Tag: balance of payments

The possibility of currency and trade wars and how to avert them were major topics at the G20 meeting in Seoul on 11 and 12 November 2010. Some countries, such as the USA and the UK have been running large current account deficits. Others, such as China, Germany and Japan have been running large current account surpluses. But balance of payments accounts must balance. Thus there have been equal and opposite imbalances on the financial plus capital accounts. Large amounts of finance and capital have flowed from the trade-surplus to the trade-deficit countries. In particular China holds a vast amount of US dollar assets: a debt for the USA.

The trade and finance imbalances are linked to exchange rates. The USA has accused China of keeping its exchange rate artificially low, which boosts Chinese exports and further exacerbates the trade and finance imbalances. The USA is keen to see an appreciation of the Chinese yuan (also known as the renminbi). The Chinese response is that the USA is asking China to take medicine to cure America’s disease.

So was the meeting in Seoul successful in achieving a global response to trade and exchange rate problems? Has it averted currency and trade wars? Or were national interests preventing a concrete agreement? The articles look at the outcomes of the talks.

Articles
G20 pledge to avoid currency war gets lukewarm reception Guardian, Phillip Inman and Patrick Wintour (12/11/10)
G20 fails to agree on trade and currencies Financial Times, Chris Giles, Alan Beattie and Christian Oliver (12/11/10)
Main points of the G20 Seoul summit document Reuters (12/11/10)
Factbox: Outcome of the Seoul G20 summit Reuters (12/11/10)
No deal: Seoul’s G20 summit fails to deliver on currencies, trade imbalances The Australian, Laurence Norman and Ian Talley, Dow Jones Newswires (12/11/10)
G20 to tackle US-China currency concerns BBC News (12/11/10)
The expectations game BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (12/11/10)
Obama: Imbalances threaten growth BBC News (12/11/10)
Obama leaves G-20 empty-handed on currency spat msnbc (12/11/10)
The ghost at the feast The Economist, Newsbook blog (12/11/10)
Forget summit failures, look at G20 record Financial Times, Christian Oliver, Chris Giles and Alan Beattie (12/11/10)
Obama warns nations not to rely on exports to US BBC News (13/11/12)
G20 summit distracted by ‘currency wars’ Guardian, Mark Weisbrot (12/11/10)
Current account targets are a way back to the future Financial Times podcasts, Martin Wolf (2/11/10) (Click here for transcript)
Ben Bernanke hits back at Fed critics BBC News (19/11/10)
Why should you care about currency wars? BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (9/11/10)

G20 sites
G20 Korea, home page
Korean G20 site
2010 G-20 Seoul summit Wikipedia

Questions

  1. What are the causes of the large trade imbalances in the world?
  2. What problems arise from large trade imbalances?
  3. What is meant by beggar-my-neighbour policies?
  4. Are moves towards freer trade a zero-sum game? Explain.
  5. Are moves towards protectionism a zero-sum game? Explain.
  6. Are attempts to get a realignment of currencies a zero-sum game? Explain.
  7. How successful has the G20 been over the past two or three years?
  8. Would it be desirable for governments to pursue current account targets?

There’s some good news and some bad news concerning the balance of payments, according to figures just released. First the good: the trade in goods and services deficit narrowed from £4.89bn in August to £4.57bn in September; and the trade in goods deficit narrowed from £8.47bn to £8.23bn. Now the bad: the trade in goods and services deficit rose from £12.63bn in quarter 2 to £14.28bn in quarter 3 and the trade in goods deficit rose from £19.72bn to £21.33bn over the same period.

This is worrying as the recovery depends to a large part on a recovery in exports. These rose by only 1.36% from quarter 2 to quarter 3, whereas imports rose by 3.33%. And this is despite a fall in the exchange rate of the pound against the UK’s trading partners over the past four years. Looking at the quarter 3 figures, the exchange rate index was 104.3 in 2007, 91.6 in 2008, 82.9 in 2009 and 81.8 in 2010. What is also worrying is a very modest rise in manufacturing output.

