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Posts Tagged ‘recession’

Brazil: suffering from an old economic problem in the new world

The article below looks at the economy of Brazil. The statistics do not look good. Real output fell last year by 3.8% and this year it is expected to fall by another 3.3%. Inflation this year is expected to be 9.0% and unemployment 11.2%, with the government deficit expected to be 10.4% of GDP.

The article considers Keynesian economics in the light of the case of Brazil, which is suffering from declining potential supply, but excess demand. It compares Brazil with the case of most developed countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Here countries have suffered from a lack of demand, made worse by austerity policies, and only helped by expansionary monetary policy. But the effect of the monetary policy has generally been weak, as much of the extra money has been used to purchase assets rather than funding a growth in aggregate demand.

Different policy prescriptions are proposed in the article. For developed countries struggling to grow, the solution would seem to be expansionary fiscal policy, made easy to fund by lower interest rates. For Brazil, by contrast, the solution proposed is one of austerity. Fiscal policy should be tightened. As the article states:

Spending restraint might well prove painful for some members of Brazilian society. But hyperinflation and default are hardly a walk in the park for those struggling to get by. Generally speaking, austerity has been a misguided policy approach in recent years. But Brazil is a special case. For now, anyway.

The tight fiscal policies could be accompanied by supply-side policies aimed at reducing bureaucracy and inefficiency.

Article
Brazil and the new old normal: There is more than one kind of economic mess to be in The Economist, Free Exchange Economics (12/10/16)

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘crowding out’.
  2. What is meant by the ‘liquidity trap’? Why are many countries in the developed world currently in a liquidity trap?
  3. Why have central banks in the developed world found it difficult to stimulate growth with policies of quantitative easing?
  4. Under what circumstances would austerity policies be valuable in the developed world?
  5. Why is crowding out of fiscal policy unlikely to occur to any great extent in Europe, but is highly likely to occur in Brazil?
  6. What has happened to potential GDP in Brazil in the past couple of years?
  7. What is meant by the ‘terms of trade’? Why have Brazil’s terms of trade deteriorated?
  8. What sort of policies could the Brazilian government pursue to raise growth rates? Are these demand-side or supply-side policies?
  9. Should Brazil pursue austerity policies and, if so, what form should they take?
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Brexit: the economic consequences

The UK has voted to leave the EU by 17 410 742 votes (51.9% or 37.4% of the electorate) to 16 141 241 votes (48.1% or 34.7% of the electorate). But what will be the economic consequences of the vote?

To leave the EU, Article 50 must be invoked, which starts the process of negotiating the new relationship with the EU. This, according to David Cameron, will happen when a new Conservative Prime Minister is chosen. Once Article 50 has been invoked, negotiations must be completed within two years and then the remaining 27 countries will decide on the new terms on which the UK can trade with the EU. As explained in the blog, The UK’s EU referendum: the economic arguments, there are various forms the new arrangements could take. These include:

‘The Norwegian model’, where Britain leaves the EU, but joins the European Economic Area, giving access to the single market, but removing regulation in some key areas, such as fisheries and home affairs. Another possibility is ‘the Swiss model’, where the UK would negotiate trade deals on an individual basis. Another would be ‘the Turkish model’ where the UK forms a customs union with the EU. At the extreme, the UK could make a complete break from the EU and simply use its membership of the WTO to make trade agreements.

The long-term economic effects would thus depend on which model is adopted. In the Norwegian model, the UK would remain in the single market, which would involve free trade with the EU, the free movement of labour between the UK and member states and contributions to the EU budget. The UK would no longer have a vote in the EU on its future direction. Such an outcome is unlikely, however, given that a central argument of the Leave camp has been for the UK to be able to control migration and not to have to pay contributions to the EU budget.

It is quite likely, then, that the UK would trade with the EU on the basis of individual trade deals. This could involve tariffs on exports to the EU and would involve being subject to EU regulations. Such negotiations could be protracted and potentially extend beyond the two-year deadline under Article 50. But for this to happen, there would have to be agreement by the remaining 27 EU countries. At the end of the two-year process, when the UK exits the EU, any unresolved negotiations would default to the terms for other countries outside the EU. EU treaties would cease to apply to the UK.

