The Gap has been a fixture of UK High Streets for many years and has had both ups and downs. In a highly competitive market, it faces fierce rivals from other high street retailers and also from an increasingly important online presence. Same-shop sales for Gap fell in July by 7% and the brand is now finding itself in a tricky position.
Although the Gap does sell products at a variety of prices, even sales growth in its most affordable line was not sufficient to offset declines elsewhere. It’s not just the UK where this decline is observed, with 175 Gap specialty shops in America being shut down over the next year. This will inevitably mean job losses. So why is Gap struggling so much, after being such a popular brand?
Its competitors are arguably offering a very similar product, but at a lower price. Consumers, being increasingly aware of prices and having many more options to make price comparisons, are perhaps using this information to make better choices. If they don’t believe that they are getting something extra from paying a slightly higher price at Gap, then they’d prefer to get the same thing elsewhere, from somewhere like Forever 21 or H&M. Some also suggest that the product itself is out of date and with the world of high fashion being such an important part of life for many people, an out-of-date product is bad news. That, together with consumers finding more and more things that they can spend their money on, beyond clothes has led to a tricky position for the Gap.
A key part of maintaining a presence on high streets has been sales and special offers – this has been a key element in keeping customers coming, but it is certainly not a long term strategy. Research analysts have been investigating some of the key aspects of the Gap and various comments have been made, including:
“Uniformity is no longer cool… The trick now is convincing your customer that they’re getting something unique.” (Simeon Siegel), Nomura Securities.
“Of top priority is delivering more consistent and compelling product collections.” Kari Shellhorn, Gap spokeswomen.
“Whether it’s colour or print or it’s pattern, the Gap brand hasn’t been kept up to date … Until they have their product right, I think we’ll continue to see them have promotions.” Dana Telsey, Telsey Advisory Group.
The future of Gap is certainly in the balance and with an increasingly competitive market when it comes to retail, an effective strategy to maintain and increase its market share will be essential.
Why Gap is in a tight squeeze BBC News, Gianna Palmer (20/8/15)
Gap Inc sees some potential for next year but Q2 2015 remains weak Forbes, Investing, Trefis Team (24/8/15)
Questions
- What sort of figure would you expect Gap’s clothes to have and why?
- Into which market structure would you place the retail industry? What does this tell us about how a company such as Gap can hope to make profits?
- If you were advising Gap, what strategies would you propose as a means of boosting revenue and cutting costs?
- The BBC News article states that the fortunes of Gap have been hurt by a strong US dollar. Why may this be the case?
In the year to June 2014, Qantas, the Australian airline, posted record losses of $2.8 billion. The airline was seen to be in some serious trouble and engaged in various cost-cutting measures. This, together with help from falling oil prices appears to have reversed this company’s fortunes. It posted profits of $557 million in the year to the end of June 2015.
The airline industry was hit by the financial crisis and subsequent worldwide recession. Holidays are a luxury item, such that when incomes are rising, there is a greater demand for travel abroad. Conversely, when incomes fall (as we see in a recession) demand will fall and this can hurt the revenues and profits of airlines such as Qantas. 
Qantas, in particular, had been struggling with a high degree of competition from other airlines, who are also competing on key long-haul routes, for example Emirates, Etihad and Singapore. Further competition came at home from Virgin Australia, who had significant backing from other large airlines and Qantas found itself unable to compete with such low prices and restrictions on foreign ownership.
However, with significant layoffs, cancelling some unprofitable routes and various other cost-cutting measures, Qantas will return $505 million of profits to its shareholders and will purchase 8 Boeing 787-9 Dreamliners. This will certainly boost confidence in the company and its Chief Executive, Alan Joyce’s comments may well add to this. He said:
“We are halfway through the biggest and fastest transformation in our history … Without that transformation, we would not be reporting this strong profit, recommencing shareholder returns, or announcing our ultra-efficient Dreamliner fleet for Qantas International.”
Although the investment in so many new planes is a large outlay, it is expected that they will improve the efficiency of its fleet, reducing its fuel bill significantly, especially over its longest routes. As these profit figures only represent a job that is half done, it will be interesting to see how Qantas fares with the recovery of the global economy.
