Category: Economics: Ch 07

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The European Commission’s latest battle with Apple – The interoperability obligation of the Digital Markets Act

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) outlines a new regulatory approach that the European Commission (EC) is taking to address concerns over the lack of competition in digital platform markets. The DMA complements existing European Union competition law and officially came into force on 1st November 2022.

In the first stage of this new regulatory approach, the EC identified ten core platform services (CPS). Examples include search engines, online social networking services, video sharing services, cloud computing services, web browsers and operating systems. These services act as important gateways for large numbers of businesses and consumers to interact with one another. They also have some important economic characteristics, such as large economies of scale and very strong network effects.

The next stage of the regulatory process was to assess which of the large established businesses should be designated as ‘gatekeepers’ of these CPS. To be judged as a gatekeeper, a business had to meet three qualitative criteria. Using quantitative thresholds as a guide to see if these qualitative criteria had been met, the following six companies were designated as gatekeepers by the EC in September 2023: Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (owner of TikTok), Meta (owner of Facebook) and Microsoft. Individual companies can be gatekeeper for more than one CPS. For example, Apple was judged to be a gatekeeper for both web browsers (Safari) and operating systems (iOS and iPadOS).

Rules and compliance

Once a business has been designated as a gatekeeper for one or more CPS, the DMA imposes a set of rules on its future conduct. Some of these rules refer to conduct that the business must follow, while others refer to types of behaviour that are prohibited. The EC sometimes refer to these rules as a list of “do’s” and “don’ts”.

One of the rules refers to interoperability. This is the degree to which different (a) software, (b) devices and (c) other applications can work seamlessly together (i.e. share functionality/data) without requiring any actions by the user (i.e. how compatible they are with one another).

For example, consider the degree of interoperability between the operating system of a gatekeeper, such as Apple, and other hardware/software services. One of the requirements of the DMA is for the gatekeeper to provide the same degree of interoperability for the hardware/software services provided by rival businesses as they do for similar hardware/software services they supply. This is sometimes referred to as the interoperability obligation.

Once a business is designated as a gatekeeper, it has 6 months to submit a compliance report to the EC that demonstrates how it is meeting the rules set out in the DMA. This should include descriptions of any changes the company has had to make to its conduct to meet the new requirements. Further compliance reports must then be submitted on an annual basis.

If, after assessing a compliance report, the EC suspects that a gatekeeper is still acting in ways that do not comply with the DMA, then it can launch either a non-compliance or specification procedure.

The case of Apple

Apple submitted its first compliance report on 7 March 2024. It was far less extensive than those completed by other designated gatekeepers and adopted a very different tone: it directly challenged the EC’s view that the DMA rules would have a positive impact on consumer welfare.

In September 2024, the EC launched its first two specification proceedings that focused on Apple’s compliance with the interoperability obligation.

The first of these proceedings opened a formal discussion with Apple over the interoperability between the iPhone operating system (iOS) and connected devices such as smartwatches and headphones. The proceeding identified nine features that gave the iOS greater functional compatibility with connected devices produced by Apple than with those made by other businesses. For example:

  • Only users of connected devices produced by Apple can (a) receive iOS notifications that contain images or other attachments and (b) select the iOS notifications they want to appear on the device.
  • Only users of Apple’s wireless headphones have intelligent audio switching functionality that allows them to switch automatically to the device playing the most relevant audio.
  • The Airdrop function, which enables users to share files wirelessly between devices, only works if they are both produced by Apple.
  • Only connected devices made by Apple have the functionality for high-bandwidth data transfer from an iPhone without having to rely on network or cellular connection. This is useful for gaming and AI services.

The second specification proceeding focused on the process developed by Apple to deal with requests from other businesses that wanted to develop hardware or software services that are compatible with the iOS.

On 18th December 2024, the EC informed Apple of its preliminary specification decisions and opened a consultation exercise with other interested parties about the suitability of its proposals. Once this process was completed, the EC informed Apple of its final specification decisions on 19 March 2025.

The EC’s decisions

The first decision included a set of measures that Apple must take to improve the interoperability of connected devices produced by other businesses with the iOS. The EC stated that:

The interoperability solutions for third parties will have to be equally effective to those available to Apple and must not require more cumbersome system setting or additional user friction.