It is quite likely, then, that the UK would face trade restrictions on its exports to the EU, which would adversely affect firms for whom the EU is a significant market. Where practical, some firms may thus choose to relocate from the UK to the EU or move business and staff from UK offices to offices within the EU. This is particularly relevant to the financial services sector. As the second Economist article explains:

In the longer run … Britain’s financial industry could face severe difficulties. It thrives on the EU’s ‘passport’ rules, under which banks, asset managers and other financial firms in one member state may serve customers in the other 27 without setting up local operations. …

Unless passports are renewed or replaced, they will lapse when Britain leaves. A deal is imaginable: the EU may deem Britain’s regulations as ‘equivalent’ to its own. But agreement may not come easily. French and German politicians, keen to bolster their own financial centres and facing elections next year, may drive a hard bargain. No other non-member has full passport rights.

But if long-term economic effects are hard to predict, short-term effects are happening already.

The pound fell sharply as soon as the results of the referendum became clear. By the end of the day it had depreciated by 7.7% against the dollar and 5.7% against the euro. A lower pound will make imports more expensive and hence will drive up prices and reduce the real value of sterling. On the other had, it will make exports cheaper and act as a boost to exports.

If inflation rises, then the Bank of England may raise interest rates. This could have a dampening effect on the economy, which in turn would reduce tax revenues. The government, if it sticks to its fiscal target of achieving a public-sector net surplus by 2020 (the Fiscal Mandate), may then feel the need to cut government expenditure and/or raise taxes. Indeed, the Chancellor argued before the vote that such an austerity budget may be necessary following a vote to leave.

Higher interest rates could also dampen house prices as mortgages became more expensive or harder to obtain. The exception could be the top end of the market where a large proportion are buyers from outside the UK whose demand would be boosted by the depreciation of sterling.

But given that the Bank of England’s remit is to target inflation in 24 month’s time, it is possible that any spike in inflation is temporary and this may give the Bank of England leeway to cut Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% or even 0% and/or to engage in further quantitative easing.

One major worry is that uncertainty may discourage investment by domestic companies. It could also discourage inward investment, and international companies many divert investment to the EU. Already some multinationals have indicated that they will do just this. Shares in banks plummeted when the results of the vote were announced.

Uncertainty is also likely to discourage consumption of durables and other big-ticket items. The fall in aggregate demand could result in recession, again necessitating an austerity budget if the Fiscal Mandate is to be adhered to.

We live in ‘interesting’ times. Uncertainty is rarely good for an economy. But that uncertainty could persist for some time.

Articles
Why Brexit is grim news for the world economy The Economist (24/6/16)
International banking in a London outside the European Union The Economist (24/6/16)
What happens now that Britain has voted for Brexit The Economist (24/6/16)
Britain and the EU: A tragic split The Economist (24/6/16)
Brexit in seven charts — the economic impact Financial Times, Chris Giles (21/6/16)
How will Brexit result affect France, Germany and the rest of Europe? Financial Times, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Stefan Wagstyl, Duncan Robinson and Richard Milne (24/6/16)
How global markets are reacting to UK’s Brexit vote Financial Times, Michael Mackenzie and Eric Platt (24/6/16)
Brexit: What happens now? BBC News (24/6/16)
How will Brexit affect your finances? BBC News, Brian Milligan (24/6/16)
Brexit: what happens when Britain leaves the EU Vox, Timothy B. Lee (25/6/16)
An expert sums up the economic consensus about Brexit. It’s bad. Vox, John Van Reenen (24/6/16)
How will the world’s policymakers respond to Brexit? The Telegraph, Peter Spence (24/6/16)
City of London could be cut off from Europe, says ECB official The Guardian, Katie Allen (25/6/16)
Multinationals warn of job cuts and lower profits after Brexit vot The Guardian, Graham Ruddick (24/6/16)
How will Brexit affect Britain’s trade with Europe? The Guardian, Dan Milmo (26/6/16)
Britain’s financial sector reels after Brexit bombshell Reuters, Sinead Cruise, Andrew MacAskill and Lawrence White (24/6/16)
How ‘Brexit’ Will Affect the Global Economy, Now and Later New York Times, Neil Irwin (24/6/16)
Brexit results: Spurned Europe wants Britain gone Sydney Morning Herald, Nick Miller (25/6/16)
Economists React to ‘Brexit’: ‘A Wave of Economic and Political Uncertainty’ The Wall Street Journal, Jeffrey Sparshott (24/6/16)
Brexit wound: UK vote makes EU decline ‘practically irreversible’, Soros says CNBC, Javier E. David (25/6/16)
One month on, what has been the impact of the Brexit vote so far? The Guardian (23/7/16)

