UK productivity growth remains well below levels recorded before the financial crisis, as Chart 1 illustrates. In fact, output per hour worked in 2016 Q3 was virtually the same as in 2007 Q4. What is more, as can be seen from Chart 2, UK productivity lags well behind its major competitors (except for Japan).
But why does UK productivity lag behind other countries and why has it grown so slowly since the financial crisis? In its July 2015 analysis, the ONS addressed this ‘productivity puzzle’.
Among the many reasons suggested are low levels of investment, the impact of the financial crisis on bank’s willingness to lend to new businesses, higher numbers of people working beyond normal retirement age as a result of population and pensions changes, and firms’ ability to retain staff because of low pay growth. While these and other factors may be relevant, they do not provide a complete explanation for the weakness in productivity.
The lack of investment in technology and lack of infrastructure investment have been key reasons for the sluggish growth in productivity. Many companies are prepared to continue using relatively labour-intensive techniques because wage growth has been so low and this reduces the incentive to invest in labour-saving technology.
Another factor has been long hours and, for many office workers, being constantly connected to their work, checking and responding to emails and messages away from the office. The Telegraph article below reports Ann Francke, chief executive of the Chartered Management Institute, as saying:
“This is having a deleterious effect on the health of managers, which has a direct impact on productivity. UK workers already have the longest hours in Europe and yet we’re less productive.”
Another problem has been ultra low interest rates, which have reduced the burden of debt for poor performing companies and has allowed them to survive. It may also have prevented finance from being reallocated to more dynamic companies which would like to develop new products and processes.
Another feature of UK productivity is the large differences between regions. This is illustrated in Chart 3. Productivity in London in 2015 (the latest full year for data) was 31.5% above the UK average, while that in Wales was 19.4% below.
This again reflects investment patterns and also the concentration of industries in particular locations. Thus London’s financial sector, a major part of London’s economy, has experienced relatively large increases in productivity and this has helped to push productivity growth in the capital well above other parts of the country.
Another factor, which again has a regional dimension, is the poor productivity performance of family-owned businesses, where ownership and management is passed down the generations within the family without bringing in external managerial expertise.
The government is very aware of the UK’s weak productivity performance. Its recently launched industrial policy is designed to address the problem. We look at that in a separate post.
Articles
UK productivity edges up but growth still flounders below pre-crisis levels The Telegraph, Julia Bradshaw (6/1/17)
Weak UK productivity spurs warnings of living standards squeeze The Guardian, Katie Allen (6/1/17)
Productivity gap yawns across the UK BBC News, Jonty Bloom (6/1/17)
The UK productivity puzzle Fund Strategy. John Redwood (26/1/17)
Productivity puzzle remains for economists despite UK growth in third quarter of 2016 City A.M., Jasper Jolly (6/1/17)
Portal site
Solve the Productivity Puzzle Unipart
Report
Productivity: no puzzle about it TUC (Feb 2015)
Data
Labour Productivity: Tables 1 to 10 and R1 ONS (6/1/17)
International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP) ONS (6/10/16)
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) The World Bank
Questions
- In measuring productivity, the ONS uses three indicators: output per worker, output per hour and output per job. Compare the relative usefulness of these three measures of productivity.
- How would you explain the marked difference in productivity between regions and cities within the UK?
- How do flexible labour markets impact on productivity?
- Why is investment as a percentage of GDP so low in the UK compared to that in most other developed countries (see)?
- Give some examples of industrial policy measures that could be adopted to increase productivity growth.
- Examine the extent to which very low interest rates and quantitative easing encourage productivity-enhancing investment.
In the blog post, Global warning, we looked at the use of unconventional macroeconomic policies to deal with the slow pace of economic growth around the world. One of the articles was by Nouriel Roubini. In the linked article below, he argues that slow economic growth may be the new global norm.
At the centre of the problem is a fall in the rate of potential economic growth. This has been caused by a lack of investment, which has slowed the pace of innovation and the growth in labour productivity.
The lack of investment, in turn, has been caused by a lack of spending by both households and governments. What is the point in investing in new capacity, argue firms, if they already have spare capacity?
Low consumer spending is partly the result of a redistribution of income from low- and middle-income households (who have a high marginal propensity to consume) to high-income households and corporations (who have a low mpc). Low spending is also the result of both consumers and governments attempting to reduce their levels of debt by cutting back spending.
Low growth leads to hysteresis – the process whereby low actual growth leads to low potential growth. The reason is that the unemployed become deskilled and the lack of investment by firms reduces the innovation that is necessary to embed new technologies.
Read Roubini’s analysis and consider the policy implications.
Article
Has the global economic growth malaise become the ‘new normal’? The Guardian, Nouriel Roubini (2/5/16)
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘hysteresis’ and how the concept is relevant in explaining low global economic growth.
