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Articles for the ‘Economics 7e: Ch 07’ Category

Attendance at football matches: Why clubs need to apply some economics!

Later this afternoon I’ll be going down to watch my beloved Leicester City. Our first home match drew a crowd of just over 21,500. This was perhaps a little disappointing for the first home match of the season. Normally, supporters’ spirits are high are the start of the season, we all go down to the ground with renewed optimism, and so ‘first match’ crowds are high. But, this year a number had not come along and the problem was not confined to my club. Just down the road in Coventry, their first match against fellow Midlanders Derby County drew a crowd of only a little over 13,000. While this match was televised by SKY, the attendance is likely to have disappointed many at this historic club. Up by the River Tees, Midllesbrough’s first home match drew a record low league crowd of 14,633 and led manager Gordon Strachan to blame poor crowds on the recession. But, while some clubs are struggling to get supporters through the turnstiles, others seemed rather more immune from the affects of the economic climate. Manchester United’s first home match drew a near-capacity 75,221, despite being a televised match on a Monday night, while Arsenal’s first home match against newly promoted Blackpool drew a capacity crowd of 60,032.

These contrasting experiences amongst football clubs raise some important questions about the nature of demand for attending football matches. Perhaps a good place to start for any chief executive thinking about the demand for their club’s matches is to actually step back and consider about how supporters derive satisfaction from attending matches. This satisfaction from consuming something is also known by economists as ‘utility’. In understanding how supporters derive utility clubs may gain some really useful information when pricing season tickets or match-day tickets.

Well, let’s start with me! I am a fox (a Leicester supporter) through and through and so it’s about an emotional attachment. I was first taken down to Filbert Street by Grandfather in the early 1980s. We were soundly beaten on the day by Notts County on the day. But, while I was gutted, I was supporting my team! I derive a lot of my satisfaction from supporting my home-town team. I guess that makes me what we might term a ‘core supporter’. It’s important for clubs to have a sense of their core support because these are likely to be supporters who are least sensitive to pricing. In other words, this group of supporters is more likely to exhibit a price inelastic demand.

So, a happy chief executive of a football club is likely to be one with a sizeable core support. Another way of looking at this, which is not always popular amongst football traditionalists, is to think of a football club as a brand. A popular, sought-after brand gives the supplier a greater degree of power over pricing. The greater the attachment to the brand the greater the power to set price. While for me the attachment comes from the geography of my birth, for others the attachment comes from being associated with success. This helps to explain the attachment of so many supporters to what we refer to as ‘the big clubs’. Therefore, success can help generate supporter-attachment which can therefore be ‘priced-in’ by clubs when determining the pricing structure for matches and season tickets.

But, not everybody is attached to a team out of loyalty to their town or city or because of its success. For others, the utility from attending matches could come from a variety of sources. A ‘floating supporter’ is therefore likely to be more choosey and pricing needs to try and take this into account. For these supporters it might be a question of who the two teams on show are on a particular day. This helps, in part, to understand why local derbies are generally well attended – but why they are also relatively expensive to attend. It might also be the case that particular matches allow supporters to see a ‘superstar’. If a certain player or club is in town then prices at the turnstiles are likely to reflect this.

What we have suggested here is that in beginning to understand the demand for attending football matches, clubs need to build up a profile of their supporters and their potential supporters. We have focused on how supporters derive satisfaction from watching football and how this affects what they are willing to pay. Yet they need to do more than this, including building up a profile of the economic, social and geographic demographics of supporters. As Gordon Strachan points out, supporters are not immune to economic conditions and football clubs can’t be either. Therefore, clubs will also need to have a sense of how income-sensitive is the demand for attending their matches. The economic climate means that many in football, especially those at clubs involved in setting prices, may need to give considerable thought to the demand function for attending live football matches. May be an economist really could help in the board rooms of many football clubs. While I may not make the board room at the Walkers Stadium later, I will be in the crowd!