Questions

  1. What are the main elements of a balance of payments account? Changes in which elements caused the depreciation of the pound following the Brexit vote? What elements of the account, in turn, are likely to be affected by the depreciation?
  2. What determines the size of the effect on the current account of the balance of payments of a depreciation? How might long-term effects differ from short-term ones?
  3. Is it possible for firms to have access to the single market without allowing free movement of labour?
  4. What assumptions were made by the Leave side about the economic effects of Brexit?
  5. Would it be beneficial to go for a ‘free trade’ option of abolishing all import tariffs if the UK left the EU? Would it mean that UK exports would face no tariffs from other countries?
  6. What factors are likely to drive the level of investment in the UK (a) by domestic companies trading within the UK and (b) by multinational companies over the coming months?
  7. What will determine the course of monetary policy over the coming months?
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Global warning

Project Syndicate is an organisation which produces articles on a range of economic, political and social topics written by eminent scholars, political and business leaders, policymakers and civic activists. It then makes these available to news media in more than 150 countries. Here we look at four such articles which assess the outlook for the European and global economies and even that of capitalism itself.

The general tone is one of pessimism. Despite unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (QE) and negative nominal interest rates, the global recovery is anaemic. As the Nouriel Roubini articles states:

Unconventional monetary policies – entrenched now for almost a decade – have themselves become conventional. And, in view of persistent lacklustre growth and deflation risk in most advanced economies, monetary policymakers will have to continue their lonely fight with a new set of ‘unconventional unconventional’ monetary policies.

Perhaps this will involve supplying additional money directly to consumers and/or business in a so-called ‘helicopter drop’ of money. Perhaps it will be supplying money directly to governments to finance infrastructure projects – a policy dubbed ‘people’s quantitative easing‘. Perhaps it will involve taxing the holding of cash by banks to encourage them to lend.

The Hans-Werner Sinn article looks at some of the consequences of the huge amount of money created through QE and continuing to be created in the eurozone. Although it has not boosted consumption and investment nearly as much as desired, it has caused bubbles in various asset markets. For example, the property market has soared in many countries:

Property markets in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg have practically exploded throughout the crisis, as a result of banks chasing borrowers with offers of loans at near-zero interest rates, regardless of their creditworthiness.

The German property boom could be reined in with an appropriate jump in interest rates. But, given the ECB’s apparent determination to head in the opposite direction, the bubble will only grow. If it bursts, the effects could be dire for the euro.

The Jean Pisani-Ferry article widens the analysis of the eurozone’s problems. Like Roubini, he considers the possibility of a helicopter drop of money, which “would be functionally equivalent to a direct government transfer to households, financed by central banks’ permanent issuance of money”.

Without such drastic measures he sees consumer and business pessimism (see chart) undermining recovery and making the eurozone vulnerable to global shocks, such as further weakening in China. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Finally, Anatole Kaletsky takes a broad historical view. He starts by saying that “All over the world today, there is a sense of the end of an era, a deep foreboding about the disintegration of previously stable societies.” He argues that the era of ‘leaving things to the market’ is coming to an end. This was an era inspired by the monetarist and supply-side revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s that led to the privatisation and deregulation policies of Reagan, Thatcher and other world leaders.

But if the market cannot cope with the complexities of today’s world, neither can governments.

If the world is too complex and unpredictable for either markets or governments to achieve social objectives, then new systems of checks and balances must be designed so that political decision-making can constrain economic incentives and vice versa. If the world is characterized by ambiguity and unpredictability, then the economic theories of the pre-crisis period – rational expectations, efficient markets, and the neutrality of money – must be revised.

… It is obvious that new technology and the integration of billions of additional workers into global markets have created opportunities that should mean greater prosperity in the decades ahead than before the crisis. Yet ‘responsible’ politicians everywhere warn citizens about a ‘new normal’ of stagnant growth. No wonder voters are up in arms.

His solution has much in common with that of Roubini and Pisani-Ferry. “Money could be printed and distributed directly to citizens. Minimum wages could be raised to reduce inequality. Governments could invest much more in infrastructure and innovation at zero cost. Bank regulation could encourage lending, instead of restricting it.”

So will there be a new era of even more unconventional monetary policy and greater regulation that encourages rather than restricts investment? Read the articles and try answering the questions.

