Posts Tagged ‘market power’
In 2009, the European Commission investigated Microsoft’s practice of bundling its own browser, Internet Explorer, with new copies of Windows. It found that this was an abuse of market power and created an unfair barrier to entry of other browsers, such as Firefox.
An agreement was reached that Microsoft would include a ‘choice screen’ in which users in the EU would be given a full list of alternative browsers and asked which they would like to install. On making their selection, a link would take them to the browser site to download the installation program. This screen would be available until 2014. Between March 2010, when the choice screen was first provided and November of the same year, 84 million browsers were downloaded through it.
In May 2011, however, the screen was no longer present on new Windows 7 purchases. The Commission took some time to realise this: indeed it was Microsoft’s rivals that pointed it out. The screen reappeared some 13 months later, after some 15m copies of Windows software had been sold.
For this lapse, the Commission has just fined Microsoft €561m. Commission Vice President in charge of competition policy, Joaquín Almunia, said:
In 2009, we closed our investigation about a suspected abuse of dominant position by Microsoft due to the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows by accepting commitments offered by the company. Legally binding commitments reached in antitrust decisions play a very important role in our enforcement policy because they allow for rapid solutions to competition problems. Of course, such decisions require strict compliance. A failure to comply is a very serious infringement that must be sanctioned accordingly.
This may seem unduly harsh, given that Internet Explorer’s share of the browser market has fallen dramatically. In 2009, it had around 50% of the European market, with its main rival at the time, Mozilla’s Firefox, having just under 40%. By 2013, Internet Explorer’s share has fallen to around 24% and Firefox’s to around 29%. Google’s Chrome, which was just starting up in 2009, has seen its share of the European market rise to around 35% and is now the market leader. Partly this is due to the rise in tablets and smartphones, a large proportion of which use Google’s Android operating system and the Chrome browser.
Not surprisingly, the European Commission is investigating Google to see whether it is abusing a dominant position. Is Google’s case, it’s not just about its share of the browser market, it’s more about its share of the search market, which in the EU is around 90% (compared with around 65% in the USA). As The Economist article below states:
The Commissioner believes that Google may be favouring its own specialised services (eg, for flights or hotels) at rivals’ expense; that its deals with publishers may unfairly exclude competitors; and that it prevents advertisers from taking their data elsewhere.
Joaquín Almunia asked Google to respond to these concerns by January 31. Google delivered its suggestions on the deadline, but we await to hear precisely what it said and how the Commission will respond. It is understood that Google’s proposal is for clearly labelling its own products on its search engine.
Articles
Microsoft Fined $732 Million By EU Over Browser eWeek, Michelle Maisto (6/3/13)
Microsoft faces hefty EU fine The Guardian (6/3/13)
Sin of omission The Economist (9/3/13)
Microsoft fined by European Commission over web browser BBC News (6/3/13)
EU commissioner Joaquin Almunia announces Microsoft fine BBC News (6/3/13)
Microsoft’s European Fine Comes in an Era of Browser Diversity Forbes, J.P. Gownder (6/3/13)
Life after Firefox: Can Mozilla regain its mojo? BBC News, Dave Lee (11/4/12)
Google responds to European commission’s antitrust chief The Guardian, Charles Arthur (31/1/13)
Google May Clinch EU Settlement After ‘Summer,’ Almunia Says Bloomberg Businessweek, Stephanie Bodoni and Aoife White (22/2/13)
European Commission Press Release
Antitrust: Commission fines Microsoft for non-compliance with browser choice commitments Europa (6/3/13)
Questions
- Why did Microsoft’s share of the browser market continue to decline between May 2011 and June 2012?
- Why would it matter if Microsoft had market power in the browser market, given that it’s free for anyone to download a browser?
- In what ways might Google be abusing a dominant position in the market?
- Can Mozilla regain its mojo?
- According to the second Guardian article, the Microsoft-backed lobby group Icomp said “To be seen as a success, any settlement must … include specific measures to restore competition and allow other parties to compete effectively on a level playing field with Google in the key markets of search and search advertising.” Give examples of such measures and assess how successful they might be.