Articles
UK’s September trade deficit smallest since June BBC News (9/11/10)
Record trade deficit for UK Guardian, Larry Elliott (9/11/10)
Britain’s trade gap: What the economists say Guardian (9/11/10)

Data
UK Trade National Statistics
Statistical Bulletin: UK Trade September 2010 National Statistics
United Kingdom Balance of Payments – The Pink Book National Statistics (Balance of payments data going back many years)
Statistical Interactive Database: Effective exchange rates Bank of England

Questions

  1. How is a depreciation of its currency likely to affect a country’s balance of payments?
  2. What are the requirements for the UK to achieve an export-led recovery?
  3. Why did the UK’s balance of trade deteriorate between Q2 and Q3 of 2010?
  4. How might supply-side policy affect the balance of trade?
  5. What determines the income elasticity of demand for (a) UK imports; (b) UK exports?

Every three years the Bank for International Settlements (the central bankers’ central bank) publishes a survey of foreign exchange market activity. The latest survey has just been published. Despite the banking crisis and subsequent recession, foreign exchange market turnover has increased by nearly 20% since 2007. The daily average value of currencies traded on the foreign exchange market is now $3.981 trillion. In 2007 it was $3.324 trillion and in 2001 it was just $1.239 trillion.

According to the BIS press release:

• The increase was driven by the 48% growth in turnover of spot transactions, which represent 37% of foreign exchange market turnover. Spot turnover rose to $1.5 trillion in April 2010 from $1.0 trillion in April 2007.

• The increase in turnover of other foreign exchange instruments was more modest at 7%, with average daily turnover of $2.5 trillion in April 2010. Turnover in outright forwards and currency swaps grew strongly. Turnover in foreign exchange swaps was flat relative to the previous survey, while trading in currency options decreased.

• As regards counterparties, the higher global foreign exchange market turnover is associated with the increased trading activity of “other financial institutions” – a category that includes non-reporting banks, hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and central banks, among others. Turnover by this category grew by 42%, increasing to $1.9 trillion in April 2010 from $1.3 trillion in April 2007. For the first time, activity of reporting dealers with other financial institutions surpassed inter-dealer transactions (i.e. transactions between reporting dealers).

• Foreign exchange market activity became more global, with cross-border transactions representing 65% of trading activity in April 2010, while local transactions account for 35%.

• The percentage share of the US dollar has continued its slow decline witnessed since the April 2001 survey, while the euro and the Japanese yen gained relative to April 2007. Among the 10 most actively traded currencies, the Australian and Canadian dollars both increased market share, while the pound sterling and the Swiss franc lost ground. The market share of emerging market currencies increased, with the biggest gains for the Turkish lira and the Korean won.

• The relative ranking of foreign exchange trading centres has changed slightly from the previous survey. Banks located in the United Kingdom accounted for 36.7%, against 34.6% in 2007, of all foreign exchange market turnover, followed by the United States (18%), Japan (6%), Singapore (5%), Switzerland (5%), Hong Kong SAR (5%) and Australia (4%).

The following articles look at some of the details of the report and consider their implications for London and for the global economy: an economy that has grown (in money terms) by 82% since 2001, while exports have grown by 101% and foreign currency transactions by 221%.

Articles
Giant FX market now $4 trillion gorilla Reuters (1/9/10)
Global currency trading jumps 20% in three years BBC News (1/9/10)
Daily foreign-exchange turnover hits $4 trillion Market Watch, William L. Watts (1/9/10)
Banks’ shift pushes FX trading to $4,000bn a day Financial Times, Peter Garnham and Jennifer Hughes (1/9/10)
Demonised ‘algos’ push the surge in FX trading Financial Times, Jennifer Hughes (1/9/10)
A valueless banking boom? BBC News Blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (1/9/10)
Financial crisis boosts London’s dominance in global currency trading Telegraph (1/9/10)
BIS Triennial Survey of Foreign Exchange and Over-the-Counter Interest Rate Derivatives Markets in April 2010 – UK Data Bank of England News Release (1/9/10)

BIS documents
Press Release Bank for International Settlements (1/9/10)
Report “Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and OTC Derivatives Market Activity in April 2010 – Preliminary global results – Turnover” Bank for International Settlements (1/9/10)
Statistical Tables Bank for International Settlements (1/9/10)
Link to previous reports Link from Bank of England site

Questions

  1. Why has the foreign exchange market grown so strongly (a) since 1998; (b) since 2007?
  2. How has the balance of the types of foreign exchange transactions changed since 2007? Explain why.
  3. What are the implications of this growth for the UK economy?
  4. What are the implications of this growth for the stability of exchange rates?
  5. What are ‘algos’ and what benefits (if any) do they bring to the foreign exchange market?
  6. What are the benefits and costs of the growth of foreign exchange carried out on behalf of financial (as opposed to non-financial) businesses?
  7. Where in a balance of payments account would the bulk of foreign exchange transactions be recorded?