Articles
Unconventional Monetary Policy on Stilts Project Syndicate, Nouriel Roubini (1/4/16)
Europe’s Emerging Bubbles Project Syndicate, Hans-Werner Sinn (28/3/16)
Preparing for Europe’s Next Recession Project Syndicate, Jean Pisani-Ferry (31/3/16)
When Things Fall Apart Project Syndicate, Anatole Kaletsky (31/3/16)

Questions

  1. Explain how a ‘helicopter drop’ of money would work in practice.
  2. Why has growth in the eurozone been so anaemic since the recession of 2009/10?
  3. What is the relationship between tightening the regulations about capital and liquidity requirements of banks and bank lending?
  4. Explain the policies of the different eras identified by Anatole Kaletsky.
  5. Would it be fair to describe the proposals for more unconventional monetary policies as ‘Keynesian’?
  6. If quantitative easing was used to finance government infrastructure investment, what would be the effect on the public-sector deficit and debt?
  7. If the inflation of asset prices is a bubble, what could cause the bubble to burst and what would be the effect on the wider economy?
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Japan’s deflation fears grow (update)

In the blog Japan’s interesting monetary policy as deflation fears grow we detailed the aggressive monetary measures of Japan’s central bank to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming again established. In January it introduced a negative interest rate on some deposits placed with it by commercial banks. This is in addition to it massive quantitative easing programme to boost the country’s money supply. Despite this, the latest consumer price inflation data show inflation now running at zero per cent.

As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation (click here to download a PowerPoint file of the chart). In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, through purchases of government bonds from investors.

Following this substantial monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.

However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. The latest inflation data show that the annual rate of CPI inflation in January 2016 fell to zero percent. In other words, consumer prices were on average at the levels seen in January 2015.

The latest inflation numbers appear give further credence to the fear of the Bank of Japan that deflation is set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate was the latest move to prevent deflation. As well as encouraging banks to lend, the move is intended to affect expectations of inflation. By adopting such an aggressive monetary stance the central bank is looking to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established. Hence, by increasing the expectations of the inflation rate and by raising wage demands the inflation rate will rise.

The loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows the acceleration of the quantitative easing programme announced in October 2015 to conduct Open Market Operations so as to increase the monetary base annually by ¥80 trillion.

The decline of Japan’s inflation rate to zero may yet mean that further monetary loosening might be called for. Eradicating a deflationary mindset is proving incredibly difficult. Where next for Japan’s monetary authorities?

Data
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan

New Articles
Japan’s inflation drops to zero in January MarketWatch, Takashi Nakamichi (25/2/16)
Japan inflation falls back to zero in January: govt AFP (26/2/16)
With pause in inflation, many brace for retreat Nikkei Asian Review (27/2/16)
Japan’s inflation rate has fallen again – to 0% Business Insider Australia, David Scutt (26/2/16)

Previous Articles
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates The Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What is deflation?
  2. What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
  3. To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?
  4. What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
  5. What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
  6. What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
  7. How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?
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Riding the Japanese roller coaster

Sustained economic growth in Japan remains elusive. Preliminary Quarterly Estimates of GDP point to the Japanese economy having contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015. This follows on from growth of 0.3 per cent in the third quarter, a contraction of 0.3 per cent in the second and growth of 1 per cent in the first quarter. Taken as a whole output in 2015 rose by 0.4 per cent compared to zero growth in 2014. The fragility of growth means that over the past 20 years the average annual rate of growth in Japan is a mere 0.8 per cent.

Chart 1 shows the quarter-to-quarter change in real GDP in Japan since the mid 1990s (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). While economies are known to be inherently volatile the Japanese growth story over the past twenty or years so is one both of exceptional volatility and of repeated bouts of recession. Since the mid 1990s Japan has experienced 6 recessions, four since 2008.

Of the four recessions since 2008, the deepest was that from 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q1 which saw the economy shrink by 9.2 per cent. This was followed by a recession from 2010 Q4 to 2011 Q2 when the economy shrunk by 3.1 per cent, then from 2012 Q2 to 2012 Q4 when the economy shrunk by 0.9 per cent and from 2014 Q2 to 2014 Q3 when output fell another 2.7 per cent. As a result of these four recessionary periods the economy’s output in 2015 Q4 was actually 0.4 per cent less than in 2008 Q1.

Chart 2 shows the annual levels of nominal (actual) and real (constant-price) GDP in trillions of Yen (¥) since 1995. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over the period actual GDP has fallen from ¥502 trillion to ¥499 trillion (about £3 trillion at the current exchange rate) while GDP at constant 2005 prices has risen from ¥455 trillion to ¥528 trillion.

Chart 2 reveals an interesting phenomenon: the growth in real GDP at the same time as a fall in nominal GDP. So why has the actual value of GDP fallen slightly between 1995 and 2005? The answer is quite simple: deflation.

Chart 3 shows a protracted period of economy-wide deflation from 1999 to 2013. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the GDP deflator fell each year by an average of 1.0 per cent. 2014 and 2015 saw a pick up in economy-wide inflation. However, the quarterly profile through 2015 shows the pace of inflation falling quite markedly. As we saw in Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow, policymakers are again concerned about the possibility of deflation and the risks that poses for growth.

