In an attempt to prevent recession following the financial crisis of 2007–8, many countries adopted both expansionary monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy – and with some success. It is likely that the recession would have been much deeper without such policies
But with growing public-sector deficits caused by the higher government expenditure and sluggish growth in tax receipts, many governments soon abandoned expansionary fiscal policy and relied on a mix of loose monetary policy (with ultra low interest rates and quantitative easing) but tight fiscal policy in an attempt to claw down the deficits.
But such ‘austerity’ policies made it much harder for loose monetary policy to boost aggregate demand. The problem was made worse by the attempt of both banks and individuals to ‘repair’ their balance sheets. In other words banks became more cautious about lending, seeking to build up reserves; and many individuals sought to reduce their debts by cutting down on spending. Both consumer spending and investment were slow to grow.
And yet government and central banks, despite the arguments of Keynesians, were reluctant to abandon their reliance solely on monetary policy as a means of boosting aggregate demand. But gradually, influential international institutions, such as the IMF (see also) and World Bank, have been arguing for an easing of austerity fiscal policies.
The latest international institution to take a distinctly more Keynesian stance has been the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its November 2015 Economic Outlook it had advocated some use of public-sector investment (see What to do about slowing global growth?. But in its Interim Economic Outlook of February 2016, it goes much further. It argues that urgent action is needed to boost economic growth and that this should include co-ordinated fiscal policy. In introducing the report, Catherine L Mann, the OECD’s Chief Economist stated that:
“Across the board there are lower interest rates, except for the United States. It allows the authorities to undertake a fiscal action at very very low cost. So we did an exercise of what this fiscal action might look like and how it can contribute to global growth, but also maintain fiscal sustainability, because this is an essential ingredient in the longer term as well.
So we did an experiment of a two-year increase in public investment of half a percentage point of GDP per annum undertaken by all OECD countries. This is an important feature: it’s everybody doing it together – it’s a collective action, because it’s global growth that is at risk here – our downgrades [in growth forecasts] were across the board – they were not just centred on a couple of countries.
So what is the effect on GDP of a collective fiscal action of a half a percentage point of GDP [increase] in public investment in [high] quality projects. In the United States, the euro area, Canada and the UK, who are all contributors to this exercise, the increase in GDP is greater than the half percentage point [increase] in public expenditure that was undertaken. Even if other countries don’t undertake any fiscal expansion, they still get substantial increases in their growth rates…
Debt to GDP in fact falls. This is because the GDP effect of quality fiscal stimulus is significant enough to raise GDP (the denominator in the debt to GDP ratio), so that the overall fiscal sustainability [debt to GDP] improves.”
What is being argued is that co-ordinated fiscal policy targeted on high quality infrastructure spending will have a multiplier effect on GDP. What is more, the faster growth in GDP should outstrip the growth in government expenditure, thereby allowing debt/GDP ratios to fall, not rise.
This is a traditional Keynesian approach to tackling sluggish growth, but accompanied by a call for structural reforms to reduce inefficiency and waste and improve the supply-side of the economy.
Articles
Osborne urged to spend more on infrastructure by OECD Independent, Ben Chu (18/2/16)
OECD blasts reform fatigue, downgrades growth and calls for more rate cuts Financial Review (Australia), Jacob Greber (18/2/16)
OECD calls for less austerity and more public investment The Guardian, Larry Elliott (18/2/15)
What’s holding back the world economy? The Guardian, Joseph Stiglitz and Hamid Rashid (8/2/16)
OECD calls for urgent action to combat flagging growth Financial Times, Emily Cadman (18/2/16)
Central bankers on the defensive as weird policy becomes even weirder The Guardian, Larry Elliott (21/2/16)
Keynes helped us through the crisis – but he’s still out of favour The Guardian, Larry Elliott (7/2/16)
G20 communique says monetary policy alone cannot bring balanced growth
Reuters (27/2/15)
OECD publications
Global Economic Outlook and Interim Economic Outlook OECD, Catherine L Mann (18/2/16)
Interim Economic Outlook OECD (18/2/16)
Questions
- Draw an AD/AS diagram to illustrate the effect of a successful programme of public-sector infrastructure projects on GDP and prices.
- Draw a Keynesian 45° line diagram to illustrate the effect of a successful programme of public-sector infrastructure projects on actual and potential GDP.
- Why might an individual country benefit more from a co-ordinated expansionary fiscal policy of all OECD countries rather than being the only country to pursue such a policy?
- What determines the size of the multiplier effect of such policies?
- How might a new classical/neoliberal economist respond to the OECD’s recommendation?