Qantas to buy eight Boeing dreamliners after posting profit of $557m The Guardian (20/8/15)
Qantas returns to full-year profit and pledges new growth phase BBC News (20/8/15)
Qantas soars past overhaul to return to profit Wall Street Journal, Rebecca Thurlow (20/8/15)
Qantas injects another $55 million into Jetstar Japan Sydney Morning Herald, Jamie Freed (24/8/15)
Is Qantas set to keep on soaring? Sydney Morning Herald, John Collett (21/8/15)
Qantas to expand fleet after rapid profit turnaround Reuters (20/8/15)
Qantas turnaround gains altitude with swing to profit Financial Times, Jamie Smyth (20/8/15)
Questions
- Into which market structure would you place the airlines industry?
- Consider the different strategies that were adopted by Qantas and in each case, explain whether it would have had an impact on the firm’s costs or revenues.
- Why was Virgin Australia proving to be such fierce competition for Qantas?
- The Wall Street Journal Article refers to Qantas finding it difficult ‘to attract a White Knight’. What is meant by a White Knight?
- What has been the impact of falling global oil prices on the airline industry? Use a diagram to explain your answer.
Deloitte recently published its 24th Annual Review of Football Finance and it contained some surprising results. Historically, most teams in the English Premier League (EPL) have made accounting losses with any increases in revenues being offset by higher wage costs. However, this report found that in 2013–14 most teams in the EPL actually made accounting profits.
The Deloitte’s review reported that the combined operating profits of clubs in the EPL increased from £82 million in 2012–13 to £614 million on 2013–14 – an enormous increase of 649%. Nearly all of the teams (19 out of 20) in the league made an operating profit while 14 also reported pre-tax profits. Dan Jones, head of Deloitte’s Sports Business Group, commented that:
“The change in club profitability in 2013–14 was more profound than anything we could have forecast.”
Why has the profitability of teams in the EPL suddenly improved so dramatically? One important factor was the significant increase in revenue. The combined income of the teams was £3.26 billion in 2013–14 – an increase of £735 million, or 29% on the previous year. Although match-day and commercial revenue both increased, the majority of this growth in income (nearly 80%) came from the sale of broadcast rights. The 2013–14 season was the first year of a new three-year contract that raised over £1.7 billion per year from the sale of these rights in both the UK and overseas.
However, clubs in the EPL have received big increases in revenue from TV deals before and still made substantial accounting losses. For example, the broadcasting contract that ran from 2010–13 generated over £1.1 billion per season – a £243 million per annum increase on the previous deal. Significantly, in the first year of this deal (2010–11), 81% of this increase in revenue went straight into higher player salaries, whereas in 2013–14 this figure was only 16%. The ratio of wages to turnover also fell from 71% in 2012–13 to 58% in 2013–14
So why did a smaller proportion of the increase in revenue go to the players compared with previous years? The explanation appears to be the impact of two new controls and regulations that were implemented by the EPL at the beginning of the 2013–14 season.
One of these has received considerable media attention and is similar to UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations. The Profitability and Sustainability Rules allow the clubs to make a maximum cumulative loss of £105 million over three seasons before having to face sanctions from the league. The size of the permissible loss is significantly higher than in the UEFA regulations.
The other control that has received far less attention is called Short-Term Cost Control (STCC). This regulation places limits on the extent to which clubs can increase their total wage bill. It operates from 2013–14 to 2015&ndash16: i.e. it covers the same three years as the current TV deal. For the 2013–14 season it worked in the following way.
If teams had a wage bill of less than £52 million they faced no restrictions on their spending on players’ salaries. Only Crystal Palace (£46 million) and Hull City (£43 million) fell into this category. Unsurprisingly, the five biggest spending clubs, Man Utd, Man City, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool, had much greater wage bills of £215m, £205m, £192m, £166m and £144m respectively.
Any of the 18 teams that exceeded the £52m limit would still not face sanctions if their wage bill increased by £4 million or less. For example, Stoke City’s wage bill only increased from £60m to £61m, while Tottenham Hotspur’s increased from £96m to £100m. Some clubs actually managed to reduce their total wage bill, including the champions, Manchester City, which managed to lower its from £233m to £215m.