As Chart 4 helps to demonstrate, a significant factor behind the latest slowdown in Japan’s growth is household spending. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). In 2015 household spending accounted for about 57 per cent by value of GDP in Japan. In the last quarter of 2015 real household spending fell by 0.9 per cent while across 2015 as a whole real household spending fell by 1.3 per cent. This follows on from a 0.8 per cent decrease in spending by households in 2014.

The recent marked weakening of household spending is a significant concern for the short term growth prospects of the Japanese economy. The roller coaster ride continues, unfortunately it appears that the ride is again downwards.

Data
Quarterly Estimates of GDP Japanese Cabinet Office
Japan and the IMF IMF Country Reports
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD

Articles
Japan’s economy contracts in fourth quarter BBC News, (15/2/16)
Japanese economy shrinks again, raising expectations of more stimulus Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy shrinks again as Abenomics is blown off course Guardian, Justin McCurry (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy contracts in latest setback for Abe policies New Zealand Herald, (15/2/16)
Japan’s ‘Abenomics’ on the ropes as yen soars, markets plunge Daily Mail, (15/2/16)
Japan economy shrinks more than expected, highlights lack of policy options CNBC, Leika Kihara and Tetsushi Kajimoto (15/2/16)

Questions

  1. Why is the distinction between nominal and real important in analysing economic growth?
  2. How do we define a recession?
  3. Of what importance is aggregate demand to the volatility of economies?
  4. Why are Japanese policymakers concerned about the prospects of deflation?
  5. What policy options are available to policymakers trying to combat deflation?
  6. Why is the strength of household consumption important in affecting the path of an economy?
  7. Why has Japan experienced an increase in real GDP but a fall in nominal GDP between 1995 and 2015?
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Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow

The perceived wisdom is that nominal interest rates have a lower zero bound. The Swedish central bank (the Ricksbank) has effectively been charging financial institutions to deposit money at the central bank since 2009. On 29 January 2016 the Central Bank of Japan also introduced a negative interest rate on deposits. The -0.1 per cent rate currently applies to a portion of the reserves held by financial institutions at the central bank. The move is another attempt to pump energy into a struggling economy.

As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation. In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, principally through purchases of government bonds from investors. Following the monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.

However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. Now there appears to be an increasing fear at the Bank of Japan that deflation may be set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate is intended to prevent deflation. In particular by affecting expectations of inflation. The hope is to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established.

The further loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows on the heels of an acceleration of quantitative easing last October. Back then, the Bank of Japan said that it would conduct Open Market Operations so that the monetary base would increase annually be ¥80 trillion. This was reaffirmed in its 29 January announcement. For an economy that has experienced four recessionary contractions since 2008 and with provisional estimates suggesting that it contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015, it remains to be seen whether further monetary loosening might yet be called for.

Data
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan

Articles
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
  2. What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
  3. What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
  4. How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?
  5. What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
  6. To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?
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Constructing growth without construction: The UK growth paradox

In the blog the service sector continues to drive the UK business cycle written in October 2014 we observed how UK growth was being driven by the service sector while other industrial sectors struggled. The contrasting performance across UK industry appears now to be even more marked. The latest GDP numbers from the Office for National Statistics contained in Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 show the economy’s output expanded by 0.5 per cent in the fourth quarter. Yet the construction sector is in recession following contractions of 1.9 per cent (Q3) and 0.1 per cent (Q4). Here we update our earlier blog to evidence the UK’s growth paradox.

Preliminary estimates suggest that the UK economy expanded by 0.5 per cent in the final quarter of 2015 following on from growth of of 0.4 per cent in the third quarter. 2015 as a whole saw output grow by 2.2 per cent, down from 2.9 per cent in 2014 and a little below the average over the past 60 years of around 2.6 per cent.

Chart 1 shows quarterly economic growth since 1980s (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It illustrates nicely the inherent volatility of economies – one of the threshold concepts in economics.The average quarterly rate of growth since 1980 has been 0.5 per cent so on the face of it, a quarterly growth number of 0.5 per cent might seem to paint a picture of sustainable growth. Yet, the industrial make up of growth is far from balanced.

Consider now Chart 2 (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It allows us to analyse more recent events by tracking how industrial output has evolved since 2006. It suggests an unbalanced recovery following the financial crisis. In 2015 Q4 the economy’s total output was 6.6 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1 with service-sector output 11.6 per cent higher. However, a very different picture emerges for the other principal industrial types.