- Why may monetary policy have ‘run out of steam’? Are there further monetary policy measures that could be adopted?
- Compare the relative effectiveness of increased government investment in infrastructure and tax cuts as alterative forms of expansionary fiscal policy.
- Should quantitative easing be directed at financing public-sector infrastructure projects? What are the benefits and problems of such a policy? (See the blog post People’s quantitative easing.)
The perceived wisdom is that nominal interest rates have a lower zero bound. The Swedish central bank (the Ricksbank) has effectively been charging financial institutions to deposit money at the central bank since 2009. On 29 January 2016 the Central Bank of Japan also introduced a negative interest rate on deposits. The -0.1 per cent rate currently applies to a portion of the reserves held by financial institutions at the central bank. The move is another attempt to pump energy into a struggling economy.
As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation. In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, principally through purchases of government bonds from investors. Following the monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.
However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. Now there appears to be an increasing fear at the Bank of Japan that deflation may be set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate is intended to prevent deflation. In particular by affecting expectations of inflation. The hope is to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established.
The further loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows on the heels of an acceleration of quantitative easing last October. Back then, the Bank of Japan said that it would conduct Open Market Operations so that the monetary base would increase annually be ¥80 trillion. This was reaffirmed in its 29 January announcement. For an economy that has experienced four recessionary contractions since 2008 and with provisional estimates suggesting that it contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015, it remains to be seen whether further monetary loosening might yet be called for.
Data
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan
Articles
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)
Questions
- What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
- What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
- What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
- How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?
- What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
- To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?
In our recent blog constructing growth without production: The UK growth paradox we saw that the provisional estimate of economic growth in the UK in the final quarter of 2015 was 0.5 per cent. This was buoyed by service sector growth of 0.7 per cent. Meanwhile, construction sector output was estimated to have fallen by 0.1 per cent and production in the production industries by 0.2 per cent. The ONS Index of Production released on 11 February suggests the decline in production activity in the final quarter might have been has much as 0.5 per cent further pointing to unbalanced industrial growth.
The production industries today account for about 15 per cent of UK output which is small in comparison to the roughly 79 per cent from service-sector industries. Chart 1 shows the quarterly rate of growth in UK industrial production since the 1980s. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the average quarterly rate of growth in industrial output has been a mere 0.1 per cent compared with 0.5 per cent for total economic output and 0.7 per cent for the service sector. As a result, the importance of the production industries as a driver of economic output has declined.
Across 2015 industrial production rose by 1 per cent while the total output of the economy grew by 2.2 per cent. Industrial output comprises four main components. Of these, output from mining and quarrying grew in 2015 by 6.6 per cent, water, sewerage and waste management by 3.1 per cent, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning by 0.3 per cent, while manufacturing output contracted by 0.2 per cent.
Chart 2 shows the path of industrial output since 2006. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). In particular, it allows us to analyse the effect of the financial crisis and the global economic downturn. Whereas the total output of the economy surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, driven by the service sector, total industrial output in 2015 Q4 remains 9.9 per cent below its 2008 Q1 level. Among its component parts, output in mining and quarrying is 31 per cent lower, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning output is 12.2 per cent lower and manufacturing 6.5 per cent lower. Only the output of water, sewerage and waste management is greater – some 7.4 per cent higher.
The data point to the industrial composition of UK remaining heavily skewed towards the service sector and, hence, to service-sector industries driving economic growth. A key talking point is the extent to which this matters. On one hand we might point to the deindustrialisation captured by the data. This has had profound implications for certain regions of the United Kingdom and in particular for living standards in certain communities. Industrial change poses challenges for the UK labour force and for policymakers trying to affect the skills of workers needed in a changing economy. It has had a profound impact on the country’s balance of trade in goods: we consistently run a balance of trade deficit in goods. On the other hand we might argue that the UK does services well. We might be said to have a comparative advantage in this area. Whatever, your view point the latest industrial production data show the fragility of UK industrial output.
Data
Index of Production Dataset December 2015 Office for National StatisticsIndex of Production, December 2015 Office for National Statistics
Articles
UK industrial production shrank in 2015 Guardian, Phillip Inman (10/2/16)
December UK industrial output falls sharply BBC News, (10/2/16)
Manufacturing output fall dents UK growth hope Sky News, (10/2/16)
Industrial production’s worst monthly fall since 2012 Belfast Trelegraph, Holly Williams (11/2/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)
Questions
- What is meant by industrial production? How does it differ from the economy’s total output?