- Would “clearly labelling its own products on its search engine” be enough to ensure adequate competition?
Tags: abuse of dominant position, browser market, competition, competition policy, dominant position, EU competition policy, market power, monopoly power, oligopoly, public interest, search engine market
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 07, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 13, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 15, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 23, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07
Authored by: John Sloman
Six of the major tea producing countries – India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Rwanda and Malawi – have formed an International Tea Producers’ Forum (ITPF). Together these countries produce slightly more than the world’s tea. The hope of the members of the new ITPF is that their cartel will allow them to increase the price of tea to the growers and to create greater price stability.
According to the Assam Tribune article below:
ITPF’s main objectives include – safeguarding the interests of the tea-producing countries, evolving collective solutions for the problems facing the producers, providing technical cooperation, sharing of technology and expertise by the member countries, undertaking market studies and research projects to address any specific issues concerning tea in general or any variety of tea, among others.
And according to the article from Sri Lanka’s Daily News:
Chairman of the Planters’ Association of Ceylon, which represents the interests of 23 Regional Plantation Companies, Lalith Obeyesekere said this was a landmark occasion. Sri Lanka particularly looks to the forum to provide long-term sustainability to the tea industry in maintaining price stability and quality standards, among the other objectives set out in the mandate… The Planters’ Association said they were confident that Sri Lanka could use the ITPF to re-look at the industry in order that local tea producers realize their full potential.
Sri Lanka’s plantation industries minister Mahinda Samarasinghe said:
The bulk of production is in the hands of smallholders. So there’s a need to increase their incomes. Price stability is definitely important.
The main aim of the ITPF over the longer term is likely to be to raise tea prices. The chart shows international tea prices from 1983 to the present day. As you can see, they have fluctuated considerably. Note that these are prices in nominal terms and hence do not take inflation into account. Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.
But if the main aim is to increase prices to tea growers, how could this be achieved? One objective of the ITPF is to stimulate demand for tea by ‘promoting tea consumption through generic promotional campaigns’. The aim would be to encourage people to switch from coffee and soft drinks.
But to take advantage of its market power, the cartel might also want to reduce tea production, thereby pushing up the price. This, of course, would be more feasible if it had a larger than 50% share of the market.
Although production quotas are not currently part of the agreement, these are likely to be considered at future meetings, especially if the three other large producers – China, Vietnam and Iran – can be persuaded to join.
China, with some 38% of the market, is the world’s largest tea producer. Although it sent an observer to the meeting (as did Iran), it was not one of the signatories. If it could be persuaded to join the cartel, this would increase its power. Nevertheless, China specialises in different types of tea, mainly green teas, and is not the world’s biggest exporter – that is Kenya.
Articles
Tea nations join forces Radio New Zealand (25/1/13)
International Tea Producers’ Forum formed Assam Tribune, Ajit Patowary (23/1/13)
Planters’ Association upbeat on newly formed International Tea Producer’s Forum Daily News (Sri Lanka) (26/1/13)
Leaf Lobby: Sri Lanka hosts tea producer forum Lanka Business Online (24/1/13)
‘Tea cartel’ formed by biggest producing nation BBC News (23/1/13)
Tea producers brew up plan to raise prices Emirates 24/7 (23/1/13)
Data
Tea Monthly Price – US cents per Kilogram Index Mundi
Questions
- What are the stated aims of the newly formed ITPF? How realistic are they?
- What conditions are necessary for a cartel to be successful in raising prices over the long term?
- With reference to the chart, what can you say about the real price of tea over the period 1983 to 2013?
- To what extent are these conditions met by the ITPF?
- Why may a rise in tea prices in the supermarkets not result in a rise in prices to tea growers?
- How may tea growers benefit from the ITPF even if the Forum does not result directly in a rise in prices to growers?
- How can game theory help to explain the possible behaviour of members of a cartel and producers outside the cartel?