The economy’s total output surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, but output across the production industries in 2015 Q4 remains 9.4 per cent lower than in 2008 Q1 (and 6.4 per cent lower specifically within manufacturing) and 4.2 per cent lower in the construction sector. However, output in the agricultural sector has rebounded and is now 8.4 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1.

The growth data continue to show the British economy struggling to rebalance its industrial composition. With output in construction in 2015 Q4 2 per cent lower than it was in Q2 and manufacturing output 0.4 per cent lower, UK growth remains stubbornly dependent on the service sector.

Data
Preliminary Estimate of GDP – Time Series Dataset Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Economy tracker: GDP BBC News

Articles
UK economic growth slows in 2015: what the economists are saying Guardian, Katie Allen (28/1/16)
UK economy grows 0.5% in fourth quarter BBC News, (28/1/16)
Bumpy times ahead’ for UK even as fourth quarter growth accelerates Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (28/1/16)
UK economic growth rises to 0.5% in fourth quarter The Scotsman, Roger Baird (28/1/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What is the difference between nominal and real GDP? Which of these helps to track changes in economic output?
  2. Looking at Chart 1 above, summarise the key patterns in real GDP since the 1980s.
  3. What is a recession?
  4. What are some of the problems with the traditional definition of a recession?
  5. Can a recession occur if nominal GDP is actually rising? Explain your answer.
  6. What factors lead to economic growth being so variable?
  7. What factors might explain the very different patterns seen since the late 2000s in the volume of output of the four main industrial sectors?
  8. What different interpretations could there be of a ‘rebalancing’ of the UK economy?
  9. What other data might we look at to analyse whether the UK economy is ‘rebalancing’?.
  10. Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
  11. Produce a short briefing paper exploring the prospects for economic growth in the UK over the next 12 to 18 months.
  12. What is the difference between GVA and GDP?
  13. Explain the arguments for and against using GDP as a measure of a country’s economic well-being.
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What to do about slowing global growth?

First the IMF in its World Economic Outlook, then the European Commission in its Economic Forecasts (see also) and now the OECD in its Economic Outlook (see also) – all three organisations in the latest issues of their 6-monthly publications are predicting slower global economic growth than they did 6 months previously. This applies both to the current year and to 2016. The OECD’s forecast for global growth this year is now 2.9%, down from the 3.7% it was forecasting a year ago. Its latest growth forecast for 2016 is 3.3%, down from the 3.9% it was forecasting a year ago.

Various reasons are given for the gloomier outlook. These include: a dramatic slowdown in global trade growth; slowing economic growth in China and fears over structural weaknesses in China; falling commodity prices (linked to slowing demand but also as a result of increased supply); austerity policies as governments attempt to deal with the hangover of debt from the financial crisis of 2007/8; low investment leading to low rates of productivity growth despite technological progress; and general fears about low growth leading to low spending as people become more cautious about their future incomes.

The slowdown in trade growth (forecast to be just 2% in 2015) is perhaps the most worrying for future global growth. As Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, states in his remarks at the launch of the latest OECD Economic Outlook:

‘Global trade, which was already growing slowly over the past few years, appears to have stagnated and even declined since late 2014, with the weakness centering increasingly on emerging markets, particularly China. This is deeply concerning as robust trade and global growth go hand in hand. In 2015 global trade is expected to grow by a disappointing 2%. Over the past five decades there have been only five other years in which trade growth has been 2% or less, all of which coincided with a marked downturn of global growth.’

So what policies should governments pursue to stimulate economic growth? According to Angel Gurría:

‘Short-term demand needs to be supported and structural reforms to be pursued with greater ambition than is currently the case. Three specific actions are key:

•  First, we need to resist and turn back rising protectionism. Trade strengthens competition and investment and revs up the “diffusion machine” – the spread of new technologies throughout the economy – which will ultimately lift productivity.
•  Second, we need to step up structural reform efforts, which have weakened in recent years. And here, I mean the whole range of structural reforms – education, innovation, competition, labour and product market regulation, R&D, taxes, etc.
•  Third, there is scope to adjust public spending towards investment. If done collectively by all countries, if the sector and projects chosen have high multipliers, and if combined with serious structural reforms, stronger public investment can give a boost to growth and employment and not increase the relative debt burden.’

On this third point, the OECD Economic Outlook argues that ‘the rationale for such investments is that they could help to push economies onto a higher growth path than might otherwise be the case, at a time when private investment growth remains modest.’

Collective action to increase public investment can be expected to boost the initial domestic multiplier effects from the stimulus, since private investment and exports in each economy will benefit from stronger demand in other economies. …the multiplier effects from an investment-led stimulus are likely to be a little larger than from other forms of fiscal stimulus, since the former also has small, but positive, supply-side effects.