Articles
Boro boss Strachan blames recession for poor crowds BBC News (22/8/10)
Premier League fun for all – at a cost BBC Sport, Matt Slater’s Blog (27/8/10)
Inside football with Rob Tanner: Where have all the fans gone Leicester Mercury, Rob Tanner (27/8/10)

Questions

  1. What do you understand by term ‘utility’? Think of any two products or services and draw up a list of how you derive utility from them?
  2. What do you understand by the terms ‘price elasticity of demand’ and ‘income elasticity of demand’? Try applying these concepts to the demand to attend matches at any two football clubs that you might be aware of.
  3. Are football clubs price-takers or price-makers when determining match prices? Is this true of all clubs?
  4. Imagine that a club is promoted to the top league in its country for the first ever time. How will this affect the position and slope of its demand curve for season tickets?

Chipping away at cartels

The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:

The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.

“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.

Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)

European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)

Questions

  1. Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
  2. Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
  3. Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
  4. Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?

Changes in the Office

Whilst a new version of Windows may make the headlines, it’s not Windows that is the main source of profit for Microsoft: it’s Office, with it’s suite of appplications – Word for word processing, Excel for spreadsheets, PowerPoint for presentations, Access for databases, FrontPage for web pages and Outlook for e-mail. But Office is under threat from two sources.

First, despite that fact that Microsoft’s share of the office applications market has remained fairly constant at around 94%, it is facing increased competition from free alternatives, such as Google docs and Google Apps, and OpenOffice from Oracle (see also).

Second, the demands of users are changing. With the growing use of social networking and file sharing, and with a more mobile and dispersed workforce, Microsoft Office needs to adapt to this new environment.

With the launch of Office 2010, these issues are being addressed. The following articles examine what Microsoft has done and whether it is a good business model

Microsoft Office 2010 takes aim at Google Docs BBC News (11/5/10)
Office 2010: banking on Apps Sydney Morning Herald, David Flynn (11/5/10)
Microsoft’s two-pronged strategy for Office 2010 BBC News, Tim Weber (12/5/10)
Revamped Microsoft Office Will Be Free on the Web New York Times, Ashlee Vance (11/5/10)
Microsoft Predicts Fastest-Ever Adoption of New Office Software Bloomberg Businessweek, Dina Bass (12/5/10)

Questions

  1. Discuss the business logic of giving away products free.
  2. Discuss the likely success of Microsoft’s response to the changing market conditions for office applications software.
  3. Explain what is meant by ‘cloud computing’. What opportunities does this provide to Microsoft and what are the threats?
  4. What is meant by ‘network economies’? How do these benefit Microsoft? How is Sharepoint relevant here?
  5. Are network economies likely to increase or decrease for Microsoft in the future?

Airline mergers

Two of America’s airlines have agreed to merge to form the world’s largest carrier. The deal between United and Continental Airlines is worth £2.1 billion and the management of the two companies hope that the new airline, to be called United Airlines, will bring cost savings of some £800 million per year. Last year, the two companies lost a total of £900 million. It is also hoped to increase revenues by providing more routes and more effective competition against rivals, such as Delta Air Lines.

But just how significant will any economies of scale be and to what extent will they involve job losses? Certainly the merger has been greeted with caution by the Air Line Pilots Association and unions such as the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Also, will the larger company be able to compete more effectively to the benefit of consumers, or will the increased market power see a rise in fares?

And this is not the only airline merger. In April, British Airways and Iberia of Spain signed a deal to merge, thereby creating one of the world’s biggest airlines. Other mergers are expected as airlines battle to cope with rising costs and lower passenger numbers in the wake of the global recession. So will such mergers benefit passengers, or will it simply result in less choice and higher fares? The following articles look at the issues

Articles
1st priority for new United-Continental combo: Keep customers, workers happy Chicago Tribune, Julie Johnsson (3/5/10)
Debating future of US Airways Philadelphia Business Today, Linda Loyd (4/5/10)
Arpey points out good, bad of United-Continental deal The Dallas Morning News, Terry Maxon (3/5/10)
US airline merger creates world’s biggest carrier Independent, Nick Clark (4/5/10)
We can’t fix fares, says chief of merging US airlines Telegraph, James Quinn (3/5/10)
United and Continental Airlines to merge BBC News (3/5/10)
British Airways and Iberia sign merger agreement BBC News (8/4/10)
Are mergers good for airlines? BBC News, Edwin Lane (4/5/10)
United boss Glenn Tilton on Continental merger BBC News (3/5/10)
United and Continental bosses’ press conference on merger BBC News (3/5/10)

