Posts Tagged ‘expectations’
After a week of turmoil in Cyprus (see the News item Ochi, ochi, ochi) a deal has been struck between Cyprus, the EU and the IMF over a €10bn bailout for the island’s banking system. But while the deal may bring the immediate crisis to an end, the Cypriot economy could face years of austerity and depression. And there remain questions over whether the deal sends the wrong message to depositors in banks in other eurozone countries whose banking systems are under pressure.
Unlike the original EU proposal, the deal will not impose a levy on deposits under €100,000, much to the relief of small and medium depositors. But individuals and businesses with deposits over €100,000 in the two main troubled banks (Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus) will face losses that could be as high as 40%. The precise size will become clear in the coming days.
The troubled second largest bank, Laiki (Popular) Bank, will be split into a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ bank. The assets and liabilities of the good part will be taken over by the largest bank, the Bank of Cyprus. Thus people’s accounts under €100,000 will be moved from one to the other. The ‘bad’ part will include deposits over €100,000 and bonds. Holders of these could lose a substantial proportion of their value.
Many businesses will be hard hit and may be forced to close. This could have serious adverse multiplier effects on the economy. These effects will be aggravated by the fiscal austerity measures which are also part of the deal. The measures are also likely to discourage further inward investment, again pushing the economy further into recession.
And then there are the broader effects on the eurozone. The direct effect of a decline in the Cypriot economy would be tiny; the Cypriot economy accounts for a mere 0.2% of eurozone GDP. Also the effect on small savers in other eurozone countries is also likely to be limited, as people will probably be reassured that savings under €100,000 have remained protected, even in an economy as troubled as Cyprus.
But some commentators argue that the effect on large depositors in other troubled eurozone countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, could be much more serious. Would people with large balances in these countries prefer to move their money to, say, Germany, or even out of the eurozone altogether? There is clearly disagreement over this last point as you will see from the articles below.
Webcasts and Podcasts
Cyprus agrees bailout with eurozone ministers The Guardian (25/3/13)
Cyprus bailout: Deal reached in Eurogroup talks BBC News (25/3/13)
‘Disaster avoided’ as Cyprus agrees EU bailout deal Euronews (25/3/13)
Cyprus saved from bankruptcy Channel 4 News on YouTube, Faisal Islam (25/3/13)
What are the implications of the Cyprus deal? BBC Radio 4 Today Programme, Stephanie Flanders (25/3/13)
Cyprus bailout deal: Russia riled but Germany relieved BBC News, Steve Rosenberg in Moscow and Stephen Evans in Berlin (25/3/13)
Cyprus bailout deal ‘durable’ says IMF chief BBC News, Christine Lagarde (25/3/13)
Cyprus Bailout Deal Raises Questions: Lombardi Bloomberg, Domenico Lombardi (25/3/13)
Minister Michalis Sarris: Cyprus paying ‘tremendous cost’ BBC Radio 4 Today Programme, Michalis Sarris (26/3/13)
Articles
Last-minute Cyprus deal to close bank, force losses Reuters, Jan Strupczewski and Annika Breidthardt (25/3/13)
Cyprus strikes last-minute EU bailout deal The Guardian, Ian Traynor (25/3/13)
‘There is no future here in Cyprus’ The Telegraph, Nick Squires (25/3/13)
Back from the brink: EU ministers approve €10bn bailout deal at 11th-hour to save Cyprus Independent, Charlotte McDonald-Gibson and Majid Mohamed (25/3/13)
Cyprus bailout: Deal reached in Eurogroup talks BBC News (25/3/13)
Q&A: Cyprus deal BBC News (25/3/13)
The rescue of Cyprus won’t feel like one to its people BBC News, Robert Peston (25/3/13)
Lessons of Cyprus BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (25/3/13)
Cyprus bailout: Dijsselbloem remarks alarm markets BBC News (25/3/13)
Cyprus saved – but at what cost? The Guardian, Helena Smith (25/3/13)
Cyprus bail-out: savers will be raided to save euro in future crisis, says eurozone chief The Telegraph, Bruno Waterfield (25/3/13)
Cyprus’s banks have been tamed – are Malta and Luxembourg next? The Guardian, Ian Traynor (25/3/13)
Lehman lessons weigh on Cyprus talks but 1920s slump must not be ignored The Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/3/13)
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘moral hazard’. What moral hazards are implicit in the deal that has been struck with Cyprus?
- How does the size of the banking system in Cyprus as a proportion of GDP differ from that in other troubled eurozone countries? How does this affect the ‘contagion’ argument?