Tags: cartel, collusion, commodity markets, game theory, market power, nominal prices, oligopoly, real prices, tea
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 02, Economics 8e: Ch 03, Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 02, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 03, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 07, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 04, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 05, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 08, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 23
Authored by: John Sloman
Two of the biggest publishing companies, Pearson of the UK and Bertelsmann of Germany are to form a joint venture by merging their Penguin and Random House imprints. Bertelsmann will have a majority stake in the venture of 53% and Pearson will have 47%.
The Penguin imprint, with a turnover of just over £1bn, has an 11% share of the English language book publishing market. Random House has a 15% share, with turnover of around £1.5bn. The new ‘Penguin Random House’, as it will be called, will have nearly 26% of the market, which should give it considerable market power to combat various threats in the book publishing market.
One threat is from online retailers, such as Amazon, Apple and Google, which use their countervailing power to drive down the prices they pay to publishers. Another threat is from the rise of electronic versions of books. Although e-books save on printing costs, competition is driving down prices, including the prices of paper books, which may make publishers more reluctant to publish new titles in paper form.
There has been a mixed reception from authors: some are worried that an effective reduction in the number of major publishers from six to five will make it harder to get books published and may squeeze royalty rates; others feel that an increased market power of publishers to take on the online retailers will help to protect the interests of authors
The following videos and articles look at the nature of this joint venture and its implications for costs, revenues and publishing more generally.
Videos and webcasts
Penguin and Random House merge to take on digital giants Channel 4 News, Matthew Cain (29/10/12)
Penguin and Random House confident merger will be approved BBC News, Will Gompertz (29/10/12)
Penguin Books and Random House to merge BBC News, Matt Cowan (29/10/12)
Articles
Random House and Penguin merge to take on Amazon, Apple Reuters, Kate Holton (29/10/12)
Pearson’s Penguin joins Random House Independent, Amy Thomson and Joseph de Weck (29/10/12)
Penguin and Random House sign merger deal Financial Times, Gerrit Wiesmann and Robert Budden (29/10/12)
March of the Penguin The Economist, Schumpeter blog (29/10/12)
Penguin chief: News Corp can’t derail Random House deal The Guardian, Mark Sweney (29/10/12)
Penguin and Random House confident merger will be approved BBC News, Anthony Reuben (29/10/12)
And so I bid Penguin a sad farewell Independent, Andrew Franklin (29/10/12)
Questions
- How does a joint venture differ from a merger?
- What types of economies of scale are likely to result from the joint venture?
- How are authors likely to be affected?
- Will the joint venture benefit the book reading public?
- The relationship between publishers and online retailers can be described as one of ‘bilateral oligopoly’. Explain what this means and why it is impossible to determine an ‘equilibrium’ wholesale price of books in such a market.
- What criteria would the competition authorities use to assess whether or not the joint venture should be permitted to proceed?
- What is likely to be the long-term outlook for Penguin Random House?
- Assess the benefits and costs of a News Corporation takeover of the Penguin division? This was an alternative offer to Pearson had it not gone with Bertelsmann. (News Corp. has the Harper Collins imprint.)
Tags: bilateral monopoly, bilateral oligopsony, business strategy, competition policy, countervailing power, joint venture, market power, merger, monopsony power, oligopoly, oligopsony, strategic alliance
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 05, Economics 8e: Ch 08, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 04, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 06, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 07, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 13, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 15, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 04, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07, Podcasts and Webcasts
Authored by: John Sloman
When crude oil prices go up, the prices of petrol and diesel go up pretty well straight away and by the full amount, or more, of the crude price rise. When crude prices go down, however, road fuel prices are often slow to fall; and when they do, the fall is less than the full fall in crude prices.
Click on charts below for a larger version. Click here for a PowerPoint of the left-hand chart.
In response to complaints of motorists and haulage companies, the Office of Fair Trading has announced that it will investigate the link between crude prices and prices at the pump. It will report in January 2013.

The review will consider questions of competition and market power. In particular, it will look at the power of the oil companies in determining the wholesale price of road fuel.
It will also examine the retail fuel sector and whether supermarkets are driving out independent retailers. The claim of many independent petrol stations is that supermarkets are selling below cost as a lost leader to encourage people to shop in their stores. They also claim that supermarkets use their buying power to obtain fuel more cheaply.
