Category: Essentials of Economics: Ch 08

You might think that small environmentally-friendly companies would be moving into the green energy market: that setting up a wind farm, for example, would be a perfect business opportunity for a small company. In fact, the big companies are taking over this market. As the Der Spiegel article below states:

Europe’s wind energy sector is currently experiencing a major transformation. New massive offshore wind parks are soon expected to crop up off Europe’s coastline. Big companies like Siemens and General Electrics are increasing their stakes in a market worth billions. But experts warn that a new energy oligopoly may soon emerge.

So what is it about the wind energy market that makes it suitable for an oligopoly to develop? The two articles explore this question.

Winds of Change Der Spiegel, Nils-Viktor Sorge (1/11/10)
GE and Siemens Outpacing Wind Pioneers, Becoming Clean Energy’s “New Oligopoly” Fast Company, David Zax (2/11/10)

Questions

  1. What market failures are there in the wind energy market?
  2. What barriers to entry are there in the wind energy market?
  3. What economies of scale are there in this market?
  4. How are changes in this market affecting the minimum efficient scale of companies?
  5. Would there be room in the market for enough competitors to prevent collusion?
  6. How might the authorities prevent (a) open and (b) tacit collusion in the wind energy market?
  7. Do small wind energy companies have any market advantages?

Student fees are set to rise to between £6000 and £9000 per year from 2012 (see Will students be Browned off?. But I’m sure you know that already! Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate about the effects on student debt and whether potential students will be put off from applying to university. But there is another issue, explored in the article below. This is the question of the ‘marketisation’ of higher education.

With the exception of the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and maths) universities will no longer receive any teaching subsidy from the government. Teaching will have to be funded from student fees. This means that provision will depend on supply and demand. If there is a high demand for certain courses, then the courses will be financially viable for universities. If not, they will have to close (unless the university chooses to cross-subsidise them from other profitable courses).

This might be fine if the market for university places were perfectly competitive and if questions of inequality of access were fully taken into account. But the higher education market is not perfect. The article looks at some of these imperfections and why, therefore, a pure market system will fail to achieve the optimum allocation of university places.

Browne’s Gamble London Review of Books, Stefan Collini (4/11/10)

Questions

  1. What information failures are there in the market for higher education places?
  2. What externalities are involved in higher education and will this lead to an over or underprovision of higher education in a pure market system?
  3. Apart from externalities and information asymmetries, what other market failures apply to the market for student places in HE?
  4. What are the arguments for subsidising non-STEM subjects (as well as STEM ones)? Should these subsidies vary from course to course and from university to university?
  5. What is the best way of tackling the problem of unequal access to higher education?

Competition authorities across the world are in a constant battle against the abuse of monopoly power and the collusion of oligopolists to gang up against the consumer. They are also concerned with mergers where these result in a reduction in competition. The following articles look at market power in Australia and at some high profile cases of oligopolist collusion. Examples include the big four banks in Australia and the two supermarket giants, Coles and Woolworths, which dominate the sector.

The articles also examine the role of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australia’s equivalent to the UK’s Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading (soon to be merged).

Articles
Get out of monopoly free cards can’t be left to the roll of the dice Sydney Morning Herald, Jessica Irvine (27/10/10)
Australia watchdog adds voice to criticism of banks Reuters (22/10/10)
Major banks to beat wage rise The Australian, Blair Speedy (6/10/10)
Analysis: Australian firms forced into deals abroad Reuters, Michael Smith and Sonali Paul (21/10/10)
Hockey outlines plan for banking reform Business Spectator (25/10/10)
Banks are laughing all the way to… the bank Sydney Morning Herald, Josh Gordon (24/10/10)
Xenophon: ACCC Allows Woolworths & Lowes to Hurt Consumers & Competition Mathaba (27/10/10)
Woolies still the target of Coles firepower Sydney Morning Herald, Michael Baker (27/10/10)

Competition authority in Australia
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Questions

  1. In what ways can competition authorities bring about greater competition in oligopolistic industries?
  2. Explain the distinction between a demand-side and a supply-side approach to competition policy.
  3. Why do Australian airlines find it more difficult than Australian banks to pass on cost increases to consumers?
  4. Are highly competitive markets always better for consumers than oligopolistic ones? Explain.

As part of its drive to reduce the number of ‘quangos’ (quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organisations), the government has decided to merger the two main competition authorities: the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading. The aim is to streamline the investigation of mergers, restrictive practices and the abuse of monopoly power, thereby saving costs and reducing the time taken before a decision is made. At present an initial OFT investigation can take many months before a reference is then made to the Competition Commission, which then starts the process of investigation from the beginning again.

Business leaders have welcomed the announcement, seeing the merger as a means of simplifying and speeding up investigations. But will the proposal be more effective in preventing the abuse of market power and encouraging competition? The following articles look at some of the issues.

