
Boeing and Airbus have called a truce in their 17-year battle over subsidies. During this period, both have accused each other of unfair government subsidies to their respective plane makers.
The long-running trade dispute
In October 2004, the USA requested the establishment of a WTO panel to consider whether Airbus was providing unfair subsidies to develop its new super-jumbo – the A380. This provoked a counter-request by Airbus, claiming unfair subsidies of $27.3 billion for Boeing by the US government since 1992. In July 2005, two panels were set up to deal with the two sets of allegations.
In June 2010, the WTO panel circulated its findings on Boeing’s case against Airbus. It found Airbus guilty of using some illegal subsidies to win contracts through predatory pricing, but dismissed several of Boeing’s claims because many of the subsidies were reimbursable at commercial rates of interest. However, some of the ‘launch aid’ for research and development was given at below market rates and so violated WTO rules. The report evoked appeal and counter-appeal from both sides, but the WTO’s Appellate Body reported in May 2011 upholding the case that ‘certain subsidies’ provided by the EU and member states were incompatible with WTO rules. In June 2011, the EU accepted the findings.
In March 2011, the WTO panel circulated its findings on Airbus’s case against Boeing. The EU claimed that ten specific measures amounted to subsidies to Boeing, which were inconsistent with the WTO’s rules on subsidies (the SCM agreement). It upheld three of ten alleged breaches, including subsidies between 1989 and 2006 of at least $5.3 billion. These subsidies were adjudged to have resulted in adverse effects to the EU’s interests, specifically in lost sales, especially to third-country markets, and in significantly suppressing the price at which Airbus was able to sell its aircraft.
But these rulings were not the end of the matter. Various appeals and counter-appeals were lodged by both sides with varying degrees of success. Also the disputes extended to other wide-bodied jets and to narrow-bodied ones too with claims by both sides of unfair subsidies and tax breaks.
On 9 June 2017 the WTO’s compliance panel rejected several EU claims that the USA had failed to withdraw all illegal subsidies to Boeing. However, it also found that the USA had not complied with an earlier ruling to abolish illegal tax breaks. Both sides claimed victory. Airbus claimed that the ruling had seen the WTO condemn non-compliance and new subsidies. In particular, it focused on the WTO ruling that Washington State subsidies had resulted in a significant loss of sales for Airbus. On the other hand, a Boeing press release spoke of a US win in a major WTO compliance ruling. Boeing claimed that that ruling meant that the United States had complied with ‘virtually all’ of the WTO’s decisions in the counter-case that the EU had filed against the USA in 2006.
On 27 June 2017, as expected, the EU challenged the WTO decision. This meant that the EU’s case would go back to the WTO’s appellate body, which was still considering a separate US case over state aid to Airbus.
On 15 May 2018, the WTO ruled that Airbus did not use unfair subsidies for narrow-bodied jets, such as the A320, which competes with the 737, but did for wide-bodied jets. The EU said that it would comply with the WTO ruling over the support for wide-bodied jets.
In 2019, the WTO ruled that the EU had illegally provided support to Airbus. The USA responded with tariffs of up to $7.5bn on a range of goods imported from the EU. In a parallel case, the WTO ruled that the US benefits to Boeing also violated trade rules, authorising the EU to impose tariffs on US imports worth roughly $4bn. Then in March 2020, the USA imposed a 15% tariff on Airbus aircraft.
The truce
Agreement was reached on 15 June 2021 in trade talks between the USA and the EU in Brussels. Both sides recognised that the dispute had been a negative-sum game, with both sides losing. It was thus agreed to suspend for five years all tariffs on aircraft and on a range of other goods, such as EU cheese and wine and US tobacco and spirits. The agreement did not include ending EU tariffs on US steel, however.
It was also agreed to work on an overarching agreement on subsidies, which would allow fair support by governments on both sides, and to co-operate in finding ways to counter unfair state investment in aircraft by China. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai said that the agreement ‘includes a commitment for concrete joint collaboration to confront the threat from China’s ambitions to build an aircraft sector on non-market practices’. China’s state-sponsored aerospace manufacturer, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, or Comac, sees its C919, now in late stages of development, as a direct rival to the Airbus A320neo and the Boeing 737 Max.
