Category: Economics for Business: Ch 06

A major failing of free markets is the principal–agent problem. This is where one party to a transaction (normally the principal) has poorer information than the other (normally the agent). A good example of this is rogue traders from the building trade – “builders who overcharge or do shoddy work”. Often people are persuaded by doorstep sellers to have their drives resurfaced or their roofs felted or to have double glazing installed. But frequently, the unsuspecting homeowner (the principal to the transaction) has little knowledge of the quality of the work being offered by the builder (the agent). This asymmetry of information means that the homeowner could be taken in by clever selling or reassuring statements.

Another example is estate agents. A recent OFT study found that nearly a quarter of estate agents deliberately misdescribe the properties they are selling, either by exaggerating a property’s benefits or omitting to mention problems, or, in some cases, by downright lying.

So how are agents able to exploit principals and what can be done about it? Is the answer to have better regulation, or is there a market solution?

More complaints of rogue traders BBC News, Brian Milligan (14/11/09)
Rogue trader complaints on the up (video) BBC News, Brian Milligan (14/11/09)
Crackdown on rogue doorstep traders Press Association (16/11/09)
Estate agents ‘regularly lie to homebuyers’ Telegraph (12/11/09)
Lying estate agents confronted with home truths Times Online, Rebecca O’Connor (12/11/09)

A summary of the OFT campaign against rogue traders selling at the doorstep can be found at:
Doorstep selling campaign strategy Office of Fair Trading (16/11/09)
The relevant section of the OFT’s site is Doorstep selling
The government’s Consumer Direct agency has four relevant sections on its site:
Doorstep selling, Home Improvements, Buying a home in England and Wales and Buying a home in Scotland

Questions

  1. Give some other examples of the principal–agent problem. Are there any cases where it is the agent that has poorer information and is thus exploited by the principal?
  2. What can bodies such as the Office of Fair Trading and Consumer Direct do to lessen the problem? What factors determine their success?
  3. Discuss the relative merits of alternative solutions to the principal–agent problem.

In a speech to Scottish business organisations, Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, argued that it might be necessary to split banks up. The aim would be to separate the core retail banking business, of receving deposits and lending to individuals and businesses, from the more risky and exotic wholesale acitivites of banks, such as securitisation, speculation and hedging – so-called ‘casino banking’.

Governments around the world, as represented at the G20 meeting at Pittsburg in September, have favoured tougher regulation of banks. But Mervyn King believes that this is not enough. It may not prevent the reckless behaviour that resulted in the credit crunch and bank bailouts by the government. “Never has so much money been owed by so few to so many. And, one might add, so far with little real reform.” And if regulation were to fail and banks were to get into difficulties, what would happen? There would have to be another bailout. As Mervyn King said, “The belief that appropriate regulation can ensure that speculative activities do not result in failures is a delusion.”

There are two key problems.

The first is Goodhart’s Law. If rules are set for bank behaviour, banks may adhere to the letter of the rules, but find ways around them to continue behaving in risky ways. The rules may cease to be a good measure of prudent behaviour.

The second is moral hazard. If banks know that they will be bailed out if they get into difficulties because they are too big to fail, then this encourages them to take the risks. As Mervyn King said in his speech, “The massive support extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history. The ‘too important to fail’ problem is too important to ignore.”

So should the banks be split? Is there any likelihood that they will? Or are Mervyn King’s proposals merely another headache for the government? The following articles looks at the issues. The first link below is to his speech.

Speech by Mervyn King, Governor to Scottish business organisations, Edinburgh (20/10/09)
Mervyn King: bail-outs created ‘biggest moral hazard in history’ (including video of part of speech) Telegraph (20/10/09)
Governor warns bank split needed BBC News (20/10/09)
A sombre warning BBC News, Stephanomics (20/10/09)
Alistair Darling rebuffs Mervyn King’s attack over timidity of banking reforms Guardian (21/10/09)
King and Brown in rift over whether to split the banks Independent (22/10/09)
Tucker set to join calls for stricter controls on banks Scotsman (22/10/09)
Testing times for bank regulators Financial Times (21/10/09)
Mervyn King is right – the economy is changing and we’re blindfolded, without a map Telegraph, Edmund Conway (22/10/09)

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘moral hazard’ in the context of bank bailouts. Are the any ways in which banks could be prevented from failing during a crisis without creating a moral hazard?
  2. Does regulation necessarily involve Goodhart’s Law? To what extent is it possible to devise regulation and avoid Goodnart’s Law?
  3. What are the arguments for and against splitting banks’ core business from more risky ‘casino banking’?
  4. Does the separation of retail and investment banking necessarily involve splitting banks into separate organisations? If they are not split, how can the government or central bank underwrite retail banking without underwriting riskier investment banking?

This podcast is from BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme. It consists of an interview with James Berresford, chief executive of VisitEngland, and Tracy Corrigan, of the Daily Telegraph on the topic of ‘staycations’ – a term used to refer to people holidaying at home rather than going abroad. Staycations are up, but why is this the case; how much have people switched; and is it really a cheaper option?