In other words, the OECD is calling for a relaxation of austerity policies, with public investment being used to provide a stimulus to growth. The higher growth will then lead to increased potential output, as well as actual output, and an increase in tax revenues.

These policy recommendations are very much in line with those of the IMF.

Videos and Webcasts
OECD warns of global trade slowdown, trims growth outlook again Reuters (9/11/15)
OECD returns to revisionism with growth downgrade Euronews, Robert Hackwill (9/11/15)
OECD: Weak China Import Growth Leads Trade Slowdown Bloomberg, Catherine L Mann, OECD Chief Economist (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook: Moving forward in difficult times OECD PowerPoint presentation, Catherine L Mann, OECD Chief Economist (9/11/15)
Press Conference OECD, Angel Gurría and Álvaro Pereira (9/11/15)

Articles
OECD cuts world growth forecast Financial Times, Ferdinando Giugliano (9/11/15)
OECD rings alarm bell over threat of global growth recession thanks to China slowdown Independent, Ben Chu (10/11/15)
OECD cuts global growth forecasts amid ‘deep concern’ over slowdown BBC News (9/11/15)
OECD fears slowdown in global trade amid China woes The Guardian, Katie Allen (9/11/15)
The global economy is slowing down. But is it recession – or protectionism? The Observer, Heather Stewart and Fergus Ryan (14/11/15)
Global growth is struggling, but it is not all bad news The Telegraph, Andrew Sentance (13/11/15)

OECD Publications
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OCED (9/11/15)
Press Release: Emerging market slowdown and drop in trade clouding global outlook OCED (9/11/15)
Data handout for press OECD (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook, Chapter 3: Lifting Investment for Higher Sustainable Growth OCED (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook: Full Report OECD (9/11/15)

Questions

  1. Is a slowdown in international trade a cause of slower economic growth or simply an indicator of slower economic growth? Examine the causal connections between trade and growth.
  2. How worried should we be about disappointing growth in the global economy?
  3. What determines the size of the multiplier effects of an increase in public investment?
  4. Why are the multiplier effects of an increase in public-sector investment likely to be larger in the USA and Japan than in the UK, the eurozone and Canada?
  5. How can monetary policy be supportive of fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth?
  6. Under what circumstances would public-sector investment (a) stimulate and (b) crowd out private-sector investment?
  7. How would a Keynesian economist respond to the recommendations of the OECD?
  8. How would a neoclassical/neoliberal economist respond to the recommendations?
  9. Are the OECD’s recommendations in line with the Japanese government’s ‘three arrows‘?
  10. What structural reforms are recommended by the OECD? Are these ‘market orientated’ or ‘interventionist’ reforms, or both? Explain.
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No instruments left to play

Let’s say that the world slides back into recession, or at least, the eurozone, the USA and other major economies. This is not unthinkable, given the determination of many countries to reduce public-sector deficits and debt, concerns about slowing growth in China and other major developing countries, and worries about various geo-political developments, such as conflict in the Middle East and the possible exit of Greece from the euro and the shock waves this might send. If it happened, what could governments and central banks do to stimulate aggregate demand? The problem is, according to the linked articles below, the world has largely run out of policy instruments.

In normal times, the main policy instruments for stimulating aggregate demand are cuts in interest rates (monetary policy) and increases in government expenditure and/or tax cuts (fiscal policy). But with interest rates currently at virtually zero, there is little scope for further cuts. And with governments attempting to ‘repair’ their balance sheets by cutting deficits, there is little appetite for increasing deficits again.

It is possible that central banks could engage in further quantitative easing. Indeed, the ECB is only just starting its large QE programme, involving monthly bond purchases of €60bn until at least September 2016 (totalling €1.14tr at that point). But QE leads to market distortions, such as increased asset prices (e.g. share and house prices), made higher and more unstable by speculation. By providing ‘cheap money’, it also encourages potentially risky investments.

The articles below considers the dilemma and looks at six possible options for policy makers suggested by Stephen King, chief economist at HSBC. But are they realistic? Read the articles and then consider the questions.

