Category: Economics for Business: Ch 25

A deal has just been signed between 26 African nations to form a new free trade area, the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). The countries have a population of 625 million (56% of Africa’s total) and a GDP of $1.6 trillion (63% of Africa’s total). The deal effectively combines three existing free trade areas: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community.

Although the deal has been signed by the nations’ leaders, it still needs parliamentary approval from each of the countries. It is hoped that this will be achieved by 2017. If it is, it will mark a major step forward in encouraging intra-African trade.

The deal will involve the removal of trade barriers on most goods and lead to a reduction in overall tariffs by more than 50%. The expectation of the leaders is that this will generate $1 trillion worth of economic activity across the 26 countries through a process of trade creation, investment, increased competition and the encouragement of infrastructure development. But given the current poor state of infrastructure and the lack of manufacturing capacity in many of the countries, the agreement will also encourage co-operation to promote co-ordinated industrial and infrastructure development.

Up to now, the development of intra-African trade has been relatively slow because of poor road and rail networks and a high average protection rate – 8.7% on exports to other African countries compared with 2.5% on exports to non-African countries. As a result, intra-African trade currently accounts for just 12% of total African trade. It is hoped that the development of TFTA will result in this rising to over 30%.

Much of the gains will come from economies of scale. As Kenyan academic Calestous Juma says:

“By having larger markets, it signals the possibility of being able to manufacture products at a scale that is cost-effective. For example, where you need large-scale investments like $200m to create a pharmaceutical factory, you couldn’t do that if you were only selling the products in one country.”

The question is whether the agreement signed on the 10 June will lead to the member countries fully taking advantage of the opportunities for trade creation. Agreeing on a deal is one thing; having genuinely free trade and investing in infrastructure and new efficient industries is another.

Videos and audio
African leaders ink trade deal Deutsche Welle (11/6/15)
African leaders sign pact to create ‘Cape to Cairo’ free trade bloc euronews (10/6/15)
Africa Free Trade Analysis BBC Africa, Calestous Juma (9/6/15)

Articles

African Leaders To Sign Free Trade Agreement To Create Common Market International Business Times, Aditya Tejas (10.6.15)
EAC, COMESA and SADC Blocs Ink ‘Historic’ Trade Deal allAfrica, James Karuhanga (11/6/15)
Tripartite Free Trade Area an Opportunity Not a Threat allAfrica, Sindiso Ngwenya (9/6/15)
Africa a step closer to free trade area Business Report (South Africa), Rob Davies (11/6/15)
The Cape to Cairo trade ‘super bloc’ is here; 15 surprising – and shocking – facts on trade within Africa Mail & Guardian (Kenya), Christine Mungai (8/6/15)
The tripartite free trade area agreement in Africa is bound to disappoint Quartz Africa, Hilary Matfess (10/6/15)
Africa creates TFTA – Cape to Cairo free-trade zone BBC News Africa (10/6/15)
Will the Cape to Cairo free-trade zone work? BBC News Africa, Lerato Mbele (10/6/15)
African free trade still some way off BBC News, Matthew Davies (10/6/15)
Zambia not to benefit from Africa’s TFTA Medafrica, Geraldine Boechat (10/6/15)

Questions

  1. Distinguish between a free trade area, a customs union and a common market.
  2. What does the law of comparative advantage imply about the gains from forming a free trade area?
  3. Distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion.
  4. Why is it likely that there will be considerable trade creation from TFTA? Would there be any trade diversion?
  5. Why are small countries with a relatively low level of economic development likely to experience more trade creation than larger, richer ones?
  6. What barriers might remain in trade between the TFTA countries?
  7. Why might smaller, less developed members of TFTA be worried about the removal of trade barriers?
  8. Why might concentrating on developing local capacity, rather than just lowering tariffs, be a more effective way of developing intra-African trade
  9. What ‘informal’ barriers to trade exist in many African countries?
  10. Why is it that ‘Ordinary Africans are most probably not holding their breath’ about the gains from TFTA?