To work out the details of US-EU collaboration, a working group will be set up. It will consider ways of ensuring that finance is provided on market terms, that R&D funding is transparent and that support given to aircraft manufactures will be equivalent by each side and will avoid harming the other side. It will consider just how the two sides can co-operate to address unfair competition from elsewhere.
Two days later, an almost identically worded deal was reached between the USA and the UK to end tariffs on a range of goods and join the EU-USA co-operation on aircraft manufacture.
Articles
US and Europe end Airbus-Boeing dispute as they eye threat from China
CNN, Charles Riley and Kevin Liptak (15/6/21)
- After 17 years, truce nears in U.S.-Europe jet subsidy war
Reuters, Tim Hepher, Andrea Shalal, David Shepardson and Philip Blenkinsop (15/6/21)
U.S, EU agree truce in 17-year Airbus-Boeing conflict
Reuters, Philip Blenkinsop (16/6/21)
- After EU, Britain and U.S. reach truce in aircraft trade dispute
Reuters, Tim Hepher and Alistair Smout (17/6/21)
- EU and US end Airbus-Boeing trade dispute after 17 years
Financial Times, Jim Brunsden, Sam Fleming, Aime Williams and James Politi (15/6/21)
- Boeing-Airbus trade row set to end after 17 years
BBC News (16/6/21)
- Biden, E.U. end 17-year Airbus-Boeing trade dispute, seek to calm relations after Trump
The Washington Post, Michael Birnbaum, Anne Gearan and David J. Lynch
EU, U.S. Agree to Five-Year Truce in Boeing-Airbus Trade Dispute
Bloomberg, Alberto Nardelli, Nikos Chrysoloras and Jennifer Jacobs (15/6/21)
Questions
- Choose any one particular complaint to the WTO by either Boeing or Airbus and assess the arguments used by the WTO in its ruling.
- Are subsidies by aircraft manufacturers in the interests of (a) passengers; (b) society in general?
- Is collaboration between Boeing and Airbus in the interests of (a) passengers; (b) society in general?
- How is game theory relevant to the long-running disputes between Boeing and Airbus and to their relationships in the coming years?
- Would cheaper aircraft from China be in the interests of (a) passengers; (b) society in general?
- Explain what is meant by ‘strategic trade theory’. How is it relevant to aircraft manufacture?
In his March 2021 Budget, Rishi Sunak announced the setting up of eight freeports in England. These will be East Midlands Airport, Felixstowe & Harwich, Humber, Liverpool City Region, Plymouth and South Devon, Solent, Teesside and Thames. The locations were chosen after a bidding process. Some 30 areas applied and they were judged on various criteria, including economic benefits to poorer regions. Other freeports are due to be announced in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Scottish government is stressing their contribution to the green agenda and will call them ‘green ports’.
Unlike many countries, the UK in recent years chose not to have freeports. There are currently around 3500 freeports worldwide, There are around 80 in the EU, including the whole or part of Barcelona, Port of Bordeaux, Bremerhaven, Cadiz, Copenhagen, Gdansk, Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta, Plovdiv, Piraeus, Riga, Split, Trieste, Venice and Zagreb. The UK had freeports at Liverpool, Southampton, the Port of Tilbury, the Port of Sheerness and Prestwick Airport from 1984, but the government allowed their status to lapse in 2012.
Freeports are treated as ‘offshore’ areas, with goods being allowed into the areas tariff free. This enables raw materials and parts to be imported and made into finished or semi-finished products within the freeport area. At that stage they can either be imported to the rest of the country, at which point tariffs are applied, or they can be exported with no tariff being applied by the exporting country, only the receiving country as appropriate. This benefits companies within the freeport area as it simplifies the tariff system.
The new English freeports will provide additional benefits to companies, including reduced employers’ national insurance payments, reduced property taxes for newly acquired and existing land and buildings, 100% capital allowances whereby the full cost of investment in plant and machinery can be offset against taxable profits, and full business-rates relief for five years (see paragraph 2.115 in Budget 2021).
Benefits and costs
Freeport status will benefit the chosen areas, as it is likely to attract inward investment and provide employment. Many areas were thus keen to bid for freeport status. To the extent that there is a net increase in investment for the country, this will contribute to GDP growth.