Data
Aviation Data & Statistics Federal Aviation Administration
TransStats RITA, Bureau of Transportation Statistics
Airline and Airport Statistics European Regions Airline Association

Questions

  1. What type of merger is the one between United and Continental: horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or a mixture?
  2. What types of economies of scale can be achieved by a merger of airlines?
  3. For what reasons may a merger of airlines result in higher revenues?
  4. To what extent will passengers (a) gain and (b) lose from airline mergers? What determines the size of these gains and losses?
  5. Is the airline industry an oligopoly? To what extent is there collusion between the various airlines?
  6. What should be the attitude of regulatory authorities across the world to airline mergers?

A smoking gun

In 2003, the Office of Fair Trading launched an investigation into possible collusion between tobacco manufacturers and retailers to fix prices. The investigation sought to establish whether the firms had breached the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Chapter I is concerned with Restrictive Practices.

The allegation was that two tobacco manufacturers, Imperial Tobacco and Gallaher, had colluded with 11 retailers to fix the retail prices and thereby reduce competition. The details of the allegations are given in a 2008 press release.

As a result of its investigations, the OFT has decided to impose fines of £225m. “The OFT has concluded that each manufacturer had a series of individual arrangements with each retailer whereby the retail price of a tobacco brand was linked to that of a competing manufacturer’s brand. These arrangements restricted the ability of these retailers to determine their selling prices independently and breached the Competition Act 1998.” As the Times Online article states:

The OFT said that the companies were guilty of “price-linking” or “price matching”. It said that Imps and Gallaher had come to an arrangement with each retailer that if one or other manufacturer increased or decreased prices the retailer would alter the price of the competitor brand in line, up or down accordingly – a practice known in competition law circles as “vertical price collusion”.

Articles
‘Unlawful’ tobacco pricing leads to £225m fine by OFT BBC News (16/4/10)
OFT levies £225m fine for cigarette price fixing Guardian, Richard Wray (17/4/10)
Tobacco giants face £225m fine for price-fixing Independent, Alistair Dawber
(17/4/10)
OFT case will send smoke signals Financial Times, Michael Peel, Elizabeth Rigby and Pan Kwan Yuk (16/4/10)
Imperial and Morrison set to appeal OFT fine Financial Times, Michael Peel, Pan Kwan Yuk and Elizabeth Rigby (16/4/10)
OFT faces challenge to £225m price-fixing ruling Times Online, Robert Lea (17/4/10)
OFT gets tough on tobacco as price-fixing net is cast wider Independent, Nick Clark (26/4/08)

OFT Press Release
OFT imposes £225m fine against certain tobacco manufacturers and retailers over retail pricing practices OFT Press Release (16/4/10)

Questions

  1. What are the allegations against the tobacco manufacturers and retailers?
  2. Why has the OFT judged that such behaviour is in breach of the 1988 Competition Act, and hence against the public interest?
  3. What are the arguments put by the tobacco companies and retailers in their defence?
  4. Is giving companies an amnesty if they alert the OFT an example of a prisoners’ dilemma game? What credible threats or promises may the companies have in such a situation?

Is the Sky falling in?

In 2007, BT, Virgin, Top up TV and Setanta complained about Sky’s dominance within the pay-TV industry. Sky, who have an estimated 85% share of the market were investigated by Ofcom and a decision has now been made. Sky will be forced to reduce the price it charges to other Broadcasters for showing premium sport channels. The wholesale price of Sky Sports 1 and 2 (two of my favourite channels!!) will each be reduced by just over 23% to £10.63 a month each. The idea is that this decision will benefit consumers by increasing choice. However, Sky argues that it will be to the ‘detriment of consumers’ as incentives to invest and take risks will be blunted.

Furthermore, there are also concerns that it will mean less money going into sport. Rugby, football, tennis etc benefit from some very lucrative TV rights deals and if Sky is forced to reduce prices (it is appealing the decision), then the value of these deals is likely to decline, which may lead to less investment in grass-routes participation.