The period from the end of the Second World War until the financial crisis of 2007–8 was one of increasing globalisation. World trade rose considerably faster than world GDP. The average annual growth in world GDP from 1950 to 2007 was 4.2%; the average annual growth in world merchandise exports was 6.7%.

And there were other ways in which the world was becoming increasingly interconnected. Cross-border financial flows grew strongly, especially in the 1990s and up to 2007. In the early 1990s, global cross-border capital flows were around 4% of world annual GDP; by 2007, they had risen to over 20%. The increasing spread of multinational corporations, improvements in transport, greater international movement of labour and improved communications were all factors that contributed to a deepening of globalisation.

But have things begun to change? Have we entered into an era of ‘deglobalisation’? Certainly some indicators would suggest this. In the three years 2012–14, world exports grew more slowly than world GDP. Global cross-border financial flows remain at about one-third of their 2007 peak. Increased banking regulations are making it harder for financial institutions to engage in international speculative activities.

What is more, with political turmoil in many countries, multinational corporations are more cautious about investing in such markets. Many countries are seeking to contain immigration. Fears of global instability are encouraging many firms to look inwards. After more than 13 years, settlement of the Doha round of international trade negotiations still seems a long way off. Protectionist measures abound, often amount to giving favourable treatment to domestic firms.

The Observer article considers whether the process of increased globalisation is now dead. Or will better banking regulations ultimately encourage capital flows to grow again; and will the inexorable march of technological progress give international trade and investment a renewed boost? Will lower energy and commodity prices help to reboot the global economy? Will the ‘Great Recession’ have resulted in what turns out to be merely a blip in the continued integration of the global economy? Is it, as the Huffington Post article states, that ‘globalization has a gravitational pull that is hard to resist’? See what the articles and speech have to say and what they conclude.

Articles

Borders are closing and banks are in retreat. Is globalisation dead? The Observer, Heather Stewart (23/5/15)
Is Globalization Finally Dead? Huffington Post, Peter Hall (6/5/14)

Speech
Financial “deglobalization”?: capital flows, banks, and the Beatles Bank of England, Kristin Forbes (18/11/14)

Questions

  1. Define globalisation.
  2. How does globalisation affect the distribution of income (a) between countries; (b) within countries?
  3. Why has the Doha round of trade negotiations stalled?
  4. Examine the factors that might be leading to deglobalisation.
  5. What are the implications of banking deglobalisation for the UK?
  6. Are protectionist measures always undesirable in terms of increasing global GDP?
  7. What forces of globalisation are hard to resist?

One of the key battle grounds at the next General Election is undoubtedly going to be immigration. A topic that is very closely related to EU membership and what can be done to limit the number of people coming to the UK. One side of the argument is that immigrants coming into the UK boost growth and add to the strength of the economy. The other side is that once in the UK, immigrants don’t move into work and end up taking more from the welfare state than they give to it through taxation.

A new report produced by University College London’s Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration has found that the effect on the UK economy of immigrants from the 10 countries that joined the EU from 2004 has been positive. In the years until 2011, it has been found that these immigrants contributed £4.96 billion more in taxes than they took out in benefits and use of public services. Christian Dustmann, one of the authors of this report said:

“Our new analysis draws a positive picture of the overall fiscal contribution made by recent immigrant cohorts, particularly of immigrants arriving from the EU … European immigrants, particularly, both from the new accession countries and the rest of the European Union, make the most substantial contributions … This is mainly down to their higher average labour market participation compared with natives and their lower receipt of welfare benefits.”

The report also found that in the 11 years to 2011, migrants from these 10 EU countries were 43 per cent less likely than native Britons to receive benefits or tax credits, and 7 per cent less likely to live in social housing. This type of data suggests a positive overall contribution from EU immigration. However, critics have said that it doesn’t paint an accurate picture. Sir Andrew Green, Chairman of Migration Watch commented on the choice of dates, saying:

“If you take all EU migration including those who arrived before 2001 what you find is this: you find by the end of the period they are making a negative contribution and increasingly so … And the reason is that if you take a group of people while they’re young fit and healthy they’re not going to be very expensive but if you take them over a longer period they will be.”