- Does the experience of Iceland and its troubled banks suggest that the Cypriot problem has nothing to do with its being in the eurozone?
- What options are open to the Cypriot government to stimulate the economy and prevent a severe recession? How realistic are these options (if any)?
- What are the likely implications of the deal for the economic relationships (as opposed to the political ones) between Cyprus and Russia and between the eurozone and Russia?
- Are there any similarities in the relationships between the weak and strong eurozone countries today and those between Germany and other countries in the 1920s and 30s?
Tags: austerity measurs, bank bailouts, Cyprus, eurozone, expectations, inward investment, moral hazard, recession, rescue package
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 18, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics 8e: Ch 25, Economics 8e: Ch 26, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 13, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 27, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 28, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 32, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 10, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 14, Podcasts and Webcasts
Authored by: John Sloman
The UK economy is suffering from a lack of aggregate demand. Low spending in real terms is preventing the economy from growing. A simple solution would seem to be to stimulate aggregate demand through fiscal policy, backed up by even looser monetary policy. But this is easier said than done and could result in undesirable consequences in the medium term.
If increased borrowing were to be used to fund increased government expenditure and/or cuts in taxes, would any resulting growth be sufficient in the medium term to reduce the public-sector deficit below the initial level through automatic fiscal stabilisers? And would the growth be sustainable? The answer to this second question depends on what happens to the supply side of the economy. Would there be an increase in aggregate supply to match the increase in aggregate demand?
This second question has led many economists to argue that we need to see a rebalancing of the economy. What is needed is an increase in investment and exports, rather than an increase in just consumer expenditure funded by private borrowing and government current expenditure funded by public borrowing.
But how will exports and investment be stimulated? As far as exports are concerned, it was hoped that the depreciation of the pound since 2008 would give UK exporters a competitive advantage. Also domestic producers would gain a competitive advantage in the UK from imports becoming more expensive. But the current account deficit has actually deteriorated. According to the EU’s AMECO database, in 2008 the current account deficit was 1% of GDP; in 2012 it was 3.7%. It would seem that UK producers are not taking sufficient advantage of the pound’s depreciation, whether for exports or import substitutes.
As far as investment is concerned, there are two major problems. The first is the ability to invest. This depends on financing and things such as available land and planning regulations. The second is the confidence to invest. With not little or no growth in consumer demand, there is little opportunity for the accelerator to work. And with forecasts of sluggish growth and austerity measures continuing for some years, there is little confidence in a resurgence in consumer demand in the future. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the above chart. Note that the 2013 plots are based on AMECO forecasts.)
So hope of a rebalancing is faint at the current time. Hence the arguments for an increase in government capital expenditure that we looked at in the last blog post (The political dynamite of calm economic reflection). The problem and the options for government are considered in the following articles.
Articles
Budget 2013: Chancellor’s rebalancing act BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (11/3/13)
Why George Osborne is failing to rebalance the economy The Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/3/13)
Economy fails to ‘rebalance’ Financial Times, Sarah O’Connor (27/2/13)
Analysis – Long haul ahead for Britain’s struggling economy Reuters, William Schomberg (3/3/13)
Can banks be forced to lend more? BBC News, Robert Peston (12/3/13)
Budget 2013: What the commentators are saying BBC News (13/3/13)
Data
UK Trade, January 2013 (ONS) (12/3/13)
Business investment, Q4 2012 ONS (27/2/13)
Questions
- Draw a diagram to illustrate the effects of a successful policy to increase both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. What will determine the effect on the output gap?
- For what reasons has the UK’s current account deteriorated over the past few years while those of the USA and the eurozone have not?
- Using ONS data, find out what has happened to the UK’s balance of trade in (a) goods and (b) services over the past few years and explain your findings.
- Why are firms reluctant to invest at the moment? What policy measures could the government adopt to increase investment?
- With interest rates so low, why don’t consumers borrow and spend more, thereby aiding the recovery?
Tags: accelerator, balance of payments, balance of trade, Capital expenditure, confidence, current account, demand-side policy, economic growth, expectations, fiscal policy, investment, rebalancing, supply-side policy
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 17, Economics 8e: Ch 19, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 27, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 31, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 08, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12
Authored by: John Sloman
Moody’s, one of the three main international credit rating agencies, has just downgraded the UK’s credit rating from the top Aaa rating to Aa1. The other two agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch may follow suit as they have the UK’s triple A rating on ‘negative outlook’.