Whilst progress has been made within this area, critics argue that Ofcom have not gone far enough and should have extended their decision to more sport channels (not just Sky Sports 1 and 2) and even to the premium movie channels. This would again increase consumer choice and provide more people with access to premium TV. This would work alongside more innovation within the pay-TV industry, which has seen Sky being given permission to offer pay-TV services on freeview, which will open up pay-TV to millions more consumers. Whilst no action has been taken regarding Sky’s dominance of premium movie channels, this issue has been referred to the Competition Commission. Is Sky’s dominance over sporting events about to come to an end?

Articles
BSkyB ordered to cut sports channels rates Reuters, Kate Holton (31/3/10)
Sky forced to cut price of sports channels Telegraph (31/3/10)
Consumers are big winners in BSkyB ruling Financial Times, Ben Fenton and Andrew Parker (31/3/10)
BSkyB should shake hands and move on Financial Times (31/3/10)
Sky told to cut wholesale prices by regulator Ofcom BBC News (31/3/10)
Ofcom v Sky BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (31/3/10)
BSkyB ‘restricting competition’ BBC Today Programme (31/3/10)
Ofcom orders Sky Sports price cut Guardian, Mark Sweney (31/3/10)
Sky ruling: Culture Secretary challenges Tories to back Ofcom Guardian, Mark Sweney (31/3/10)
Sky forced to cut the price for top sports events: Q and A Telegraph, Rupert Neate (31/3/10)
New ruling lets fans see Premier League on TV for just £15 a month London Evening Standard, Jonathan Prynn (31/3/10)
Regulator sets the fuse for shake-up of pay-TV Independent, Nick Clark (31/3/10)

Ofcom report
Delivering consumer benefits in Pay TV Ofcom Press Release (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Overview (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Summary (pdf file) (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Full document (pdf file) (31/3/10)

Questions

  1. To what extent will Ofcom’s decision to force Sky to reduce prices lead to an increase in consumer choice? Why is consumer choice good?
  2. Why has Sky been able to charge such high prices in the past, in particular for sports channels?
  3. According to the BBC News article, Sky shares were the biggest risers on the FTSE by midday on the day of the announcement. Why do you think this was the case?
  4. Would a similar decision on premium movie channels significantly increase consumer choice?
  5. Into which market structure does the Premium TV industry best fit? Consider the characteristics of the pay-TV industry. Into which market structure does it best fit?
  6. Why may Ofcom’s decision lead to less investment in sport at the grass roots?

A faster spread of super-fast

Ofcom, the communications regulator, is keen to encourage the spread of super-fast broadband through investment in fibre-optic cabling. So far, super-fast broadband is available to around 46 per cent of the UK population. Both Virgin Media (formerly Telewest and NTL) and BT have invested in fibre optic cables, but Ofcom is keen to extend the use to rival companies.

It proposes two methods: the first is to give competitors access to BT’s cables; the second is to allow competitors to install their own cables using BT’s ducts and telegraph poles. In both cases BT would charge companies to use its infrastructure and would be free to set prices so as to ensure a ‘fair rate of return’.

The articles below consider this ’solution’ and its likely success in developing competition in the super-fast broadband market through competition, or whether BT’s and Virgin’s market dominance will continue to the detriment of consumers. You can also find links below to the Ofcom report and summaries

Articles
BT welcomes Ofcom’s fibre access plans Reuters, Kate Holton (23/3/10)
Ofcom to encourage super-fast broadband Business Financial Newswire (23/3/10)
Ofcom tells BT to open its fibre network ShareCast (23/3/10)
Ofcom wants BT to open up infrastructure Financial Times, Philip Stafford (23/3/10)
Ofcom push to give broadband rivals access to BT tunnels Financial Times, Tim Bradshaw and Andrew Parker (23/3/10)
BT UK Pushes Ofcom to Open Virgin Medias Broadband Cable Ducts SamKnows, Phil Thompson (23/3/10)
BT welcomes Ofcom’s fibre access plans ISPreview, MarkJ (8/3/10)

Report and summaries
Summary: Enabling a super-fast broadband Britain Ofcom (23/3/10)
Review of the wholesale local access market: full document Ofcom (23/3/10)
Review of the wholesale local access market: summary Ofcom (23/3/10)

Questions

  1. What forms does competition take in the broadband market?
  2. What are the barriers to entry to the super-fast broadband market?
  3. Are fibre-optic networks a natural monopoly? Explain the significance of your answer for competition in the super-fast broadband market.
  4. Will Ofcom’s desire for BT to get a fair return on its wholesale pricing of access to its cabling, ducts and telegraph poles be sufficient to ensure effective competition and that profits are not excessive?
  5. Explain whether it would be in consumers’ interests for competitors to be given access to Virgin’s cables and ducts.

