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UK growth fuelled by consumption as households again lose affection for their piggy banks

The latest data in the Quarterly National Accounts show that UK households in 2015 spent £1.152 trillion, the equivalent of 62 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In real terms, household spending rose by 2.8 per cent in 2015 in excess of the 2.3 per cent growth observed in GDP. In the final quarter of 2015 real household spending rose by 0.6 per – the same rate of growth as that recorded for the UK economy. This was the tenth consecutive quarter of positive consumption growth and the twelfth of economic growth.

It is the consistent growth seen over the recent past in real household spending that marks it out from the other components of aggregate demand. Consequently, household spending remains the bedrock of UK growth.

Chart 1 helps to evidence the close relationship between consumption and economic growth. It picks out nicely the stark turnaround both in economic growth and consumer spending following the financial crisis. Over the period from 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q2, real consumer spending typically fell by 0.4 per cent each quarter. This weakness in consumption was mirrored by economic growth. Real GDP contracted over this period by an average of 0.2 per cent each quarter. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Since 2011 Q3 real consumption growth has averaged 0.6 per cent per quarter – the rate at which consumption grew in 2015 Q4 – while, real GDP growth has averaged 0.5 per cent per quarter. Over this same period the real disposable income (post-tax income) of the combined household and NPISH (non-profit institutions serving households), has typically grown by 0.4 per cent per quarter. (NPISHs are charities and voluntary organisations.)

The strength of consumption relative to income is evidenced by the decline in the saving ratio as can be observed in Chart 2. The ratio captures the percentage of disposable income that households (and NPISHs) choose to save. In 2010 Q3 the proportion of income saved hit 11.9 per cent having been as low as 4.5 per cent in 2008 Q1. By 2015 Q4 the saving ratio had fallen to 3.8 per cent, the lowest value since the series began in 1963 Q1. (Click here to download a PowerPoint.)

The historic low in the saving ratio in the final quarter of 2015 reflects the strength of consumption alongside a sharp fall in real disposable income of 0.6 per cent in the quarter. However, the bigger picture shows a marked downward trend in the saving ratio over the period from 2012.

When seen in a more historic context the latest numbers taken on even greater significance. Chart 3 shows the annual saving ratio since 1963. From it we can see that the 2015 value of 4.2 was the first year when the ratio fell below 5 per cent. With 2014 being the previous historic low, there must be some concern that UK consumption growth is not being underpinned by income growth. (Click here to download a PowerPoint.)

Of course, consumption theory places great emphasis on expected future income in determining current spending. To some extent it may be argued that households were liquidity-constrained following the financial crisis. They were unable to borrow to support spending and, as time moved on, to borrow against the expectation of stronger income growth in the future. This would have depressed consumption growth. But, there may also have been a self-imposed liquidity constraint as the financial crisis unfolded. Heightened uncertainty may have led households to be more prudent and divert resources to saving. Such precautionary saving would tend to boost the saving ratio and so may be a factor in the sharp rise we observed in the ratio.

The easing of credit constraints as we headed through the early 2010s allied with stronger economic growth may help to explain the strength of the recovery in consumption growth. However, it is the extent and, in particular, the duration of this strong consumption growth that is fuelling a debate over its sustainability. The current uncertainty around future income growth and the need for households to be mindful of the indebtedness built up prior to the financial crisis point to households needing to retain a degree of caution. Consequently, the debates around the financial well-being of households and the need to rebalance the UK economy away from consumer spending are likely to be further intensified by the latest consumption and saving data.

Data
All data related to Quarterly National Accounts: Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Office for National Statistics Office for National Statistics

Articles
Britons raid savings to fund spending as economists warn recovery ‘built on sand’ Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (31/3/16)
UK Growth Higher But Deficit Hits New Record Sky News, (31/3/16)
Britain is a nation that has forgotten how to save Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (31/3/16)
A vulnerable economy: the true cost of Britain’s current account deficit Guardian, Larry Elliott (31/3/16)
U.K. Manufacturing ‘In the Doldrums’ Leaves Growth Lopsided Bloomberg, Emma Charlton (1/4/16)
Pound drops as UK manufacturing languishes in the doldrums Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (1/4/16)

Questions

  1. Why is the distinction between nominal and real growth an important one when looking at many macroeconomic variables.
  2. Examine the argument that the historic low saving ratio in the UK is a cause for concern.
  3. What factors might we expect to impact on the saving ratio?
  4. To what extent do you think the current growth in consumer spending is sustainable?
  5. How important are expectations in determining consumer behaviour?
  6. Explain what you understand by consumption smoothing.
  7. Why would we would typically expect consumption growth to be less variable than that in disposable income?
  8. Why might consumption sometimes be observed to be less sensitive or more sensitive to income changes?
  9. What factors might cause households to be liquidity constrained?
  10. What is precautionary saving? What might affect its perceived importance among households?