- Would you expect the index of production to be less or more volatile than total output? Explain your answer.
- What factors might explain the volatility of industrial production?
- Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
- Discuss the economic issues that might arise as the industrial composition of a country changes.
- Why is the distinction between nominal and real important when analysing economic growth?
The Bank of England’s Money and Credit release on 1 Feb provides us with data up to the end of 2015 on lending by banks and building societies to the rest of the UK private sector. In this post we update our blog of 17 December 2015 – is Minsky right yet again? – to analyse the latest data on lending. The headline numbers show that the flow of lending (net of repayments) by banks and building societies to UK households in 2015 was £40.8 billion up from £29.9 billion in 2014 taking their amount of outstanding lending to households to £1.26 trillion. Was American economist Minsky (1919-1996) right to have argued that cycles in credit are inevitable?
Chart 1 shows the stocks of debt acquired by both households and private non-financial corporations from MFIs (Monetary Financial Institutions), i.e. deposit-taking institutions. The scale of debt accumulation in the late 1980s and again from the mid 1990s up to the financial crisis of the late 2000s is stark. At the start of 1980 the UK household sector had debts to MFIs of around £53 billion. By the start of 2009 this had hit £1.29 trillion. To put these figures into context this corresponds to an increase in indebtedness to MFIs from 25 per cent of GDP to 86 per cent of GDP.
The chart also shows the increase in indebtedness of private non-financial corporations which are effectively every day businesses. They saw their debts to MFIs rise from around £25 billion to over £500 billion which is equivalent to an increase from 12 per cent of GDP to 33 per cent of GDP. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of Chart 1.)
The path of debt at the start of the 2010s is consistent with a story of consolidation. Although the term is readily used in the context of the public sector and measures to reduce public-sector deficits the term is also relevant for the private sector. Financially-distressed households, private non-financial corporations and MFIs took steps to repair their balance sheets following the financial crisis. Indeed the term is synonymous with the idea of a balance sheet recession which some economists argue describe the late 2000s. The result was that the demand for and supply of additional credit waned. Debt accumulation largely ceased and, as we can see from Chart 1, debt numbers fell.
More recently the indebtedness to MFIs of households has started to edge up again, though, as yet, not for private non-financial corporations. From the end of the first quarter of 2013 to the end of 2015 household indebtedness to MFIs has increased by 7 per cent to £1.26 trillion.
Chart 2 focuses on flows rather than stocks. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of Chart 2.) It allows us to see the accumulation of new credit (i.e. less repayments of debt). What is even more apparent from this chart is the evidence of cycles in credit. The growth in new credit during the 2000s is stark as is the subsequent squeeze on credit that followed. Across 2006 net flows of credit from MFIs to households reached £106 billion while the peak for PNFCs was across 2007 when they reached £71 billion. Subsequently, net credit numbers crashed with negative numbers for PNFCs indicating net repayments to MFIs.
The size of the credit flows emanating from MFIs and the magnitude of the resulting credit cycles is even more stark when presented as percentages of GDP. The annual flow of credit to households in the late 1980s reached 9.4 per cent of GDP while that to PNFCs peaked at the end of the decade at 5.2 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, across 2006 net credit to households reached 7.5 per cent of GDP while the peak of lending to PNFCs was in the 12-month period to the end of 2007 Q1 equivalent to 4.8 per cent of GDP. In 2015, credit from MFIs to households reached 2.2 per cent of GDP while that to PNFCs was a mere 0.2 per cent of GDP.
Of course, the key question now is the path of credit. Clearly flows of credit to households are again on the rise. In part, this is driven by the rebound in the UK housing market. But, significantly there has been a significant rise in flows of consumer credit, i.e. unsecured debt.
Chart 3 shows the flows of consumer credit to individuals (excluding student loans involving the Student Loans Company) from MFIs and other credit providers. Again, we see the marked evidence of cycles. Across 2015 these net consumer credit flows amounted to £14.5 billion, the highest annual figure since 2005. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)
To put the current rise in consumer credit into context, the net flow of consumer credit to individuals as percentage of GDP across 2015 as a whole amounts to about 0.8 per cent of GDP. This is the highest figure since the second half of 2006. While it might be a little early to say that credit numbers are a cause for concern, they do need to be seen in the context of a still relatively highly indebted household sector. Policymakers will be keeping a keen eye on credit patterns and assessing whether we have again acquired a real appetite for credit.