What is more, most of the petrol stations that are not part of supermarkets are owned by the oil companies. Again, independents claim that oil companies supply fuel more cheaply to their own stations than to independents.
As a result of what many independents see as unfair competition, many are driven out of business. Today there some 9000 petrol stations in the UK; 20 years ago there were twice as many.
The following articles look at the remit of the OFT investigation and at the competition issues in the road fuel market.
Articles
Formal inquiry tries to ease motorist pain at the pumps ITV News, Laura Kuenssberg (5/9/12)
OFT to scrutinise retail petrol market Financial Times, Caroline Binham (5/9/12)
OFT launches probe into pump prices Channel 4 News (5/9/12)
Petrol and diesel prices: Office of Fair Trading launches competition inquiry Guardian, Terry Macalister (5/9/12)
Petrol and diesel price review is launched by OFT BBC News (5/9/12)
Are supermarkets to blame for the devastation of independent petrol retailers by deliberately selling at a loss? This is Money, Tom Mcghie and Neil Craven (8/9/12)
OFT petrol pricing probe welcomed The Grocer, Beth Phillips (7/9/12)
Private businesses welcome OFT’s fuel price investigation Talking Retail (6/9/12)
10 charges that make consumers scratch their heads BBC News Magazine, Lucy Townsend (6/9/12)
Data
Crude Oil Price Index Index Mundi
Daily Brent Crude Spot Price, 1987 to present day US Energy Information Administration
Current UK Petrol Pump Prices What Pric£?
Fuel Prices WhatGas.com
Questions
- Describe the structure of the road fuel market, from oil production through to the retailing of petrol and diesel.
- What is meant by the terms ‘monosony’ and ‘oligopsony’? Which companies in the road fuel market have significant monopsony/oligopsony power?
- What determines the price elasticity of demand for road fuel in (a) the short run; (b) the long run? What implications does this have for the value of the short-run and long-run price elasticities?
- Where is the abuse of market power likely to occour in the road fuel market?
- To what extent is it in the consumers’ interests for supermarkets to sell road fuel below average cost?
- Examine the data for pump prices and crude oil prices and establish whether there is any truth in the claim that pump prices adjust rapidly to a rise in crude prices and slowly to a fall in crude prices.
Tags: bilateral monopoly, competition commission, competition policy, fuel prices, market power, monopsony power, Office of Fair Trading, OFT, oligopsony
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 08, Economics 8e: Ch 09, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 17, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07
Authored by: John Sloman
Barclays’ Chief Executive, Bob Diamond, has resigned following revelations that Barclays staff had been involved in rigging the LIBOR in the period 2005–9, including the financial crisis of 2007–9.
So what is the LIBOR; how is it set; what were the reasons for Barclays (and other banks, as will soon be revealed) attempting to manipulate the rate; and what were the consequences?
The LIBOR, or London interbank offered rate, is the average of what banks report that they would have to pay to borrow from one another in the inter-bank market. Separate LIBORs are calculated for 15 different lending periods: overnight, one week, one month, two months, three months, six months, etc. The rates are set daily as the average of submissions made to Thomson Reuters by some 15 to 20 banks (a poll overseen by the British Bankers’ Association). Thomson Reuters then publishes the LIBORs, along with all of the submissions from individual banks which are used to calculate it.
Many interest rates around the world are based on LIBORs, or their European counterpart, EURIBORs. They include bond rates, mortgage rates, overdraft rates, etc. Trillions of dollars worth of such assets are benchmarked to the LIBORs. Thus manipulating LIBORs by even 1 basis point (0.01%) can result in millions of dollars worth of gains (or losses) to banks.
The charge, made by the Financial Services Authority, is that Barclays staff deliberately under- or overstated the rate at which the bank would have to borrow. For example, when interbank loans were drying up in the autumn of 2008, Barclays staff were accused of deliberately understating the rate at which they would have to borrow in order to persuade markets that the bank was facing less difficulty than it really was and thereby boost confidence in the bank. In other words they were accused of trying to manipulate LIBORs down by lying.