Accelerating interest in the interesting case of UK interest rates

As John reminds us in his blog A seven year emergency we have now seen the official Bank Rate at 0.5 per cent for the past seven years. Understandably many attribute the financial crisis that led to the easing of monetary policy to the lending practices of commercial banks. Consequently, it is important that we better understand (and monitor) banks’ behaviour. Some argue that these practices are affected by the macroeconomic environment, with credit conditions varying across the business cycle. We consider here what recent patterns in interest rates might tell us about credit conditions.

One way in the macroeconomic environment might affect commercial banks’ lending practices is through the difference between banks’ lending rates and the official Bank Rate. We can think of such interest rate differentials – or spreads – as a credit premium. In other words, the greater are commercial borrowing rates relative to the Bank Rate, the greater the credit premium being demanded by banks. On the other hand, the lower the interest rate on borrowing relative to the Bank Rate, the smaller the credit premium.

Some economists argue that interest-rate differentials will fall when the economy is doing well and increase when the economy is doing less well. This is because the probability of default by borrowers is seen as smaller when the macroeconomic environment improves. If this is the case, it will tend to amplify the business cycle, since economic shocks will have larger affects on economic activity.

Consider a positive demand-side shock, such as a rise in consumer confidence, which lowers the propensity of households to save. As the positive shock causes the economy’s aggregate demand to rise, the economy grows. This growth in economic activity might result in lower borrowing rates offered by commercial banks relative to the official Bank Rate. Since savings rates tend to be close to the official Bank Rate, this also means that the cost of borrowing falls relative to the interest rates on savings. This financial effect further stimulates the demand for credit and, as a consequence, aggregate demand and economic activity. It is an example of what economists called the financial accelerator.

Similarly, the financial accelerator means that negative shocks depress economic activity by more than would otherwise be the case. A fall in consumer confidence, for example, would cause economic activity to fall as aggregate demand weakens. This, in turn, causes banks to raise borrowing rates relative to the Bank Rate and savings rates. This further dampens economic activity.

The chart shows the Bank Rate along with the average unsecured borrowing rate on loans by Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) of £10 000. (Secured borrowing is that which is secured against property.) We use this borrowing rate to capture general trends in commercial borrowing rates.

As expected, we can see that the borrowing rate is greater than the Bank Rate. In other words, there is a positive interest-rate differential. However, this differential is seen to vary. It falls sharply in the period up to the financial crisis. In early 2002 it was running at 8 percentage points. By summer 2007 the differential had fallen to only 1.7 percentage points. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The period from 2002 to 2007 was characterised by consistently robust growth. The UK economy grew over this period by about 2.7 per cent per annum. This would certainly fit with the story that economic growth may have contributed to an easing of credit conditions which, in turn, helped to induce growth. Regardless, the falling interest-rate differential points to credit conditions easing.

The story from 2008 changes very quickly as the interest-rate differential increases very sharply. In 2009, as the official Bank Rate was cut to 0.5 per cent, the unsecured borrowing rate climbed to close to 10.5 per cent. Consequently, the interest-rate differential rose to 10 percentage points. Inter-bank lending had dried up with banks concerned that banks would default on loans. The increase in interest rates on lending to the non-bank private sector was stark and evidence of a credit market disruption.

The interest-rate differential has steadily declined since its peak at the end of 2009 as the unsecured borrowing rate has fallen. Hence credit conditions have eased. In fact, in February 2016 our indicative interest rate differential stood at 3.8 percentage points, unchanged from its level in January. This is its lowest level since July 2008. Furthermore, today’s differential is lower than the 6.5 percentage point average over the period from 1997 to 2003, before the differential then went on its pre-crisis fall.

Given concerns about the impact of credit cycles on the macroeconomy we can expect the authorities to keep a very keen eye on credit conditions in the months ahead.