The reason for Moody’s decision can be see in its press statement:
The key interrelated drivers of today’s action are:
1. The continuing weakness in the UK’s medium-term growth outlook, with a period of sluggish growth which Moody’s now expects will extend into the second half of the decade;
2. The challenges that subdued medium-term growth prospects pose to the government’s fiscal consolidation programme, which will now extend well into the next parliament;
3. And, as a consequence of the UK’s high and rising debt burden, a deterioration in the shock-absorption capacity of the government’s balance sheet, which is unlikely to reverse before 2016.
The direct economic consequences of Moody’s action are likely to be minimal. People were excpecting a downgrade sooner or later for the reasons Moody’s quotes. Thus stock markets, bond markets and foreign exchange markets already reflect this. Indeed, in the first seven weeks of 2013, the sterling exchange rate index has depreciated by over 6%.
The political consequences, however, are likely to be significant. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Orborne, has put considerable emphasis on the importance of maintaining a triple A rating. He has seen it as a sign of the confidence of investors in the government’s policy of focusing on cutting the public-sector deficit and, ultimately, of cutting the public-sector debt as a proportion of GDP. His response, therefore, has been that the government will redouble its efforts to reduce the deficit.
Not surprisingly the Labour opposition claims the downgrading is evidence that the government’s austerity policies are not working. If the aim is to cut the deficit/GDP ratio, this is difficult if GDP is falling or just ‘flat lining’. A less aggressive austerity policy, it is argued, would allow growth to recover and this rise in the denominator would allow the deficit/GDP ratio to fall.
Latest forecasts are that government borrowing is set to rise. The average of 24 independent forecasts of the UK economy, published by the Treasury on 13/2/13, is that public-sector net borrowing will rise from £90.7bn in 2012/13 to £107bn in 2013/14. And the European Commission forecast of the UK economy is that the general government deficit will rise from 5.9% of GDP in 2012/13 to 7.0% of GDP in 2013/14.
So what will be the economic and political consequences of the loss of the triple A rating? What policy options are open to the government? The following articles explore these questions. Not surprisingly, they don’t all agree!
Downgrading Britain: The Friday night drop The Economist, Buttonwood’s notebook (23/2/13)
Rating downgrade: Q&A The Observer, Josephine Moulds (24/2/13)
Downgrade is Osborne’s punishment for deficit-first policy The Guardian, Phillip Inman (23/2/13)
Britain’s downgraded credit rating: Moody’s wake-up call must trigger a change of course The Observer (24/2/13)
Editorial: AAA loss is a sign of failure Independent (24/2/13)
It’s not the end of the world – but it’s the end of any false complacency Independent, Hamish McRae (24/2/13)
Moody’s downgrade will stiffen George Osborne’s resolve The Telegraph, Kamal Ahmed (23/2/13)
UK AAA downgrade: Budget is now George Osborne’s make or break moment The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (23/2/13)
Britain’s credit downgrade is a call to live within our means The Telegraph, Liam Halligan (23/2/13)
Britain will take years to earn back AAA rating, says Ken Clarke The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (24/2/13)
Questions
- How important are credit agencies’ sovereign credit ratings to a country (a) economically; (b) politically? Why may the political effects have subsequent economic effects?
- Explain the meaning of the terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ variables. In terms of the determination of economic growth, are government expenditure and tax revenue exogenous or endogenous variables? What are the implications for a policy of cutting the government deficit?
- Identify the reasons for the predicted rise in the public-sector deficit as a proportion of GDP. Which of these, if any, are ‘of the government’s own making’?
- In the absence of a change in its fiscal stance, what policies could the government adopt to increase business confidence?
Tags: confidence, endogenous variable, exogenous variable, expectations, forecasting, Forecasting public finances, Moody's, public-sector deficit, sovereign credit rating
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 17, Economics 8e: Ch 19, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 08, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12
Authored by: John Sloman
Each month the accountancy firm BDO publishes its Business Trends Indices. These indices “are ‘polls of polls’ that pull together the results of all the main UK business surveys”. The latest report shows that the January 2013 Optimism Index was its lowest since the report began 21 years ago.
The Optimism Index predicts business performance two quarters ahead. In January 2013 it was 88.9. The way the index is constructed, a reading of 95 or more suggests that firms are optimistic about business performance. Clearly, they were pessimistic.
Although there was an increase in hiring intentions, firms were still predicting a fall in output. The indices for optimism, employment and output are shown in the chart. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)
As Peter Hemington, Partner, BDO LLP, commented:
In spite of a strengthening Labour Market, business confidence continues to weaken, and improved hiring intentions are not translating into growth plans. It seems the damaging effects on businesses of five years’ zigzagging economic growth, has left them wary of making concrete plans for expansion and resigned to the ‘new normal’ of economic stagnation.