More people holidaying in England BBC Today Programme (27/8/09)

See also the following articles:
Unemployment Up In Seaside Resorts Despite Era Of The ‘Staycation’ Fresh Business Thinking (22/8/09)
Unemployment up in seaside resorts despite era of the ‘staycation’ TUC (21/8/09)
Haven Holidays sees rise in caravan sales Times Online (26/8/09)
‘Staycation’ Britons reconsider their holiday plans The National (Abu Dhabi) (28/8/09)
Recession-hit Britons abandon foreign holidays in favour of ‘staycations’ Guardian (13/8/09)
Bad weather puts paid to the Great British Staycation Independent on Sunday (22/8/09)

The following are useful sources of evidence:
Visits to the UK up 4 per cent Office for National Statistics News Release (13/8/09)
1.2 Million More Holidays Taken In England As Brits Take Breaks Closer To Home enjoyEngland (7/8/09)
11.9 million Brits to take U.K break this Bank Holiday enjoyEngland (26/8/09)

Questions

  1. What are the determinants of demand for staycations? How have these impacted on the demand for staycations in the UK in summer 2009?
  2. How are the (a) price; (b) income and (c) cross-price elasticities of demand for staycations relevant in determining the demand for staycations?
  3. Why is imperfect information an important problem in making a decision about where to take a holiday and how do risk attitudes affect the decision?
  4. Why has unemployment risen more than the UK national average in many seaside towns?

With recession biting, many people are cutting back on spending. This has not been even across products, however. People have tended to shift from more luxurious products, such as foreign holidays and branded products, to holidays at home and supermarkets’ own-brand products (see Shoppers opt for supermarket brands Financial Times (4/8/09)). There has also been a decline in spending on consumer durables, such as cars, furniture and kitchen appliances.

One sector that has fared better than most, however, is the teenage market. “So far it seems teenagers have not cut back on their shopping. Teen-targeted retailers such as Primark, New Look, H&M, Asos and Hot Topic are all weathering the recession better than rivals aimed at an older demographic.” This is a quote from the first of the two linked articles below, which look at this market and its future prospects.

Teenage spenders struggle to learn BBC News (4/8/09)
Hollister: the shop that smells like teen spirit Times Online (5/8/09)

Questions

  1. How is spending on particular products during a recession related to their income elasticity of demand? How does the income elasticity of demand depend on the length of the time period under consideration?
  2. Why has the teenage market been less susceptible to the recession than many other markets?
  3. To what extent will being ‘bargain savvy’ be enough for teenagers to survive the recession without having to make substantial changes in spending patterns? Consider the concept of price elasticity of demand in your answer.

On July 8 the UK government published its long-awaited White Paper on reform of the system of banking regulation. Several commentators had called for the abolition of the ‘tripartite’ system of regulation, whereby responsibility for ensuring the stability and security of the banking system is shared between the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England and the Treasury. Some have advocated a considerable strengthening of the role of the Bank of England and even abolishing the FSA. What is generally agreed is that there needs to be ‘macro-prudential’ regulation that looks at the whole banking system and at questions of systemic risk and not just at individual banks. Several of the articles below debate this issue.

The government’s White Paper proposes keeping the tripartite system but also strengthening various aspects of regulation. Amongst other things, it proposes giving the FSA powers to ‘penalise banks if their pay policies create unnecessary risks and are not focused on the long-term strength of their institutions’. It also proposes setting up a ‘new Council for Financial Stability – made up of the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury – to meet regularly and report on the systemic risks to financial stability’. Banks would also be required to increase their capital adequacy ratios. The first two articles below give an outline of the proposals. The detailed proposals are contained in the third link, to the Treasury site.

Chancellor moves to rein in ‘risky’ banks Independent (9/7/09)
Banks to face tougher regulation BBC News (8/7/09)
Reforming financial markets HM Treasury (8/7/09)
Treasury sees devil in the detail Financial Times (7/7/09)
How to police the banking system Independent (8/7/09)
City regulation: a quick guide Telegraph (8/7/09)
Treasury White Paper: what it means for the financial services industry Telegraph (8/7/09)
Key issues: Financial regulation BBC News (8/7/09)
Alistair Darling accuses banks of ‘kamikaze’ attitude to loans Telegraph (5/7/09)
HSBC boss on banking reform BBC News video (3/7/09)
Bankers ‘want to be proud of what they do’ BBC Today Programme, Radio 4 (7/7/09)
Divisions on display at Mansion House BBC Newsnight video (18/6/09)
Who should supervise the banks? BBC Newsnight video (18/6/09)
Governor wants more bank powers BBC News video (17/6/09)
King puts spotlight on banks too big to fail Times Online (21/6/09)
Mervyn King: Banks cannot be too big to fail Edmund Conway blog, Telegraph (17/6/09)
The City doesn’t need any more rules Telegraph (6/7/09)
Treasury admits ‘intellectual failure’ behind credit crisis Telegraph (8/7/09)
Bankers to face draconian pay veto Times Online (8/7/09)

Questions

  1. What do you understand by macro-prudential regulation? What would be the difficulties of applying regulation at this level?
  2. Why may liquidity ratios and capital adequacy ratios that are deemed appropriate by individual banks be inappropriate for the banking system as a whole?
  3. If banks are too big to fail, why does this create a moral hazard?
  4. Examine the case for splitting universal banks into retail banks and investment banks.
  5. Examine the arguments for and against regulating the level and nature of remuneration of senior bank executives.