The second decision outlined measures that Apple had to take to improve the process of dealing with requests for greater compatibility with the iOS. For example, it should provide outside businesses with more (a) access to technical documentation, (b) predictable timelines for the reviews and (c) timely updates.

Apple argued that being forced to introduce these measures will (a) create significant additional costs, (b) limit its ability to develop products that work seamlessly with one another and (c) lead to its having to share sensitive customer information with its rivals.

On 30th May 2025, Apple filed an appeal against the EC’s specification decisions to the General Court of the European Union. It will be interesting to see what judgment is made on this case by the General Court and the implications this has for the enforcement of the DMA.

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Articles

Questions

  1. Identifying core platform services is similar to defining relevant markets in standard competition policy but takes a more legalistic approach. Discuss some of the problems of defining a relevant market for a digital platform.
  2. Outline the three qualitative criteria and the quantitative thresholds that are used by the EC to designate a digital platform as a gatekeeper of a core platform service.
  3. Find an example of a digital platform that met the quantitative thresholds but did not meet the qualitative criteria and so was not designated as a gatekeeper.
  4. Find an example of a digital platform that did not meet the quantitative thresholds but did meet the qualitative criteria and so was designated as a gatekeeper.
  5. Interoperability is a type of conduct that is sometimes referred to as self-preferencing: i.e. behaviour by a digital platform that gives its own products/services preferential treatment over those provided by other firms that use the same platform. What other types of conduct are possible examples of self-preferencing?
  6. What is the difference between a non-compliance procedure and a specification procedure? Find some recent examples of non-compliance procedures that have been undertaken by the EC to enforce the DMA.
  7. What are the potential advantages and disadvantages for consumer welfare of the specification decisions made by the EC?
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Competition policy – the evolving approach towards firms that misuse market power

The enforcement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the European Commission (EC) tends to focus on exclusionary abuses by firms with significant market power. Exclusionary abuses are actions that limit or prevent competition, as opposed to exploitative abuses that directly harm the consumer, such as charging high prices.

The treatment of exclusionary abuses has evolved over time. Initially, the approach towards enforcement was form-based (i.e. the nature of the abuses), but this changed when the EC produced new guidelines in 2009 which signalled a move to a more effects-based approach.

The EC plans to produce a new set of guidelines in 2025 and published a draft version in August 2024 as part of the consultation process with businesses and other stakeholders. These draft guidelines indicate a partial shift back to a form-based approach. Any moves in this direction made by the EC are likely to influence both national-level competition authorities and the courts.

The form-based approach to policy enforcement

A form-based approach to the enforcement of Article 102 assumes that certain types of business conduct are inherently anti-competitive except in very exceptional circumstances. In other words, there is a presumption that the characteristics or form of the behaviour mean that it must have a negative impact on competition and consumer welfare in virtually all real-world cases.

With a form-based approach to enforcement there is no requirement for the authorities to carry out detailed case-specific analyses of business conduct as part of an investigation. This had been the approach adopted by the EC before 2009. It is possible, however, that the same form of business conduct could have anti-competitive effects in some market situations but pro-competitive effects in others. The EC was criticised for not making enough allowance for the chances of this happening.

The effects-based approach to policy enforcement

In response to this criticism the European Union published a new set of guidelines in 2009 which signalled that the enforcement of Article 102 was moving to a more effects-based approach. The effects-based approach uses economic analysis to assess the impact of a dominant firm’s conduct on a case-by-case basis. Context-specific evidence is examined by the competition authorities to see if the behaviour effectively excludes rival businesses from the market that are just as efficient as the dominant firm.

The use of economics in this effects-based approach gradually increased over time. Initially, the analysis was predominately based on theoretical arguments, but increasingly cases included sophisticated analysis of market-specific evidence using econometric models and market simulations. This, however, led to the following issues.

  • The increasing use of complex economic analysis makes it more difficult to meet the evidentiary standards of the courts and prove a case. As the effects-based approach places a greater burden on the competition authorities to meet these evidentiary standards (i.e. provide evidence of case-specific anti-competitive effects of the conduct) it disproportionality affects their ability to prove cases.
  • Businesses with significant market power are more likely to make large profits and so have access to greater resources than government-funded competition authorities. Therefore, they will be able to employ more economic consultants with the relevant technical expertise to (a) carry out the analysis and (b) communicate the findings effectively in a court case

This led to concerns that the competition authorities were losing cases where there was strong evidence of exclusionary conduct by the dominant firm.

