Should economists have foreseen the credit crunch? A few were warning of an overheated world economy with excessive credit and risk taking. Most economists prior to 2007/8, however, were predicting a continuation of steady economic growth. Inflation targeting, fiscal rules and increasingly flexible markets were the ingredients of this continuing prosperity. And then the crash happened!
So why did so few people see the downturn coming? Were the models used by economists fundamentally flawed, or was it simply a question of poor assumptions or poor data? Do we need a new way of modelling the economy, or is it simply a question of updating theories from the past? Should, for example, models become much more Keynesian? Should we abandon the new classical approach of assuming that markets are essentially good at pricing in risk and that herd behaviour will not be seriously destabilising?
The following podcast looks at these issues. “Aditya Chakrabortty’s joined in the studio by the Guardian’s economics editor Larry Elliott, as well as Roger Bootle, the managing director of Capital Economics, and political economist and John Maynard Keynes biographer Robert Skidelsky. Also in the podcast, we hear from Nobel prize-winning economist, Elinor Ostrom, Freakonomics author Steven Levitt, and UN advisor and developmental economist Daniel Gay.”
The Business: A crisis of economics Guardian podcast (25/11/09)
See also the following news items from the Sloman Economics news site:
Keynes is dead; long live Keynes (3/10/09)
Learning from history (3/10/09)
Macroeconomics – Crisis or what? (6/8/09)
The changing battle grounds of economics (27/7/09)
Repeat of the Great Depression – or learning the lessons from the past? (23/6/09)
Animal spirits (30/4/09)
Keynes – do we need him more than ever? (26/10/08)
Questions
- Why did most economists fail to predict the credit crunch and subsequent recession? Was it a problem with the models that were used or the data that was put into these models, or both?
- What was the Washington consensus? To what extent did this consensus contribute to the current recession?
- What is meant by systemic risk? How does this influence the usefulness of ‘micro’ financial models?
- What particular market failures were responsible for the credit crunch?
- What is meant by ‘rational behaviour’? Is it reasonable to assume that people are rational?
- Is macroeconomics too theoretical or too mathematical (or both)? If you think it is, how can macroeconomics be reformed to improve its explanatory and predictive power?
- Does a ‘really good economist’ need to have a good grounding in a range of social sciences and in economic history?
In a speech to Scottish business organisations, Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, argued that it might be necessary to split banks up. The aim would be to separate the core retail banking business, of receving deposits and lending to individuals and businesses, from the more risky and exotic wholesale acitivites of banks, such as securitisation, speculation and hedging – so-called ‘casino banking’.
Governments around the world, as represented at the G20 meeting at Pittsburg in September, have favoured tougher regulation of banks. But Mervyn King believes that this is not enough. It may not prevent the reckless behaviour that resulted in the credit crunch and bank bailouts by the government. “Never has so much money been owed by so few to so many. And, one might add, so far with little real reform.” And if regulation were to fail and banks were to get into difficulties, what would happen? There would have to be another bailout. As Mervyn King said, “The belief that appropriate regulation can ensure that speculative activities do not result in failures is a delusion.”
There are two key problems.
The first is Goodhart’s Law. If rules are set for bank behaviour, banks may adhere to the letter of the rules, but find ways around them to continue behaving in risky ways. The rules may cease to be a good measure of prudent behaviour.
The second is moral hazard. If banks know that they will be bailed out if they get into difficulties because they are too big to fail, then this encourages them to take the risks. As Mervyn King said in his speech, “The massive support extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history. The ‘too important to fail’ problem is too important to ignore.”
So should the banks be split? Is there any likelihood that they will? Or are Mervyn King’s proposals merely another headache for the government? The following articles looks at the issues. The first link below is to his speech.
Speech by Mervyn King, Governor to Scottish business organisations, Edinburgh (20/10/09)
Mervyn King: bail-outs created ‘biggest moral hazard in history’ (including video of part of speech) Telegraph (20/10/09)
Governor warns bank split needed BBC News (20/10/09)
A sombre warning BBC News, Stephanomics (20/10/09)
Alistair Darling rebuffs Mervyn King’s attack over timidity of banking reforms Guardian (21/10/09)
King and Brown in rift over whether to split the banks Independent (22/10/09)
Tucker set to join calls for stricter controls on banks Scotsman (22/10/09)
Testing times for bank regulators Financial Times (21/10/09)
Mervyn King is right – the economy is changing and we’re blindfolded, without a map Telegraph, Edmund Conway (22/10/09)
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘moral hazard’ in the context of bank bailouts. Are the any ways in which banks could be prevented from failing during a crisis without creating a moral hazard?