To end this cycle, it is imperative that the Government implements plans to expedite growth. Without growth incentives, we will continue to see UK businesses reluctant to invest and expand, which poses a grave threat to the UK’s economic recovery.
The following articles comment on the gloomy mood of business and on its implications for output and investment. They also look at the implications for government policy.
Articles
Confidence slumps despite optimism from manufacturers Insider News (11/2/13)
Fears of a triple-dip recession return as survey puts business confidence at a 21-year low This is Money (11/2/13)
Pressure grows on ministers for growth strategy Yorkshire Post (11/2/13)
Triple-dip jitters as business confidence hits 21-yr low Management Today, Michael Northcott (11/2/13)
Report and data
Business Trends: Business confidence hits 21-year low signalling economic contraction BDO Press Release (11/2/13)
BDO Monthly Business Trends Indices, February 2013 – Full Report BDO (11/2/13)
Business and Consumer Surveys European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs
Questions
- What reasons are given by the report for a decline in business optimism?
- Explain how an accelerator/multiplier interaction could compound the recession or help to cause a bounce back from recession.
- How does business sentiment in one country affect business sentiment in others?
- In the absence of a change in its fiscal stance, what policies could the government adopt to increase business confidence?
- Why might firms’ hiring intentions increase even though they are predicting a fall in output?
Tags: accelerator, business confidence, expectations, forecasting, multiplier, optimism
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 14, Economics 8e: Ch 17, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 08, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09
Authored by: John Sloman
In a previous blog, Anyone got a crystal ball?, we reported on the Bank of England’s and other agencies’ difficulty in making forecasts. As the Governor, Mervyn King, said, “There is just enormous uncertainty out there.”
The Bank of England has just published its November Inflation Report. This quarterly publication gives forecasts of inflation, GDP and other indicators. It is clear that forecasting hasn’t become any easier. In his opening remarks, Dr. King says:
Continuing the recent zig-zag pattern, output growth is likely to fall back sharply in Q4 as the boost from the Olympics in the summer is reversed – indeed output may shrink a little this quarter. It is difficult to discern the underlying picture. It is probably neither as good as the zigs suggest nor as bad as the zags imply.
The Inflation Report looks at the various factors affecting aggregate demand, inflation, unemployment and aggregate supply. It is quite clear on reading the report why there is so much uncertainty.
A salutary lesson is to look back at previous forecasts and see just how wrong they have been. The chart above shows the forecasts for GDP made in the Inflation Reports of Nov 2012 and Aug 2011. You can see that they are significantly different and yet just 15 months apart. You might also like to compare the forecasts made a year ago (or even two!) about 2012 with the actual situation today. A good source for this is the Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK economy. This collates the forecasts from a range of independent forecasters.
The inaccuracy of forecasting is an inevitable consequence of a highly interdependent world economy that is subject to a range of economic shocks and where confidence (or lack of it) is a major determinant of aggregate demand. But when firms, governments, individuals and central banks have to make plans, it is still necessary to project into the future and try to forecast as accurately as possible – even though it might mean keeping your fingers firmly crossed.
Articles
Bank of England downgrades growth forecast for 2013 Daily Record (14/11/12)
A gloomy picture from the Old Lady Financial Times (14/11/12)
Will Britain’s post-recession economy be resurgent, stagnant or greener? The Guardian, Larry Elliott (11/11/12)
Economics must heed political risk Financial Times, Sebastian Mallaby (6/11/12)
European Commission autumn forecast: overoptimistic and in denial Social Europe Journal, Andrew Watt (7/11/12)
Bank of England gets long to-do list for overhaul Reuters, Sven Egenter (2/11/12)
Data
Inflation Report, November 2012 Bank of England
Index of economic forecasts European Commission DGECFIN
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD
World Economic Outlook Reports IMF
Forecasts for the UK economy HM Treasury
Questions
- What was being forecast for economic growth and inflation for 2012 (a) one year ago; (b) two years ago?
- What are the main reasons for the inaccuracy of forecasts?
- How might forecasting be made more reliable?
- If sentiment is a key determinant of economic activity, how might politicians increase the confidence of firms and consumers? What are the political constraints on doing this?
- Explain the following statement from the Guardian article: “The problem … is that last decade’s tailwind has become this decade’s headwind.” Why is it difficult to forecast the strength of this ‘headwind’?
- How useful is it to use past trends as a guide to the future course of the economy?
