
The vicious euro circle keeps turning BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (12/6/12)
Spanish banks need up to 62bn euros BBC News (21/6/12)
Eurozone crisis explained BBC News (19/6/12)
Spain formally requests a bailout for its banks BBC News (25/6/12)
Documents and press releases
IMF Says Spain’s Core Financial System is Resilient, but Important Vulnerabilities Remain IMF Press Release (8/6/12)
Spain and the IMF IMF links to various documents including: Spain – Financial System Stability Assessment (8/6/12)
Eurogroup statement on Spain Eurozone Portal, The Eurogroup (9/6/12)
Questions
- How does the Spanish bailout differ from those for Greece, Irelend and Portugal?
- What are the likely implications for Spanish borrowing costs of the loans coming from the ESM?
- To what extent does the plan to bail out Spanish banks involve a moral hazard?
- What is likely to be the effect of the Spanish bailout on Greece, Ireland and Portugal?
- How bad is Spanish public-sector debt compared with other countries? What is the likely effect of the bailout on Spanish public-sector debt?
- What is meant by a banking union in the eurozone and how would it work? What would be the implication of a eurozone banking union for the UK?
Paul Volcker was Chair of the US Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987. He was also Chair of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama from February 2009 to January 2011. In the webcast and articles below, he reflects on the current state of the world financial system – from regulation, to the euro crisis, to world imbalances, to the system of floating exchange rates.
He argues that global financial systems are vulnerable to breakdowns. What is needed is reform to the system, and for that there needs to be consensus by politicians, regulators and central banks.
But, in the absence of international consensus on some key points, reform will be greatly weakened, if not aborted. The freedom of money, financial markets and people to move – and thus to escape regulation and taxation – might be an acceptable, even constructive, brake on excessive official intervention, but not if a deregulatory race to the bottom prevents adoption of needed ethical and prudential standards.
Perhaps most important is a coherent, consistent approach to dealing with the imminent failure of “systemically important” institutions. Taxpayers and governments alike are tired of bailing out creditors for fear of the destructive contagious effects of failure – even as bailouts encourage excessive risk-taking.
According to Volcker, countries must be prepared to surrender some sovereignty. Policies must be co-ordinated internationally and there must be stronger regulation by international bodies, such as the IMF and stronger concerted action by global organisations, such as the G20.
Left to their own devices, in an era of floating exchange rates, countries may pursue policies that exacerbate global imbalances.
Not so long ago, we were comforted by theorising that floating exchange rates would mediate international adjustments in a timely and orderly way. But, in the real world, many countries, particularly but not limited to small, open economies, simply find it impractical or undesirable to permit their currency to float.
We are left with the certainty, however awkward, that active participation in an open world economy requires some surrender of economic sovereignty. Or, to put the point more positively, it requires a willingness to co-ordinate policies more effectively.
Webcast
Volcker Urges Global Monetary System Overhaul BloombergBusinessweek (31/5/12)
Articles
Is global financial reform possible? Guardian, Paul Volcker (6/6/12)
Volcker Urges Global Financial System Overhaul After Crisis BloombergBusinessweek, Robyn Meredith and Shamim Adam (31/5/12)
Questions
- What reforms, according to Volcker, need to be implemented in order for the euro to function effectively without crises?
- What can the USA do to ease the euro crisis?
- What are Volcker’s views on the regulation of the US banking system?
- How are incentive structures in banks related to speculative activities?
- Should banks be allowed to fail?
- What financial imbalances exist between countries?
- What international monetary reforms are required?
- What light can game theory shed on the difficulty of achieving global policy co-ordination?
- Is an international system of floating exchange rates appropriate given the size of international financial flows?
Figures released by the Bank of England show that M4 fell by 5.0% in the year to March 2012. This record fall comes despite over £320 billion of assets purchased by the Bank under its quantitative easing programme. These are funded by the creation of reserves in the Bank of England. (See the Bank of England site for details of the timing and amounts of QE.)
Because of the considerable injection of new money into the banking system, notes and coin plus banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England rose by 44.9%. So how is it that this measure of narrow money has increased massively and yet M4 has fallen?
One problem with using figures for changes in M4 to gauge economic activity is that they include intra-financial sector transactions – transactions between ‘other financial corporations’ (OFCs). Such transactions do not impact on the real economy. For this reason, the Bank of England prefers to focus on a measure that excludes these transactions between OFCs, a measure known as ‘M4 excluding intermediate OFCs’. This measure rose by 2.7% in the year to March 2012. Although this was positive, it was still weak.
So why does quantitative easing seem to be having such a small effect on bank lending? The following articles look at the issue.