However, there were still 12 teams with a total wage bill that was greater than £52 million in 2013–14 and which had increased by more than £4 million on the previous year. For these teams not to face any sanctions, they had to prove to the EPL that any of the increase above £4 million was either due to player contracts entered into before January 2013 or could by financed from the following two sources.
• Club Own Revenue Uplift
• Profit from player transfers
Whereas the profit from player transfers is straightforward, the ‘Club Own Revenue Uplift’ requires some explanation, as it excludes a very important part of teams’ incomes – Central Fund payments.
Some revenues earned by clubs in the EPL are referred to as ‘Central Fund payments’. These are, in effect, income payments from money that is raised centrally by the EPL on behalf of the clubs and then distributed to the teams using an agreed formula. The majority of the revenue generated under this category is from the broadcast deals, although some commercial income, such as the sponsorship of the league, also falls under this category. For some teams the money raised from Central Fund payments makes up the majority of their revenue.
‘Club Own Revenue’ in STCC calculations refers to all revenues other than those from Central Fund payments. This includes a number of income streams that the club has more direct control over. They include:
• Gate money/other match-day revenue
• Commercial deals negotiated by the individual club
• Income from playing in European competitions, including TV revenue.
The uplift refers to increases in revenue from these sources compared to 2012–13.
For example, assume a club has made no profit from its transfer dealing and did not enter into any significant player contracts prior to January 2013. If this club’s wage bill increased from £100m in 2012–13 to £110m in 2013–14 then it would have to provide evidence to show that £6m of this increase could be financed from growth in its Club Own Revenue. In other words, it would have to demonstrate how its income from gate money, commercial deals and playing in Europe was at least £6m higher in 2013–14 than it had been in 2012–13.
It will be interesting to see if (1) the profitability of the clubs continues to improve in future years and (2) the STCC regulations are extended when the new broadcast deal comes into effect in 2016–17.
The EPL Proves Cost Control Works The Judge 13 (4/6/15)
English Premier League clubs made more revenue than Spain and Italy’s clubs combined UK Business Insider, Lianna Brinded (4/6/15)
Premier League football club revenues and profits soar BBC News, Bill Wilson (4/6/15)
Deloitte Premier League list: Clubs’ revenue boom to £3.3billion as Tottenham record highest ever pre-tax profits after Gareth Bale transfer The Independent, Joanna Bourke (4/6/15)
Annual Review of Football Finance 2015 Premier League clubs generate over £3bn revenue in season of records Deloitte (4/6/15)
Premier League top of the rich list with record income of £3.26bn The Guardian, David Conn (4/6/15)
Questions
- What is the difference between an operating profit and a pre-tax profit?
- If a club reports that it is making an accounting profit, does this mean that it must be making an economic profit? Explain your answer.
- Give some examples of the economic costs of running a football club that might not be included in accounting calculations of profit.
- How is the profit/loss from player transfers calculated?
- Explain why the current rules may give teams that play in European competitions a competitive advantage.
Ever been to the cinema and found it almost empty? And then wondered why you paid the full price? Perhaps you’ve taken advantage of Orange Wednesday or only go if there’s a particularly good film on? Often it might be cheaper to wait until the film is out on DVD!
Going to the cinema can be an expensive outing. The ticket, the popcorm, a drink, ice cream – it all adds up! Orange Wednesday has recently disappeared and this will definitely have an impact on consumption of movies at your local Odeon, Vue or Showcase. The impact will be on how many seats are left empty.
However, a new app could be set to generate revenues for the cinema and provide cheaper entertainment for your everyday consumer. This new app will allow cinemas to send out alerts to people in the local area advising them that a screening will have many empty seats. What’s the incentive? Perhaps a discount, or some food. But, why would they do such a thing?
If a movie is being shown at a cinema, there will be a large fixed cost. However, what happens as each additional consumer enters the theatre? Does the cost to the cinema rise? Perhaps there is a small cost with more cleaning required, but the additional cost of actually showing the film if there 11 rather than 10 people is almost (if not equal to) zero. That is, the marginal cost of an extra user is zero. Therefore, if there is a screening with many empty seats, wouldn’t the cinema be better to offer the seats for half price. After all, if you can earn £5 from selling a ticket and the additional cost is almost zero, then it’s better to sell it for £5 than not sell it for £10! The following article and video from BBC News considers this new app and other strategies to maximise cinema usage!