Tags: aggregate demand, Bank of England Inflation Report, confidence, expectations, forecasting, shocks, time-series analysis, Uncertainty
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 01, Economics 8e: Ch 14, Economics 8e: Ch 16, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 01, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 01, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 07, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 29, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 08, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12
Authored by: John Sloman
Barclays’ Chief Executive, Bob Diamond, has resigned following revelations that Barclays staff had been involved in rigging the LIBOR in the period 2005–9, including the financial crisis of 2007–9.
So what is the LIBOR; how is it set; what were the reasons for Barclays (and other banks, as will soon be revealed) attempting to manipulate the rate; and what were the consequences?
The LIBOR, or London interbank offered rate, is the average of what banks report that they would have to pay to borrow from one another in the inter-bank market. Separate LIBORs are calculated for 15 different lending periods: overnight, one week, one month, two months, three months, six months, etc. The rates are set daily as the average of submissions made to Thomson Reuters by some 15 to 20 banks (a poll overseen by the British Bankers’ Association). Thomson Reuters then publishes the LIBORs, along with all of the submissions from individual banks which are used to calculate it.
Many interest rates around the world are based on LIBORs, or their European counterpart, EURIBORs. They include bond rates, mortgage rates, overdraft rates, etc. Trillions of dollars worth of such assets are benchmarked to the LIBORs. Thus manipulating LIBORs by even 1 basis point (0.01%) can result in millions of dollars worth of gains (or losses) to banks.
The charge, made by the Financial Services Authority, is that Barclays staff deliberately under- or overstated the rate at which the bank would have to borrow. For example, when interbank loans were drying up in the autumn of 2008, Barclays staff were accused of deliberately understating the rate at which they would have to borrow in order to persuade markets that the bank was facing less difficulty than it really was and thereby boost confidence in the bank. In other words they were accused of trying to manipulate LIBORs down by lying.
As it was the LIBORs were rising well above bank rate. The spread for the one-month LIBOR was around 1 to 1.2% above Bank Rate. Today it is around 0.1 to 0.15% above Bank Rate. Without lying by staff in Barclays, RBS and probably other banks too, the spread in 2008 may have been quite a bit higher still.
The following articles look at the issue, its impact at the time and the aftermath today.
Articles
A Libor primer The Globe and Mail, Kevin Carmichael (3/7/12)
60 second guide to Libor Which? (3/7/12)
Explaining the Libor interest rate mess CNN Money (3/7/12)
Fixing Libor Financial Times (27/6/12)
LIBOR in the News: What it is, Why it’s Important Technorati, John Sollars (2/7/12)
Libor rigging ‘was institutionalised at major UK bank’ The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (1/7/12)
Barclays ‘attempted to manipulate interest rates’ BBC News, Robert Peston (27/6/12)
The Libor Conspiracy: Were the Bank of England and Whitehall in on it? Independent, Oliver Wright, James Moore , Nigel Morris (4/7/12)
Fixing LIBOR The Economist (10/3/12)
Cleaning up LIBOR? The Economist (14/5/12)
Eagle fried The Economist, Schumpeter (27/6/12)
Barclays looks like the victim Financial Post, Terence Corcoran (3/7/12)
Inconvenient truths about Libor BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (4/7/12)
Timeline: Barclays’ widening Libor-fixing scandal BBC News (5/7/12)
The elusive truth about Barclays’ lie BBC News, Robert Peston (4/7/12)
Rate Fixing Scandal Is International: EU’s Almunia CNBC, Shai Ahmed (4/7/12)
Bank-Bonus Culture to Blame for Barclays Scandal The Daily Beast, Alex Klein (3/7/12)
Libor scandal ‘damaging’ for City BBC Today Programme, Andrew Lilico and Mark Boleat (5/7/12)
Data
Libor rate fixing: see each bank’s submissions Guardian Data Blog, Simon Rogers (3/7/12)
Sterling interbank rates Bank of England
Questions
- Using data from the Bank of England (see link above), chart two or three LIBOR rates against Bank rate from 2007 to the present day.
- For what reason would individuals and firms lose from banks manipulating LIBOR rates?
- Why would LIBOR manipulation be more ‘effective’ if banks colluded in their submissions about their interest rates?
- Why might the Bank of England and the government have been quite keen for the LIBOR to have been manipulated downwards in 2008?
- To what extent was the LIBOR rigging scandal an example of the problem of asymmetric information?
- In the light of the LIBOR rigging scandal, should universal banks be split into separate investment and retail banks, rather than erecting some firewall around their retail banking arm?
- What are the arguments for and against making attempts to manipulate LIBOR rates a criminal offences?