- Why has there been a reduction in the marginal propensity to consume in recent years? What is the implication of this for the multiplier and economic recovery?
- Explain what Roubini means by ‘a painful de-leveraging process’. What are the implications of this process?
- How important are structural reforms and what forms could these take? Why has there been a reluctance for governments to institute such reforms?
- ‘Asymmetric adjustment between debtor and creditor economies has also undermined growth.’ Explain what Roubini means by this.
- Why are governments reluctant to use fiscal policy to boost both actual and potential economic growth?
- What feasible policy measures could be taken to boost actual and potential economic growth?
The Treasury has published a paper analysing the costs of Britain leaving the EU. Its central assumption is that the UK would negotiate a bilateral trade deal with the EU similar to that between Canada and the EU. Under this assumption the Treasury estimates that, by 2030, GDP would be 6.2% lower than if the UK had remained in the EU, meaning that the average household would be £4300 per year worse off than it would otherwise have been. The analysis also finds that there would be a total reduction in tax receipts of £36 billion per year – far greater than any savings from lower contributions to the EU budget.
Not surprisingly the ‘Vote Remain’ campaign for the UK to stay in the EU has welcomed the analysis, seeing it as strong evidence in support of their case. Also, not surprisingly, the Vote Leave campaign has questioned both the analysis and the assumptions on which it is based.
The Treasury analysis looks at three possible scenarios: (a) a Canada-style bilateral arrangement (the central estimate); (b) the UK becoming a member or the European Economic Area – the ‘Norwegian model’ (according to the Treasury, this would reduce GDP by 3.8%); (c) no specific deal with the EU, with the UK simply having the same access to the EU as any other country that is a mamber of the WTO (this would reduce GDP by 7.5%). Thus the Norwegian model would probably result in a smaller reduction in growth, but the UK would still continue to make contributions to the EU budget and have to allow free movement of labour. Only in option (c) would it have total control over migration. Each of the estimates has a margin of error, giving a range for the reduction in GDP across the three scenarios from 3.4% to 9.5%.
The Treasury used a three-stage process to arrive at its conclusions, as explained in the FT article below:
First, it uses gravity models to estimate the effect of different trade relationships on the quantity of trade and foreign direct investment. Gravity models take into account how close countries are to each other geographically, as well as their historical links, rather than assuming that trade flows to wherever the lowest tariffs are.
Second, it uses external academic results to estimate the consequences for productivity – the efficiency of the UK economy – from different levels of trade and foreign direct investment.
Third, it plugs the productivity numbers unto a global economic model run by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research to estimate the long-run differences in national income and prosperity.
Clearly there is large-scale uncertainty over any forecasts 14 years ahead, especially when the relationship with the EU and other countries post-EU exit can only be roughly estimated. The question is whether the assumptions are reasonable and whether there would be substantial costs from Brexit, but not necessarily of £4300 per household.
The following articles look at the analysis and its assumptions. Unlike many newspaper articles, which clearly have an agenda, these articles are relatively unbiased and try to assess the arguments. Of course, it would be difficult to be totally unbiased and it would be a good idea to try to spot any biases in each of the articles.
Articles
Treasury’s Brexit analysis: what it says — and what it doesn’t Financial Times, Chris Giles (18/4/16)
A Treasury analysis suggests the costs of Brexit would be high The Economist (18/4/16)
George Osborne says UK would lose £36bn in tax receipts if it left EU The Guardian, Anushka Asthana and Tom Clark (18/4/16)
Will each UK household be £4,300 worse off if the UK leaves the EU? The Guardian, Larry Elliott (18/4/16)
FactCheck Q&A: can we trust the Treasury on Brexit? Channel 4 News, Patrick Worrall (18/4/16)
Reality Check: Would Brexit cost your family £4,300? BBC News, Anthony Reuben (18/4/16)
Brexit sparks outbreak of agreement among economists Financial Times, Chris Giles (27/4/16)
Treasury analysis
EU referendum: HM Treasury analysis key facts HM Treasury (18/4/16)
HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU membership and the alternatives HM Treasury (18/4/16)
Questions
- Would households actually be poorer if the Treasury’s forecasts are correct?
- What alternative trade arrangements with the EU would be possible if the UK left the EU?
- What are the Treasury model’s main weaknesses?
- What considerations are UK voters likely to take into account in the referendum which are not included in the Treasury analysis?
- Make out the case for supporting the analysis of the Treasury.
- Make out the case for rejecting the analysis of the Treasury.
Pork – a favourite food of many Brits, whether it’s as a key ingredient of a roast dinner or a full English Breakfast! But, British pig farmers may be in for a tricky ride and we might be seeing foreign pork on our plates in the months to come. This is because of the falling price of pork, which may be driving local farmers out of the market.