Apps in pockets, bums on cinema seats BBC News, Dave Lee (27/2/15)
Questions
- What would the budget constraint look like for a cinema where a discount was offered if you purchased two cinema tickets and then received the third ticket for half price?
- Why is the marginal cost of an extra user at the cinema almost zero?
- If the MC = 0, does this mean that a cinema is a public good?
- How will this new app allow a cinema to increase total revenue and profit?
- If it is cheaper to buy a DVD rather than go to a cinema, why do people still go to the cinema?
The recent low price of oil has been partly the result of faltering global demand but mainly the result of increased supply from shale oil deposits. The increased supply of shale oil has not been offset by a reduction in OPEC production. Quite the opposite: OPEC has declared that it will not cut back production even if the price of oil were to fall to $30 per barrel.
We looked at the implications for the global economy in the post, A crude indicator of the economy (Part 2). We also looked at the likely effect on oil prices over the longer term and considered what the long-run supply curve might look like. Here we examine the long-run effect on prices in more detail. In particular, we look at the arguments of two well-known commentators, Jim O’Neill and Anatole Kaletsky, both of whom have articles on the Project Syndicate site. They disagree about what will happen to oil prices and to energy markets more generally in 2015 and beyond.
Jim O’Neill argues that with shale oil production becoming unprofitable at the low prices of late 2014/early 2015, the oil price will rise. He argues that a good indicator of the long-term equilibrium price of oil is the five-year forward price, which is much less subject to speculation and is more reflective of the fundamentals of demand and supply. The five-year forward price is around $80 per barrel – a level to which O’Neill thinks oil prices are heading.
Anatole Kaletsky disagrees. He sees $50 per barrel as a more likely long-term equilibrium price. He argues that new sources of oil have made the oil market much more competitive. The OPEC cartel no longer has the market power it had from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s and from the mid 2000s, when surging Chinese demand temporarily created a global oil shortage and strengthened OPEC’s control of prices. Instead, the current situation is more like the period from 1986 to 2004 when North Sea and Alaskan oil development undermined OPEC’s power and made the oil market much more competitive.
Kaletsky argues that in a competitive market, price will equal the marginal cost of the highest cost producer necessary to balance demand and supply. The highest cost producers in this case are the shale oil producers in the USA. As he says:
Under this competitive logic, the marginal cost of US shale oil would become a ceiling for global oil prices, whereas the costs of relatively remote and marginal conventional oilfields in OPEC and Russia would set a floor. As it happens, estimates of shale-oil production costs are mostly around $50, while marginal conventional oilfields generally break even at around $20. Thus, the trading range in the brave new world of competitive oil should be roughly $20 to $50.
So who is right? Well, we will know in twelve months or more! But, in the meantime, try to use economic analysis to judge the arguments by answering the questions below.
The Price of Oil in 2015 Project Syndicate, Jim O’Neill (7/1/15)
A New Ceiling for Oil Prices Project Syndicate, Anatole Kaletsky (14/1/15)
Questions
- For what reasons might the five-year forward price of oil be (a) a good indicator and (b) a poor indicator of the long-term price of oil?
- Under O’Neill’s analysis, what would the long-term supply curve of oil look like?
- Are shale oil producers price takers? Explain.
- Draw a diagram showing the marginal and average cost curves of a swing shale oil producer. Put values on the vertical axis to demonstrate Kaletsky’s arguments. Also put average and marginal revenue on the diagram and show the amount of profit at the maximum-profit point.
- Why are shale oil producers likely to have much higher long-run average costs than short-run variable costs? How does this affect Kaletsky’s arguments?
- Under Kaletsky’s analysis, what would the long-term supply curve of oil look like?
- Criticise Kaletsky’s arguments from O’Neill’s point of view.
- Criticise O’Neill’s arguments from Kaletsky’s point of view.
- Will OPEC’s policy of not cutting back production help to restore its position of market power?
- Why might the fall in the oil price below $50 in early 2015 represent ‘overshooting’? Why does overshooting often occur in volatile markets?