OFT merger to shake up competition regime in UK Belfast Telegraph (15/10/10)
Competition lawyers gear up for merger of OFT and Competition Commission Legal Week, Friederike Heine (14/10/10)
Labour’s antitrust system dismantled Financial Times, Michael Peel (13/10/10)
Watchdog merger that merits review Financial Times (14/10/10)
Merged competition agency divides opinion Financial Times, Michael Peel (14/10/10)
Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission to merge Guardian, Julia Kollewe (14/10/10)
Concerns at merger of OFT and Competition Commission Telegraph, Alistair Osborne (15/10/10)

Questions

  1. What are the current roles and responsibilities of the OFT and the Competition Commission?
  2. What types of market abuse are the two agencies designed to reduce or prevent? What instruments do they have at their disposal for enforcing their findings?
  3. What are the arguments in favour of the merger of the two agencies?
  4. What are the dangers of the merger?
  5. How will consumer protection be provided under the new regime?

Governments and businesses across the world have been trying to become more environmentally friendly, as everyone becomes more concerned with climate change and emissions. In the UK, incentives had been put in place to encourage large-scale organisations to reduce their consumption of gas and electricity. The Carbon Reduction Commitment Scheme began in April 2010, with companies and public-sector orgainisations required to record their energy consumption. Then in April 2011 it was planned that those consuming over 6000 MWh of electricity per year (about £500,000 worth) would be required to purchase ‘allowances’ of £12 for each tonne of carbon dioxide that is emitted by their use of fuel: electricity, gas, coal and other fuels. This would require the organisations working out their ‘carbon footprint’, using guidance from the Department of Energy and Climate Change. In the case of coal and gas, the emissions would be largely from burning the fuel. In the case of electricity it would be largely from generating it.

The government had intended to use the revenue received from the sale of allowances to pay subsidies to those firms which were the most successful in cutting their emissions.

By raising money from the largest emitters via a levy and giving it back as a ‘refund’ to those who cut their usage the most, the government would not have been able to raise any revenue, but it did tackle the core of the problem – reducing emissions. However, following the Spending Review, this scheme will now actually generate revenue for the government. Paragraph 2.108 on page 62 of the Spending Review states the following:

The CRC Energy Efficiency scheme will be simplified to reduce the burden on businesses,
with the first allowance sales for 2011-12 emissions now taking place in 2012 rather than 2011. Revenues from allowance sales totalling £1 billion a year by 2014-15 will be used to support the public finances, including spending on the environment, rather than recycled to participants. Further decisions on allowance sales are a matter for the Budget process.

Over 5000 firms and other organisations will now find that their hard work in cutting usage and being more environmentally friendly will give them much less reward, as the revenue raised from the levy will remain in the Treasury. All that firms will now gain from cutting emissions is a reduction their levy bill. The extra £1bn or more raised each year from the scheme will undoubtedly be beneficial for tackling the budget deficit, but it will no longer provide subsidies to firms which reduce their emissions. Furthermore, PriceWaterhouseCooper estimates that it will cost businesses with an average gas and electricity bill of £1 million an extra £76,000 in the first year and this may increase to an additional cost of £114,000 per year by 2015.

It’s hardly surprising that businesses are angry, especially when this withdrawal of subsidy, which some have dubbed a ‘stealth tax’, was not mentioned in the Chancellor’s speech, but was left to the small print of the Spending Review announcement. The following articles look at this highly controversial plan.

Articles
Spending Review: Large firms ‘face green stealth tax’ BBC News (21/910/10)
Business lose out via £1bn-a-year green ‘stealth tax’ Management Today, Emma Haslett (21/10/10)
Fury over £1bn green stealth tax in spending review Telegraph, Rowena Mason (20/10/10)
Is ‘stealth’ tax a threat to UK economy going green? BBC News, Roger Harrabin (20/10/10)
Green spending review – it could have been a whole lot worse Business Green, James Murray (20/10/10)
Coalition hits big business with stealth carbon tax Business Green, James Murray (20/10/10)
UK government hits big businesses with stealth carbon tax Reuters, James Murray (20/10/10)
UK’s carbon tax bombshell takes business by surprise Reuters, Will Nichols and James Murray (21/10/10)
CRC allowances sting in UK Spending Review The Engineer, M&C Energy Group (22/10/10)

The CRC scheme
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Department of Energy and Climate Change

Questions

  1. How does a tax affect the supply curve and what would be the impact on the equilibrium price and quantity?
  2. To what extent might this “stealth tax” (i.e. withdrawal of subsidy) adversely affect (a) businesses in the UK; (b) the economy more generally?
  3. Why will firms have to re-look at their cash flow, costs and revenue following this change? How might this affect business strategy?
  4. By taxing firms using more gas and electricity, what problem is the government trying to solve? (Think about market failure.)