In many parts of the UK, bus services are run by a single operator. In other parts, it is little different, with the main operator facing competition on only a very limited number of routes. Over the whole of England, Scotland and Wales there are 1245 bus operators, but the ‘big five’ (Arriva, FirstGroup, Go-Ahead, National Express and Stagecoach) carry some 70% of passengers. Generally these five companies do not compete with each other, but, instead, operate as monopolies, or near monopolies, in their own specific areas. On average, the largest operator in an urban area runs 69% of local bus services.
Given this lack of competition and potential abuse of monopoly power, the Office of Fair Trading referred local bus services in Great Briatin (excluding London) to the Competition Commission (CC) in January 2010. The CC has just published its final report. Paragraph 5 of the summary to the report states:
We concluded that there were four features of local bus markets which mean that effective head-to-head competition is uncommon and which limit the effectiveness of potential competition and new entry. These features are the existence of: high levels of concentration; barriers to entry and expansion; customer conduct in deciding which bus to catch; and operator conduct by which operators avoid competing with other operators in ‘Core Territories’ (certain parts of an operator’s network which it regards as its ‘own’ territory) leading to geographic market segregation.
And paragraph 8 states:
We decided on a package of remedies with three main elements to address the AECs [adverse effects on competition] that we found. First, the remedies include market-opening measures to reduce barriers to entry and expansion, thereby reducing market concentration and providing an environment in which competition is likely to be sustained. By reducing barriers to entry and expansion, we also expect it to become harder for operators to sustain a coordinated outcome. Second, the remedies include measures to promote competition in relation to the tendering of contracts for supported services. Third, we made recommendations about the wider policy and regulatory environment, including emphasizing compliance with and effective enforcement of competition law.
The following articles look at the findings of the report and at the potential for improving the service to passengers, in terms of quality, frequency and price.
Articles
Competition regulator outlines bus market shake-up The Telegraph (20/12/11)
Bus market not competitive, Competition Commission says BBC News (20/12/11)
Passengers ‘need more bus rivalry’ Press Association (20/12/11)
Competition Commission publications
CC sets out Future Destination for Bus Market Competition Commission News Release (20/12/11)
Bus Market Inquiry: Final Report, Case Studies and Appendices Competition Commission (20/12/11)
Local Bus Services: Accompanying Documents Competition Commission (20/12/11)
Questions
- What are the barriers to entry in the market for local bus services?
- In what circumstances are local bus services a natural monopoly? Is this generally the case?
- In a non-regulated bus market, how could established operators use predatory pricing to drive out new entrants?
- How may offering reductions for return tickets reduce competition on routes where there is a large operator and one or more smaller ones?
- What practices can established large operators use to drive out smaller competitors?
- Go through the four reasons given by the CC why head-to-head competition in local bus markets is uncommon and in each case consider what remedies could be adopted by the regulator or by local authorities.
- Which of the remedies proposed by the CC involve encouraging more competition and which involve tighter regulation?
Ministers from around the world met in Durban in the first two weeks of December 2011 to hammer out a deal on tackling climate change. The aim was that this would replace the Kyoto Treaty, due to expire at the end of 2012.
International climate change agreements are particularly difficult to achieve, as there are several market failures involved. Also, there is considerable ‘gaming’, as each country seeks to negotiate a deal that benefits the world as a whole but which minimises the disadvantages to their own particular country.
The conference ended on the 11 December with a last-minute deal. Both developed and developing countries would for the first time work on a legally binding agreement to limit emissions. This would be drawn up by 2015 and to come into force after 2020. The following articles assess the significance of the agreement and whether it represents real progress or little more than a deal to work on a deal.