But there is the question of how much net additional investment there will be. Critics argue that freeports can divert investment from areas without such status. Also, to the extent that investment is diverted rather than being new investment, this will reduce tax revenue to the government.
Then there is the question of whether such areas are in breach of international agreements. WTO rules forbid countries from directly subsidising exports. And the Brexit trade deal requires subsidies to be justified for reasons other than giving a trade advantage. If the UK failed to do so, the EU could impose tariffs on such goods to prevent unfair competition.
Also, there is the danger of tax evasion, money laundering and corruption encouraged by an absence of regulations and checks. Tight controls and thorough auditing by the government and local authorities will be necessary to counter this and prevent criminal activity and profits going abroad. Worried about these downsides of freeports, in January 2020 the EU tightened regulations governing freeports and took extra measures to clamp down on the growing level of corruption, tax evasion and criminal activity.
Articles
According to the Brexit trade agreement (the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)), trade between the EU and the UK will remain quota and tariff free. ‘Quota free’ means that trade will not be restricted in quantity by the authorities on either side. ‘Tariff free’ means that customs duties will not be collected by the UK authorities on imports from the EU nor by the EU authorities on imports from the UK.
Article ‘GOODS .5: Prohibition of customs duties’ on page 20 of the agreement states that:
Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, customs duties on all goods originating in the other Party shall be prohibited.
This free-trade agreement was taken by many people to mean that trade would be unhindered, with no duties being payable. In fact, as many importers and exporters are finding, trade is not as ‘free’ as it was before January 2021. There are four sources of ‘friction’.
Tariffs on goods finished in the UK
This has become a major area of concern for many UK companies. When a good is imported into the UK from outside the EU and then has value added to it by processing, packaging, cleaning, remixing, preserving, refashioning, etc., under ‘rules of origin’ regulations, it can only count as a UK good if sufficient value or weight is added. The proportions vary by product, but generally goods must have approximately 50% UK content (or 80% of the weight of foodstuffs) to qualify for tariff-free access to the EU. For example, for a petrol car, 55% of its value must have been created in either the EU or UK. Thus cars manufactured in the UK which use many parts imported from Japan, China or elsewhere, may not qualify for tariff-free access to the EU.
In other cases, it is simply the question of whether the processing is deemed ‘sufficient’, rather than the imported inputs having a specific weight or value. For example, the grinding of pepper is regarded as a sufficient process and thus ground pepper can be exported from the UK to the EU tariff free. Another example is that of coal briquettes:
The process to transform coal into briquettes (including applying intense pressure) goes beyond the processes listed in ‘insufficient processing’ and so the briquettes can be considered ‘UK originating’ regardless of the originating status of the coal used to produce the briquettes.
In the case of many garments produced in the UK and then sold in retail chains, many of which have branches in both the UK and EU, generally both the weaving and cutting of fabric to make garments, as well as the sewing, must take place in the UK/EU for the garments to be tariff free when exported from the UK to the EU and vice versa.
Precise details of rules of origin are given in the document, The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA): detailed guidance on the rules of origin.
Many UK firms exporting to the EU and EU firms exporting to the UK are finding that their products are now subject to tariffs because of insufficient processing being done in the UK/EU. Indeed, with complex international supply chains, this is a major problem for many importing and exporting companies.
Documentation
Rules of origin require that firms provide documentation itemising what parts of their goods come from outside the UK/EU. Then it has to be determined whether tariffs will be necessary on the finished product. This is time consuming and is an example of the increase in ‘red tape’ about which many firms are complaining. As the Evening Standard article states:
Exporters have to be able to provide evidence to prove the origin of their products’ ingredients. Next year, they will also have to provide suppliers’ declarations too, and EU officials may demand those retrospectively, so exporters need to have them now.
The increased paperwork and checks add to the costs of trade. Some EU companies are stating that they will no longer export to the UK and some UK companies that they will no longer export to the EU, or will have to set up manufacturing plants or distribution hubs in the EU to handle trade within the EU.
Other companies are adding charges to their products to cover the costs. As the Guardian article states:
“We bought a €47 [£42] shelf from Next for our bathroom,” said Thom Basely, who lives in Marseille. “On the morning it was supposed to be delivered we received an ‘import duty/tax’ demand for over €30, like a ransom note. It came as a complete surprise.”