As it was the LIBORs were rising well above bank rate. The spread for the one-month LIBOR was around 1 to 1.2% above Bank Rate. Today it is around 0.1 to 0.15% above Bank Rate. Without lying by staff in Barclays, RBS and probably other banks too, the spread in 2008 may have been quite a bit higher still.
The following articles look at the issue, its impact at the time and the aftermath today.
Articles
A Libor primer The Globe and Mail, Kevin Carmichael (3/7/12)
60 second guide to Libor Which? (3/7/12)
Explaining the Libor interest rate mess CNN Money (3/7/12)
Fixing Libor Financial Times (27/6/12)
LIBOR in the News: What it is, Why it’s Important Technorati, John Sollars (2/7/12)
Libor rigging ‘was institutionalised at major UK bank’ The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (1/7/12)
Barclays ‘attempted to manipulate interest rates’ BBC News, Robert Peston (27/6/12)
The Libor Conspiracy: Were the Bank of England and Whitehall in on it? Independent, Oliver Wright, James Moore , Nigel Morris (4/7/12)
Fixing LIBOR The Economist (10/3/12)
Cleaning up LIBOR? The Economist (14/5/12)
Eagle fried The Economist, Schumpeter (27/6/12)
Barclays looks like the victim Financial Post, Terence Corcoran (3/7/12)
Inconvenient truths about Libor BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (4/7/12)
Timeline: Barclays’ widening Libor-fixing scandal BBC News (5/7/12)
The elusive truth about Barclays’ lie BBC News, Robert Peston (4/7/12)
Rate Fixing Scandal Is International: EU’s Almunia CNBC, Shai Ahmed (4/7/12)
Bank-Bonus Culture to Blame for Barclays Scandal The Daily Beast, Alex Klein (3/7/12)
Libor scandal ‘damaging’ for City BBC Today Programme, Andrew Lilico and Mark Boleat (5/7/12)
Data
Libor rate fixing: see each bank’s submissions Guardian Data Blog, Simon Rogers (3/7/12)
Sterling interbank rates Bank of England
Questions
- Using data from the Bank of England (see link above), chart two or three LIBOR rates against Bank rate from 2007 to the present day.
- For what reason would individuals and firms lose from banks manipulating LIBOR rates?
- Why would LIBOR manipulation be more ‘effective’ if banks colluded in their submissions about their interest rates?
- Why might the Bank of England and the government have been quite keen for the LIBOR to have been manipulated downwards in 2008?
- To what extent was the LIBOR rigging scandal an example of the problem of asymmetric information?
- In the light of the LIBOR rigging scandal, should universal banks be split into separate investment and retail banks, rather than erecting some firewall around their retail banking arm?
- What are the arguments for and against making attempts to manipulate LIBOR rates a criminal offences?
Tags: asymmetric information, Barclays, expectations, financial regulation, imperfect information, incentives, LIBOR, market power, marrket manipulation
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 11, Economics 8e: Ch 12, Economics 8e: Ch 18, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 20, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 28, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 10
Authored by: John Sloman
Centrica, owners of British Gas, has warned that electricity and gas prices in the UK are set to rise in the autumn. Centrica blames this on the expected rise in the costs of wholesale gas and other non-energy inputs.
One of the other ‘big six’ energy suppliers, E.On, has responded by saying that it will not raise energy prices this year. Whether it will raise prices after 1 Jan next year remains to be seen.
Last autumn, household energy prices rose substantially: between 15.4% and 18% for gas and between 4.5% and 16% for electricity. This spring, in response to lower wholesale energy prices, suppliers cut prices for either electricity or gas (but not both) by around 5%.
The government and various pressure groups are encouraging consumers to use price comparison sites to switch to a cheaper supplier. The problem with this is that supplier A may be cheaper than supplier B one month, but B cheaper than A the next. Nevertheless, switching does impose some degree of additional competitive pressure on suppliers.