Articles
Bank holds UK interest rates at 0.5% BBC News (17/3/16)
UK’s record low interest rates to continue in 2016 The Guardian, Katie Allen (3/3/16)
Big rise in consumer credit in January BBC News, Brian Milligan (29/2/16)
Household debt binge has no end in sight, says OBR The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (17/3/16)

Data
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) – Latest Tables Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database – interest and exchange rates data Bank of England

Questions

  1. Why would we expect banks’ borrowing rates to be higher than the official Bank Rate?
  2. What factors might lead to a change in the interest-rate differential between banks’ borrowing rates and the official Bank Rate?
  3. How would we expect a credit market disruption to affect the interest-rate differential?
  4. Explain how the financial accelerator affects the change in the size of the economy following a positive demand shock.
  5. Explain how the financial accelerator affects the change in the size of the economy following a negative demand shock.
  6. What is the impact of the financial accelerator of the amplitude of the business cycle?
  7. How might banks’ credit criteria change as the macroeconomic environment changes?
  8. How might regulators intervene to minimise the effect of the financial accelerator?

Japan’s deflation fears grow (update)

In the blog Japan’s interesting monetary policy as deflation fears grow we detailed the aggressive monetary measures of Japan’s central bank to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming again established. In January it introduced a negative interest rate on some deposits placed with it by commercial banks. This is in addition to it massive quantitative easing programme to boost the country’s money supply. Despite this, the latest consumer price inflation data show inflation now running at zero per cent.

As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation (click here to download a PowerPoint file of the chart). In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, through purchases of government bonds from investors.

Following this substantial monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.

However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. The latest inflation data show that the annual rate of CPI inflation in January 2016 fell to zero percent. In other words, consumer prices were on average at the levels seen in January 2015.

The latest inflation numbers appear give further credence to the fear of the Bank of Japan that deflation is set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate was the latest move to prevent deflation. As well as encouraging banks to lend, the move is intended to affect expectations of inflation. By adopting such an aggressive monetary stance the central bank is looking to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established. Hence, by increasing the expectations of the inflation rate and by raising wage demands the inflation rate will rise.

The loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows the acceleration of the quantitative easing programme announced in October 2015 to conduct Open Market Operations so as to increase the monetary base annually by ¥80 trillion.

The decline of Japan’s inflation rate to zero may yet mean that further monetary loosening might be called for. Eradicating a deflationary mindset is proving incredibly difficult. Where next for Japan’s monetary authorities?

Data
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan

New Articles
Japan’s inflation drops to zero in January MarketWatch, Takashi Nakamichi (25/2/16)
Japan inflation falls back to zero in January: govt AFP (26/2/16)
With pause in inflation, many brace for retreat Nikkei Asian Review (27/2/16)
Japan’s inflation rate has fallen again – to 0% Business Insider Australia, David Scutt (26/2/16)

Previous Articles
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates The Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What is deflation?
  2. What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
  3. To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?
  4. What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
  5. What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
  6. What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
  7. How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?

Riding the Japanese roller coaster

Sustained economic growth in Japan remains elusive. Preliminary Quarterly Estimates of GDP point to the Japanese economy having contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015. This follows on from growth of 0.3 per cent in the third quarter, a contraction of 0.3 per cent in the second and growth of 1 per cent in the first quarter. Taken as a whole output in 2015 rose by 0.4 per cent compared to zero growth in 2014. The fragility of growth means that over the past 20 years the average annual rate of growth in Japan is a mere 0.8 per cent.

Chart 1 shows the quarter-to-quarter change in real GDP in Japan since the mid 1990s (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). While economies are known to be inherently volatile the Japanese growth story over the past twenty or years so is one both of exceptional volatility and of repeated bouts of recession. Since the mid 1990s Japan has experienced 6 recessions, four since 2008.

Of the four recessions since 2008, the deepest was that from 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q1 which saw the economy shrink by 9.2 per cent. This was followed by a recession from 2010 Q4 to 2011 Q2 when the economy shrunk by 3.1 per cent, then from 2012 Q2 to 2012 Q4 when the economy shrunk by 0.9 per cent and from 2014 Q2 to 2014 Q3 when output fell another 2.7 per cent. As a result of these four recessionary periods the economy’s output in 2015 Q4 was actually 0.4 per cent less than in 2008 Q1.

Chart 2 shows the annual levels of nominal (actual) and real (constant-price) GDP in trillions of Yen (¥) since 1995. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over the period actual GDP has fallen from ¥502 trillion to ¥499 trillion (about £3 trillion at the current exchange rate) while GDP at constant 2005 prices has risen from ¥455 trillion to ¥528 trillion.

Chart 2 reveals an interesting phenomenon: the growth in real GDP at the same time as a fall in nominal GDP. So why has the actual value of GDP fallen slightly between 1995 and 2005? The answer is quite simple: deflation.

Chart 3 shows a protracted period of economy-wide deflation from 1999 to 2013. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the GDP deflator fell each year by an average of 1.0 per cent. 2014 and 2015 saw a pick up in economy-wide inflation. However, the quarterly profile through 2015 shows the pace of inflation falling quite markedly. As we saw in Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow, policymakers are again concerned about the possibility of deflation and the risks that poses for growth.

