Category: Economics: Ch 12

Market failure occurs when the free market fails to deliver an efficient allocation of resources. Pollution by cars is a prime example of a negative externality or an external cost. We pay road tax and face high tax rates on petrol, but another form of government intervention is due to come into effect. From the 1st January 2011, nine models of electric car will be eligible for grants of up to £5000 (although only three models will be immediately available). By subsidising certain electric cars, the government is aiming to give people an incentive to switch to these so-called more environmentally friendly cars, as they will now be cheaper.

There are concerns, however, that generating the electricity to charge these cars still emits carbon dioxide. The Transport Secretary, Philip Hammond, said:

There’s no point in switching the car fleet to running on electricity if the electricity emits vast amounts of carbon dioxide.

So is the electric car the car of the future?

Nine electric cars will be eligible for subsidies BBC News (14/120/10)
Cash grants for environmentally friendly cars announced Telegraph (14/12/10)
£850,000 to kickstart use of electric cars in NI BBC News (14/12/10)
UK names nine electric cars eligible for subsidy Reuters (14/20/10)

Questions

  1. What is the purpose of a subsidy? Using a diagram explain how it will work and what the impact should be.
  2. Why is pollution an example of a market failure? Illustrate this on a diagram.
  3. Why could electric cars also be an example of a market failure? Illustrate this on a diagram.
  4. How will the subsidy aim to encourage more firms to produce electric cars and also more consumers to buy them?
  5. Is there an argument for increased investment in technology to produce electric cars more cheaply and more effectively?
  6. Why is there such a high demand for car usage?

Student fees are set to rise to between £6000 and £9000 per year from 2012 (see Will students be Browned off?. But I’m sure you know that already! Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate about the effects on student debt and whether potential students will be put off from applying to university. But there is another issue, explored in the article below. This is the question of the ‘marketisation’ of higher education.

With the exception of the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and maths) universities will no longer receive any teaching subsidy from the government. Teaching will have to be funded from student fees. This means that provision will depend on supply and demand. If there is a high demand for certain courses, then the courses will be financially viable for universities. If not, they will have to close (unless the university chooses to cross-subsidise them from other profitable courses).

This might be fine if the market for university places were perfectly competitive and if questions of inequality of access were fully taken into account. But the higher education market is not perfect. The article looks at some of these imperfections and why, therefore, a pure market system will fail to achieve the optimum allocation of university places.

Browne’s Gamble London Review of Books, Stefan Collini (4/11/10)

Questions

  1. What information failures are there in the market for higher education places?
  2. What externalities are involved in higher education and will this lead to an over or underprovision of higher education in a pure market system?
  3. Apart from externalities and information asymmetries, what other market failures apply to the market for student places in HE?
  4. What are the arguments for subsidising non-STEM subjects (as well as STEM ones)? Should these subsidies vary from course to course and from university to university?
  5. What is the best way of tackling the problem of unequal access to higher education?

Governments and businesses across the world have been trying to become more environmentally friendly, as everyone becomes more concerned with climate change and emissions. In the UK, incentives had been put in place to encourage large-scale organisations to reduce their consumption of gas and electricity. The Carbon Reduction Commitment Scheme began in April 2010, with companies and public-sector orgainisations required to record their energy consumption. Then in April 2011 it was planned that those consuming over 6000 MWh of electricity per year (about £500,000 worth) would be required to purchase ‘allowances’ of £12 for each tonne of carbon dioxide that is emitted by their use of fuel: electricity, gas, coal and other fuels. This would require the organisations working out their ‘carbon footprint’, using guidance from the Department of Energy and Climate Change. In the case of coal and gas, the emissions would be largely from burning the fuel. In the case of electricity it would be largely from generating it.

The government had intended to use the revenue received from the sale of allowances to pay subsidies to those firms which were the most successful in cutting their emissions.

By raising money from the largest emitters via a levy and giving it back as a ‘refund’ to those who cut their usage the most, the government would not have been able to raise any revenue, but it did tackle the core of the problem – reducing emissions. However, following the Spending Review, this scheme will now actually generate revenue for the government. Paragraph 2.108 on page 62 of the Spending Review states the following:

The CRC Energy Efficiency scheme will be simplified to reduce the burden on businesses,
with the first allowance sales for 2011-12 emissions now taking place in 2012 rather than 2011. Revenues from allowance sales totalling £1 billion a year by 2014-15 will be used to support the public finances, including spending on the environment, rather than recycled to participants. Further decisions on allowance sales are a matter for the Budget process.