More powerful pressure could be applied by ‘collective switching’. This is where a lot of people switch via an intermediary company, which sources a deal from an energy supplier. This collective buying is a form of countervailing power to offset the oligopoly power of the suppliers. Such schemes are being encouraged by the Energy Minister, Ed Davey.
The other approach, apart from doing nothing, is for Ofgem, the energy regulator, to impose tough conditions on pricing. But at present, Ofgem’s approach has been to try to make the market more competitive (see also), rather than regulating prices.
British Gas owner Centrica warns of higher energy bills BBC News (11/5/12)
E.ON to keep residential energy prices unchanged in 2012 Reuters, Adveith Nair (14/5/12)
E.ON promises to hold energy prices for 5million customers in 2012 This is Money, Tara Evans (14/5/12)
British Gas owner Centrica feels cold blast from critics ShareCast, John Harrington (11/5/12)
Gas and electricity price battle lines drawn BBC News (14/5/12)
Taking on the energy giants: The co-operative insurgency gains ground Left Foot Forward, Daniel Elton (11/5/12)
Group Energy Buying hits the UK Headlines Spend Matters UK/Europe, Peter Smith (11/5/12)
Think tank calls for competition to break Big Six rip-off Energy Live News, Tom Gibson (30/4/12)
Collective switching will not fix the UK’s broken energy market Guardian, Reg Platt (27/4/12)
Make your own small switch for cheaper energy The Telegraph, Rosie Murray-West (14/5/12)
Questions
- What are the barriers to entry in the electricity supply market?
- How competitive is the retail energy market at present?
- To what extent do price comparison sites put pressure on energy companies to reeduce prices or limit price increases?
- What scope is there for collective buying of gas and electricity from the six energy suppliers by (a) households; (b) firms?
- Assess Ofgem’s package of proposals for a simpler and more competitive energy market.
Tags: collective buying, competition policy, countervailing power, electricity prices, energy prices, gas prices, market power, oligopoly, pricing
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 05, Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 04, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 17, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 04, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07
Authored by: John Sloman
Oligopoly: it’s a complex market structure and although closer to the monopoly end of the ‘Market Structure Spectrum’, it can still be a highly competitive market. The characteristics are well-documented and key to the degree of competition within any oligopoly is the number of competitors and extent to which there are barriers to entry.
The greater the barriers and the fewer the competitors the greater the power the established firms have. This can then spell trouble for pricing and hence for consumers. The following articles are just some examples of the oligopolies that exist around the world and some of the benefits and problems that accompany them.
Articles
Oligopoly of PSU oil cos reason for high ATF prices The Indian Express, Smita Aggarwal (30/4/12)
Group energy buying hits the UK headlines Spend Matters UK/Europe(18/1/11)
German cartel office probes petrol companies on pricing Fox Business (4/4/12)
Gov’t unveils steps to lower fuel prices Yonhap News (19/4/12)
How big banks threaten our economy Wall Street Journal, Warren Stephens (29/4/12)
UK Governance: Call for Whitehall to simplify the landscape for SME suppliers to win more government contracts The Information Daily (26/4/12)
Other blogs
Pumping up the price: fuel cartels in Germany April 2012
Energy profit margins up by over 700% October 2011
Every basket helps October 2011
The art of oligopoly December 2010
Questions
- What are the assumptions of an oligopolistic market structure?
- Consider (a) the energy sector and (b) the banking sector. To what extent does each market conform with the assumptions of an oligopoly?
- In the ‘Spend Matters’ article, a group of people in a Lincolnshire village formed a local buying consortium to negotiate deals for heating oil. What could we refer to this as?
- To what extent is an oligopoly in the public interest?
- Explain how barriers to entry in oligopolies affect the competitiveness and efficiency of a market.
- Illustrate how an oligopolistic market structure can fix prices and hence exploit consumers.
- How have the actions of the big oil companies in both the UK and Germany been against independent retailers and the consumer interest?
- What action can governments take to break up oligopolies? Will it always be effective?