In evidence given to the Treasury Select Committee (Q640) in May 2018, Sir Jon Thompson, then Chief Executive of HMRC, predicted that leaving the single market would involve approximately 200 million extra customs declarations on each side of the UK/EU border at a cost of £32.50 for each one, giving a total extra cost of approximately £6.5bn on each side of the border for companies trading with Europe. Although this was only an estimate, the extra ‘paperwork’ will represent a substantial cost.
VAT
Previously, goods could be imported into the UK without paying VAT in the UK on value added up to that point as VAT had already been collected in the EU. Similarly, goods exported to the EU would already have had VAT paid and hence would only be subject to the tax on additional value added. The UK was part of the EU VAT system and did not have to register for VAT in each EU country.
Now, VAT has to be paid on the goods as they are imported or released from a customs warehouse – similar to a customs duty. This is therefore likely to involve additional administration costs – the same as those with non-EU imports.
Services
The UK is a major exporter of services, including legal, financial, accounting, IT and engineering. It has a positive trade in services balance with the EU, unlike its negative trade in goods balance. Yet, the Brexit deal does not include free trade in services. Some of the barriers to other non-EU countries have been reduced for the UK in the TCA, but UK service providers will still face new barriers which will impose costs. For example, some EU countries will limit the time that businesspeople providing services can stay in their countries to six months in any twelve. Some will not recognise UK qualifications, unlike when the UK was a member of the single market.
The financial services supplied by City of London firms are a major source of export revenue, with about 40% of these revenues coming from the EU. Now outside the single market, these firms have lost their ‘passporting rights’. These allowed such firms to sell their services into the EU without the need for additional regulatory clearance. The alternative now is for such firms to be granted ‘equivalence’ by the EU. This has not yet been negotiated and even if it were, does not cover the full range of financial services. It excludes, for example, banking services such as lending and deposit taking.
Conclusions
Leaving the single market has introduced a range of frictions in trade. These are causing severe problems to some importers and exporters in the short term. Some EU goods are now unavailable in the UK or only so at significantly higher prices. Some exporters are finding that the frictions are too great to make their exports profitable. However, it remains to be seen how quickly accounting and logistical systems can adjust to improve trade flows between the UK and the EU.
But some of these frictions, as itemised above, will remain. According to the law of comparative advantage, these restrictions on trade will lead to a loss of GDP. And these losses will not be spread evenly throughout the UK economy: firms and their employees which rely heavily on UK–EU trade will be particularly hard hit.
Articles
- EU firms refuse UK deliveries over Brexit tax changes
BBC News, Robert Plummer (5/1/21)
- Brexit trade problems: what’s gone wrong and can it be fixed?
The Conversation, Billy Melo Araujo (14/1/21)
- Brexit: parcels of grief
Turbulent Times, Richard North (8/1/21)
- UK retailers stumped by post-Brexit trade deal with EU
Financial Times, Jonathan Eley and Daniel Thomas (7/1/21)
- Pan-EU food supply chains hit by Brexit trade deal
Financial Times, Peter Foster, Arthur Beesley and Sam Fleming (6/1/21)
- Customers in Europe hit by post-Brexit charges when buying from UK
The Guardian, Jon Henley (7/1/21)
- UK importers brace for ‘disaster’ as new Brexit customs checks loom
The Guardian, Joanna Partridge (7/2/21)
- Brexit: The reality dawns
BBC News, Scotland, Douglas Fraser (8/1/21)
- Post-Brexit customs systems not fit for purpose, say meat exporters
BBC News, Simon Jack (15/1/21)
- Brexit: How much disruption has there been so far?
BBC News, Reality Check team (1/2/21)
- Baffling Brexit rules threaten export chaos, Gove is warned
The Observer, Toby Helm (10/1/21)
- Shock Brexit charges are hurting us, say small British businesses
The Observer, Toby Helm and Michael Savage (17/1/21)
- ‘A Brexit nightmare’: the British businesses being pushed to breaking point
The Observer, Toby Helm (24/1/21)
- Debenhams closes online business in Ireland as 50 major UK retailers face EU tariffs
ITV News, Joel Hills (7/1/21)
- The Brexit deal is being celebrated as though it removes all tariffs. It doesn’t
Prospect, Sam Lowe (8/1/21)
- As Marks and Spencer warns of Brexit nightmare, what are these Rules of Origin red tape issues?