As we know, market prices are determined by the interaction of demand and supply and as market conditions change, this will affect the price at which pork sells at. This in turn will have an impact on the incomes of farmers and hence on farmers’ ability to survive in the market. According to forecasts from Defra, specialist pig farms are expected to see a fall in income by 46%, from £49,400 to £26,500 in 2016. A key driver of this, is the decline in the price of pork, which have fallen by an average of £10 per pig. This loss in income has led to pig farmers facing the largest declines of any type of farm, even beating the declines of dairy farmers, which have been well-documented.
If we think about the forces of demand and supply and how these have led to such declines in prices, we can turn to a few key things. Following the troubles in Russia and the Ukraine and Western sanctions being imposed on Russia, a retaliation of sorts was Russia banning European food imports. This therefore reduced demand for British pork. Adding to this decline in demand, there were further factors pushing down demand, following suggestions about the adverse impact that bacon and ham have on health. If pig farmers in the UK continue with the number of pigs they have and bearing in mind they would have invested in their pig farms before such bans and warnings were issued, then we see supply being maintained, demand falling and prices being pushed downwards.
Zoe Davies, Chief Executive of the National Pig Association said:
“This year is going to be horrendous for the British pig industry … Trading has been tough for at least 18 months now and we are starting to see people leave. We’re already seeing people calling in saying they’ve decided to give up. All we can hope is that more people leave European pig farms before ours do.”
We can also look to other factors that have been driving pig farmers out of business, including a strong pound, the glut of supply in Europe and productivity in the UK. Lily Hiscock, a commentator in this market said:
“It is estimated that the average pig producer is now in a loss-making position after 18 months of positive margins … The key factors behind the fall in markets are the exchange rate, UK productivity and retail demand … Indeed, pigmeat seems to be losing out to cheaper poultry meat in consumers’ shopping baskets … The recent fall in prices may stimulate additional demand, and a strengthening economy could help, but at present these are hopes rather than expectations.”
The future of British pig farms is hanging in the balance. If the economy grows, then demand may rise, offsetting the fall in demand being driven by other factors. We will also see how the exit of pig farmers affects prices, as each pig farmer drops out of the market, supply is being cut and prices rise. Though this is not good news for the farmers who go out of business, it may be an example of survival of the fittest. The following articles consider the market for pork.
Podcast
UK pork market, Poppers, Scrap Metal BBC Radio 4, You and Yours (28/01/16)
Articles
Drop in global pork prices to bottom out – at 10-year lows agrimoney.com (29/01/16)
UK pork crisis looms as pig farmers expect income to half in 2016 Independent, Zlata Rodionova (5/02/16)
British pig farmers et for horrendous year as pork prices fall Western Morning News (17/01/16)
Questions
- What are they demand-side and supply-side factors which have pushed down the price of pork?
- Illustrate these effects using a demand and supply diagram.
- Into which market structure, would you place the pork industry?
- Using a diagram showing costs and revenues, explain why pig farmers in the UK are being forced out of the market.
- How has the strength of the pound affected pork prices in the UK?
There are countless people who work 12-hour days – some get rewarded with huge salaries, while others are paid peanuts. A key question is: are these people happy? With 24 hours in a day for both rich and poor, the more hours we work, the fewer hours we have for leisure time. So, how do we choose the optimal work-life balance?
In economics, we often talk about the concept of diminishing marginal utility and this concept can be applied to working life. For many people, each additional hour worked is tougher or adds less to your utility – we get tired, bored and the job may seem more unpleasant the more hours you work. The typical day of work is around 7-8 hours, but across Sweden, some offices are now closing at 3.30, with a 6-hour working day, but with salaries remaining the same. It’s not a new idea in Sweden and trials of this shorter working day concept have proved successful, with higher reported profits, better service to customers (or patients) and happier, more productive staff.
This shorter working day is not a common occurrence across Sweden or other countries, but it’s a practice that is certainly garnering media attention. Companies will certainly be keen if this means an increase in productivity, but one key concern will be the potential loss of business from companies who do keep working after 3.30 and expect phones to be answered.
It would certainly be an attractive prospect for employees and perhaps is a good way of ‘poaching’ the best staff and hence of boosting worker productivity. With more free time, perhaps an employee’s happiness would also increase, which could have significant effects on a range of variables. The following article considers this shorter working day.
The truth about Sweden’s short working hours BBC News, Maddy Savage (2/11/15)
Questions
- Explain the concept of diminishing marginal utility with respect to hours worked. Can this be used to explain why overtime often receives higher rates of pay?
- Using indifference analysis, explain how a change in the number of hours worked might affect an individual’s happiness.
- Why might a shorter working day help to increase a firm’s profits?
- If a shorter working day did increase happiness, what other factors might be affected? Does this explain why other countries are so interested in the success of this initiative?