Tags: asymmetric information, Barclays, expectations, financial regulation, imperfect information, incentives, LIBOR, market power, marrket manipulation
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 11, Economics 8e: Ch 12, Economics 8e: Ch 18, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 09, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 20, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 21, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 28, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 07, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 10
Authored by: John Sloman
46p – that buys you a First Class stamp. However, the price will now rise to 60p and the price of a Second Class stamp will increase to 50p from 36p, as Ofcom lifts some price caps. These significant price rises have seen shortages of stamps emerging across the country. As people anticipate the price rise, individuals and businesses are buying up stamps while they remain relatively cheap.
The problem is that this has started to result in a stamp shortage, so much so that the Royal Mail has now begun rationing retailers’ supply of stamps, capping each retailers’ supply this month to 20% of its annual allocation. A Royal Mail spokesman said:
“We are more than happy for retailers to receive the normal commercial return they obtain on stamps and no more than that … That is why we have put in place a prudent allocation policy to safeguard Royal Mail’s revenues and ensure there are more than enough stamps for people to buy both now and in the future.”
With postage volumes falling, as individuals turn to other methods of communication, Royal Mail says that this price rise is essential to keep this universal service going. Revenues have been low and the Royal Mail has been loss-making for some time.
However, while the price rise may help the Royal Mail, many businesses may suffer in its place. One optician, who sends out approximately 5,000 reminders to patients each year intends to bulk-buy 10,000 stamps in the hopes of saving some £1,400 when prices of stamps rise. An IT worker bought 20 books of 12 first-class stamps and said ‘If I could afford it, I would buy a lot more’. Many are unhappy at the ‘shameless profiteering at the public’s expense’, but whatever your opinion about the price rise, it does make for an interesting case of demand and supply. The following articles consider this stamp shortage.
Man’s 10,000 stamp panic: stampede for stamps leaves a 1st class mess as Royal Mail introduces rationing ahead of 30% price rise Mail Online, Colin Fernandez and John Stevens (15/4/12)
Stamps rationed by Royal Mail in run up to price rise (including video) BBC News (13/4/12)
Stamp rationing could hit pensioners Telegraph, James Hall (14/3/12)
Stamp sales limited ahead of price hike Sky News (13/4/12)
How stamp collecting came unstuck Guardian, Hunter Davies (13/4/12)
Royal Mail limits supply of stamps ahead of price rise Telegraph, James Hall and Andrew Hough (12/4/12)
’Profiteering’ Royal Mail limits supply of stamps before price rise Guardian, David Batty (13/4/12)
Royal Mail’s stamp price rises come into force BBC News (30/4/12)
How businesses will be affected by Royal Mail’s changing prices BBC News, Catherine Burns (28/4/12)
Questions
- If people expect prices to rise, what will happen to the demand curve? Illustrate this idea on a demand and supply diagram?
- If suppliers anticipate a price rise, what would their best strategy be?
- On a demand and supply diagram, illustrate the shortage of stamps that has emerged. If left to the free market, what should happen to the price of stamps?
- Why could pensioners and those in rural areas be the most adversely affected by this shortage and price rise?
- Why could ‘children and new collectors’ be priced out of the market?
- Why will small businesses be affected by this price hike? How could their customers be affected?
Tags: costs of production, demand, equilibrium price, expectations, Ofcom, price, price cap, privatisation, rationing, Royal Mail, shortage, stamps, supply
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 02, Economics 8e: Ch 03, Economics 8e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 02, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 04, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 04, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 05, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 09, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 10, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 02, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 03, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 04
Authored by: Elizabeth Jones
Petrol prices have been a bone of contention for some time. With household incomes remaining low and the cost of living rising, the fact that average petrol prices have reached their highest level of more than 1.37p per litre on average will undoubtedly put growing pressure on the approaching budget.
There have already been calls for the Chancellor to reduce fuel duty and with this latest data, the pressure will only mount. The problem is, if fuel duty does fall, so will tax revenues and as one of the Coalition’s key objectives has been to cut the budget deficit, this could pose further problems. Even the calls to cut VAT on fuel will also put a dent in the budget deficit.
Although everyone is undoubtedly feeling the effects of these higher prices, the key thing with petrol is its elasticity of demand. Whether the price of petrol was 0.90p or 1.37p per litre, I continue to buy the same amount. Therefore, for me, the price elasticity of demand for petrol is highly inelastic – at least between those prices. After all, if the price increase above say £3 per litre, I might think twice about driving to work!