Evening Standard, Jim Armitage (9/1/21)
- UK VAT after the transitional period
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (31/12/20)
- The Brexit deal and the services sector
UK in a Changing Europe, Sarah Hall (28/12/20)
- What does the Brexit trade deal mean for financial services?
UK in a Changing Europe, Sarah Hall (27/12/20)
Official documents
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘rules of origin’.
- If something is imported to the UK from outside the UK and then is refashioned in the UK and exported to the EU but, according to the rules of origin has insufficient value added in the UK, does this mean that such as good will be subject to tariffs twice? Explain.
- Are tariffs exactly the same as customs duties? Is the distinction made in the Guardian article a correct one?
- Is it in the nature of a free-trade deal that it is not the same as a single-market arrangement?
- Find out what arrangement Switzerland has with the EU. How does it differ from the UK/EU trade deal?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Swiss/EU agreement over the UK/EU one?
- Are the frictions in UK–EU trade likely to diminish over time? Explain.
- Find out what barriers to trade in services now exist between the UK and EU. How damaging are they to UK services exports?
At 23:00 on 31 December 2020, the UK withdrew from the European single market. This ended the transition period which followed the UK’s departure from the EU on 31 January 2020. But, with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (‘the deal’) signed on 30 December, it was agreed that there would be no tariffs or quotas on trade in goods between the UK and the EU.
So what are the new economic relations between the EU and the UK and how will they impact on the UK economy? What new restrictions are there on trade in goods and on the movement of labour and capital? How is trade in services, including financial services, affected? What new agreements, such as on fishing, will replace previous agreements?
What will happen to trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland? What will happen to trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland?
What will happen to regulations over standards of traded products and their production? Will the UK government be able to provide subsidies or other types of support for goods or services exported to the EU? How will disputes about standards and support to companies be resolved?
How will trade with non-EU countries change? If the EU has trade agreements with such countries, do these agreements now apply to trade between the UK and such countries? How free is the UK now to negotiate new trade agreements with non-EU countries? How will the UK’s negotiating strength be affected by its withdrawal from the EU?
Rather than listing the changes here, follow the links below to the articles and assess the nature of the changes and then attempt the questions. The articles represent a balance of views.
What is clear is that these are all big issues and are likely to have a significant impact on the UK economy. Most economists argue that the net effect will be negative on trade and economic growth, but there is huge uncertainty about the magnitude of the effects. Much will depend on how arrangements between the UK and the EU develop over the coming months and years.
Articles
Brexit deal explained: What will be the impact of UK’s agreement with EU?
Sky News, Ed Conway (24/12/20)
- Brexit deal: What is in it?
BBC News, Chris Morris (28/12/20)
- Brexit: What are the key points of the deal?
BBC News, Tom Edgington (30/12/20)
- Brexit trade deal explained: the key parts of the landmark agreement
Financial Times (25/12/20)
- The key details of the Brexit deal summarised, from trade to fishing
The Telegraph, James Crisp and Gordon Rayner (3/1/21)
- Committees, visas and climate change: Brexit experts’ verdicts on the deal details
The Guardian, Lisa O’Carroll (28/12/20)
- The left must stop mourning Brexit – and start seeing its huge potential
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (31/12/20)
- The Guardian view on Britain out of the EU: a treasure island for rentiers
The Guardian, Editorial (27/12/20)
- Brexit Is Finally Done, but It Already Seems Out of Date
New York Times, Mark Landler (30/12/20)
- Towards a modern UK-EU trade relationship
Best for Britain, David Henig (28/12/20)
- Brexit Is a New World Businesses Still Need to Figure Out
Bloomberg, Deirdre Hipwell, Craig Trudell, and Dara Doyle (1/1/21)
UK and EU documents
Questions
- Summarise the main features of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and how the UK’s new relationship with the EU differs from being a member.
- What are the potential economic benefits from being outside the EU?
- What are the economic drawbacks for the UK from having left the EU, albeit with the new Trade and Cooperation Agreement?
- On balance, do you think that the UK will gain or lose economically from having left the EU? Explain your answer.