Tags: banking, barriers to entry, cartels, competition, countervailing power, efficiency, energy sector, gas, market power, market structure, oligopoly, price, price fixing, profit
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07
Authored by: Elizabeth Jones
EDF, one of the big six energy retailers in the UK, has agreed to pay out a record £4.5m. £1m of this will go to funding an energy advice centre; the rest will go to providing £50 each to 70,000 ‘vulnerable customers’ who struggle to pay their bills and who receive the government’s warm home discount.
The agreement was made with Ofgem after an investigation into mis-selling, both on the doorstep and over the phone. Customers were persuaded to switch energy suppliers with the promise of savings on their bills. As the FT articles states:
Ofgem found that EDF’s sales force did not always provide complete information to customers on some contract terms, or on the way in which their monthly direct debits had been calculated. In some cases, telesales agents claimed savings without knowing whether they were accurate for the specific customer on the call, the regulator said.
Ofgem did not accuse the company of directly sanctioning such practices, but rather of weak monitoring and control of its sales force’s actions.
The £4.5m payment is in lieu of a fine. Consumer groups have welcomed this, preferring the company to pay compensation to a fine, which would have simply increased Treasury funding.
It is the first settlement in a broader investigation into mis-selling, involving four of the six major suppliers.
Articles
EDF to pay out £4.5m in mis-selling case Financial Times, Guy Chazan and Hannah Kuchler (9/3/12)
EDF agrees to pay £4.5m misleading sales ‘fine’ Guardian, Lisa Bachelor (9/3/12)
Is it a fine? Is it a penalty? No, it’s EDF’s mystery Ofgem payment Management Today, Rebecca Burn-Callander (9/3/12)
‘Misleading claims’ cost EDF a £4.5m payout from watchdog , Independent, Tom Bawden (10/3/12)
EDF Energy agrees to pay a £4.5m ‘fine’ BBC News (9/3/12)
EDF Energy agrees to pay a £4.5m ‘fine’ BBC News, John Moylan (9/3/12)
More energy payouts could follow EDF’s £4.5m The Telegraph, Kara Gammell (9/3/12)
Ofgem ruling
EDF energy agrees to invest £4.5 million to help vulnerable customers following Ofgem investigation Ofgem
Questions
- What types of market failure are present in the energy supply industry?
- What are the arguments for and against fines being paid directly to victims of crime rather than to the government?
- In what ways could the energy industry be made more competitive?
- Why do the utilities, such as gas, electricity and water, require their own regulator rather than simply being subject to competition law?
Tags: asymmetric information, energy sector, impoerfect information, market failures, market power, monopoly power, Ofgem, oligopoly, pricing, regulation, utilities
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 07, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07
Authored by: John Sloman
Is Google’s Android catching up with Apple’s iOS in the market for apps? With Android tablets and smartphones taking an ever larger proportion of the market, you would expect so. In the third quarter of 2011, 53% of smartphone shipments used Google’s Android system, compared with only 15% with iOS.
However, Apple is still ahead of Google in the share of apps downloads. To date, there have been 18 billion downloads from the iOS App Store for iPhone, iPad and iPod Touchs compared with 10 billion downloads of Android apps. But Android downloads are growing faster and are set to overtake those of iOS apps in the coming months. This should be boosted with the new Ice Cream Sandwich Android operating system.
But what about revenues earned from downloads? Here the picture is very different. Android Marketplace has earned around $330 million gross revenue for paid apps. Apple’s App Store, by contrast, has earned over 15 times as much: nearly $5000 million. The reason is that 99% of Android apps are free; the figure for App Store apps is 86%. But why is this so and how can Android earn revenues from its apps? And how can app developers earn revenues from the Android market? The following articles look at the economics of apps.
Android Vs. iPhone: The Economics Of Apps Financial Edge, Manish Sahajwani (6/1/12)
Google has an Amazon problem MSN Money, Jim J. Jubak (25/1/12)
Android and the economics of apps BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (7/12/11)
Apple Getting Best Of The Android Vs. iPhone Economics Forbes, Manish Sahajwani (6/1/12)
Fragmentation Is Not The End of Android cek.log, Charlie Kindel (14/1/12)
Questions
- Why are most Android apps free to download?