Financial crisis fixes leave policymakers short of ammo for next recession The Guardian, Larry Elliott (31/5/15)
How to get the economy working for us Guardian Letters, Mary Mellor; Colin Hines; Martin London; William Dixon and David Wilson (2/6/15)
HSBC’s Stephen King Outlines “Economic Nightmare” ValueWalk (14/5/15)
HSBC: Central Banks Are Running Low on Ammunition Bloomberg, Julie Verhage (13/5/15)
If the US economy is signalling an iceberg, bad news: we’re out of lifeboats The Guardian, Nils Pratley (13/5/15)
Policy makers lack the firepower to fight another US recession Financial Times, Stephen King (18/5/15)
The new surrealism Global Economics Quarterly, Stephen King (Q2, 2015)

Questions

  1. What are the risks to global recovery?
  2. Why has recovery from the 2008/9 recession been slower than that from previous recessions?
  3. What are the traditional instruments for combatting a recession?
  4. Why might central banks be wary of engaging in further rounds of quantitative easing?
  5. What is meant by ‘helicopter money’? Would this be a better solution to a recession than quantitative easing?
  6. Go through the other five policy options identified by Stephen King and discuss the suitability of each one.
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The fate of the eurozone

The eurozone is certainly in trouble and, despite the efforts of world leaders to create confidence, it appears that most announcements are having the opposite effect. The risk of deflation has now emerged to be very true; the powerhouse of Europe ‘needs to do more’ and the euro has fallen following Mario Draghi’s recent comments. So, just how bad are things in the eurozone?

Mario Draghi suggested that as a means of stimulating the eurozone economies, a process of quantitative easing may soon need to begin. However, rather than reassuring investors that action was being taken to improve the economic performance in the region, it appears to have had the opposite effect. Following his comments, the euro fell to its lowest level since the middle of 2010.

Quantitative easing has seen much use in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the aim in the eurozone would be to put a stop to the continuing price decreases. The eurozone has now entered deflation and, while the aim of this economic area has always been low prices, deflation is not good news. The downward pressure on prices has been largely driven by oil prices falling and prices in other areas remaining relatively stable.

Quantitative easing would inject money into the eurozone, thus creating growth (or at least that’s the idea) and pushing up prices. One of Mario Draghi’s comments was:

‘We are making technical preparations to alter the size, pace and composition of our measures in early 2015.’

So, while it’s not certain that the QE policy will be used, it seems pretty likely, especially as this policy has been floating around for almost a year.

A key question is, will it work? The quantity theory of money does suggest that an increase in the money supply will lead to inflationary pressures, unless its velocity of circulation falls. But will it actually stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth? If there is more money in the banking system and hence more money available for lending then it may well stimulate investment and consumption. However, if consumers and firms are not confident about the effectiveness of the policy or about the future of the economy, then will the fact that more money is available for lending actually encourage them to borrow? In this case will there merely be a fall in the velocity of circulation?

The comments by Mario Draghi have also caused the euro to fall to its lowest level since 2010. The graph included in the CNBC article provides an interesting view of the path of the euro. Marc Chandler, from Brown Brothers Harriman said:

‘I’d say there’s a good chance it [the euro] gets there [parity with the dollar] before the election next November (2016) … We know the Fed’s going to be raising rates sooner or later, and the ECB is going to be easing sooner or later. I just see a steady grind lower.’

The outlook of the euro therefore doesn’t look too good by all accounts. It is now a waiting game to see if the policy of quantitative easing is implemented and whether or not it has the desired effect. The following articles consider this topic.

Eurozone economy slows further BBC News (6/1/15)
Eurozone falls into deflation for first time since October 2009 Financial Times, Claire Jones (7/1/15)
Eurozone officially falls into deflation, piling pressure on ECB The Telegraph, Marion Dakers (7/1/15)
Eurozone consumer prices fall for first time in five years Nasdaq, Brian Blackstone and Paul Hannon (7/1/15)
Draghi comments send euro to lowest level since 2010 BBC News (2/1/15)
Oil slump drags Eurozone into deflation The Guardian, Graeme Wearden (7/1/15)
Eurozone prices fall more than expected in December Reuters (7/1/15)
Eurozone lurches into deflation after oil price crashes Independent, Russell Lynch (7/1/15)
German inflation hits five-year low as Eurozone prepares for QE The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (5/1/15)
Euro slide could take it to parity with dollar CNBC, Patti Domm (7/1/15)

Questions

  1. Why is deflation a cause for concern when normally the main problem is inflation that is too high?
  2. What is the quantity theory of money and how does it suggest an increase in the money supply will affect prices?
  3. If quantitative easing is implemented, is it likely to have the desired effect? Explain why or why not.
  4. Why has the euro been affected by Mario Draghi’s comments? Use a diagram to help your explanation.
  5. How will quantitative easing help to stimulate economic growth across the Eurozone? Are there any other policies that would be effective?
  6. Oil prices have had a big influence on the deflationary pressures in the Eurozone. If oil prices increased again, would this be sufficient to create inflation?
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