In response to these concerns, the EC announced in 2023 that it would be revising its 2009 guidelines to improve enforcement of Article 102.

The draft guidelines

The draft guidelines published in August 2024 split different types of potentially anti-competitive conduct by dominant firms into three categories.

The first category includes types of conduct where there is a strong presumption of anti-competitive effects: i.e. the sole purpose of the business behaviour is to restrict competition. These types of conduct are referred to as a ‘naked restriction’ and the documentation provides the following three examples:

  • making payments to customers (typically other businesses) on the condition that they cancel or postpone the launch of a product that uses inputs produced by the dominant firm’s rivals;
  • threatening to withdraw discounts offered to suppliers unless they agree to supply the dominant firm’s product in place of a similar product produced by a rival firm;
  • actively dismantling infrastructure used by a rival firm.

The guidelines indicate a form-based approach will be taken when investigating these types of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any case-specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. A business under investigation can challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects with appropriate evidence, but the guidelines make it clear that this would only succeed in exceptional circumstances. In other words, it is highly unlikely that the conduct could ever be justified on pro-competitive grounds.

The second category of anti-competitive conduct includes actions that are also presumed to have a negative impact on competition. The presumption, however, is not as strong as with naked restrictions, so firms have a better chance of proving pro-competitive effects.

There is a form-based element towards this second category of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any initial case specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. But, if a business under investigation does submit evidence to challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects, the EC must demonstrate that (a) it has fully assessed this evidence and (b) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the conduct does have pro-competitive effects. As part of this process, the EC can provide its own case-specific evidence. Therefore, for this second category of conduct, the initial burden of proof effectively shifts from the competition authority to the firm under investigation, making it more of a form-based approach. However, if the firm uses relevant evidence to appeal its case, the burden shifts back to the competition authority and becomes a more effects-based approach.

The third category includes types of conduct where the EC must initially provide case-specific evidence that it reduces competition. For this category of conduct, the approach towards enforcement remains the same as in the 2009 guidelines and an effects-based approach is adopted.

It will be interesting to see the extent to which the final guidelines (a) follow the approach outlined in the draft guidance and (b) influence the enforcement of Article 102 by the EC and other national-level competition authorities.

Articles

Questions

  1. What exactly does it mean if a firm has ‘significant’ market power?
  2. What methods do competitions authorities use to assess whether a firm has a dominant market position?
  3. Explain the difference between conduct by dominant firm that is (a) an exploitative abuse of its market power and (b) an exclusionary abuse of its market power.
  4. Explain why a form-based approach towards the enforcement of competition policy is more likely to lead to Type 1 errors (false positives), whereas an effects-based approach is more likely to lead to Type 2 errors (false negatives).
  5. Provide some examples of exclusionary abuses that are not considered to be naked restrictions.
  6. Competition policy guidance documents commonly refer to ‘competition on the merits’. What is the precise meaning of this term?
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Vetting vets

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.

At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.

This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:

  • Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
  • Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
  • Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
  • Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.
  • The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
  • Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
  • The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
  • The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
  • Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.

The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:

In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.

Market failures in the veterinary industry

The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.

A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.

The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.

Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.

Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.

Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.

Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.

The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.

Articles

CMA documents

Questions

  1. How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
  2. Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
  3. What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
  4. How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
  5. Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
  6. Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?
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The UK’s national fixed broadband network – wasteful duplication or effective competition?

You may have recently noticed construction workers from different businesses digging up the roads/pavements near where you live. You may also have noticed them laying fibre optic cables. Why has this been happening? Does it make economic sense for different companies to dig up the same stretch of pavement and lay similar cables next to one another?

For many years the UK had one national fixed communication network that was owned by British Telecom (BT) – the traditional phone landline made from copper wire. This is now operated by OpenReach – part of the BT group but a legally separate division. In addition to this national infrastructure, Virgin Media (formed in 2007 from the merged cable operators, Telewest and NTL) has gradually built up a rival fixed broadband network that now covers just over 50 per cent of the country.