As Chart 4 helps to demonstrate, a significant factor behind the latest slowdown in Japan’s growth is household spending. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). In 2015 household spending accounted for about 57 per cent by value of GDP in Japan. In the last quarter of 2015 real household spending fell by 0.9 per cent while across 2015 as a whole real household spending fell by 1.3 per cent. This follows on from a 0.8 per cent decrease in spending by households in 2014.

The recent marked weakening of household spending is a significant concern for the short term growth prospects of the Japanese economy. The roller coaster ride continues, unfortunately it appears that the ride is again downwards.

Data
Quarterly Estimates of GDP Japanese Cabinet Office
Japan and the IMF IMF Country Reports
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD

Articles
Japan’s economy contracts in fourth quarter BBC News, (15/2/16)
Japanese economy shrinks again, raising expectations of more stimulus Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy shrinks again as Abenomics is blown off course Guardian, Justin McCurry (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy contracts in latest setback for Abe policies New Zealand Herald, (15/2/16)
Japan’s ‘Abenomics’ on the ropes as yen soars, markets plunge Daily Mail, (15/2/16)
Japan economy shrinks more than expected, highlights lack of policy options CNBC, Leika Kihara and Tetsushi Kajimoto (15/2/16)

Questions

  1. Why is the distinction between nominal and real important in analysing economic growth?
  2. How do we define a recession?
  3. Of what importance is aggregate demand to the volatility of economies?
  4. Why are Japanese policymakers concerned about the prospects of deflation?
  5. What policy options are available to policymakers trying to combat deflation?
  6. Why is the strength of household consumption important in affecting the path of an economy?
  7. Why has Japan experienced an increase in real GDP but a fall in nominal GDP between 1995 and 2015?

Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow

The perceived wisdom is that nominal interest rates have a lower zero bound. The Swedish central bank (the Ricksbank) has effectively been charging financial institutions to deposit money at the central bank since 2009. On 29 January 2016 the Central Bank of Japan also introduced a negative interest rate on deposits. The -0.1 per cent rate currently applies to a portion of the reserves held by financial institutions at the central bank. The move is another attempt to pump energy into a struggling economy.

As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation. In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, principally through purchases of government bonds from investors. Following the monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.

However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. Now there appears to be an increasing fear at the Bank of Japan that deflation may be set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate is intended to prevent deflation. In particular by affecting expectations of inflation. The hope is to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established.

The further loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows on the heels of an acceleration of quantitative easing last October. Back then, the Bank of Japan said that it would conduct Open Market Operations so that the monetary base would increase annually be ¥80 trillion. This was reaffirmed in its 29 January announcement. For an economy that has experienced four recessionary contractions since 2008 and with provisional estimates suggesting that it contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015, it remains to be seen whether further monetary loosening might yet be called for.

Data
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan

Articles
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
  2. What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
  3. What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
  4. How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?
  5. What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
  6. To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?

Producing growth without production

In our recent blog constructing growth without production: The UK growth paradox we saw that the provisional estimate of economic growth in the UK in the final quarter of 2015 was 0.5 per cent. This was buoyed by service sector growth of 0.7 per cent. Meanwhile, construction sector output was estimated to have fallen by 0.1 per cent and production in the production industries by 0.2 per cent. The ONS Index of Production released on 11 February suggests the decline in production activity in the final quarter might have been has much as 0.5 per cent further pointing to unbalanced industrial growth.

The production industries today account for about 15 per cent of UK output which is small in comparison to the roughly 79 per cent from service-sector industries. Chart 1 shows the quarterly rate of growth in UK industrial production since the 1980s. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the average quarterly rate of growth in industrial output has been a mere 0.1 per cent compared with 0.5 per cent for total economic output and 0.7 per cent for the service sector. As a result, the importance of the production industries as a driver of economic output has declined.

Across 2015 industrial production rose by 1 per cent while the total output of the economy grew by 2.2 per cent. Industrial output comprises four main components. Of these, output from mining and quarrying grew in 2015 by 6.6 per cent, water, sewerage and waste management by 3.1 per cent, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning by 0.3 per cent, while manufacturing output contracted by 0.2 per cent.

Chart 2 shows the path of industrial output since 2006. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). In particular, it allows us to analyse the effect of the financial crisis and the global economic downturn. Whereas the total output of the economy surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, driven by the service sector, total industrial output in 2015 Q4 remains 9.9 per cent below its 2008 Q1 level. Among its component parts, output in mining and quarrying is 31 per cent lower, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning output is 12.2 per cent lower and manufacturing 6.5 per cent lower. Only the output of water, sewerage and waste management is greater – some 7.4 per cent higher.