Searching questions for Google

The European Commission has received three complaints against Google for anti-competitive practices. The complainants are Microsoft’s Ciao, UK price comparison site Foundem and French legal search engine ejustice.fr

“The Commission has not opened a formal investigation for the time being. As is usual when the Commission receives complaints, it informed Google earlier this month and asked the company to comment on the allegations. The Commission closely cooperates with the national competition authorities. No further information can be given at this stage.”

Although the complaints are different (see articles below), the common feature is that Google has used its dominant market position to the detriment of competitors and consumers. Not surprisingly, Google has vigorously defended itself against the accusations.

So just what is the case against Google? Are the complaints justified, or are they merely competitors whinging about their relative lack of success? The following articles look at the facts and the issues.

EU launches antitrust inquiry into Google ‘dominance’ Times Online, Mike Harvey (24/2/10)
Google Says It Faces Competition Complaints in Europe BusinessWeek, Brian Womack and Joseph Galante (24/2/10)
Google faces anti-monopoly probe by European Commission Guardian, Andrew Clark (24/2/10)
Why Europe could prove Google’s undoing Guardian, Bobbie Johnson (24/2/10)
Analysis: not evil? Are you sure? Times Online, Mike Harvey (24/2/10)
Google faces Brussels antitrust scrutiny Financial Times, Richard Waters and Nikki Tait (24/2/10)
EU Opens Antitrust Investigation Into Google. Microsoft’s Fingerprints Are Everywhere. Washington Post, MG Siegler (23/2/10)
Google Hit With Antitrust Probe in Europe PC World, James Niccolai (23/2/10)
Is Redmond The Puppet Master In Google EU Anti-Trust Investigation? search engine land, Greg Sterling (23/2/10)
Google Under Investigation by European Union PCMag, Mark Hachman (24/2/10)
EU inquiry points the searchlight on Google’s methods Telegraph, Kamal Ahmed (24/2/10)
Google under investigation for alleged breach of EU competition rules Telegraph, Kamal Ahmed (24/2/10)

Questions

  1. What is the case against Google? Does this make it in breach of EU competition law?
  2. Assess Google’s response.
  3. Is Google “doing anything to choke off competition or hurt our users and partners”?
  4. How could competition be increased for Google? Is this likely to happen?

Bitter sweet

Kraft was seeking to take over Cadbury since September 2009, (see Cadbury: Chocolate all change and A Krafty approach to Cadbury). But the Cadbury board had rejected previous bids as being too low. The September bid, for example, was valued at £10.2bn. On 19 January 2010, however, after heated negotiations the board accepted the latest offer by Kraft valued at £11.5bn ($19bn).

But is the deal good news? Or will what is sweet for senior management and the financial institutions which brokered the deal be dark bitter news for the main stakeholders – consumers, workers and shareholders? The following articles explore the issues.

Cadbury battle ends with midnight handshake Financial Times, Lina Saigol (19/1/10)
Cadbury takeover: a crafty bit of business or an overpriced confection? Telegraph, Jonathan Sibun (20/1/10)
Cadbury’s sweet City deal leaves a bitter taste in Bournville Guardian, Heather Stewart and Nick Mathiason (19/1/10)
Thousands of Cadbury jobs under threat as Kraft swallows a British icon (including video) Times Online, Helen Nugent and Catherine Boyle (20/1/10)
Cadbury deal ‘the price of globalisation’ Financial Times, Jenny Wiggins and Jonathan Guthrie (19/1/10)
Cadbury sale ‘right thing to do’ FT video (19/1/10)
Bitterness as Kraft wins Cadbury Independent, Nick Clark (20/1/10)
The winners: Management duo in line for bumper pay packet from takeover deal Independent, Nick Clark (20/1/10)
Kraft came hunting in the only country that would sell – Britain Independent, James Moore (20/1/10)
Kraft’s takeover leaves a bitter taste in the mouth Telegraph, Tracy Corrigan (19/1/10)
A sweet deal – or a takeover that is hard to swallow? Independent, Hamish McRae (20/1/10)
Cadbury: banks are the real winners BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (20/1/10)
Warren Buffett blasts Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury Guardian, Graeme Wearden (20/1/10)
Cadbury says job cuts inevitable after Kraft takeover (including videos) BBC News (19/1/10)
Cadbury and the open market theory: they’d better be right Guardian blog, Michael White (20/1/10)
The Business: Bonus season and the Cadbury takeover Guardian podcast, Aditya Chakrabortty
How did Quakers conquer the British sweet shop? BBC News Magazine, Peter Jackson (20/1/10)
Why Kraft must keep organic cacao farmers sweet Guardian blog, Craig Sams (20/1/10)