However, the report is not all positive about the effects of immigration. When considering the impact on the economy of migrants from outside of the EEA, the picture is quite different. Over the past 17 years, immigration has cost the UK economy approximately £120bn, through migrant’s greater consumption of public benefits, such as the NHS, compared to their contributions through taxation. The debate is likely to continue and this report will certainly be used by both sides of the argument as evidence that (a) no change in immigration policy is needed and (b) a major change is needed to immigration policy. The following articles consider this report.

Report
The Fiscal effects of immigration to the UK The Economic Journal, University College London’s Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini (November 2014)

Articles

Immigration from outside Europe ‘cost £120 billion’ The Telegraph, David Barrett (5/11/14)
New EU members add £5bn to UK says Research BBC News (5/11/14)
UK gains £20bn from European migrants, UCL economists reveal The Guardian, Alan Travis (5/11/14)
EU immigrant tax gain revealed Mail Online (5/11/14)
Immigration question still open BBC News, Robert Peston (5/11/14)
EU migrants pay £20bn more in taxes than they receive Financial Times, Helen Warrell (5/11/14)

Questions

  1. Why is immigration such a political topic?
  2. How are UK labour markets be affected by immigration? Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate the effect.
  3. Based on your answer to question 2, explain why some people are concerned about the impact of immigration on UK jobs.
  4. What is the economic argument in favour of allowing immigration to continue?
  5. What policy changes could be recommended to restrict the levels of immigration from outside the EEA, but to continue to allow immigration from EU countries?
  6. If EU migrants are well educated, does that have a positive or negative impact on UK workers, finances and the economy?

Economic journalists, commentators and politicians have been examining the possible economic effects of a Yes vote in the Scottish independence referendum on 18 September. For an economist, there are two main categories of difficulty in examining the consequences. The first is the positive question of what precisely will be the consequences. The second is the normative question of whether the likely effects will be desirable or undesirable and how much so.

The first question is largely one of ‘known unknowns’. This rather strange term was used in 2002 by Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, in the context of intelligence about Iraq. The problem is a general one about forecasting the future. We may know the types of thing that are likely happen, but the magnitude of the outcome cannot be precisely known because there are so many unknowable things that can influence it.

Here are some known issues of Scottish independence, but with unknown consequences (at least in precisely quantifiable terms). The list is certainly not exhaustive and you could probably add more questions yourself to the list.

Will independence result in lower or higher economic growth in the short and long term?
Will there be a currency union, with Scotland and the rest of the UK sharing the pound and a central bank? Or will Scotland merely use the pound outside a currency union? Would it prefer to have its own currency or join the euro over the longer term?
What will happen to the sterling exchange rate with the dollar, the euro and various other countries?
How will businesses react? Will independence encourage greater inward investment in Scotland or will there be a net capital outflow? And either way, what will be the magnitude of the effect?
How will assets, such as oil, be shared between Scotland and the rest of the UK? And how will national debt be apportioned?
How big will the transition costs be of moving to an independent Scotland?
How will independence impact on Scottish trade (a) with countries outside the UK and (b) with the rest of the UK?
What will happen about Scotland’s membership of the EU? Will other EU countries, such as Spain (because of its concerns about independence movements in Catalonia and the Basque country), attempt to block Scotland remaining in or rejoining the EU?
What will happen to tax rates in Scotland, with the new Scottish government free to set its own tax rates?
What will be the consequences for Scottish pensions and the Scottish pensions industry?
What will happen to the distribution of income in Scotland? How might Scottish governments behave in terms of income redistribution and what will be its consequences on output and growth?

Of course, just because the effects cannot be known with certainty, attempts are constantly being made to quantify the outcomes in the light of the best information available at the time. These are refined as circumstances change and newer data become available.

But forecasts also depend on the assumptions made about the post-referendum decisions of politicians in Scotland, the rest of the UK and in major trading partner countries. It also depends on assumptions about the reactions of businesses. Not surprisingly, both sides of the debate make assumptions favourable to their own case.