Although customers have only had very limited choice over which fixed communication network to use, they have had far greater choice over which Internet service provider (ISP) to sign up for. This has been possible as the industry regulator, Ofcom, forces OpenReach to provide rival ISPs such as Sky Broadband, TalkTalk and Zen with access to its network.

Expansion of the fibre optic network

Recent government policy has tried to encourage and incentivise the replacement of the copper wire network with one that is fully fibre. This is often referred to as Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) or Fibre to the Home (FTTH). A fixed network of fully fibre broadband enables much faster download speeds and many argue that it is vital for the future competitiveness of the UK economy.

Replacing the existing fixed communication network with fibre optic cables is expensive. It can involve major civil works: i.e. the digging up of roads and pavements to install new ducts to lay the fibre optic cables inside.

Over a hundred companies, that are not part of either OpenReach or Virgin Media O2 (the parent company of Virgin Media), have recently been digging up pavements/roads and laying new fibre optic cables. Known as alternative network providers (altnets) or independent networks, these businesses vary in size, with many of them securing large loans from banks and private investors. By the middle of 2023, 2.5 million premises in the UK had access to at least two or more of these independent networks.

After a slow initial response to the altnets, OpenReach has recently responded by rapidly installing FTTP. The business is currently building 62 000 connections every week and plans to have 25 million premises connected by the end of 2026. In July 2022, Virgin Media O2 announced that it was establishing a new joint venture with InfraVia Capital Partners. Called Nexfibre, this business aims to connect 5 million premises to FTTP by 2026.

Is the fibre optic network a natural monopoly?

Some people argue that the fixed communication network is an example of a natural monopoly – an industry where a single firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms. To what extent is this true?

An industry is a natural monopoly where the minimum efficient scale of production (MES) is larger than the market demand for the good/service. This is more likely to occur where there are significant economies of scale. Digging up roads/pavements, installing new ducts and laying fibre optic cable are clear examples of fixed costs. Once the network is built, the marginal cost of supplying customers is relatively small. Therefore, this industry has significant economies of scale and a relatively large MES. This has led many people to argue that building rival fixed communication networks is wasteful duplication and will lead to higher costs and prices.

However, when judging if a sector is a natural monopoly, it is always important to remember that a comparison needs to be made between the MES and the size of the market. An industry could have significant economies of scale, but not be an example of a natural monopoly if the market demand is significantly larger than the MES.

In the case of the fixed communication network, the size of the market will vary significantly between different regions of the country. In densely populated urban areas, such as large towns and cities, the demand for services provided via these networks is likely to be relatively large. Therefore, the MES could be smaller than the size of the market, making competition between network suppliers both possible and desirable. For example, competition may incentivise firms to innovate, become more efficient and reduce costs.

Research undertaken for the government by the consultancy business, Frontier Economics, found that at least a third of UK households live in areas where competition between three or more different networks is economically desirable.

By contrast, in more sparsely populated rural areas, demand for the services provided by these networks will be smaller. The fixed costs per household of installing the network over longer distances will also be larger. Therefore, the MES is more likely to be greater than the size of the market.

The same research undertaken by Frontier Economics found that around 10 per cent of households live in areas where the fixed communication network is a natural monopoly. The demand and cost conditions for another 10 per cent of households meant it is not commercially viable to have any suppliers.

Therefore, policies towards the promotion of competition, regulation, and government support for the fixed communication network might have to be adjusted depending on the specific demand and cost conditions in a particular region.

Articles

Review

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between fixed and wireless communication networks.
  2. Draw a diagram to illustrate a profit-maximising natural monopoly. Outline some of the implications for allocative efficiency.
  3. Discuss some of the issues with regulating natural monopolies, paying particular attention to price regulation.
  4. The term ‘overbuild’ is often used to describe a situation where more than one fibre broadband network is being constructed in the same place. Some people argue that incumbent network suppliers deliberately choose to use this term to imply that the outcome is harmful for society. Discuss this argument.
  5. An important part of government policy in this sector has been the Duct and Pole Access Strategy (DPA). Illustrate the impact of this strategy on the average cost curve and the minimum efficient scale of production for fibre broadband networks.
  6. Draw a diagram to illustrate a region where (a) it is economically viable to have two or more fibre optic broadband network suppliers and (b) where it is commercially unviable to have any broadband network suppliers without government support.
  7. Some people argue that network competition provides strong incentives for firms to innovate, to become more efficient and reduce costs. Draw a diagram to illustrate this argument.
  8. Explain why many ‘altnets’ are so opposed to OpenReach’s new ‘Equinox 2’ pricing scheme for its fibre network.
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The continuing controversy over the sale of tickets for live music events