So what has been driving this increase in prices? Petrol prices are hugely dependent on the cost of oil and on the demand for any product that uses fuel. With growing demand from countries like India and China, as they continue to develop and grow very quickly; the continuing concerns with Iran’s nuclear programme and the political problems in the Middle East, oil prices have been forced up. The future trend in prices will depend on many factors, not least whether or not there is any change in fuel duty in the 2012 budget and whether something like a regulator is introduced to monitor increases in fuel prices. This is definitely an area to pay close attention to in the coming months.
Petrol prices reach record high Independent, Peter Woodman (3/3/12)
Petrol prices hit record high with further rises expected Guardian, Hilary Osborne (2/3/12)
Appeak to regulate petrol prices This is South Wales (3/3/12)
Plea to slash duty as fuel costs soar to record high Scotsman, Alastair Dalton (3/3/12)
Petrol prices hit record high The Telegraph, David Millward (2/3/12)
Diesel prices predicted to reach 150p as petrol hits new record Guardian, Terry Macalister and Hilary Osborne (2/3/12)
Questions
- Which are the factors on the demand side that have pushed up the price of oil and hence petrol and diesel?
- What are the supply-side factors that are causing the rising price of fuel?
- Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate the effects you have explained in the first two questions.
- In the blog, I mention that my price elasticity of demand is relatively inelastic between 2 given prices. What does this suggest about the shape of my demand curve for petrol? How does this shape affect prices following any change in demand or supply?
- Why is petrol a relatively price inelastic product?
- There have been calls for the government to cut VAT or reduce fuel duty. What are the arguments for and against these policies?
- How effective do you think a petrol price regulator would be?
Tags: costs, demand, elasticity, equilibrium price, expectations, fuel duty, income, price, price elasticity of demand, regulation, supply, supply of oil, tax, VAT
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 02, Economics 8e: Ch 03, Economics 8e: Ch 05, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 02, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 04, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 04, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 05, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 02, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 03, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 04
Authored by: Elizabeth Jones
There has been much talk of a double-dip recession, with many suggesting that the UK economy is already in a recession. However, according to the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), a recession is not inevitable. Although the businesses surveyed showed that the economy had significantly weakened, John Longworth the Director General of the BCC said that a ‘new recession is not a foregone conclusion’.
Even though many of the figures showed a continued weakening of the economy, the results are still not as bad as they were back in 2008. The concern is that if the weakness continues, as it is predicted to do in the first quarter of 2012, confidence will remain low and then the economy may stagnate and a recession becomes a more likely scenario. Action is needed to prevent this from happening, especially with the eurozone crisis still causing concern. As John Longworth said:
The UK does have the potential to recover and make its way in the world. We have the talent, the energy and the enterprise. All we need is an environment that puts business first.
At the beginning of December 2011, many analysts thought retail sales would remain low, as they had been throughout 2011. However, British consumers came through in the second half of December and retail sales were up by 4.1% compared with a year ago. According to the British Retail Consortium, this Christmas rush should not be seen as a fundamental change in the direction of the economy and will have done little to boost the overall annual sales of most retailers.
Recession ‘not foregone conclusion’ Guardian (10/1/12)
UK economy likely to shrink amid eurozone crisis, says BCC The Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (10/1/12)
UK recession is not yet inevitable, survey says BBC News (10/1/12)
UK risks recession and lengthy stagnation – BCC Reuters, David Milliken (10/1/12)
U.K recession fears build Wall Street Journal, Ilona Billington (10/1/12)
BoE stimulus expansion may not be enough for recovery, BCC says (quick ad before article appears) Business Week, Scott Hamilton (10/1/12)
Questions
- How is a recession defined?
- What data has the BCC used to come to the conclusion that a recession is not inevitable?
- What action is needed by the government to tackle ‘short term stagnation and a lack of business confidence’?
- What could explain the 4.1% increase in sales in December compared with the previous year? Why is this data not thought to represent a ‘fundamental change in the circumstances of UK consumers’?
- What is expected to happen to UK inflation and employment during the first quarter of 2012?
- Why does the eurozone crisis present a problem for confidence and British exporters?
Tags: aggregate demand, British Chambers of Commerce, British Retail Consortium, confidence, economic growth, eurozone crisis, expectations, fiscal policy, GDP, inflation, monetary policy, recession, recovery, retail, sales, unemployment
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 14, Economics 8e: Ch 15, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 29, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 11, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12
Authored by: Elizabeth Jones
On Tuesday 29 November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered his Autumn Statement. This presented the outlook for the UK economy, with forecasts supplied by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). It also contained details of government fiscal measures to tackle various macroeconomic problems, including economic slowdown and high levels of national debt.