Then there is the second category of question. Even if you could quantify the effects, just how desirable would they be? The issue here is one of the weightings given to the various costs and benefits. How would you weight distributional consequences, given that some people will gain or lose more than others? What social discount rate would you apply to future costs and benefits?

Then there are the normative and largely unquantifiable costs and benefits. How would you assess the desirability of political consequences, such as greater independence in decision-making or the break-up of a union dating back over 300 years? But these questions about nationhood are crucial issues for many of the voters.

Articles

Scottish Independence would have Broad Impact on UK Economy NBC News, Catherine Boyle (9/9/14)
Scottish independence: the economic implications The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (7/9/14)
Scottish vote: Experts warn of potential economic impact BBC News, Matthew Wall (9/9/14)
The economics of Scottish independence: A messy divorce The Economist (21/2/14)
Dispute over economic impact of Scottish independence Financial Times, Mure Dickie, Jonathan Guthrie and John Aglionby (28/5/14)
10 economic benefits for a wealthier independent Scotland Michael Gray (6/3/14)
Scottish independence, UK dependency New Economics Foundation (NEF), James Meadway (4/9/14)
Scottish Jobs and the World Economy Scottish Economy Watch, Brian Ashcroft (25/8/14)
Scottish yes vote: what happens to the pound in your pocket? Channel 4 News (9/9/14)
What price Scottish independence? BBC News, Robert Peston (12/9/14)
What price Scottish independence? BBC News, Robert Peston (7/9/14)
Economists can’t tell Scots how to vote BBC News, Robert Peston (16/9/14)

Books and Reports
The Economic Consequences of Scottish Independence Scottish Economic Society and Helmut Schmidt Universität, David Bell, David Eiser and Klaus B Beckmann (eds) (August 2014)
The potential implications of independence for businesses in Scotland Oxford Economics, Weir (April 2014)

Questions

  1. What is a currency union? What implications would there be for Scotland being in a currency union with the rest of the UK?
  2. If you could measure the effects of independence over the next ten years, would you treat £1m of benefits or costs occurring in ten years’ time the same as £1m of benefits and costs occurring next year? Explain.
  3. Is it inevitable that events occurring in the future will at best be known unknowns?
  4. If you make a statement that something will occur in the future and you turn out to be wrong, was your statement a positive one or a normative one?
  5. What would be the likely effects of Scottish independence on the current account of the balance of payments (a) for Scotland; (b) for the rest if the UK?
  6. How does inequality in Scotland compare with that in the rest of the UK and in other countries? Why might Scottish independence lead to a reduction in inequality? (See the chapter on inequality in the book above edited by David Bell, David Eiser and Klaus B Beckmann.)
  7. One of the problems in assessing the arguments for a Yes vote is uncertainty over what would happen if there was a majority voting No. What might happen in terms of further devolution in the case of a No vote?
  8. Why is there uncertainty over the amount of national debt that would exist in Scotland if it became independent?

World leaders are meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in the Swiss Alps. This annual conference is an opportunity for politicans, economists and businesspeople from around the world to discuss the state of the world economy and to consider policy options.

To coincide with the conference, the BBC’s Newsnight has produced the following slide show, which presents some economic facts about the world economy. The slide show provides no commentary and there is no commentary either in this blog – just some questions for you to ponder.

Using the economics you’ve learned so far, try answering these questions, which focus on the reasons for the patterns in the figures, the likely future patterns and the policy implications.

Slide show
Davos: 22 facts people should know BBC Newsnight (23/1/14)

Data

For additional international data to help you answer the questions, see:
Economic Data freely available online Economics Network

Questions

  1. Go through each of the slides in the Newsnight presentation and select the ones of most interest to you. Then, as an economist, provide an explanation for them.
  2. Identify some patterns over time in the statistics. Then project forward 20 years and discuss whether the patterns are likely to have changed and, if so, why.
  3. What policies could governments adopt to reverse any undesirable trends you have identified? How likely are these policies to be implemented and how successful are they likely to be?