The data point to the industrial composition of UK remaining heavily skewed towards the service sector and, hence, to service-sector industries driving economic growth. A key talking point is the extent to which this matters. On one hand we might point to the deindustrialisation captured by the data. This has had profound implications for certain regions of the United Kingdom and in particular for living standards in certain communities. Industrial change poses challenges for the UK labour force and for policymakers trying to affect the skills of workers needed in a changing economy. It has had a profound impact on the country’s balance of trade in goods: we consistently run a balance of trade deficit in goods. On the other hand we might argue that the UK does services well. We might be said to have a comparative advantage in this area. Whatever, your view point the latest industrial production data show the fragility of UK industrial output.

Data
Index of Production Dataset December 2015 Office for National Statistics
Index of Production, December 2015 Office for National Statistics

Articles
UK industrial production shrank in 2015 Guardian, Phillip Inman (10/2/16)
December UK industrial output falls sharply BBC News, (10/2/16)
Manufacturing output fall dents UK growth hope Sky News, (10/2/16)
Industrial production’s worst monthly fall since 2012 Belfast Trelegraph, Holly Williams (11/2/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What is meant by industrial production? How does it differ from the economy’s total output?
  2. Would you expect the index of production to be less or more volatile than total output? Explain your answer.
  3. What factors might explain the volatility of industrial production?
  4. Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
  5. Discuss the economic issues that might arise as the industrial composition of a country changes.
  6. Why is the distinction between nominal and real important when analysing economic growth?

Acquiring a taste for credit (again)

The Bank of England’s Money and Credit release on 1 Feb provides us with data up to the end of 2015 on lending by banks and building societies to the rest of the UK private sector. In this post we update our blog of 17 December 2015 – is Minsky right yet again? – to analyse the latest data on lending. The headline numbers show that the flow of lending (net of repayments) by banks and building societies to UK households in 2015 was £40.8 billion up from £29.9 billion in 2014 taking their amount of outstanding lending to households to £1.26 trillion. Was American economist Minsky (1919-1996) right to have argued that cycles in credit are inevitable?

Chart 1 shows the stocks of debt acquired by both households and private non-financial corporations from MFIs (Monetary Financial Institutions), i.e. deposit-taking institutions. The scale of debt accumulation in the late 1980s and again from the mid 1990s up to the financial crisis of the late 2000s is stark. At the start of 1980 the UK household sector had debts to MFIs of around £53 billion. By the start of 2009 this had hit £1.29 trillion. To put these figures into context this corresponds to an increase in indebtedness to MFIs from 25 per cent of GDP to 86 per cent of GDP.

The chart also shows the increase in indebtedness of private non-financial corporations which are effectively every day businesses. They saw their debts to MFIs rise from around £25 billion to over £500 billion which is equivalent to an increase from 12 per cent of GDP to 33 per cent of GDP. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of Chart 1.)

The path of debt at the start of the 2010s is consistent with a story of consolidation. Although the term is readily used in the context of the public sector and measures to reduce public-sector deficits the term is also relevant for the private sector. Financially-distressed households, private non-financial corporations and MFIs took steps to repair their balance sheets following the financial crisis. Indeed the term is synonymous with the idea of a balance sheet recession which some economists argue describe the late 2000s. The result was that the demand for and supply of additional credit waned. Debt accumulation largely ceased and, as we can see from Chart 1, debt numbers fell.

More recently the indebtedness to MFIs of households has started to edge up again, though, as yet, not for private non-financial corporations. From the end of the first quarter of 2013 to the end of 2015 household indebtedness to MFIs has increased by 7 per cent to £1.26 trillion.

Chart 2 focuses on flows rather than stocks. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of Chart 2.) It allows us to see the accumulation of new credit (i.e. less repayments of debt). What is even more apparent from this chart is the evidence of cycles in credit. The growth in new credit during the 2000s is stark as is the subsequent squeeze on credit that followed. Across 2006 net flows of credit from MFIs to households reached £106 billion while the peak for PNFCs was across 2007 when they reached £71 billion. Subsequently, net credit numbers crashed with negative numbers for PNFCs indicating net repayments to MFIs.