Articles
Households put another £4.4 billion on credit cards and personal loans in December as debt rises at fastest pace in a decade ThisisMoney.co.uk, Rachel Rickard Straus (1/2/16)
One in four ‘living for the day’ as 700,000 more expected to default on debt Independent, Simon Read (2/1/16)
Surprise mortgage jump confounds expectations Independent, Russell Lynch (1/2/16)
U.K. consumer credit slows; mortgage approvals up MarketWatch, Jon Sindreu (1/2/16)
Family debt continues to rise – report BBC News (13/1/16)
Data
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) – Latest Tables Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England
Questions
- How can the financial system affect the economy’s business cycle?
- What does it mean if households or firms are financially distressed? What responses might they take to this distress and what might the economic consequences be?
- How would you measure the net worth (or wealth) of an individual or a firm? What factors might affect their net worth?
- How might uncertainty affect spending and saving by households and businesses?
- What does it mean if bank lending is pro-cyclical?
- Why might lending be pro-cyclical?
- Are there measures that policymakers can take to reduce the likelihood that flows of credit become too excessive?
- What do you understand by a consolidation by the private sector? Discuss the possible macroeconomic effects of such a consolidation.
- What is meant by a balance sheet recession?
- How might the effect of attempts by a large number of individuals to improve their financial well-being differ from those when only a small numbers of individuals do so?
In the blog the service sector continues to drive the UK business cycle written in October 2014 we observed how UK growth was being driven by the service sector while other industrial sectors struggled. The contrasting performance across UK industry appears now to be even more marked. The latest GDP numbers from the Office for National Statistics contained in Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 show the economy’s output expanded by 0.5 per cent in the fourth quarter. Yet the construction sector is in recession following contractions of 1.9 per cent (Q3) and 0.1 per cent (Q4). Here we update our earlier blog to evidence the UK’s growth paradox.
Preliminary estimates suggest that the UK economy expanded by 0.5 per cent in the final quarter of 2015 following on from growth of of 0.4 per cent in the third quarter. 2015 as a whole saw output grow by 2.2 per cent, down from 2.9 per cent in 2014 and a little below the average over the past 60 years of around 2.6 per cent.
Chart 1 shows quarterly economic growth since 1980s (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It illustrates nicely the inherent volatility of economies – one of the threshold concepts in economics.The average quarterly rate of growth since 1980 has been 0.5 per cent so on the face of it, a quarterly growth number of 0.5 per cent might seem to paint a picture of sustainable growth. Yet, the industrial make up of growth is far from balanced.
Consider now Chart 2 (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It allows us to analyse more recent events by tracking how industrial output has evolved since 2006. It suggests an unbalanced recovery following the financial crisis. In 2015 Q4 the economy’s total output was 6.6 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1 with service-sector output 11.6 per cent higher. However, a very different picture emerges for the other principal industrial types.
The economy’s total output surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, but output across the production industries in 2015 Q4 remains 9.4 per cent lower than in 2008 Q1 (and 6.4 per cent lower specifically within manufacturing) and 4.2 per cent lower in the construction sector. However, output in the agricultural sector has rebounded and is now 8.4 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1.
The growth data continue to show the British economy struggling to rebalance its industrial composition. With output in construction in 2015 Q4 2 per cent lower than it was in Q2 and manufacturing output 0.4 per cent lower, UK growth remains stubbornly dependent on the service sector.
Data
Preliminary Estimate of GDP – Time Series Dataset Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National StatisticsGross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Economy tracker: GDP BBC News
Articles
UK economic growth slows in 2015: what the economists are saying Guardian, Katie Allen (28/1/16)
UK economy grows 0.5% in fourth quarter BBC News, (28/1/16)
Bumpy times ahead’ for UK even as fourth quarter growth accelerates Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (28/1/16)
UK economic growth rises to 0.5% in fourth quarter The Scotsman, Roger Baird (28/1/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)
Questions
- What is the difference between nominal and real GDP? Which of these helps to track changes in economic output?
- Looking at Chart 1 above, summarise the key patterns in real GDP since the 1980s.
- What is a recession?
- What are some of the problems with the traditional definition of a recession?
- Can a recession occur if nominal GDP is actually rising? Explain your answer.
- What factors lead to economic growth being so variable?
- What factors might explain the very different patterns seen since the late 2000s in the volume of output of the four main industrial sectors?
- What different interpretations could there be of a ‘rebalancing’ of the UK economy?
- What other data might we look at to analyse whether the UK economy is ‘rebalancing’?.
- Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
- Produce a short briefing paper exploring the prospects for economic growth in the UK over the next 12 to 18 months.
- What is the difference between GVA and GDP?
- Explain the arguments for and against using GDP as a measure of a country’s economic well-being.