Questions

  1. What were the incentives for the Cadbury board to accept the proposed offer by Kraft?
  2. Do such incentives lead to the efficient operation of markets?
  3. Explain what is meant by ‘competition for corporate control’. To what extent is such competition in the interests of consumers?
  4. What economies or diseconomies of scale are likely to result from the takeover? What will determine the extent to which changes in costs are passed on to the consumer?
  5. How will the following stakeholders fare from the takeover, both in the short run and in the long run: (a) consumers; (b) workers; (c) shareholders?
  6. Examine Warren Buffet’s arguments for rejecting the deal.

A ‘Bus’y time for the Competition Commission

Increasing traffic on the roads is observable by everyone and government policy is focused on reducing the demand for road space, rather than increasing its supply. One method has been to improve public transport and make it a viable substitute for car travel. Private costs of motoring have increased, but if there is no viable alternative, people will continue to demand car travel. Investment in buses and trains has improved their quality: they are more frequent, more reliable, arguably more comfortable and supposed to be part of an integrated transport policy. Local bus services provide a crucial link for local communities, but it is these services that are now facing problems.

In your economics lectures, you may have looked at local bus services, when you considered monopolies, oligopolies and possibly contestable markets. Oligopolies, whilst closer to the monopoly end of the market spectrum can be very competitive, but are also open to collusion and anti-competitive practices. The local bus sector has been referred to the Competition Commission by the Office of Fair Trading through complaints of ‘predatory tactics’ by companies. It is argued that local bus services, by limiting competition, are causing prices to rise and the quality of service to fall. One key issue is that those companies established in the market are alleged to be acting aggressively towards smaller bus companies and thus reducing competition in the industry. A low number of bids for supported service contracts in many areas, local bus routes dominated by a few large companies and predatory actions by incumbent firms are all complaints that this industry is facing.

This investigation is especially important, given the amount of public money that goes into the bus industry: £1.2bn. Investigations found that in areas of limited competition, prices were 9p higher. A number of take-overs have contributed to this situation. Two-thirds of bus services are controlled by only five operators. This limits competition in the market and hence is argued to be against public interest. Yet, industry representatives still argue that the market is competitive. Read the following articles and answer the questions about this issue. Was the OFT right to to initiate this investigation?

Local buses to be re-regulated BBC News (27/9/09)
OFT refers UK bus market to Competition Commission Dow Jones Newswires, Kaveri Nihthyananthan (7/1/10)
Office of Fair Trading prompts probe into bus services Guardian (7/1/10)
Trasport groups fear OFT competition probe over buses Telegraph, Alistair Osborne (4/1/10)
Bus industry competition queried BBC News (20/8/09)
OFT refers bus industry on poor service and prices Times Online, Francesca Steele (7/1/10)
Inquiry into local bus market ‘may delay investment’ Scotsman, Hamish Rutherford (5/1/10)

Questions

  1. Why are local bus services argued to be (a) a monopoly; (b) an oligopoly?
  2. What are the main aspects of UK competition policy?
  3. What is a concentration ratio and how does this apply to the bus industry?
  4. What predatory tactics are being used in the local bus industry and how do they affect competition, prices and quality?
  5. Why may limited competition be against the public interest?
  6. Traffic congestion is a major problem. Explain the economic theory behind government intervention in this area. Think about the effects of taxes; building more roads; investment in substitutes. Which is likely to be the most effective method?