The size of the credit flows emanating from MFIs and the magnitude of the resulting credit cycles is even more stark when presented as percentages of GDP. The annual flow of credit to households in the late 1980s reached 9.4 per cent of GDP while that to PNFCs peaked at the end of the decade at 5.2 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, across 2006 net credit to households reached 7.5 per cent of GDP while the peak of lending to PNFCs was in the 12-month period to the end of 2007 Q1 equivalent to 4.8 per cent of GDP. In 2015, credit from MFIs to households reached 2.2 per cent of GDP while that to PNFCs was a mere 0.2 per cent of GDP.

Of course, the key question now is the path of credit. Clearly flows of credit to households are again on the rise. In part, this is driven by the rebound in the UK housing market. But, significantly there has been a significant rise in flows of consumer credit, i.e. unsecured debt.

Chart 3 shows the flows of consumer credit to individuals (excluding student loans involving the Student Loans Company) from MFIs and other credit providers. Again, we see the marked evidence of cycles. Across 2015 these net consumer credit flows amounted to £14.5 billion, the highest annual figure since 2005. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

To put the current rise in consumer credit into context, the net flow of consumer credit to individuals as percentage of GDP across 2015 as a whole amounts to about 0.8 per cent of GDP. This is the highest figure since the second half of 2006. While it might be a little early to say that credit numbers are a cause for concern, they do need to be seen in the context of a still relatively highly indebted household sector. Policymakers will be keeping a keen eye on credit patterns and assessing whether we have again acquired a real appetite for credit.

Articles
Households put another £4.4 billion on credit cards and personal loans in December as debt rises at fastest pace in a decade ThisisMoney.co.uk, Rachel Rickard Straus (1/2/16)
One in four ‘living for the day’ as 700,000 more expected to default on debt Independent, Simon Read (2/1/16)
Surprise mortgage jump confounds expectations Independent, Russell Lynch (1/2/16)
U.K. consumer credit slows; mortgage approvals up MarketWatch, Jon Sindreu (1/2/16)
Family debt continues to rise – report BBC News (13/1/16)

Data
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) – Latest Tables Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England

Questions

  1. How can the financial system affect the economy’s business cycle?
  2. What does it mean if households or firms are financially distressed? What responses might they take to this distress and what might the economic consequences be?
  3. How would you measure the net worth (or wealth) of an individual or a firm? What factors might affect their net worth?
  4. How might uncertainty affect spending and saving by households and businesses?
  5. What does it mean if bank lending is pro-cyclical?
  6. Why might lending be pro-cyclical?
  7. Are there measures that policymakers can take to reduce the likelihood that flows of credit become too excessive?
  8. What do you understand by a consolidation by the private sector? Discuss the possible macroeconomic effects of such a consolidation.
  9. What is meant by a balance sheet recession?
  10. How might the effect of attempts by a large number of individuals to improve their financial well-being differ from those when only a small numbers of individuals do so?

Constructing growth without construction: The UK growth paradox

In the blog the service sector continues to drive the UK business cycle written in October 2014 we observed how UK growth was being driven by the service sector while other industrial sectors struggled. The contrasting performance across UK industry appears now to be even more marked. The latest GDP numbers from the Office for National Statistics contained in Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 show the economy’s output expanded by 0.5 per cent in the fourth quarter. Yet the construction sector is in recession following contractions of 1.9 per cent (Q3) and 0.1 per cent (Q4). Here we update our earlier blog to evidence the UK’s growth paradox.

Preliminary estimates suggest that the UK economy expanded by 0.5 per cent in the final quarter of 2015 following on from growth of of 0.4 per cent in the third quarter. 2015 as a whole saw output grow by 2.2 per cent, down from 2.9 per cent in 2014 and a little below the average over the past 60 years of around 2.6 per cent.

Chart 1 shows quarterly economic growth since 1980s (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It illustrates nicely the inherent volatility of economies – one of the threshold concepts in economics.The average quarterly rate of growth since 1980 has been 0.5 per cent so on the face of it, a quarterly growth number of 0.5 per cent might seem to paint a picture of sustainable growth. Yet, the industrial make up of growth is far from balanced.

Consider now Chart 2 (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). It allows us to analyse more recent events by tracking how industrial output has evolved since 2006. It suggests an unbalanced recovery following the financial crisis. In 2015 Q4 the economy’s total output was 6.6 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1 with service-sector output 11.6 per cent higher. However, a very different picture emerges for the other principal industrial types.

The economy’s total output surpassed its 2008 Q1 peak in 2013 Q2, but output across the production industries in 2015 Q4 remains 9.4 per cent lower than in 2008 Q1 (and 6.4 per cent lower specifically within manufacturing) and 4.2 per cent lower in the construction sector. However, output in the agricultural sector has rebounded and is now 8.4 per cent higher than in 2008 Q1.