- What is the business model for (a) developing and (b) offering Android apps?
- How can money be made from free apps?
- What are the long-term strengths and weaknesses in Apple’s apps business model?
- Assess Amazon’s business model for apps for Kindle users.
Tags: apps, barriers to entry, business models, market power, monopsonistic power, oligopoly, pricing strategy, revenue
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 08, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 06, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 13, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 15, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 17, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05
Authored by: John Sloman
You’ve probably heard of Groupon. If you join its emailing list, the company will send you daily details of deals in your area that it has negotiated with local retailers. If you want to take advantage of any particular deal, you sign up for it online and if enough people do so to reach a minimum number agreed with the retailer, Groupon will bill your credit card. You then download the voucher and use it to purchase you discounted item or service. Discounts are often substantial – 50% or more.
But are these deals as good as they seem? On 2 December, the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority took the decision to refer Groupon UK to the Office of Fair Trading, following 48 breaches of the advertising code of practice in eleven months. It referred complaints about Groupon’s:
• Failure to conduct promotions fairly, such as not making clear significant terms and conditions
• Failure to provide evidence that offers are available
• Exaggeration of savings claims
And it was not just consumers who had complained. Many retailers found that so many people signed up for certain deals and the discounts were so great, with Groupon often charging the retailer half the discounted price, that retailers made substantial losses on the deals. One example was a cupcake maker, Rachel Brown, who runs the Need a Cake bakery in Reading, Berkshire. She had to bake so many extra cupcakes below cost that profits for the year were wiped out.
So what is the nature of this market failure and how appropriate are the competition authorities for dealing with it? The following webcasts and articles look at the issues. They also consider the growing problems Groupon faces in the market from new competitors.
It has not been good news recently for Groupon and it’s hardly surprising that, following Groupon’s flotation on the Nasdaq stock exchange in the USA last month, and an initial surge in the share price, its shares have since fallen by over 40%.
Webcasts
Groupon investigated by OFT Channel 4 News on YouTube, Benjamin Cohen (2/12/11)
Time to Jump Off Groupon Bandwagon? Newsy (24/11/11)
Articles
Groupon to be investigated by Office of Fair Trading Guardian, Mark Sweney (2/12/11)
OFT launches investigation into Groupon advertisements BBC News (2/12/11)
UK regulator launches Groupon probe Financial Times, Michael Stothard (2/12/11)
Groupon investigated by UK advertising authorities ZDNet, Eileen Brown (5/12/11)
Deal with it: Groupon ponders its future Independent, Stephen Foley (6/12/11)
Groupon’s Business Model Doomed To Fail Seeking Alpha, Mazen Abdallah (5/12/11)
Small Businesses Hate Groupon LiveOutLoud, Loral Langemeier
Competition authorities sites
ASA refers complaints about Groupon to OFT Advertising Standards Authority (2/12/11)
Investigation into the trading practices of MyCityDeal Limited (trading as Groupon UK) Office for Fair Trading (2/12/11)
Questions
- What market failings are there in the discount voucher market?
- What to retailers gain from dealing with companies such as Groupon?
- Do small businesses have anyone other than themselves to blame if they make a loss from doing a deal with Groupon?
- What should be the role of the competition authorities in the discount voucher market?
- Is Groupon’s business model ‘doomed to failure’ and if so why?
- Does Groupon have a ‘first-mover advantage’?
- Are there any barriers to entry of new firms into the discount voucher market? If so, what are they? What are the implications of your answer for the future of Groupon?
Tags: advertising, Advertising Standards Authority, barriers to entry, discounts, first-mover advantage, Groupon, long-term profit, market power, marketing, Office for Fair Trading, OFT, pricing, profit, vouchers
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 05, Economics 8e: Ch 06, Economics 8e: Ch 07, Economics 8e: Ch 08, Economics 8e: Ch 11, Economics 8e: Ch 13, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 03, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 06, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 08, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 12, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 13, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 15, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 16, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 17, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 20, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 04, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 05, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07, Podcasts and Webcasts
Authored by: John Sloman