Tickets for Beyonce’s 2023 UK Renaissance tour went on general sale via Ticketmaster’s website at 10am on Tuesday 7 February. Throughout the day, social media were full of messages from fans complaining about technical issues, long online queues and rising prices. This is not the first time this has happened. Similar complaints were made in 2022 when tickets went on sale for tours by Bruce Springsteen, Harry Styles and Taylor Swift.

With the general sale of tickets for Beyonce’s tour, many fans complained they were waiting in online queues of over 500 000 people. Others reported their frustration with continually receiving ‘403 error’ messages.

Market dominance

In November 2022, Ticketmaster’s website in the USA constantly crashed during the pre-sale of tickets for Taylor Swift’s tour. This led to the general sale of tickets being cancelled.

In response to the public anger that followed this decision, the Senate’s antitrust subcommittee organised a hearing with the title – ‘That’s The Ticket: Promoting Competition and Protecting Competition and Protecting Consumers in Live Entertainment.’

Senator Amy Klobuchar, the Chair of this committee, stated that

The issues within America’s ticketing industry were made painfully obvious when Ticketmaster’s website failed hundreds of thousands of fans hoping to purchase tickets for Taylor Swift’s new tour, but these problems are not new. For too long, consumers have faced long waits and website failures, and Ticketmaster’s dominant market position means the company faces inadequate pressure to innovate and improve.

Ticketmaster merged with Live Nation in 2010 to become the largest business in the primary ticket market for live music events. Some people have accused the firm of abusing its dominant market position by failing to invest enough money in its website, so leading to poor customer service.

Dynamic pricing

Fans have also been complaining about the system of dynamic pricing that Ticketmaster now uses for big live events. What exactly is dynamic pricing?

Firms with market power often adjust their prices in response to changing market conditions. For example, if a business experiences significant increases in demand for its products in one quarter/year it may respond by raising prices in the following quarter/year.

With dynamic pricing, these price changes take place over much shorter time periods: i.e. within minutes. For example, in one media report, a Harry Styles fan placed £155 tickets in their basket for a concert at Wembley stadium. When the same fan then tried to purchase the tickets, Ticketmaster’s website sent a message stating that they were no longer available. However, in reality they were still available but for £386 – the price had instantly jumped because of high demand. Continually monitoring market conditions and responding to changes so quickly requires the use of specialist software and sophisticated algorithms.

Arguments for dynamic pricing

With ticket sales taking place months/years in advance of most live events, it is difficult for artists/promotors to predict future levels of demand. Given this uncertainty and the importance for the artist of playing in front of a full venue, event organisers may err on the side of caution when pricing tickets.

If the demand for tickets proves to be much stronger than initially forecast, then resellers in the secondary market can take advantage of the situation and make significant amounts of money. Dynamic pricing enables sellers in the primary market, such as Ticketmaster, to adjust to market conditions and so limits the opportunities of resale for a profit.

Ticketmaster argues that without dynamic pricing, artists will miss out on large amounts of revenue that will go to re-sellers instead. A spokesperson for the company stated that

Over the past few years, artists have lost money to resellers who have no investment in the event going well. As such event organisers have looked to market-based pricing to recapture that lost revenue.

Critics have claimed that Ticketmaster’s use of dynamic pricing is simply an example of price gouging.

No doubt the controversy over the sale of tickets for live music events will continue in the future.

Articles

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between the primary and secondary market for ticket sales for live events.
  2. Draw a demand and supply diagram to illustrate the primary market for tickets. Using this diagram explain how below market clearing prices in the primary market enable re-sellers to make money in the secondary market.
  3. What are the limitations of using demand and supply diagrams to analyse the primary market for tickets?
  4. Who has the greater market power – Ticketmaster or artists such as Taylor Swift and Beyonce?
  5. Try to provide a precise definition of the term ‘price gouging’.
  6. What other sectors commonly use dynamic pricing?