The growth data continue to show the British economy struggling to rebalance its industrial composition. With output in construction in 2015 Q4 2 per cent lower than it was in Q2 and manufacturing output 0.4 per cent lower, UK growth remains stubbornly dependent on the service sector.

Data
Preliminary Estimate of GDP – Time Series Dataset Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2015 Office for National Statistics
Economy tracker: GDP BBC News

Articles
UK economic growth slows in 2015: what the economists are saying Guardian, Katie Allen (28/1/16)
UK economy grows 0.5% in fourth quarter BBC News, (28/1/16)
Bumpy times ahead’ for UK even as fourth quarter growth accelerates Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (28/1/16)
UK economic growth rises to 0.5% in fourth quarter The Scotsman, Roger Baird (28/1/16)
GDP growth picks up to 0.5% but only the services sector comes to the party Independent, Ben Chu (29/1/16)

Questions

  1. What is the difference between nominal and real GDP? Which of these helps to track changes in economic output?
  2. Looking at Chart 1 above, summarise the key patterns in real GDP since the 1980s.
  3. What is a recession?
  4. What are some of the problems with the traditional definition of a recession?
  5. Can a recession occur if nominal GDP is actually rising? Explain your answer.
  6. What factors lead to economic growth being so variable?
  7. What factors might explain the very different patterns seen since the late 2000s in the volume of output of the four main industrial sectors?
  8. What different interpretations could there be of a ‘rebalancing’ of the UK economy?
  9. What other data might we look at to analyse whether the UK economy is ‘rebalancing’?.
  10. Do the different rates of growth across the industrial sectors of the UK matter?
  11. Produce a short briefing paper exploring the prospects for economic growth in the UK over the next 12 to 18 months.
  12. What is the difference between GVA and GDP?
  13. Explain the arguments for and against using GDP as a measure of a country’s economic well-being.

The Leicester effect: the impact on the preparedness to pay to watch the EPL

Saturday night was a happy one. I had got back from the Kingpower Stadium after watching my beloved Leicester City win and climb back to the top of the English Premier League. It does not get much better than this. My levels of satisfaction are off the scale, at least for now. There is an economics angle here: what affects the level of satisfaction people derive from watching live sport, such as football matches? Satisfaction affects peoples’ preparedness to pay. Understanding this is invaluable to all organisations, including football clubs. Is the Leicester effect good for football?

Economists refer to the satisfaction from consuming something as utility. Understanding how supporters like myself derive utility is vital to the success of football clubs and the industry as a whole. It may, for example, help clubs better understand how to price match tickets or club merchandise and better inform important decisions about the structure of leagues and cup competitions.

According to the BBC Price of Football Survey 2015 there appears to be a high preparedness to pay to watch live football. The report shows that the cheapest season ticket at Arsenal for 2015/16 is £1,014, at Tottenham £765 and at Chelsea £750. You could have bought a Leicester season ticket for just £365. Meanwhile the cheapest match day ticket at Arsenal is £27, at Tottenham £32 and at Chelsea £52. The cheapest match day price at Leicester is £22.

So why can football clubs charge what appear to be such high prices? An important part of the story is considering what influences how much fans are willing to pay. Supporting a club for those like me involves an enormous emotional attachment. I derive a lot of my satisfaction from supporting my home-town team. Supporting another club is not alternative. No substitutes will do: it has to be Leicester. The greater the number of people like me, the higher we can expect, other things being equal, prices to be.

Of course, not everyone is like me. Leicester shirts are seen fairly infrequently outside of Leicester and even as I walk through my home city I am likely to see folks adorned, for example, with Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool or Man United shirts. Furthermore, most teams have a section of fans whose interest may wane if the team starts losing and dropping down the league. The responsiveness of match-day attendance to the winning percentage of a team is referred to by economists as the win elasticity of demand. The figure is expected to be positive because if a team’s win percentage improves its match-day attendance should increase.

For some supporters who are considering purchasing match-day tickets the issue may simply be who the two teams playing are. This helps to explain why prices for local derbies tend to be higher. It might also be the case that some matches allow supporters to see particular ‘superstars’. More generally, a rise in the quality of player on show will increase the preparedness to pay.

Another factor that can affect preparedness to pay is the perceived closeness of the contest. Many fans gain particular pleasure from watching their club win a game where they believe the two teams are evenly matched: i.e. where the outcome is very unpredictable. This idea is referred to by economists as the uncertainty of outcome.