Articles
‘Modest’ gains as UN climate deal struck Independent (11/12/11)
Landmark deal saves climate talks Irish Examiner (11/12/11)
Durban climate change: the agreement explained The Telegraph, Louise Gray (11/12/11)
Durban climate conference agrees deal to do a deal – now comes the hard part Guardian, Fiona Harvey and Damian Carrington (13/12/11)
Climate deal: A guarantee our children will be worse off than us Guardian, Damian Carrington (11/12/11)
Durban climate deal: the verdict Guardian, Damian Carrington (12/12/11)
Australia hails Cop 17 agreement News 24 Australia (11/12/11)
Climate talks reach new global accord Financial Times, Andrew England and Pilita Clark (11/12/11)
Durban Climate Talks Produce Imperfect Deals Voice of America, Gabe Joselow (11/12/11)
Critics slam climate agreement t Sydney Morning Herald, Arthur Max (11/12/11)
Deal at last at UN climate change talks Euronews on YouTube (11/12/11)
World still in arrears on climate change pledges Reuters Africa, Barbara Lewis (11/12/11)
New UN climate deal struck, critics say gains modest Hindustan Times (11/12/11)
Climate change: ambition gap Guardian (12/12/11)
Canada leaves Kyoto to avoid heavy penalties Financial Times, Bernard Simon (13/12/11)
Durban Platform Leaves World Sleepwalking Towards Four Degrees Warming Middle East North Africa Financial Network, Ben Grossman-Cohen and Georgette Thomas (Oxfam) (13/12/11)
A deal in Durban The Economist (11/12/11)
Assessing the Climate Talks — Did Durban Succeed? Harvard University – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – An Economic View of the Environment, Robert Stavins (12/12/11)
Questions
- What was agreed at the Durban Climate Change Conference?
- Why is it difficult to get agreement on measures to tackle climate change? How is game theory relevant to explaining the difficulties in reaching an agreement?
- How would you set about establishing the ‘optimal’ amount of emissions reductions?
- Why will the market fail to provide the optimal amount of emissions reductions?
- Why was it felt not possible for a legally binding international agreement to come into force before 2020?
Most people are risk-averse: we like certainty and are generally prepared to pay a premium for it. The reason is that certainty gives us positive marginal utility and so as long as the price of insurance (which gives us certainty) is less than the price we place on certainty, we will be willing to pay a positive premium. By having insurance, we know that should the unexpected happen, someone else will cover the risk. As long as there are some risk-averse people, there will always be a demand for insurance.
However, will private companies will be willing to supply it? For private market insurance to be efficient, 5 conditions must hold:
1. Probabilities must be independent
2. Probabilities must be less than one
3. Probabilities must be known or estimable
4. There must be no adverse selection
5. There must be no moral hazard
If these conditions hold or if there are simple solutions, then insurance companies will be willing and able to provide insurance at a price consumers are willing to pay.
There are many markets where we take out insurance – some of them where insurance is compulsory, including home and car insurance. However, one type of insurance that is not compulsory is that for cyclists. No insurance is needed to cycle on the road, but with cycle use increasing and with that the number of accidents involving cyclists also increasing, the calls for cyclists to have some type of insurance is growing. If they are hit by someone without insurance and perhaps suffer from a loss of income; or if they cause vehicle damage, they will receive no compensation. However, whilst the risk of accident is increasing for cyclists, they are still statistically less likely to cause an accident than motorists. Perhaps a mere £30 or £40 per year for a policy is a price worth paying to give cyclists certainty. At least, this is what the Association of British Insurers (ABI) is claiming – hardly surprising when their members made a combined loss of £1.2 billion!
Articles
Cyclists ‘urged to get insurance’ BBC News, Maleen Saeed (26/11/11)
Cyclists urged to get more insurance by … insurance companies Road.CC, Tony Farrelly (26/11/11)
The future of cycle insurance Environmental Transport Assocaition (24/11/11)
Questions
- With each of the above conditions required for private insurance to be possible, explain why each must hold.
- What do we mean by no moral hazard and no adverse selection? Why would their existence prevent a private company from providing insurance?
- Using the concept of marginal utility theory, explain why there is a positive demand insurance.
- What might explain why cyclists are less likely to take out insurance given your answer to the above question?
- Do you think cyclist insurance should be compulsory? If governments are trying to encourage more sustainable transport policy, do you think this is a viable policy?
The price of petrol at the pumps has risen substantially over the past few years. In the UK, according to the AA, the average price between January and June 2011 was 133.13p. In the same period in 2010 it was 116.68p; and in the same period in 2008 it was 109.00p.
Over the first six months of 2011, the amount of petrol sold fell by 5.2 per cent. This was on top of the decline in consumption over the previous four years. Between 2006 and 2010 consumption of petrol fell by 17.4%. The consumption of petrol and diesel are given in the following table.
UK consumption of petrol and diesel (tonnes millions)
|
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
| Petrol |
18.14 |
17.59 |
16.68 |
15.76 |
14.99 |
| Diesel |
20.15 |
21.07 |
20.61 |
20.06 |
20.87 |
| Total |
38.29 |
38.66 |
37.29 |
35.82 |
35.86 |