Over 5000 firms and other organisations will now find that their hard work in cutting usage and being more environmentally friendly will give them much less reward, as the revenue raised from the levy will remain in the Treasury. All that firms will now gain from cutting emissions is a reduction their levy bill. The extra £1bn or more raised each year from the scheme will undoubtedly be beneficial for tackling the budget deficit, but it will no longer provide subsidies to firms which reduce their emissions. Furthermore, PriceWaterhouseCooper estimates that it will cost businesses with an average gas and electricity bill of £1 million an extra £76,000 in the first year and this may increase to an additional cost of £114,000 per year by 2015.

It’s hardly surprising that businesses are angry, especially when this withdrawal of subsidy, which some have dubbed a ‘stealth tax’, was not mentioned in the Chancellor’s speech, but was left to the small print of the Spending Review announcement. The following articles look at this highly controversial plan.

Articles
Spending Review: Large firms ‘face green stealth tax’ BBC News (21/910/10)
Business lose out via £1bn-a-year green ‘stealth tax’ Management Today, Emma Haslett (21/10/10)
Fury over £1bn green stealth tax in spending review Telegraph, Rowena Mason (20/10/10)
Is ‘stealth’ tax a threat to UK economy going green? BBC News, Roger Harrabin (20/10/10)
Green spending review – it could have been a whole lot worse Business Green, James Murray (20/10/10)
Coalition hits big business with stealth carbon tax Business Green, James Murray (20/10/10)
UK government hits big businesses with stealth carbon tax Reuters, James Murray (20/10/10)
UK’s carbon tax bombshell takes business by surprise Reuters, Will Nichols and James Murray (21/10/10)
CRC allowances sting in UK Spending Review The Engineer, M&C Energy Group (22/10/10)

The CRC scheme
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Department of Energy and Climate Change

Questions

  1. How does a tax affect the supply curve and what would be the impact on the equilibrium price and quantity?
  2. To what extent might this “stealth tax” (i.e. withdrawal of subsidy) adversely affect (a) businesses in the UK; (b) the economy more generally?
  3. Why will firms have to re-look at their cash flow, costs and revenue following this change? How might this affect business strategy?
  4. By taxing firms using more gas and electricity, what problem is the government trying to solve? (Think about market failure.)

Lord Browne of Madingley, the former chief executive of BP, has been conducting a review of higher education and its funding in England. The report was published on Tuesday 12 October. At present, student fees are capped at £3290 per year. From the academic year 2012/13 Browne recommends that the cap be removed, allowing universities to charge what they like (or what the market will bear). It is anticipated that, under these circumstances, universities would typically charge around £7000 per year, but some universities could charge much more – perhaps more than £12,000 for courses in high demand at prestigious universities. Universities would receive reduced funding from the government, through a new Higher Education Council, and the funding would vary by subject, with ‘priority’ subjects, such as science, technology and medicine, being given more. It is anticipated that total government funding for teaching to universities in England would be only just over 20% of the current level.

Browne recommends that universities that charge more than £6000 a year would have to pay a proportion of the extra income to the government as a levy for supporting poorer students. Those that charge more than £7000 would have to demonstrate that they were widening access.

Students would not need to pay any of the fees upfront (although they could do if they chose). Instead, they would receive a loan to cover the full fee. They would also be eligible for an annual loan of £3750 to cover living expenses. In addition, students from households with incomes below £25,000 would be eligible for a cost-of-living grant of £3250 on top of the loan. with household incomes above £25,000 the size of this grant would diminish, and disappear with household incomes above £60,000.

Students would begin paying back their loan after they graduate and are earning more then £21,000 per year (the current figure is £15,000). The amount that graduates would be required to pay back would rise sharply as earnings increase. For example, with an income of £30,000 per year, the graduate would be required to pay back £68 per month; with an income of £60,000 the monthly payment would be £293. Interest would accumulate on the unpaid balance at a rate equal to inflation plus 2.2%. For those earning below £21,000 threshold, it would accumulate at the rate of inflation only.

Not surprisingly, there have been mixed reactions to the recommendations from universities. Some universities have argued that competition will mean that they would not be allowed to charge the approximately £7000 fee that would be necessary to make up for the reduction in direct government funding. Predictions of closures of university departments or closures or mergers of whole universities are being made. Other universities have welcomed the ability to charge significantly higher fees to help their financial position.

The reactions from prospective students have been less mixed. With students starting in 2012 set to graduate with debts in excess of £30,000 and many with much higher debts, the Browne Review report makes bleak reading.

So who are the gainers and losers and what will be the benefits to higher education? The following articles look at the issues.