The outlook for the UK economy came as no surprise. Things are looking much bleaker than a few months ago. The OBR, along with other forecasters, has downgraded its predictions of the UK’s growth rate. Although it is still forecasting positive growth of 0.9% this year and 0.7% in 2012, these rates are well below those it predicted just eight months ago. In March it forecast growth rates of 1.7% for 2011 and 2.5% for 2012.
To make things worse, its growth forecasts are based on the assumptions that the eurozone crisis will be resolved with little or no effect on the UK. But even if that were so, the debt reduction plans in the eurozone are likely to drive the eurozone back into recession. This, in turn, will impact on UK exports, more than 50% of which go to eurozone countries.
The OBR forecasts that national debt will be 67% of GDP this year and will rise to 78% by 2014/15 but then start to fall. Government borrowing is forecast to be £127bn this year, falling to £120bn in 2012/13 and then more substantially each year after that to £24bn in 2016/17.
So what measures were included in the Autumn Statement? These are detailed in the articles below, but the key ones were:
• a programme of credit easing, which will underwrite up to £40bn in low-interest loans for small and medium-sized businesses.
• £5bn of public money to be invested in infrastrucuture projects and a further £5bn in the next spending round. Agreement had been reached with two groups of pension funds to invest a further £20bn of private money in infrastructure projects.
• an additional £1.2bn for capital investment in schools.
• A cap on public-sector pay increases of 1% per year for the two years after the current two-year pay freeze.
The following videos and articles give details of the forecasts and the measures and give reactions from across the political spectrum.
Webcasts
George Osborne: Key points from chancellor’s speech BBC News, Andrew Neil 29/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: George Osborne – my plan to ‘see Britain through The Telegraph on YouTube (29/11/11)
UK economy slows to crawl Reuters (29/11/11)
George Osborne’s autumn statement – video analysis Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Osborne reveals state of UK economy BBC News, Nick Robinson (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Why is the deficit not shrinking? BBC News, Hugh Pym (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Robinson, Flanders and Peston analysis BBC News, Nick Robinson, Stephanie Flanders and Robert Peston (29/11/11)
Can the UK economy be ‘re-balanced’? BBC Newsnight, Paul Mason (29/11/11)
Articles
Autumn Statement 2011: main points The Telegraph, Rachel Cooper (29/11/11)
The Autumn Statement at a glance WalesOnline, Rhodri Evans (30/11/11)
Autumn Statement Summary 2011 TaxAssist Accountants (29/11/11)
Into the storm The Economist (3/13/11)
A battalion of troubles The Economist (3/12/11)
Weapons of mass construction The Economist (3/12/11)
Mr Osborne’s unwelcome statement BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (29/11/11)
£30bn of extra cuts keep Osborne on track, just BBC News, Paul Mason (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: Commentators give their verdict The Telegraph (30/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: concern remains but ‘Plan A-plus’ welcomed The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (29/11/11)
Autumn statement: George Osborne’s cutting fantasy is over Guardian, Robert Skidelsky (29/11/11)
Hoarding for the apocalypse? I really wouldn’t blame you Guardian, Zoe Williams (30/11/11)
Reports and data
Autumn Statement 2011 – documents HM Treasury (29/11/11)
Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2011 Office for Budget Responsibility (29/11/11)
Autumn statement 2011: the key data you need to understand George Osborne’s speech Guardian DataBlog (29/11/11)
How much will the autumn statement cost and how will the economy change? Guardian DataBlog (29/11/11)
Questions
- Compare the OBR’s March and November 2011 forecasts.
- What factors explain the differences in the two sets of forecasts?
- For what reasons might national debt in the future turn out to be higher or lower than that forecast by the OBR?
- What will be the impact on aggregate demand of the measures announced in the Autumn Statement?
- What will be the impact on aggregate supply of the measures announced in the Autumn Statement?
- Why may a recession impact not just on aggregate demand but also on long-term aggregate supply?
- Why may increased pessimism by both consumers and producers make it more difficult for the government to meet its macroeconomic objectives?
Tags: aggregate demand, aggregate supply, Autumn Statement, budget deficit, expectations, fiscal policy, infrastructure, pay restraint, recession, structural budget deficit, supply-side policies
Posted in: Economics 8e: Ch 16, Economics 8e: Ch 20, Economics 8e: Ch 23, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 10, Economics and the Business Environment 3e: Ch 11, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 26, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 29, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 30, Economics for Business 5e: Ch 31, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 08, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 09, Essentials of Economics 6e and 5e: Ch 12, Podcasts and Webcasts
Authored by: John Sloman