There have been many analyses of the economic effects of Brexit, both before the referendum and at various times since, including analyses of the effects of the deal negotiated by Theresa May’s government and the EU. But with the prospect of a no-deal Brexit on 31 October under the new Boris Johnson government, attention has turned to the effects of leaving the EU without a deal.
There have been two major analyses recently of the likely effects of a no-deal Brexit – one by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and one by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
IMF analysis
The first was in April by the IMF as part of its 6-monthly World Economic Outlook. In Scenario Box 1.1. ‘A No-Deal Brexit’ on page 28 of Chapter 1, the IMF looked at two possible scenarios.
Scenario A assumes no border disruptions and a relatively small increase in UK sovereign and corporate spreads. Scenario B incorporates significant border disruptions that increase import costs for UK firms and households (and to a lesser extent for the European Union) and a more severe tightening in financial conditions.
Under both scenarios, UK exports to the EU and UK imports from the EU revert to WTO rules. As a result, tariffs are imposed by mid-2020 or earlier. Non-tariff barriers rise at first but are gradually reduced over time. Most free-trade arrangements between the EU and other countries are initially unavailable to the UK (see the blog EU strikes major trade deals) but both scenarios assume that ‘new trade agreements are secured after two years, and on terms similar to those currently in place.’
Both scenarios also assume a reduction in net immigration from the EU of 25 000 per year until 2030. Both assume a rise in corporate and government bond rates, reflecting greater uncertainty, with the effect being greater in Scenario B. Both assume a relaxing of monetary and fiscal policy in response to downward pressures on the economy.
The IMF analysis shows a negative impact on UK GDP, with the economy falling into recession in late 2019 and in 2020. This is the result of higher trade costs and reduced business investment caused by a poorer economic outlook and increased uncertainty. By 2021, even under Scenario A, GDP is approximately 3.5% lower than it would have been if the UK had left the EU with the negotiated deal. For the rest of the EU, GDP is around 0.5% lower, although the effect varies considerably from country to country.
The IMF analysis makes optimistic assumptions, such as the UK being able to negotiate new trade deals with non-EU countries to replace those lost by leaving. More pessimistic assumptions would lead to greater costs.
OBR analysis
Building on the analysis of the IMF, the Office for Budget Responsibility considered the effect of a no-deal Brexit on the public finances in its biennial Fiscal risks report, published on 17 July 2019. This argues that, under the relatively benign Scenario A assumptions of the IMF, the lower GDP would result in annual public-sector net borrowing (PSNB) rising. By 2021/22, if the UK had left with the deal negotiated with the EU, PSNB would have been around £18bn. A no-deal Brexit would push this up to around £51bn.

According to the OBR, the contributors to this rise in public-sector net borrowing of around £33bn are:
- A fall in income tax and national insurance receipts of around £16.5bn per year because of lower incomes.
- A fall in corporation tax and expenditure taxes, such as VAT, excise duties and stamp duty of around £22.5bn per year because of lower expenditure.
- A fall in capital taxes, such as inheritance tax and capital gains tax of around £10bn per year because of a fall in asset prices.
- These are offset to a small degree by a rise in customs duties (around £10bn) because of the imposition of tariffs and by lower debt repayments (of around £6bn) because of the Bank of England having to reduce interest rates.
The rise in PSNB would constrain the government’s ability to use fiscal policy to boost the economy and to engage in the large-scale capital projects advocated by Boris Johnson while making the substantial tax cuts he is proposing. A less optimistic set of assumptions would, of course, lead to a bigger rise in PSNB, which would further constrain fiscal policy.
Articles
Video
Reports
Questions
- What are the assumptions of the IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts for the effects of a no-deal Brexit? Do you agree with these assumptions? Explain.
- What are the assumptions of the analysis of a no-deal Brexit on the public finances in the OBR’s Fiscal risks report? Do you agree with these assumptions? Explain.
- What is the difference between forecasts and analyses of outcomes?
- For what reasons might growth over the next few years be higher than in the IMF forecasts under either scenario?
- For what reasons might growth over the next few years be lower than in the IMF forecasts under either scenario?
- For what reasons might public-sector net borrowing (PSNB) over the next few years be lower than in the OBR forecast?
- For what reasons might PSNB over the next few years be higher than in the OBR forecast?