The link below is to a podcast by Martin Wolf of the Financial Times. It considers a new book, Fault Lines by Raghu Rajan of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Rajan argues that the global economy is severely unbalanced:

There is a fair amount of consensus that the world economy is in need of rebalancing. Countries like Iceland, Greece, Spain, and the United States overspent prior to the crisis, financing the spending with government or private borrowing, while countries like Germany, Japan, and China supplied those countries goods even while financing their spending habits. Simply put, the consensus now requires U.S. households to save more and Chinese households to spend more in order to achieve the necessary rebalancing.

Martin Wolf identifies these imbalances and discusses various possible solutions. The problem is that what may seem sensible economically is not always feasible politically.

Podcast
Three years and new fault lines threaten Financial Times podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/8/10)

Article
Three years and new fault lines threaten (transcript of podcast) Financial Times podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/8/10)

Questions

  1. What are the fault lines that Martin Wolf identifies?
  2. Have they become more acute since the credit crunch and subsequent recession?
  3. What risks do these fault lines pose to the future health of the global economy?
  4. How do political relationships make integrating the world economy more difficult? What insights does game theory provide for understanding the tensions in these relationships?
  5. Is a policy of export-led growth a wise one for the UK to pursue?
  6. Explain why global demand may be structurally deficient.

The demise of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency has been predicted for a long time now. Yet it is still way surpasses other currencies, such as the euro and yen, as the main reserve currency of most countries. Also it still dominates world trade with much of international trade being priced in dollars. Indeed, as the eurozone reeled from the Greek debt crisis in early February (see A Greek tragedy and Debt and the euro) so investors sold euros and bought dollars. The dollar gained 12 per cent against the euro from December 2009 to February 2010 (from $1 = €0.66 on 1/12/09 to $1 = €0.74 by mid February).

But a number of economists, investors and officials argue that the dollar’s dominance is gradually being eroded:

As the United States racks up staggering deficits and the center of economic activity shifts to fast-growing countries such as China and Brazil, these sources fear the United States faces the risk of another devaluation of the dollar. This time in slow motion – but perhaps not as slow as some might think. If the world loses confidence in U.S. policies, “there’d be hell to pay for the dollar … Sooner or later, the U.S. is going to have to pay attention to the dollar”, [said Scott Pardee, economics professor at Vermont’s Middlebury College and formerly on the staff of the New York Fed].

So what is likely to be the future of the dollar? Will it remain the number one world reserve currency? Will its position be gradually, or even rapidly eroded? What will happen to the exchange rate of the dollar in the process? Finally, what is the significance of the trade and budget deficits in the USA? Are these of benefit to the rest of the world in providing the necessary dollars to finance world trade and investment? Or are they a source of global imbalance and instability? The following article look at these issues.

How long can the U.S. dollar defy gravity? Reuters, Steven C. Johnson, Kristina Cooke and David Lawder (23/2/10)
Is greenback’s dominance coming to an end? Stuff (New Zealand), Tony Alexander (24/2/10)
Reconstructing The World Economy Eurasia Review, John Lipsky (25/2/10): see final part on Reforming the International Monetary System. See also the following conference paper referred to in this article:
The Debate on the International Monetary System Korea Development Institute / IMF Conference on Reconstructing the World Economy, Seoul, Korea, Isabelle Mateos y Lago (25/2/10)

Questions

  1. To what extent does the world benefit from having the dollar as the main reserve currency?
  2. What is the role of US current account and budget deficits in supporting this reserve currency role? How important is the size of these deficits?
  3. What is likely to happen to the exchange rate of the dollar against other major currencies in the coming years?
  4. What alternatives are there to having the dollar as the world’s main reserve?
  5. Does it matter if China holds $2.3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, with nearly $800 billion in US Treasury debt?
  6. Why is the value of its currency a less urgent problem for the USA ‘than it would be for other borrowers who borrow and pay for imports with dollars’?
  7. What are ‘currency swap accords’ and why are they important for China?
  8. What are the implications of the Chinese yuan being undervalued against the dollar by as much as 40%?