As well as the uncertainty of the match outcome, interest and preparedness to pay may be affected by intra-seasonal uncertainty. This is highly pertinent in the English Premier League given ‘the Leicester effect’. Longer term, inter-seasonal uncertainty may also be important. If leagues such as the EPL become less predictable then this may further increase interest among fans.

Of course, the benefits from increased uncertainty may not be evenly felt. While this is probably good for the total preparedness to pay across a league like the EPL – and for the rights to broadcast the league – some clubs might have to adapt should interest in them begin to wane.

Article
Price of football: full results 2015 BBC News (24/10/2015)

Questions

  1. Draw up a list of the characteristics of watching live sport from which people derive utility (satisfaction).
  2. How might we measure the predictability of leagues like the English Premier League (EPL)?
  3. How might an increase in the unpredictability of EPL results affect the preparedness to pay to watch EPL matches?
  4. Is it in the long-term interest of all clubs for total points collected in the EPL to be less concentrated?
  5. What is a superstar effect? How would this affect preparedness to pay to watch live sport?
  6. Analyse what you consider to be the relative importance of the superstar effect and the uncertainty of results in affecting preparedness to pay to watch live football or other sporting events.
  7. Can we describe football clubs as ‘brands’? How does the nature of a brand affect our preparedness to pay for its products and services?

Is Minsky right yet again?

To what extent does history repeat itself? Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis infers that credit cycles are fairly inevitable. We have seem them in the past and we will see them in the future. Human beings are subject to emotion, to irrational exuberance and to a large dose of forgetfulness! To what extent do the latest UK credit numbers suggest that we might be embarking on another credit binge? Are the credit data consistent with evidence of another credit cycle?

Chart 1 shows the stocks of debt acquired by households and private non-financial corporations from MFIs (Monetary Financial Institutions). The scale of debt accumulation in the late 1980s and again from the mid 1990s up to the financial crisis of the late 2000s is stark. At the start of 1985 the UK household sector had debts to MFIs of around £140 billion. By the start of 2009 this had hit £1.29 trillion. Meanwhile, private non-financial corporations saw their debts to MFIs rise from around £45 billion to over £500 billion. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The path of debt at the start of the 2010s is consistent with a story of consolidation. Financially-distressed households, private non-financial corporations and, of course, MFIs themselves meant that corrective action was needed to repair their balance sheets. The demand for and supply of additional credit waned. Debt accumulation largely ceased and, in fact, debt numbers fell. This trend continues today for private non-financial corporations. But, for households debt accumulation resumed in the middle of 2013. At the end of the third quarter of 2015 the household sector had debt obligations to MFIs of £1.246 trillion.

Chart 2 focuses on flows rather stocks. It allows us to see the accumulation of new credit (i.e. less repayments of debt). What is even more apparent from this chart is the evidence of cycles in credit. The growth in new credit during the 2000s is stark as is the subsequent squeeze on credit that followed.

The question that follows is what path are we now on? Clearly flows of credit to households are again on the rise. In part, this is driven by the rebound in the UK housing market. But, in fact there is a more rapid increase in consumer credit, i.e. unsecured debt. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Chart 3 shows the flows of consumer credit from MFIs and other credit providers. Again, we see the marked evidence of cycles. In the year to the end of Q1 of 2015 net consumer credit flows amounted to £22.8 billion, the highest figure since the 12-month period up to the end of Q3 of 2005. Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

While it might be a little early to say that another Minsky cycle is well under way, policymakers will be keeping a keen eye on credit patterns. Is history repeating itself?

Articles
Average UK mortgage debt rises to £85,000 The Guardian, Phillip Inman (15/12/15)
Consumer spending rise troubles Bank of England The Guardian, Heather Stewart (24/11/15)
Recovery ‘too reliant on consumer debt’ as BCC downgrades forecast The Guardian, Heather Stewart (9/12/15)
BCC: UK Growth Too Reliant On Consumer Debt Sky News (9/12/15)
Interest rates will stay low for longer – but household debt is a worry, says BoE The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (24/11/15)
IMF: UK’s economic performance ‘very strong’, but risks remain BBC News (11/12/15)

Data
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) – Latest Tables Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England

Questions

  1. How can the financial system affect the economy’s business cycle?
  2. What does it mean if households or firms are financially distressed? What responses might they take to this distress and what might the economic consequences be?
  3. How would you measure the net worth (or wealth) of an individual or a firm? What factors might affect their net worth?
  4. How might uncertainty affect spending and saving by households and businesses?
  5. What does it mean if bank lending is pro-cyclical?
  6. Why might lending be pro-cyclical?
  7. Are there measures that policymakers can take to reduce the likelihood that flows of credit become too excessive?