Note that the government has subsequently decided not to follow Browne’s recommendations fully. Annual fees will be capped at £9000 and the government expects that fees will typically be £6000.

Articles
Lord of the market: let competition and choice drive quality Times Higher Education, Simon Baker (14/10/10)
In the shake-up to come, no guarantees for anyone Times Higher Education (14/10/10)
Browne review: Universities must set their own tuition fees Guardian, Jeevan Vasagar and Jessica Shepherd (12/10/10)
Cable ‘endorses’ tuition fee increase plan BBC News (12/10/10)
Browne review at a glance Guardian, Jessica Shepherd (12/10/10)
Foolish, risky, lazy, complacent and dangerous NUS news, Aaron Porter (12/10/10)
Student debt: the £40k question for Lord Browne (includes two videos) Channel 4 News, Aaron Porter (8/10/10)
Blind spots in education proposals Financial Times letters, Philip Wales (14/10/10)
Tuition fees: securing a future for elitism Guardian, comment is free, Carole Leathwood (13/10/10)
NUS Scotland president Liam Burns condemns English tuition fee plans Courier (13/10/10)
Lord Browne review: round-up of reaction Telegraph (12/10/10)
University of Leeds responds to Lord Browne’s review of university funding Academia News (12/10/10)
Browne Review: Scrap university fees cap Chemistry World (12/10/10)
Invisible hand of market takes hold Financial Times (12/10/10)
A personal perspective on the Browne Review Progress Online, David Hall (12/10/10)
Tuition fee increases will be capped, says Nick Clegg BBC News (24/10/10)

Webcasts and podcasts
Students to face ‘unlimited fees’ BBC News, Nick Robinson (12/10/10)
Lord Browne interviewed by Nick Robinson BBC News (12/10/10)
Aaron Porter and Steve Smith on university funding and fees BBC Daily Politics (12/10/10)
University proposals create ‘two-tier system’ BBC Today Programme, Professors Roger Brown and Nicholas Barr (13/10/10)

The report and the NUS and IFS responses
Securing a sustainable future for higher education Independent Review (12/10/10)
Browne Review home page Independent Review
Initial Response to the Report of the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance (the Browne Review) NUS, Aaron Porter (10/10/10)
Graduates and universities share burden of Browne recommendations Institute for Fiscal Studies (12/10/10)

Questions

  1. To what extent will the proposals in the Browne review result in a free market in university courses?
  2. To what extent will competition between universities drive up teaching quality?
  3. Identify any market failures that might prevent an efficient allocation of university resources?
  4. To what extent will Browne’s proposals result in a fair allocation of resources between graduates and non-graduates, and between those who graduate under the new system and those who graduated in the past?
  5. Identify any externalities involved in university education. In what ways might these externalities be ‘internalised’?

Ginsters is a large producer of pasties in Cornwall. Most of its ingredients come from Cornwall, but the pasties are sold throughout Britain. But, not surprisingly, they are also sold in Cornwall. In fact, there is a large Tesco virtually next door to the Ginsters’ pasty plant and, as you can imagine, it does a good trade in Ginsters’ pasties, pies and sandwiches. After all, they are a local product.

But are they delivered directly from the Ginsters’ factory? No they are not. In fact, they are sent by lorry to the Avonmouth distribution depot, some 125 miles away, only to be sent back again to the Tesco supermarket next door! So does it make economic sense to incur all the costs of transporting the pasties 250 miles only to end up virtually where they started?

It is a similar story with Rodda’s Cornish clotted cream. It is made with Cornish milk but is also sold nationwide. In this case it is transported some 340 miles to get to another Tesco supermarket virtually next door to the Rodda plant.

The following articles and podcast consider the logistics of manufactured food distribution, and ask whether private costs are the only thing that should be taken into account when judging the sense of the system.

Articles
From here to eternity: 340-mile journey for clotted cream made two miles away Guardian, Steven Morris (3/9/10)
Food miles row as pasties travel 250 miles to the supermarket next door This is Cornwall (30/8/10)
Supermarket food mileage ‘completely bonkers’ BBC Today Programme, Tim Lang (30/8/10)

Questions

  1. Why does Tesco’s distribution system for pasties, clotted cream and other products made in parts of the country away from large centres of population make sense in ‘conventional economic terms’?
  2. What economies of scale are there in pasty production and distribution?
  3. What externalities are involved in the distribution of Ginsters’ pasties?
  4. Consider the arguments for and against locating mass producers of food products nearer to the ‘centre of gravity’ of markets.