Articles
Record collapse in UK money supply blamed on banks The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (2/5/12)
UK March mortgage approvals rise unexpectedly London South East (2/5/12)
UK March Net Consumer Lending +GBP1.4 Billion NASDAQ, Jason Douglas and Nicholas Winning (2/5/12)
M4 Hits Record Low; Non-Residents Sell Gilts Market News International (2/5/12)
Data
Bankstats (Monetary & Financial Statistics) – March 2012 Bank of England (2/5/12): see Tables A1.1.1, A2.1.1 and A2.2.3
Questions
- How does quantitative easing impact on the narrow measure of money: notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England?
- How might an increase in narrow money lead to an increase in broad money (such as M4)?
- How is it that notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances rose so rapidly in the year to March 2012, while M4 fell and even M4 excluding OFCs rose only slightly?
- Does this suggest that money supply is endogenous? Explain.
- How does requiring banks to rebuild their capital base impact on the relationship between narrow and broad money?
On 2 May 2012, Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, gave the BBC Today Prgramme’s public lecture. In it, he reflected on the causes and aftermath of the banking crisis of 2007/8.
He said that the main cause of the banking crisis was the risky behaviour of the banks themselves – behaviour that they had been allowed to get away with becuase regulation was too light. The cause was not one of inappropriate fiscal and monetary policy.
According to Dr King, there had been no classical macroeconomic boom and bust. True there had been a bust, but there was no preceding boom. Economic growth had not been unsustainable in the sense of being persistently above the potential rate. In other words, the output gap had been close to zero. As Mervyn King puts it
Let me start by pointing out what did not go wrong. In the five years before the onset of the crisis, across the industrialised world growth was steady and both unemployment and inflation were low and stable. Whether in this country, the United States or Europe, there was no unsustainable boom like that seen in the 1980s; this was a bust without a boom.
In terms of monetary policy, inflation had been on track and interest rates were not too low. And as for fiscal policy, government borrowing had been within the Golden Rule, whereby, over the cycle, the goverment borrowed only to invest and kept a current budget balance. Indeed, the period of the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s had become known as the Great Moderation.
So what went wrong? Again in the words of Dr King:
In a nutshell, our banking and financial system overextended itself. That left it fragile and vulnerable to a sudden loss of confidence.
The most obvious symptom was that banks were lending too much. Strikingly, most of that increase in lending wasn’t to families or businesses, but to other parts of the financial system. To finance this, banks were borrowing large amounts themselves. And this was their Achilles’ heel. By the end of 2006, some banks had borrowed as much as £50 for every pound provided by their own shareholders. So even a small piece of bad news about the value of its assets would wipe out much of a bank’s capital, and leave depositors scurrying for the door. What made the situation worse was that the fortunes of banks had become closely tied together through transactions in complex and obscure financial instruments. So it was difficult to know which banks were safe and which weren’t. The result was an increasingly fragile banking system.
But doesn’t his imply that regulation of the banking system had failed? And if so why? And have things now been fixed – so that banks will no longer run the risk of failure? Dr King addresses this issue and others in his speech and also in his interview the next day for the Today Programme, also linked to below.
Podcasts
The Today Programme Lecture BBC Radio 4, Sir Mervyn King (2/5/12) (Transcript of speech)
Also on YouTube at Governor’s Today Programme lecture, 2 May 2012
Sir Mervyn King: The full interview BBC Today Programme, Sir Mervyn King talks to Evan Davis (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King analysis ‘verging on delusional’ BBC Today Programme, Dylan Grice and Ngaire Woods (3/5/12)
Articles
Sir Mervyn King rejects criticism for crisis BBC News (3/5/12)
The boom and bust of Mervyn King BBC News, Robert Peston (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King admits BoE failed over financial crisis The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King admits: we did too little to warn of economic crisis Guardian, Larry Elliott (2/5/12)
King Says BOE Will Risk Unpopularity to Prevent Crises Bloomberg, Jennifer Ryan and Scott Hamilton (3/5/12)
Data
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD (See Annex Tables 1, 10, 14, 18, 27, 28, 32, 33, 61 and 62)
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England (See for example, A Money and Lending: counterparts to changes in M4, alternative presentation > Seasonally adjusted > Public sector contribution > PSNCR)
Questions
- Why was the period of the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s described as the Great Moderation?
- Chart the size of the output gap, the rate of inflation and public-sector deficits as a percentage of GDP in the UK and other major economies from 1995 to 2007. Is this evidence of the Great Moderation?
- To what extent would evidence of house prices, consumer debt, bank lending and the balance of trade deficit suggest that there was indeed a boom from the mid 1990s to 2007?
- What, according to Dr King were the main causes of the credit crunch?
- What, with hindsight, should the Bank of England have done differently?
- What UK body was responsible for regulating banks in the run up to the credit crunch? Why might its regulation be described as ‘light touch’?
- In what sense was there a moral hazard in central banks being willing to bail out banks?
- What banking reforms have taken place or will take place in the near future? Will they address the problems identified by Dr King and prevent another banking crisis ever occurring again?