- Does regulation necessarily involve Goodhart’s Law? To what extent is it possible to devise regulation and avoid Goodnart’s Law?
- What are the arguments for and against splitting banks’ core business from more risky ‘casino banking’?
- Does the separation of retail and investment banking necessarily involve splitting banks into separate organisations? If they are not split, how can the government or central bank underwrite retail banking without underwriting riskier investment banking?
Latest figures from the Bank of England show that the stock of personal debt has fallen for the first time since the Bank began recording the figures in 1993 (search for table LPMVTUV in the Bank of England’s Statistical Interactive Database). So why are people on average paying back more than they are borrowing and what will be the implications for the economy? The following articles look at the issues.
Record decline in UK lending threatens recovery Financial Times (1/9/09)
Britons’ mortgage repayments outstrip new loans Times Online (1/9/09)
Personal debt dips for first time BBC News (1/9/09)
Mortgage approvals rise again but repayments outstrip lending Guardian (1/9/09)
Exceptional times BBC, Stephanomics (2/9/09)
Personal debt falls BBC Today Programme (2/9/09)
UK personal debt levels fall (video) BBC News (2/9/09
For the July data from the Bank of England see:
Lending to Individuals: July 2009
and for later periods, if you access this news item after September 2009, see:
Lending to Individuals: latest
Questions
- What is the effect on aggregate demand of a net repayment of debt by individuals? What other information would you need to have in order to calculate whether aggregate demand is rising or falling?
- Use the Excel data from the Bank of England’s Statistical Interactive Database (linked above in the introduction to this news item) to trace the credit crunch.
- For what reasons have individuals switched from net accumulation of debt to net repayment of debt? Does this suggest that the fall in interest rates over the past 12 months has had a perverse effect?
- What factors have been determining personal saving and borrowing since the start of the credit crunch?
- What are the short-term and long-term implications of a reduction in personal debt?
This podcast is from MSN’s Slate magazine. It is an interview with David Wessel, author of the book In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic. The book and the podcast consider the recent history of the Federal Reserve Bank of America (the USA’s central bank) and its handling of the sub-prime crisis and the credit crunch.
In Fed We Trust: A podcast with author David Wessel MSN Slate (10/8/09)
Questions
- What actions were taken by the Fed as the credit crisis unfolded?
- According to David Wessel, what mistakes were made by the Fed in handling the credit crisis?
- How successful was the Fed in steering the economy through the credit crisis and subsequent recession?
- How is the role of the Fed likely to change in the future?
Banks appearing in the news has become commonplace in the past year or so. Everyday, there has been something newsworthy happening in the banking sector, whether in the UK or abroad. A recent development in this sector is Barclays agreeing to sell its fund management division, BGI, to Blackrock for £8.2 billion. Barclays says that there are strategic reasons for the sale, which undoubtedly add to the 8.2 billion other reasons. This deal will put the bank in a strong position to make acquisitions next year in creating the world’s biggest asset manager. It will also allow Barclays to weather any further storms on the horizon. The articles below look at recent developments.
Blackrock in £8.2 billion Barclays deal BBC News (12/6/09)
Blackrock and a hardplace The Economist (12/6/09)
Bob Diamond: The builder of Barclays Telegraph, Louise Armitstead (13/6/09)
Barclays offloads fund management business BGI to Blackrock for £13.5 billion Telegraph, James Quinn (12/6/09)
Inside Look: Blackrock buys Barclays fund unit for $13.5 billion Bloomberg, youtube (12/6/09)
Sovereign wealth funds back BlackRock move to acquire Barclaysd Global Investors Telegraph, Louise Armitstead, James Quinn (12/6/09)
Blackrock targets Barclays firm BBC News (8/6/09)
Questions
- What are the ‘strategic reasons’ behind Barclays’ decision to sell its fund management division?
- The Blackrock and a hardplace article talks about the benefits of economies of scale. What does it mean by this?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of combining fund management with banking and creating such a large business?
- Given that Barclays’ fund management, BGI is a successful part of its business, does their agreement to sell it put them in a stronger position?
- What will be the likely impact of this deal on the economy? Consider who will be (a) the winners and (b) the losers.